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Thomas Paine

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Beschreibung

In January of 1776, Thomas Paine published Common Sense; the book inflamed its readers and ignited the American Revolution. In truth the fires of dissent were already smoldering, but Paine's impassioned writing gave focus to the many disparate voices and united a country. One cannot over estimate the importance of this book in shaping the destiny of United States of America, as it was here that our constitutional form of government was first suggested.

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Thomas Paine

Common Sense

First digital edition 2016 by Anna Ruggieri

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.

OF THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

OF MONARCHY AND HEREDITARY SUCCESSION.

THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS.

OF THE PRESENT ABILITY OF AMERICA, WITH SOME MISCELLANEOUS REFLEXIONS.

APPENDIX.

INTRODUCTION.

Perhapsthe sentiments contained in the following pages, are notyetsufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not thinking a thingwrong, gives it a superficial appearance of beingright, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.

As a long and violent abuse of power, is generally the Means of calling the right of it in question (and in Matters too which might never have been thought of, had not the Sufferers been aggravated into the inquiry) and as the King of England hath undertaken in hisown Right, to support the Parliament in what he callsTheirs, and as the good people of this country are grievously oppressed by the combination, they have an undoubted privilege to inquire into the pretensions of both, and equally to reject theusurpation of either.

In the following sheets, the author hath studiously avoided every thing which is personal among ourselves. Compliments as well as censure to individuals make no part thereof. The wise, and the worthy, need not the triumph of a pamphlet; and those whose sentiments are injudicious, or unfriendly, will cease of themselves unless too much pains are bestowed upon their conversion.

The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind. Many circumstances hath, and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through which the principles of all Lovers of Mankind are affected, and in the Event of which, their Affections are interested. The laying a Country desolate with Fire and Sword, declaring War against the natural rights of all Mankind, and extirpating the Defenders thereof from the Face of the Earth, is the Concern of every Man to whom Nature hath given the Power of feeling; of which Class, regardless of Party Censure, is the

AUTHOR

P.S. The Publication of this newEdition hath been delayed, with a View of taking notice (had it been necessary) of any Attempt to refute the Doctrine of Independance: As no Answer hath yet appeared, it is now presumed that none will, the Time needful for getting such a Performance readyfor the Public being considerably past.

Who the Author of this Production is, is wholly unnecessary to the Public, as the Object for Attention is theDoctrine itself, not theMan. Yet it may not be unnecessary to say, That he is unconnected with any Party,and under no sort of Influence public or private, but the influence of reason and principle.

Philadelphia, February 14, 1776

OF THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL,WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

Somewriters have so confounded society with government, as toleave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are notonly different, but have different origins. Society is produced byour wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotesourhappinesspositivelyby uniting our affections, thelatternegativelyby restraining our vices. The one encouragesintercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first a patron,the last a punisher.

Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in itsbest state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state anintolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the samemiseriesby a government, which we might expect in a countrywithoutgovernment, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that wefurnish the means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, isthe badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built on theruins of the bowers of paradise. For were the impulses ofconscience clear, uniform, and irresistibly obeyed, man would needno other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he finds itnecessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish meansfor the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by thesame prudence which in every other case advises him out of twoevils to choose the least.Wherefore, security being the true designand end of government, it unanswerably follows thatwhateverformthereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, withthe least expence and greatest benefit, is preferableto allothers.

In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end ofgovernment, let us suppose a small number of persons settled insome sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest, theywill then represent the first peopling of any country, or of theworld. In this state of natural liberty, society will be theirfirst thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto, thestrength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind sounfitted for perpetual solitude, that he issoon obliged to seekassistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires thesame. Four or five united would be able to raise a tolerabledwelling in the midst of a wilderness, butoneman might labour outof the common period of life without accomplishing any thing; whenhe had felled his timber he could not remove it, nor erect it afterit was removed; hunger in the mean time would urge him from hiswork, and every different want call him adifferent way. Disease,nay even misfortune would be death, for though neither might bemortal, yet either would disable him from living, and reduce him toa state in which he might rather be said to perish than to die.

Thus necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form ournewly arrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings ofwhich, would supersede, and render the obligations of law andgovernment unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to eachother; but as nothing but heaven is impregnable to vice, it willunavoidably happen, that inproportion as they surmount the firstdifficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a commoncause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment toeach other; and this remissness, will point out the necessity, ofestablishing some formof government to supply the defect of moralvirtue.

Some convenient tree will afford them a State-House, under thebranches of which, the whole colony may assemble to deliberate onpublic matters. It is more than probable that their first laws willhavethe title only ofRegulations, and be enforced by no otherpenalty than public disesteem. In this first parliament every man,by natural right, will have a seat.

But as the colony increases, the public concerns will increaselikewise, and the distance atwhich the members may be separated,will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on everyoccasion as at first, when their number was small, theirhabitations near, and the public concerns few and trifling. Thiswill point out the convenience oftheir consenting to leave thelegislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from thewhole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stakewhich those who appointed them, and who will act in the same manneras the whole body would actwere they present. If the colonycontinue increasing, it will become necessary to augment the numberof the representatives, and that the interest of every part of thecolony may be attended to, it will be found best to divide thewhole into convenient parts, each part sending its proper number;and that theelectedmight never form to themselves an interestseparate from theelectors, prudence will point out the propriety ofhaving elections often; because as theelectedmight by that meansreturn and mixagain with the general body of theelectorsin a fewmonths, their fidelity to the public will be secured by the prudentreflexion of not making a rod for themselves. And as this frequentinterchange will establish a common interest with every part ofthecommunity, they will mutually and naturally support each other,and on this (not on the unmeaning name of king) depends thestrengthof government, and the happiness of the governed.

Here then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a moderenderednecessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern theworld; here too is the design and end of government, viz. freedomand security. And however our eyes may be dazzled with show, or ourears deceived by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills,orinterest darken our understanding, the simple voice of nature andof reason will say, it is right.

I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle innature, which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple anything is, the less liable itis to be disordered; and the easierrepaired when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer afew remarks on the so much boasted constitution of England. That itwas noble for the dark and slavish times in whichit was erected, isgranted. When theworld was over run with tyranny the least removetherefrom was a glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subjectto convulsions, and incapable of producing what it seems topromise, is easily demonstrated.

Absolute governments (tho’ the disgrace of human nature)have this advantage with them, that they are simple; if the peoplesuffer, they know the head from which their suffering springs, knowlikewise the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causesand cures. But the constitution of Englandis so exceedinglycomplex, that the nation may suffer for years together withoutbeing able to discover in which part the fault lies, some will sayin one and some in another, and every political physician willadvise a different medicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long standingprejudices, yet if we will suffer ourselves to examine thecomponent parts of the English constitution, we shall find them tobe the base remains of two ancient tyrannies, compounded with somenew republican materials.

First.—The remains of monarchical tyranny in the person ofthe king.

Secondly.—The remains of aristocratical tyranny in thepersons of the peers.

Thirdly.—The new republican materials, in the persons ofthe commons, on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of thepeople; wherefore in aconstitutional sensethey contribute nothingtowards the freedom of the state.

To say that the constitution of England is aunionof three powersreciprocallycheckingeach other, is farcical, either the words haveno meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposestwo things:

First.—That the king is not to be trusted without beinglooked after, or inother words, that a thirst for absolute power isthe natural disease of monarchy.

Secondly.—That the commons, by being appointed for thatpurpose, are either wiser or more worthy of confidence than thecrown.

But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power tocheck the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards theking a power to check the commons, by empowering him to rejecttheir other bills; it again supposes that the king is wiser thanthose whom it has already supposed to be wiser than him. A mereabsurdity!

There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition ofmonarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information,yet em [...]