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Gorgias is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 380 BC. The dialogue depicts a conversation between Socrates and a small group of sophists (and other guests) at a dinner gathering. Socrates debates with the sophist seeking the true definition of rhetoric, attempting to pinpoint the essence of rhetoric and unveil the flaws of the sophistic oratory popular in Athens at the time. The art of persuasion was widely considered necessary for political and legal advantage in classical Athens, and rhetoricians promoted themselves as teachers of this fundamental skill. Some, like Gorgias, were foreigners attracted to Athens because of its reputation for intellectual and cultural sophistication. Socrates suggests that he is one of the few Athenians to practice true politics
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Gorgias
Persons of the dialogue: Callicles; Socrates; Chaerephon; Gorgias; Polus
Scene: The house of Callicles.
Callicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.
Socrates. And are we late for a feast?
Callicles Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to us many fine things.
Socrates It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
Chaerephon. Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time.
Callicles What is the matter, Chaerephon-does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?
Chaerephon Yes, that was our intention in coming.
Callicles Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.
Socrates Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches; he may, as you [Chaerephon] suggest, defer the exhibition to some other time.
Callicles There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.
Socrates How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon-?
Chaerephon What shall I ask him?
Socrates Ask him who he is.
Chaerephon What do you mean?
Socrates I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?
Chaerephon I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?
Gorgias. Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one.
Chaerephon Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
Gorgias Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
Polus. Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired.
Chaerephon And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?
Polus What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
Chaerephon Not at all:-and you shall answer if you like.
Polus Ask:-
Chaerephon My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?
Polus Certainly.
Chaerephon Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
Polus Yes.
Chaerephon And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
Polus Clearly, a painter.
Chaerephon But now what shall we call him-what is the art in which he is skilled.
Polus O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.
Socrates Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
Gorgias What do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.
Gorgias Then why not ask him yourself?
Socrates But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.
Polus What makes you say so, Socrates?
Socrates Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
Polus Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
Socrates Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question what are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?
Gorgias Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
Socrates Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
Gorgias Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, "I boast myself to be."
Socrates I should wish to do so.
Gorgias Then pray do.
Socrates And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians?
Gorgias Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.
Socrates And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
Gorgias Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.
Socrates That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.
Gorgias Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.
Socrates Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?
Gorgias Yes.
Socrates And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
Gorgias It is.
Socrates By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.
Gorgias Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
Socrates I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
Gorgias With discourse.
Socrates What sort of discourse, Gorgias?-such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?
Gorgias No.
Socrates Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
Gorgias Certainly not.
Socrates And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
Gorgias Yes.
Socrates And to understand that about which they speak?
Gorgias Of course.
Socrates But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
Gorgias Certainly.
Socrates Then medicine also treats of discourse?
Gorgias Yes.
Socrates Of discourse concerning diseases?
Gorgias Just so.
Socrates And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?
Gorgias Very true.
Socrates And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:-all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.
Gorgias Clearly.
Socrates Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?
Gorgias Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.
Socrates I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:-you would allow that there are arts?
Gorgias Yes.
Socrates As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.
Gorgias You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
Socrates But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater-they depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?
Gorgias Exactly.
Socrates And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, "And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric." But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.
Gorgias You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.
Socrates Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:-seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:-Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, "Socrates, what is arithmetic?" and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: "Words about what?" and I should reply, Words about and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again: "What is the art of calculation?" I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, "Concerned with what?" I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, "as aforesaid" of arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only word-he would ask, "Words about what, Socrates?" and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.
Gorgias You would be quite right, Socrates.
Socrates And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words?
Gorgias True.
Socrates Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?
Gorgias To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
Socrates That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honesty obtained.
Gorgias Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
Socrates I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: "O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his." And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, "I am a physician." What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? "Certainly," he will answer, "for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, Socrates?" And after him the trainer will come and say, "I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine." To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, and what is your business? "I am a trainer," he will reply, "and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body." When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, utterly despise them all. "Consider Socrates," he will say, "whether Gorgias or any one-else can produce any greater good than wealth." Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? "Yes," he replies. And who are you? "A money-maker." And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? "Of course," will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, "What good? Let Gorgias answer." Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.
Gorgias That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in their several states.
Socrates And what would you consider this to be?
Gorgias What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?-if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.
Socrates Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
Gorgias No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
Socrates Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who-entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.
Gorgias What is coming, Socrates?
Socrates I will tell you: I am very well aware that do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask-what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, "What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?" and you said, "The painter of figures," should I not be right in asking, What kind of figures, and where do you find them?"
Gorgias Certainly.
Socrates And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
Gorgias True.
Socrates But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?
Gorgias Quite so.
Socrates Now I was it to know about rhetoric in the same way;-is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say-Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?