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- Herausgeber: Musaicum Books
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
'The Economic Policies of Alexander Hamilton' is an illuminating anthology that draws together seminal essays and papers, offering a comprehensive examination of Alexander Hamilton's economic ideologies. The collection showcases a variety of literary styles, from analytical essays to historical documents, each contributing to a multi-faceted view of Hamilton's economic strategies during the formative years of the United States. This anthology not only explores Hamilton's own writings but also includes critical analyses and interpretative essays that provide historical context and underline the enduring relevance of his economic thoughts. The works encapsulated within this volume highlight thematic cores such as federalism, economic structuring, and fiscal policy, revealing the breadth of Hamilton's influence on modern economic theory. The anthology benefits immensely from the diverse backgrounds of its contributors, notably Emory Speer, whose legal expertise and historical knowledge offer profound insights into Hamiltonian economics. Drawing from late 19th and early 20th-century perspectives, Speer and others consider the implications of Hamilton's policies on contemporary economic practices, aligning historical economic policies with modern economic challenges and achievements. This fusion of perspectives from different eras enhances the anthology's depth, positioning it within broader socio-economic historical and contemporary debates. This book is essential for readers keen on understanding the complexities of economic leadership and its long-term implications on national policy making. It invites an in-depth exploration of Hamilton's economic thoughts, encouraging readers to appreciate the fusion of historic and modern economic discourse and the dialogues it sparks amongst scholars and policy thinkers. Engaging with this collection offers a unique educational journey through the landscape of one of America's foundational economic architects.
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The Economic Policies of Alexander Hamilton
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Table of Contents
Writings and Speeches on Taxation and Finance
REPORT ON IMPOST DUTY
The Committee, consisting of Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Fitzsimmons, to whom was referred the letter of the thirtieth of November, from the Honorable William Bradford, Speaker of the lower House of Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, containing, under three heads, the reasons of that State for refusing their compliance with the recommendation of Congress for a duty on imports and prize goods, report:
That they flatter themselves the State, on a reconsideration of the objections they have offered, with a candid attention to the arguments which stand in opposition to them, will be induced to retract their dissent, convinced that the measure is supported on the most solid grounds of equal justice, policy, and general utility. The following observations, contrasted with each head of the objections successively, will furnish a satisfactory answer to the whole.
First Objection.—“That the proposed duty would be unequal in its operation, bearing hardest upon the most commercial States, and so would press peculiarly hard upon that State which draws its chief support from commerce.”
The most common experience, joined to the concurrent opinions of the ablest commercial and political observers, have established, beyond controversy, this general principle: “That every duty on imports is incorporated with the price of the commodity, and ultimately paid by the consumer, with a profit on the duty itself as a compensation to the merchant for the advance of his money.”
The merchant considers the duty demanded by the State on the imported article in the same light with freight or any similar charge, and, adding it to the original cost, calculates his profit on the aggregate sum. It may happen that, at particular conjunctures, where the markets are overstocked, and there is a competition among the sellers, this may not be practicable; but, in the general course of trade, the demand for consumption preponderates; and the merchant can with ease indemnify himself, and even obtain a profit on the advance. As a consumer, he pays his share of the duty, but it is no further a burthen upon him. The consequence of the principle laid down is that every class of the community bears its share of the duty in proportion to its consumption; which last is regulated by the comparative wealth of the respective classes, in conjunction with their habits of expense or frugality. The rich and luxurious pay in proportion to their riches and luxury; the poor and parsimonious, in proportion to their poverty and parsimony. A chief excellence of this mode of revenue is that it preserves a just measure to the abilities of individuals, promotes frugality, and taxes extravagance. The same reasoning, in our situation, applies to the intercourse between two States: if one imports and the other does not, the latter must be supplied by the former. The duty, being transferred to the price of the commodity, is no more a charge on the importing State for what is consumed in the other, than it is a charge on the merchant for what is consumed by the farmer or artificer. Either State will only feel the burthen in a ratio to its consumption; and this will be in a ratio to its population and wealth. What happens between the different classes of the same community, internally, happens between the two States; and as the merchant, in the first case, so far from losing the duty himself, has a profit on the money he advances for that purpose, so the importing State, which, in the second case, is the merchant with respect to the other, is not only reimbursed by the non-importing State, but has a like benefit on the duty advanced.
It is, therefore, the reverse of a just position, that the duty imposed will bear hardest on the most commercial States; it will, if any thing, have a contrary effect, though not in a sufficient degree to justify an objection on the part of the non-importing States. For it is as reasonable that they should allow an advance on the duty paid as on the first cost, freight, or any incidental charge. They have also other advantages in the measure fully equivalent to this disadvantage. Overnice and minute calculations, in matters of this nature, are inconsistent with national measures, and, in the imperfect state of human affairs, would stagnate all the operations of government. Absolute equality is not to be attained: to aim at it is pursuing a shadow at the expense of the substance; and, in the event, we should find ourselves wider of the mark than if, in the first instance, we were content to approach it with moderation.
Second Objection.—“That the recommendation proposes to introduce into that and the other States, officers unknown and unaccountable to them, and so is against the constitution of the State.”
It is not to be presumed that the constitution of any State could mean to define and fix the precise numbers and descriptions of all officers to be permitted in the State, excluding the creation of any new ones, whatever might be the necessity derived from that variety of circumstances incident to all political institutions. The Legislature must always have a discretionary power of appointing officers, not expressly known to the constitution; and this power will include that of authorizing the Federal Government to make the appointments in cases where the general welfare may require it. The denial of this would prove too much: to wit, that the power given by the Confederation to Congress, to appoint all officers in the post-office, was illegal and unconstitutional.
The doctrine advanced by Rhode Island would, perhaps, prove also, that the Federal Government ought to have the appointment of no internal officers whatever; a position that would defeat all the provisions of the Confederation, and all the purposes of the Union. The truth is that no Federal Constitution can exist without powers that, in their exercise, affect the internal police of the component members. It is equally true that no government can exist without a right to appoint officers for those purposes which proceed from, and concentrate in, itself; and therefore the Confederation has expressly declared that Congress shall have authority to appoint all such “civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction.” All that can be required is that the Federal Government confine its appointments to such as it is empowered to make by the original act of union, or by the subsequent consent of the parties. Unless there should be express words of exclusion in the constitution of a State, there can be no reason to doubt that it is within the compass of legislative discretion to communicate that authority.
The propriety of doing it upon the present occasion is founded on substantial reasons.
The measure proposed is a measure of necessity. Repeated experiments have shown that the revenue to be raised within these States is altogether inadequate to the public wants. The deficiency can only be supplied by loans. Our applications to the foreign powers, on whose friendship we depend, have had a success far short of our necessities. The next resource is to borrow from individuals. These will neither be actuated by generosity nor reasons of State. ‘T is to their interest alone we must appeal. To conciliate this, we must not only stipulate a proper compensation for what they lend, but we must give security for the performance. We must pledge an ascertained fund; simple and productive in its nature, general in its principle, and at the disposal of a single will. There can be little confidence in a security under the constant revisal of thirteen different deliberatives. It must, once for all, be defined and established on the faith of the States solemnly pledged to each other, and not revocable by any without a breach of the general compact.
It is by such expedients that nations, whose resources are understood, whose reputations and governments are erected on the foundation of ages, are enabled to obtain a solid and extensive credit. Would it be reasonable in us to hope for more easy terms, who have so recently assumed our rank among the nations? Is it not to be expected, that individuals will be cautious in lending their money to a people in our circumstances, and that they will at least require the best security we can give?
We have an enemy vigilant, intriguing, well acquainted with our defects and embarrassments. We may expect that he will make every effort to instil diffidences into individuals; and, in the present posture of our internal affairs, he will have too plausible ground on which to tread. Our necessities have obliged us to embrace measures, with respect to our public credit, calculated to inspire distrust. The prepossessions on this article must naturally be against us, and it is therefore indispensable we should endeavor to remove them, by such means as will be the most obvious and striking.
It was with these views Congress determined on a general fund; and the one they have recommended must, upon a thorough examination, appear to have fewer inconveniences than any other.
It has been remarked, as an essential part of the plan, that the fund should depend on a single will. This will not be the case, unless the collection, as well as the appropriation, is under the control of the United States; for it is evident, that after the duty is agreed upon, it may, in a great measure, be defeated by an ineffectual mode of levying it. The United States have a common interest in a uniform and equally energetic collection; and not only policy, but justice to all the parts of the Union, designates the utility of lodging the power of making it where the interest is common. Without this, it might, in reality, operate as a very unequal tax.
Third Objection.—“That by granting to Congress a power to collect moneys from the commerce of these States, indefinitely as to time and quantity, and for the expenditure of which they are not to be accountable to the States, they would become independent of their constituents; and so the proposed impost is repugnant to the liberty of the United States.”
Admitting the principle of this objection to be true, still it ought to have no weight in the present case, because there is no analogy between the principle and the fact.
Firstly. The fund proposed is sufficiently definite as to time, because it is only co-extensive with the existence of the debt contracted, and to be contracted, in the course of war. Congress are persuaded that it is as remote from the intention of their constituents to perpetuate that debt, as to extinguish it at once by a faithless neglect of providing the means to fulfil the public engagements. Their ability to discharge it in a moderate time, can as little be doubted as their inclination; and the moment that debt ceases, the duty, so far as respects the present provision, ceases with it.
The resolution recommending the duty specifies the object of it to be the discharge of the principal and interest of the debts already contracted, or which may be contracted, on the faith of the United States, for supporting the present war.
Secondly. The rate per cent. is fixed; and it is not at the option of the United States to increase it. Though the product will vary according to the variations in trade, yet, as there is this limitation of the rate, it cannot be properly said to be indefinite as to quantity.
By the Confederation, Congress have an absolute discretion in determining the quantum of revenue requisite for the national expenditure. When this is done, nothing remains for the States, separately, but the mode of raising. No State can dispute the obligation to pay the sum demanded, without a breach of the Confederation; and when the money comes into the treasury, the appropriation is the exclusive province of the Federal Government. This provision of the Confederation (without which it would be an empty form) comprehends in it the principle, in its fullest latitude, which the objection under consideration treats as repugnant to the liberty of the United States,—to wit, an indefinite power of prescribing the quantity of money to be raised, and of appropriating it when raised.
If it be said that the States, individually, having the collection in their own hands, may refuse a compliance with exorbitant demands, the Confederation will answer, that this is a point of which they have no constitutional liberty to judge. Such a refusal would be an exertion of power, not of right; and the same power which could disregard a requisition made on the authority of the Confederation, might at any time arrest the collection of the duty.
The same kind of responsibility which exists with respect to the expenditure of money furnished in the forms hitherto practised, would be equally applicable to the revenue from the imports.
The truth is, the security intended to the general liberty in the Confederation consists in the frequent election, and in the rotation, of the members of Congress, by which there is a constant and an effectual check upon them. This is the security which the people in every State enjoy against the usurpations of their internal governments; and it is the true source of security in a representative republic. The government, so constituted, ought to have the means necessary to answer the end of its institution. By weakening its hands too much, it may be rendered incapable of providing for the interior harmony or the exterior defence of the State.
The measure in question, if not within the letter, is within the spirit, of the Confederation. Congress, by that, are empowered to borrow money for the use of the United States; and, by implication, to concert the means necessary to accomplish the end. But without insisting upon this argument, if the Confederation has not made proper provision for the exigencies of the States, it will be at all times the duty of Congress to suggest further provisions; and when their proposals are submitted to the unanimous consent of the States, they can never be charged with exceeding the bounds of their trust. Such a consent is the basis and sanction of the Confederation, which expressly, in the thirteenth article, empowers Congress to agree to, and propose, such additional provision.
The remarks hitherto made have had reference, principally, to the future prosecution of the war. There still remains an interesting light in which the subject ought to be viewed.
The United States have already contracted a debt in Europe and in this country, for which their faith is pledged. The capital of this debt can only be discharged by degrees; but a fund for this purpose, and for paying the interest annually, on every principle of policy and justice, ought to be provided. The omission will be the deepest ingratitude and cruelty to a large number of meritorious individuals, who, in the most critical periods of the war, have adventured their fortunes in support of our independence. It would stamp the national character with indelible disgrace.
An annual provision for the purpose will be too precarious. If its continuance and application were certain, it would not afford complete relief. With many, the regular payment of interest by occasional grants would suffice; but with many more it would not. These want the use of the principal itself; and they have a right to it; but since it is not in our power to pay off the principal, the next expedient is to fund the debt, and render the evidences of it negotiable.
Besides the advantage to individuals from this arrangement, the active stock of the nation would be increased by the whole amount of the domestic debt, and of course the abilities of the community to contribute to the public wants; the national credit would revive, and stand hereafter on a secure basis.
This was another object of the proposed duty.
If it be conceded that a similar fund is necessary, it can hardly be disputed that the one recommended is the most eligible. It has been already shown that it affects all parts of the community in proportion to their consumption, and has therefore the best pretensions to equality. It is the most agreeable tax to the people that can be imposed, because it is paid insensibly, and seems to be voluntary.
It may, perhaps, be imagined that it is unfavorable to commerce; but the contrary can easily be demonstrated. It has been seen that it does not diminish the profit of the merchant, and of course can be no diminution of his inducements to trade. It is too moderate in its amount to discourage the consumption of imported goods, and cannot, on that account, abridge the extent of importations. If it even had this effect, it would be an advantage to commerce, by lessening the proportion of our imports to our exports, and inclining the balance in favor of this country.
The principal thing to be consulted for the advancement of commerce is to promote exports. All impediments to these, either by way of prohibition, or by increasing the prices of native commodities, decreasing by that means their sale and consumption at foreign markets, are injurious. Duties on exports have this operation. For the same reason taxes on possessions and the articles of our own growth or manufacture, whether in the form of a land-tax, excise, or any other, are more hurtful to trade than impost duties. The tendency of all such taxes is to increase the prices of those articles which are the objects of exportation, and to enable others to undersell us abroad. The farmer, if he pays a heavy land-tax, must endeavor to get more for the products of his farm; the mechanic and laborer, if they find the necessaries of life grow dearer by an excise, must endeavor to exact higher wages: and these causes will produce an increase of prices within, and operate against foreign commerce.
It is not, however, to be inferred that the whole revenue ought to be drawn from imports; all extremes are to be rejected. The chief thing to be attended to is that the weight of the taxes fall not too heavily, in the first instance, upon particular parts of the community. A judicious distribution to all kinds of taxable property, is a first principle in taxation. The tendency of these observations is only to show that taxes on possessions, on articles of our own growth and manufacture, are more prejudicial to trade than duties on imports.
The observations which conclude the letter on which these remarks are made, naturally lead to reflections that deserve the serious attention of every member of the Union. There is a happy mean between too much confidence and excessive jealousy, in which the health and prosperity of a State consist. Either extreme is a dangerous vice. The first is a temptation to men in power, to arrogate more than they have a right to; the latter enervates government, prevents system in the administration, defeats the most salutary measures, breeds confusion in the State, disgusts and discontents among the people, and may eventually prove as fatal to liberty as the opposite temper.
It is certainly pernicious to leave any government in a situation of responsibility disproportioned to its power.
The conduct of the war is intrusted to Congress, and the public expectation turned upon them without any competent means at their command to satisfy the important trust. After the most full and solemn deliberation, under a collective view of all the public difficulties, they recommended a measure which appears to them the corner-stone of the public safety: they see this measure suspended for nearly two years; partially complied with by some of the States; rejected by one of them, and in danger, on that account, to be frustrated; the public embarrassments every day increasing; the dissatisfaction of the army growing more serious; the other creditors of the public clamoring for justice; both irritated by the delay of measures for their present relief or future security; the hopes of our enemies encouraged to protract the war; the zeal of our friends depressed by an appearance of remissness and want of exertion on our part; Congress harassed; the national character suffering; and the national safety at the mercy of events.
This state of things cannot but be extremely painful to Congress; and appears to your Committee to make it their duty to be urgent, to obviate the evils with which it is pregnant.
Resolved, That Congress agree to the said report.
SPEECH ON THE REVENUE SYSTEM
There appears to me to have been some confusion in the manner of voting on the two preceding clauses of this bill: the first, for granting the impost to the United States, having been carried by a majority of one; and the last, for making the officers employed in the collection accountable to them, having been lost by a much larger majority. I was induced to hope, from the success of the first question, that the second would have met with equal success, as I presume gentlemen who meant to adhere to the act of the last session would have opposed the whole of the present bill as unnecessary, and those who meant to depart from it would be willing to agree substantially to the system recommended by Congress, as it had been adopted and modified by the other States generally. From the complexion of the votes on the last question, I am obliged to conclude either that I was mistaken in my ideas of the intention of the committee, or that there is some misapprehension, in part, of the members.
It becomes, therefore, necessary—to obviate such misapprehension, if any exists, and to discharge my duty at all events—to lay the subject fully before the committee, and to detail, at large, my reasons for wishing to see the bill, in its present form, prevail.
It is a common practice, in entering upon the discussion of an important subject, to endeavor to conciliate the good-will of the audience to the speaker by professions of disinterestedness and zeal for the public good. The example, however frequent, I shall no further imitate than by making one or two general observations. If, in the public stations I have filled, I have acquitted myself with zeal, fidelity, and disinterestedness; if, in the private walk of life, my conduct has been unstained by any dishonorable act, if it has been uniformly consistent with the rules of integrity, I have a right to the confidence of those to whom I address myself; they cannot refuse it to me without injustice. I am persuaded they will not refuse it to me. If, on the other hand, my public conduct has been in any instance marked with perfidy, duplicity, or with sinister views of any kind; if any imputations, founded in fact, can be adduced to the prejudice of my private character, I have no claim to the confidence of the committee; nor should I expect it.
Even these observations I should have spared myself, did I not know that, in the rage of party, gross calumnies have been propagated. Some I have traced and detected; there may still be others in secret circulation, with which I am unacquainted. Against the influence of such arts I can have no other shield than the general tenor of my past conduct. If that will protect me, I may safely confide in the candor of the committee. To that standard I cheerfully submit.
But, indeed, of what importance is it who is the speaker? ’T is his reasons only that concern the committee; if these are good, they owe it to themselves and to their constituents to allow them their full weight.
The first objection (and that which is supposed to have the greatest force) against the principles of the bill is, that it would be unconstitutional to delegate legislative power to Congress. If this objection be founded in truth, there is at once an end of the inquiry. God forbid that we should violate that constitution which is the charter of our rights. But it is our duty to examine dispassionately whether it really stands in our way. If it does not, let us not erect an ideal barrier to a measure which the public good may require.
The first ground of the objection is deduced from that clause of the constitution which declares “that no power shall be exercised over the people of this State but such as is granted by or derived from them.”
This, it is plain, amounts to nothing more than a declaration of that fundamental maxim of republican government, “that all power, mediately or immediately, is derived from the consent of the people,” in opposition to those doctrines of despotism which uphold the divine right of kings, or lay the foundations of government in force, conquest, or necessity. It does not at all affect the question how far the Legislature may go in granting power to the United States. A power conferred by the representatives of the people, if warranted by the constitution under which they act, is a power derived from the people. This is not only a plain inference of reason, but the terms of the clause itself seem to have been calculated to let in the principle. The words, “derived from,” are added to the words “granted by,” as if with design to distinguish an indirect derivation of power from an immediate grant of it. This explanation is even necessary to reconcile the constitution to itself, and to give effect to all its parts, as I hope fully to demonstrate in its proper place.
The next clause of the constitution relied upon, is that which declares that “the supreme legislative power within this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly.” This, it is said, excludes the idea of any other legislative power operating within the State. But the more obvious construction of this clause, and that which best consists with the situation and views of the country at this time, with what has been done before and since the formation of our constitution, and with those parts of the constitution itself which acknowledge the Federal Government, is this: “In the distribution of the different parts of the sovereignty in the particular government of this State, the legislative authority shall reside in a Senate and Assembly”; or, in other words, “the legislative authority of the particular government of the State of New York shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly.” The framers of the constitution could have had nothing more in view than to delineate the different departments of power in our own State government, and never could have intended to interfere with the formation of such a Constitution for the Union as the safety of the whole might require. The justness of this construction will be further elucidated by that part of the constitution which prescribes, “that the supreme executive authority of the State shall be vested in a governor.” If the former clause excludes the grant of legislative power, this must equally exclude the grant of the executive power, and the consequence would be that there could be no Federal Government at all.
It will be of no avail to say, that there is a difference in the two cases in the mode of expression: that, in one, the terms of description are “within the State”; in the other, “of the State.” In grammar, or good sense, the difference in the phrases constitutes no substantial difference in the meaning, or if it does, it concludes against the objection; for the words, within this State, which are applied to the legislative power, have a certain precision that may be supposed to intend a distinction between that legislative power which is to operate within this State only, and that which is to operate upon this State in conjunction with the others. But I lay no stress on this observation. In my opinion the legislative power “within this State” or the legislative power “of this State,” amount in substance to the same thing, and therefore (as has been already observed) if the constitution prohibits the delegation of legislative power to the Union, it equally prohibits the delegation of executive power—and the Confederacy must then be at an end; for without legislative or executive power, it becomes a nullity.
Unfortunately for the objection, if it proves any thing it proves too much. It proves that the powers of the Union in their present form are an usurpation on the constitution of this State. This will appear not only from the reasoning adduced, but from this further consideration,—that the United States are already possessed of legislative as well as executive authority. The objects of executive power are of three kinds: to make treaties with foreign nations, to make war and peace, to execute and interpret the laws. This description of the executive power will enable us the more readily to distinguish the legislative; which in general may be defined the power of prescribing rules for the community.
The United States are authorized to require from the several States as much money as they judge necessary for the general purposes of the Union, and to limit the time within which it is to be raised; to call for such a number of troops as they deem requisite for the common defence in time of war; to establish rules in all cases of capture by sea or land; to regulate the alloy and value of coin, the standard of weights and measures, and to make all laws for the government of the army and navy of the Union. All these are powers of the legislative kind, and are declared by the Confederation to be binding upon all the States.
The first is nothing less than a power of taxing the States in gross, though not in detail; and the last is the power of disposing of the liberty and lives of the citizens of this State, when in arms for the common defence. That the powers enumerated are all, or most of them, of a legislative nature, will not be denied by the law members on the other side of the question. If the constitution forbids the grant of legislative power to the Union, all those authorities are illegal and unconstitutional, and ought to be resumed.
If, on the contrary, those authorities were properly granted, then it follows that the constitution does not forbid the grant of legislative power, and the objection falls to the ground; for there is nothing in the constitution permitting the grant of one kind of legislative authority, and forbidding that of an other. The degree or nature of the powers of legislation which it might be proper to confer upon the Federal Government, would in this case be a mere question of prudence and expediency, to be determined by general considerations of utility and safety.
The principle of the objection under consideration would not only subvert the foundation of the Union as now established, would not only render it impossible that any Federal Government could exist, but would defeat some of the provisions of the constitution itself. This last idea deserves particular attention.
The nineteenth clause makes it the duty of the governor “to correspond with the Continental Congress.” The twentieth provides “that the judges and chancellor shall hold no other office than delegate to the General Congress”; and the thirtieth directs “that delegates to represent this State in the General Congress of the United States of America shall be annually appointed.”
Now, sir, I ask, if Congress were to have neither executive nor legislative authority, to what purpose were they to exist? To what purpose were delegates to be annually appointed to that body? To what purpose were these delegates to represent this State? Or how could they be said to represent it at all?
Is not the plain import of this part of the constitution, that they were to represent this State in the General Assembly of the United States, for the purpose of managing the common concerns of the Union? And does not this necessarily imply that they were to be clothed with such powers as should be found essential to that object? Does it not amount to a constitutional warrant to the Legislature to confer those powers, of whatever kind they might be?
To answer these questions in the negative would be to charge the constitution with the absurdity of proposing to itself and end, and yet prohibiting the means of accomplishing that end.
The words “to represent this State” are of great latitude, and are of themselves sufficient to convey any power necessary to the conduct and direction of its affairs in connection with the other parts of the Confederacy.
In the interpretation of laws it is admitted to be a good rule to resort to the co-existing circumstances, and collect from thence the intention of the framers of the law. Let us apply this rule to the present case.
In the commencement of the Revolution delegates were sent to meet in Congress with large discretionary powers. In short, generally speaking, with full power “to take care of the republic.” In the whole of this transaction the idea of an Union of the colonies was carefully held up. It pervaded all our public acts.
In the Declaration of Independence we find it continued and confirmed. That declaration, after setting forth its motives and causes, proceeds thus: “We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things that independent states may of right do.”
Hence we see that the Union and Independence of these States are blended and incorporated in one and the same act; which, taken together, clearly imports that the United States had in their origin full power to do all acts and things which independent states may of right do; or, in other words, full power of sovereignty.
Accordingly, we find that upon the authority of that act, only approved by the several States, they did levy war, contract alliances, and exercise other high powers of sovereignty, even to the appointment of a dictator, prior to the present Confederation.
In this situation, and with this plenitude of power, our constitution knows and acknowledges the United States in Congress assembled, and provides for the annual appointment of delegates to represent this State in that body, which, in substance, amounts to a constitutional recognition of the Union, with complete sovereignty.
A government may exist without any formal organization or precise definition of its powers. However improper it might have been that the Federal Government should have continued to exist with such absolute and undefined authority, this does not militate against the position that it did possess such authority. It only proves the propriety of a more regular formation to ascertain its limits. This was the object of the present Confederation, which is, in fact, an abridgment of the original sovereignty of the Union.
It may be said (for it has been said upon other occasions) that, though the constitution did consider the United States in the light I have described, and left the Legislature at liberty in the first instance to have organized the Federal Government in such a manner as they thought proper, yet that liberty ceased with the establishment of the present Confederacy. The discretion of the Legislature was then determined.
This, upon the face of it, is a subtilty, uncountenanced by a single principle of government, or a single expression of the constitution. It is saying that a general authority given to the Legislature for the permanent preservation and good of the community, has been exhausted and spent by the exercise of a part of that authority. The position is the more destitute of color, because the Confederation, by the express terms of the compact, preserves and continues this power. The last clause of it authorizes Congress to propose, and the States to agree to, such alterations as might be afterward found necessary or expedient.
We see, therefore, that the constitution knows and acknowledges the United States in Congress; that it provides for the annual appointment of delegates to represent this State in that body without prescribing the objects or limits of that representation; that at the time our constitution was framed, the Union existed with full sovereignty; and that therefore the idea of sovereignty in the Union is not incompatible with it. We see, further, that the doctrine contained in the objection against granting legislative power would equally operate against granting executive power, would prove that the powers already vested in the Union are illegal and unconstitutional, would render a confederacy of the States in any form impracticable, and would defeat all those provisions of our own constitution which relate to the United States. I submit it to the committee, whether a doctrine pregnant with such consequences can be true; whether it is not as opposite to our constitution as to the principles of national safety and prosperity; and whether it would not be lamentable if the zeal of opposition to a particular measure should carry us to the extreme of imposing upon the constitution a sense foreign to it, which must embarrass the national councils upon future occasions, when all might agree in the utility and necessity of a different construction.
If the arguments I have used under this head are not well-founded, let gentlemen come forward and show their fallacy. Let the subject have a fair and full examination, and let truth, on whatever side it may be, prevail!
Flattering myself it will appear to the committee that the constitution, at least, offers us no impediment, I shall proceed to other topics of objection. The next that presents itself, is a supposed danger to liberty from granting legislative power to Congress.
But, before I enter upon this subject, to remove the aspersions thrown upon that body, I shall give a short history of some material facts relating to the origin and progress of the business. To excite the jealousies of the people, it has been industriously represented as an undue attempt to acquire an increase of power. It has been forgotten, or intentionally overlooked, that, considering it in the strongest light as a proposal to alter the Confederation, it is only exercising a power which the Confederation has in direct terms reposed in Congress, who, as before observed, are, by the 13th article, expressly authorized to propose alterations.
But so far was the measure from originating in improper views of that body, that, if I am rightly informed, it did not originate there at all. It was first suggested by a convention of the four Eastern States and New York, at Hartford, and, I believe, was proposed there by the deputies of this State. A gentleman on our bench, unconnected with Congress, who now hears me (I mean Judge Hobart), was one of them. It was dictated by a principle which bitter experience then taught us, and which, in peace or war, will always be found true—that adequate supplies to the Federal treasury can never flow from any system which requires the intervention of thirteen deliberatives between the call and the execution.
Congress agreed to the measure, and recommended it. This State complied without hesitation. All parts of the government — Senate, Assembly, and Council of Revision — concurred; neither the constitution nor the public liberty presented any obstacle. The difficulties from these sources are a recent discovery.
So late as the first session of the Legislature, after the evacuation of this city, the governor of the State, in his speech to both Houses, gave a decided countenance to the measure. This he does, though not in expressed terms, yet by implications not to be misunderstood.
The leading opponents of the impost, of the present day, have all of them, at other times, either concurred in the measure, in its most exceptionable form, and without the qualifications annexed to it by the proposed bill, or have, by other instances of conduct, contradicted their own hypothesis on the constitution, which professedly forms the main prop of their opposition.
The honorable member in my eye, at the last session, brought in a bill for granting to the United States the power of regulating the trade of the Union. This surely includes more ample legislative authority than is comprehended in the mere power of levying a particular duty. It indeed goes to a prodigious extent, much farther than, on a superficial view, can be imagined. Can we believe that the constitutional objection, if well founded, would so long have passed undiscovered and unnoticed? Or, is it fair to impute to Congress criminal motives for proposing a measure which was first recommended to them by five States, or from persisting in that measure, after the unequivocal experience they have had of the total inefficacy of the mode provided in the Confederation for supplying the treasury of the Union?
I leave the answer to these questions to the good sense and candor of the committee, and shall return to the examination of the question, how far the power proposed to be conferred upon Congress would be dangerous to the liberty of the people. And here I ask:
Whence can this danger arise? The members of Congress are annually chosen by the members of the several Legislatures. They come together with different habits, prejudices, and interests. They are, in fact, continually changing. How is it possible for a body so composed to be formidable to the liberties of States—several of which are large empires in themselves?
The subversion of the liberty of the States could not be the business of a day. It would at least require time, premeditation, and concert. Can it be supposed, that the members of a body so constituted would be unanimous in a scheme of usurpation? If they were not, would it not be discovered and disclosed? If we could even suppose this unanimity among one set of men, can we believe that all the new members who are yearly sent from one State or another would instantly enter into the same views? Would there not be found one honest man to warn his country of the danger?
Suppose the worst—suppose the combination entered into and continued. The execution would at least announce the design; and the means of defence would be easy. Consider the separate power of several of these States, and the situation of all. Consider the extent, populousness, and resources of Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania; I might add, of New York, Connecticut, and other States. Where could Congress find means sufficient to subvert the government and liberties of either of these States? or, rather, where find means sufficient to effect the conquest at all? If an attempt was made upon one, the others, from a sense of common danger, would make common cause; and they could immediately unite and provide for their joint defence.
There is one consideration, of immense force in this question, not sufficiently attended to. It is this—that each State possesses in itself the full powers of government, and can at once, in a regular and constitutional way, take measures for the preservation of its rights. In a single kingdom or state, if the rulers attempt to establish a tyranny, the people can only defend themselves by a tumultuary insurrection; they must run to arms without concert or plan; while the usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can employ the forces of the State to suppress them in embryo, and before they can have time or opportunity to give system to their opposition. With us, the case is widely different. Each State has a government, completely organized in itself, and can at once enter into a regular plan of defence; with the forces of the community at its command, it can immediately form connections with its neighbors, or even with foreign powers, if necessary.
In a contest of this kind, the body of the people will always be on the side of the State governments. This will not only result from their love of liberty and regard to their own safety, but from other strong principles of human nature. The State governments operate on those immediate familiar personal concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is awake. The distribution of private justice belonging to them, they must always appear to the senses of the people as the immediate guardians of their rights. They will, of course, have the strongest hold on their attachment, respect, and obedience. Another circumstance will contribute to the same end. Far the greatest number of offices and employments are in the gift of the States separately; the weight of official influence will therefore be in favor of the State governments; and, with all these advantages, they cannot fail to carry the people along with them in every contest with the General Government in which they are not palpably in the wrong, and often when they are. What is to be feared from the efforts of Congress to establish a tyranny, with the great body of the people, under the direction of their State governments, combined in opposition to their views? Must not their attempts recoil upon themselves, and terminate in their own ruin and disgrace? or, rather, would not these considerations, if they were insensible to other motives, for ever restrain them from making such attempts?
The causes taken notice of, as securing the attachment of the people to their local governments, present us with another important truth—the natural imbecility of federal governments, and the danger that they will never be able to exercise power enough to manage the general affairs of the Union; though the States will have a common interest, yet they will also have a particular interest. For example: as a part of the Union, it will be the interest of every State to pay as little itself, and to let its neighbors pay as much as possible. Particular interests have always more influence upon men than general. The Federal States, therefore, consulting their immediate advantage, may be considered as so many eccentric powers, tending in a contrary direction to the government of the Union; and as they will generally carry the people along with them, the Confederacy will be in continual danger of dissolution. This, Mr. Chairman, is the real rock upon which the happiness of this country is likely to split. This is the point to which our fears and cares should be directed, to guard against this, and not to terrify ourselves with imaginary dangers from the spectre of power in Congress, will be our true wisdom.
But let us examine a little more closely the measure under consideration. What does the bill before us require us to do? Merely to grant duties on imposts to the United States, for the short period of twenty-five years; to be applied to the discharge of the principal and interest of the debts contracted for the support of the late war; the collection of which duties is to be made by officers appointed by the State, but accountable to Congress, according to such general regulations as the United States shall establish, subject to these important checks: that no citizen shall be carried out of the State for trial; that all prosecutions shall be in our own courts; that no excessive fines or penalties shall be imposed; and that a yearly account of the proceeds and application of the revenue shall be rendered to the Legislature, on failure of which it reserves to itself a right of repealing its grant.
It is possible for any measure to be better guarded? or is it possible that a grant for such precise objects, and with so many checks, can be dangerous to the public liberty?
Having now, as I trust, satisfactorily shown that the constitution offers no obstacle to the measure, and that the liberty of the people cannot be endangered by it, it remains only to consider it in the view of revenue.
The sole question left for discussion is, whether it be an eligible mode of supplying the Federal treasury or not.
The better to answer this question, it will be of use to examine how far the mode by quotas and requisitions has been found competent to the public exigencies.
The universal delinquency of the States during the war shall be passed over with the bare mention of it. The public embarrassments were a plausible apology for that delinquency; and it was hoped the peace would have produced greater punctuality. The experiment has disappointed that hope to a degree which confounds the least sanguine. A comparative view of the compliances of the several States for the five last years will furnish a striking result.
During that period, as appears by a statement on our files, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia have paid nothing. I say nothing, because the only actual payment is the trifling sum of about $7,000 by New Hampshire. South Carolina indeed has credits, but these are merely by way of discount on the supplies furnished by her during the war, in consideration of her peculiar sufferings and exertions while the immediate theatre of it.
Connecticut and Delaware have paid about one third of their requisitions; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, about one half; Virginia about three fifths; Pennsylvania nearly the whole; and New York more than her quota.
These proportions are taken on the specie requisitions; the indents have been very partially paid, and in their present state are of little account.
The payments into the Federal treasury have declined rapidly each year. The whole amount for three years past, in specie, has not exceeded $1,400,000, of which New York has paid 100 per cent. more than her proportion. This sum, little more than $400,000 a year, it will readily be conceived, has been exhausted in the support of the civil establishments of the Union, and the necessary guards and garrisons of public arsenals, and on the frontiers; without any surplus for paying any part of the debt, foreign or domestic, principal or interest.
Things are continually growing worse; the last year in particular produced less than two hundred thousand dollars, and that from only two or three States. Several of the States have been so long unaccustomed to pay, that they seem no longer concerned even about the appearances of compliance.
Connecticut and Jersey have almost formally declined paying any longer. The ostensible motive is the non-concurrence of this State in the impost system. The real one must be conjectured from the fact.
Pennsylvania, if I understand the scope of some late resolutions, means to discount the interest she pays upon her assumption to her own citizens; in which case there will be little coming from her to the United States. This seems to be bringing matters to a crisis.
The pecuniary support of the Federal Government has of late devolved almost entirely upon Pennsylvania and New York. If Pennsylvania refuses to continue her aid, what will be the situation of New York? Are we willing to be the Atlas of the Union? or are we willing to see it perish?
This seems to be the alternative. Is there not a species of political knight-errantry in adhering pertinaciously to a system which throws the whole weight of the Confederation upon this State, or upon one or two more? Is it not our interest, on mere calculations of State policy, to promote a measure which, operating under the same regulations in every State, must produce an equal, or nearly equal, effect everywhere, and oblige all the States to share the common burthen?
If the impost is granted to the United States, with the power of levying it, it must have a proportionate effect in all the States, for the same mode of collection everywhere will have nearly the same return everywhere.
What must be the final issue of the present state of things? Will the few States that now contribute be willing to contribute much longer? Shall we ourselves be long content with bearing the burthen singly? Will not our zeal for a particular system soon give way to the pressure of so unequal a weight? And if all the States cease to pay, what is to become of the Union? It is sometimes asked: Why do not Congress oblige the States to do their duty? But where are the means? Where are the fleets and armies, where the Federal treasury to support those fleets and armies, to enforce the requisitions of the Union? All methods short of coercion, have repeatedly been tried in vain.
Let us now proceed to another most important inquiry. How are we to pay our foreign debt? This, I think, is estimated at about $7,000,000, which will every year increase with the accumulations of interest. If we pay neither principal nor interest, we not only abandon all pretensions to character as a nation, but we endanger the public peace. However it may be in our power to evade the just demands of our domestic creditors, our foreign creditors must and will be paid.
They have power to enforce their demands, and sooner or later they may be expected to do it. It is not my intention to endeavor to excite the apprehensions of the committee, but I would appeal to their prudence. A discreet attention to the consequences of national measures is no impeachment of our firmness.
The foreign debt, I say, must sooner or later be paid, and the longer provision is delayed the heavier it must fall at last.
We require about 1,600,000 dollars to discharge the interest and instalments of the present year, about a million annually upon an average, for ten years more, and about 300,000 dollars for another ten years.
The product of the impost may be computed at about a million of dollars annually. It is an increasing fund. This fund would not only suffice for the discharge of the foreign debt, but important operations might be ingrafted upon it towards the extinguishment of the domestic debt.
Is it possible to hesitate about the propriety of adopting a resource so easy in itself and so extensive in its effects?
Here I expect I may be told there is no objection to employing this resource. The act of the last session does it. The only dispute is about the mode. We are willing to grant the money, but not the power required from us. Money will pay our debts; power may destroy our liberties.
It has been insinuated that nothing but a lust of power would have prevented Congress from accepting the grant in the shape it has already passed the Legislature. This is a severe charge. If true, it ought undoubtedly to prevent our going a step further. But it is easy to show that Congress could not have accepted our grant without removing themselves further from the object than they now are. To gain one State they must have lost all the others. The grants of every State are accompanied with a condition that similar grants be made by the other States. It is not denied that our act is essentially different from theirs. Their acts give the United States the power of collecting the duty; ours reserves it to the State, and makes it receivable in paper-money.
The immediate consequences of accepting our grant would be a relinquishment of the grants of other States. They must take the matter up anew, and do the work over again to accommodate it to our standard. In order to anchor one State, would it have been wise to set twelve, or at least eleven others, afloat?
It is said, that the States which have granted more would certainly be willing to grant less. They would easily accommodate their acts to that of New York, as more favorable to their own power and security.
But would Massachusetts and Virginia, which have no paper-money of their own, accede to a plan that permitted other States to pay in paper while they paid in specie? Would they consent that their citizens should pay twenty shillings in the pound, while the citizens of Rhode Island paid only four, the citizens of North Carolina ten, and of other States in different degrees of inequality, in proportion to the relative depreciation of their paper? Is it wise, in this State, to cherish a plan that gives such an advantage to the citizens of other States over its own?
The paper-money of the State of New York, in most transactions, is equal to gold and silver; that of Rhode Island is depreciated to five for one; that of North Carolina to two for one; that of South Carolina may perhaps be worth fifteen shillings in the pound.
If the States pay the duties in paper, is it not evident that for every pound of that duty consumed by the citizen of New York he would pay twenty shillings, while the citizen of South Carolina would pay fifteen shillings; of North Carolina, ten shillings; and Rhode Island, only four!
This consideration alone is sufficient to condemn the plan of our grant of last session, and to prove incontestably that the States which are averse to emitting a paper currency, or have it in their power to support one when emitted, would never come into it.
Again, would those States which by their public acts demonstrate a conviction that the powers of the Union require augmentation; which are conscious of energy in their own administration—would they be willing to concur in a plan which left the collection of the duties in the hands of each State; and of course subject to all the inequalities which a more or less vigorous system of collection would produce?
This too is an idea which ought to have great weight with us. We have better habits of government than are to be found in some of the States; and our constitution admits of more energy than the constitution of most of the other States. The duties, therefore, would be more effectually collected with us than in such States, and this would have a similar effect to the depreciation of the money, in imposing a greater burthen on the citizens of this State.
