Two Treatises of Government - Locke E-Book

John Locke

• Herausgeber: Lebooks Editora
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Seitenzahl: 520

Beschreibung

"Treatise of Government" is one of the great classics of Political Philosophy. Its author, John Locke, became one of the greatest philosophers of liberalism and democracy, and his ideas remain relevant and are studied to this day. Locke's thoughts influenced important events in history, particularly in Europe and America. He is often called the theorist of the English Revolution (1688) and was the main source of ideas for the American Revolution (1776), influencing the Declaration of Independence and the state constitutions of that country. In "Second Treatise of Government," John Locke expresses his liberal thinking and his position against absolutist governments with arguments that demonstrate that government emanates from the people and that, together with the law, should be used for the common good.

Leseprobe

John Locke

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

Original Title:

“Two treatises of government”

Contents

INTRODUCTION

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

THE PREFACE

THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS, ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN

Chapter I

Chapter II - Of paternal and regal Power.

Chapter III - Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Creation.

Chapter IV - Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty, by Donation, Gen. i. 28.

Chapter V - Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty, by the Subjection of Eve

Chapter VI - Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood.

Chapter VII - Of Fatherhood and Property considered together as Fountains of Sovereignty

Chapter VIII - Of the Conveyance of Adam’s sovereigns monarchical Power

Chapter IX - Of Monarchy by Inheritance from Adam

Chapter X - Of the Heir to Adam’s Monarchical Power.

Chapter XI - Who Heir?

CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIC GOVERNMENT

Chapter I - Of Political Power

Chapter II - Of the State of Nature

Chapter III - Of the State of War

Chapter IV - Of Slavery

Chapter V - Of Property

Chapter VI - Of Paternal Power

Chapter VII - Of Political or Civil Society

Chapter VIII - Of the Beginning of Political Societies

Chapter IX - Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

Chapter X - Of the Forms of a Commonwealth

Chapter XI - Of the Extent of the Legislative Power

Chapter XII -The Legislative, Executive and Federative Power of the Commonwealth

Chapter XIII - Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth

Chapter XIV - Of Prerogative

Chapter XV - Of Paternal, Political and Despotical Power, Considered Together

Chapter XVI - Of Conquest

Chapter XVII - Of Usurpation

Chapter XVIII - Of Tyranny

Chapter XIX - Of the Dissolution of Government

INTRODUCTION

John Locke

1632-1704

John Locke born in Wrington, Somerset, England, English philosopher whose works lie at the foundation of modern philosophical empiricism and political liberalism,classical liberalism in particular. He was an inspirer of both the European Enlightenment and the Constitution of the United States. His philosophical thinking was close to that of the founders of modern science, especially Robert Boyle, Sir Isaac Newton, and other members of the Royal Society. His political thought was grounded in the notion of a social contract between citizens and in the importance of toleration, especially in matters of religion. Much of what he advocated in the realm of politics was accepted in England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89 and in the United States after the country’s declaration of independence in 1776.

Early years

Locke’s family was sympathetic to Puritanism but remained within the Church of England, a situation that coloured Locke’s later life and thinking. Raised in Pensford, near Bristol, Locke was 10 years old at the start of the English Civil Wars between the monarchy of Charles I and parliamentary forces under the eventual leadership of Oliver Cromwell. Locke’s father, a lawyer, served as a captain in the cavalry of the parliamentarians and saw some limited action. From an early age, one may thus assume, Locke rejected any claim by the king to have a divine right to rule.

After the first Civil War ended in 1646, Locke’s father was able to obtain for his son, who had evidently shown academic ability, a place at Westminster School in distant London. It was to this already famous institution that Locke went in 1647, at age 14. Although the school had been taken over by the new republican government, its headmaster, Richard Busby (himself a distinguished scholar), was a royalist. For four years Locke remained under Busby’s instruction and control (Busby was a strong disciplinarian who much favoured the birch). In January 1649, just half a mile away from Westminster School, Charles was beheaded on the order of Cromwell. The boys were not allowed to attend the execution, though they were undoubtedly well aware of the events taking place nearby.

The curriculum of Westminster centred on Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, mathematics, and geography. In 1650 Locke was elected a King’s Scholar, an academic honour and financial benefit that enabled him to buy several books, primarily classic texts in Greek and Latin. Although Locke was evidently a good student, he did not enjoy his schooling; in later life he attacked boarding schools for their overemphasis on corporal punishment and for the uncivil behaviour of pupils. In his enormously influential work Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), he would argue for the superiority of private tutoring for the education of young gentlemen (see below Other works).

Oxford

In the autumn of 1652 Locke, at the comparatively late age of 20, entered Christ Church, the largest of the colleges of the University of Oxford and the seat of the court of Charles I during the Civil Wars. But the royalist days of Oxford were now behind it, and Cromwell’s Puritan followers filled most of the positions. Cromwell himself was chancellor, and John Owen, Cromwell’s former chaplain, was vice-chancellor and dean. Owen and Cromwell were, however, concerned to restore the university to normality as soon as possible, and this they largely succeeded in doing.

Locke later reported that he found the undergraduate curriculum at Oxford dull and unstimulating. It was still largely that of the medieval university, focusing on Aristotle (especially his logic) and largely ignoring important new ideas about the nature and origins of knowledge that had been developed in writings by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), René Descartes (1596–1650), and other natural philosophers. Although their works were not on the official syllabus, Locke was soon reading them. He graduated with a bachelor’s degree in 1656 and a master’s two years later, about which time he was elected a student (the equivalent of fellow) of Christ Church. At Oxford Locke made contact with some advocates of the new science, including Bishop John Wilkins, the astronomer and architect Christopher Wren, the physicians Thomas Willis and Richard Lower, the physicist Robert Hooke, and, most important of all, the eminent natural philosopher and theologian Robert Boyle. Locke attended classes in iatrochemistry (the early application of chemistry to medicine), and before long he was collaborating with Boyle on important medical research on human blood. Medicine from now on was to play a central role in his life.

Last years and influence

Locke remained in Holland until James II was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution. Indeed, Locke himself in February 1689 crossed the English Channel in the party that accompanied the princess of Orange, who was soon crowned Queen Mary II of England. Upon his return he became actively involved in various political projects, including helping to draft the English Bill of Rights, though the version eventually adopted by Parliament did not go as far as he wanted in matters of religious toleration. He was offered a senior diplomatic post by William but declined. His health was rarely good, and he suffered especially in the smoky atmosphere of London. He was therefore very happy to accept the offer of his close friend Damaris Masham, herself a philosopher and the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, to make his home with her family at Oates in High Laver, Essex. There he spent his last years revising the Essay and other works, entertaining friends, including Newton, and responding at length to his critics. After a lengthy period of poor health, he died while Damaris read him the Bible. He was buried in High Laver church.

As a final comment on his achievement, it may be said that, in many ways, to read Locke’s works is the best available introduction to the intellectual environment of the modern Western world. His faith in the salutary, ennobling powers of knowledge justifies his reputation as the first philosopher of the Enlightenment. In a broader context, he founded a philosophical tradition, British empiricism, that would span three centuries. In developing the Whig ideology underlying the exclusion controversy and the Glorious Revolution, he formulated the classic expression of liberalism, which was instrumental in the great revolutions of 1776 and 1789. His influence remains strongly felt in the West, as the notions of mind, freedom, and authority continue to be challenged and explored.

About the "Two Treatises of Government"

When Shaftesbury failed to reconcile the interests of the king and Parliament, he was dismissed; in 1681 he was arrested, tried, and finally acquitted of treason by a London jury. A year later he fled to Holland, where in 1683 he died. None of Shaftesbury’s known friends was now safe in England. Locke himself, who was being closely watched, crossed to Holland in September 1683.

Out of this context emerged Locke’s major work in political philosophy, Two Treatises of Government (1689). Although scholars disagree over the exact date of its composition, it is certain that it was substantially composed before Locke fled to Holland. In this respect the Two Treatises was a response to the political situation as it existed in England at the time of the exclusion controversy, though its message was of much more lasting significance. In the preface to the work, composed at a later date, Locke makes clear that the arguments of the two treatises are continuous and that the whole constitutes a justification of the Glorious Revolution, which brought the Protestant William III and Mary II to the throne following the flight of James II to France.

It should be noted that Locke’s political philosophy was guided by his deeply held religious commitments. Throughout his life he accepted the existence of a creating God and the notion that all humans are God’s servants in virtue of that relationship. God created humans for a certain purpose, namely to live a life according to his laws and thus to inherit eternal salvation; most importantly for Locke’s philosophy, God gave humans just those intellectual and other abilities necessary to achieve this end. Thus, humans, using the capacity of reason, are able to discover that God exists, to identify his laws and the duties they entail, and to acquire sufficient knowledge to perform their duties and thereby to lead a happy and successful life. They can come to recognize that some actions, such as failing to care for one’s offspring or to keep one’s contracts, are morally reprehensible and contrary to natural law, which is identical to the law of God.

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

In the Former, The False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer and His Followers, Are Detected and Overthrown: The Latter, Is an Essay Concerning the Original, Extent and End, of Civil Government.

THE PREFACE

Reader,

Thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle and were more than all the rest, it is not worthwhile to tell thee. These which remain I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present king William; to make good his title in else consent of the people; which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights? with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it war on the very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are lost and my reader may be satisfied without them. For I imagine I shall have neither the time nor inclination to repeat my pains and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing sir Robert again through all the windings and obscurities which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful system. The king and body of the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his hypothesis, that I suppose nobody hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular style and well-turned periods.

For if anyone will be at the pains himself, in those parts which are here untouched, to strip sir Robert’s discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions and endeavor to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied there was never so much glib nonsense put together in well sounding English. If he thinks it not worthwhile to examine his works all through, let him make an experiment in that part where he treats of usurpation; and let him try whether he can, with all his skill, make sir Robert intelligible and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late years, publicly owned his doctrine and made it the current divinity of the times. It is necessary those men who, taking on them to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly showed of what authority this their patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed; that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which they have preached up for Gospel, though they had no better an author than an English courtier. For I should not have writ against sir Robert, or taken the pains to show his mistakes, inconsistencies and avant of (what he so much boasts of and pretends wholly to build on) Scripture-proofs, were there not men amongst us who, by crying up his books and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been so zealous in this point, that if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it and allow it’s just weight to this reflection, viz., that there cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the “drum ecclesiastic.” If anyone really concerned for truth undertake the confutation of my hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, upon fair conviction, or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things.

First, that caviling here and there at some expression or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book.

Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of these worth my notice: though I shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to anyone who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point and shall show any just grounds for his scruples.

I have nothing more but to advertise the reader, that A. stands for our author, O. for his Observations on Hobbes, Milton, &c. And that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his Patriarcha, edit. 1680.

THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS, ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN

Chapter I

§1. Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it. And truly I should have taken sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, as any other treatise, which would persuade all mere that they are slaves and ought to be so, for such another exercise of wit as was his who writ the encomium of Nero; rather than for a serious discourse, meant in earnest: had not the gravity of the title and epistle, the picture in the front of the book and the applause that followed it, required me to believe that the author and publisher were both in earnest. I therefore took it into my hands with all the expectation and read it through with all the attention due to a treatise that made such a noise at its coming abroad; and cannot but confess myself mightily surprised that in a book, which was to provide chains for all mankind, I should find nothing but a rope of sand; useful perhaps to such whose skill and business it is to wise a dust and would blind the people, the better to mislead them; but in truth not of any force to draw those into bondage who have their eyes open and so much sense about them, as to consider that chains are but an ill wearing, how much care soever hath been taken to file and polish them.

§2. If anyone think I take too much liberty in speaking so freely of a man who is the great champion of absolute power and the idol of those who worship it; I beseech him to make this small allowance for once, to one who, even after the reading of sir Robert’s book, cannot but think himself; as the laws allow him a free man: and I know no fault it is to do so, unless any one, better skilled in the fate of it than I, should have it revealed to him that this treatise, which has lain dormant so long, was, plan it appeared in the world, to carry, by strength of its arguments, all liberty out or it; and that, from thenceforth, our author’s short model was to be the pattern in the mount and the perfect standard of politics for the future. His system lies in a little compass; it is no more but this,

“That all government is absolute monarchy.”

And the ground he builds on is this.

“That no man is born free.”

§3. In this last age a generation of men has sprung up amongst us, that would flatter princes with an opinion, that they have a divine right to absolute power, let the laws by which they are constituted and are to govern and the conditions under which they enter upon their authority, be what they will; and their engagements to observe them ever so well ratified by solemn oaths and promises. To make way for this doctrine, they have denied mankind a right to natural freedom; whereby they have not only, as much as in them lies, exposed all subjects to the utmost misery of tyranny and oppression, but have also unsettled the titles and shaken the thrones of princes: (for they too, by these men’s system, except only one, are all born slaves and by divine right are subjects to Adam’s right heir); as if they had designed to make war upon all government and subvert the very foundations of human society, to serve their present turn.

§4. However, we must believe them upon their own bare words, when they tell us, “We are all born slaves and we must continue so;” there is no remedy for it; life and thralldom we entered into together and can never be quit of the one till we part with the other. Scripture or reason, I am sure, do not anywhere say so, notwithstanding the noise of divine right, as if divine authority hath subjected us to the unlimited will of another. An admirable state of mankind and that which they have not lead wit enough to find out till this latter age! For however sir Robert Filmier seems to condemn the novelty of the contrary opinion, Patr. p. 3, yet I believe it will be hard for him to find any other age, or country of the world, but this, which has asserted monarchy to be jure divine. And he confesses, Patr. p. 4, that “Heyward, Blackwood, Barclay and others, that have bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points, never thought of this; but, with one consent, admitted the natural liberty and equality of mankind.”

§5. By whom this doctrine came at first to be broached and brought in fashion amongst us and what sad elects it gave rise to, I leave to historians to relate, or to the memory of those who were contemporaries with Sibthorp and Manwaring to recollect. My business at present is only to consider what sir Robert Filmer, who is allowed to have carried this argument farthest and is supposed to have brought it to perfection, has said in it: for from him every one, who would be as fashionable as French was at court, has learned and runs away with this short system of politics, viz., “Men are not born free and therefore could never have the liberty to choose either governors, or forms of government.” Princes have their power absolute and by divine right; for slaves could never have a right to compact or consent. Adam was an absolute monarch and so are all princes ever since.

Chapter II - Of paternal and regal Power.

§6. Sir Robert Filmer’s great position is, that “men are not naturally free.” This is the foundation on which his absolute monarchy stands and from which it erects itself to a height, that its power is above every power: caput inter nubilia, so high above all earthly and human things, that thought can scarce reach it; that promises and oaths, which tie the infinite Deity, cannot confine it. But if this foundation fails, all his fabric falls with it and governments must be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance and the consent of men, making use of their reason to unite together into society. To prove this grand position of his, he tells us, p. 12, “Men are born in subjection to their parents,” and therefore cannot be free. And this authority of parents he calls “royal authority,” p. 12,14, “fatherly authority, right of fatherhood,” p. 12, 20. One would have thought he would, in the beginning of such a work as this, on which was to depend the authority of princes and the obedience of subjects, have told us expressly what that fatherly authority is, have definer it, though not limited it, because in some other treatises of his he tells us, it is unlimited and unlimitable;{1} he should at least have given us such an account of it, that we might have had an entire notion of this fatherhood, or fatherly authority, whenever it came in our way, in his writings: this I expected to have found in the first chapter of his Patriarchal But instead thereof, having, 1. En passant, made his obeisance to the arcana imperii, p. 5; 2. Made his compliment to the “rights and liberties of this or any other nation,” p. 6, which he is going presently to null and destroy; and 3. Made his leg to those learned men who did not see so far into the matter as himself; p. 7: he comes to fall on Bellarmine, p. 8 and by a victory over him establishes his fatherly authority beyond any question. Bellarmine being routed by his own confession, p. 11, the day is clear got and there is no more need of any forces: for having done that, I observe not that he states the question, or rallies up any arguments to make good his opinion, but rather tells us the story as he thinks fit of this strange kind of domineering phantom called the fatherhood, which whoever could catch presently got empire and unlimited absolute power. He acquaints us how this fatherhood liege in Adam, continued its course and kept the world in order all the time of the patriarchs till the flood; got out of the ark with Noah and his sons, made and supported all the kings of the earth till the captivity of the Israelites in Egypt; and then the poor fatherhood was under hatches, till “God, by giving the Israelites kings, reestablished the ancient and prime right of the lineal succession in paternal government.” This is his business from p. 12 to 19. And then, obviating au objection and clearing a difficulty or two with one-half reason, p. 23, “to confirm the natural right of regal power,” he ends the first chapter. I hope it is no injury to call a half quotation a half reason; for God says, “Honor thy father and mother;” but our author contents himself with half, leaves out “thy mother” quite, as little serviceable to his purpose. But of that more in another place.

§7. I do not think our author so little skilled in the way of writing discourses of this nature, nor so careless of the point in hand, that he by oversight commits the fault that he himself, in his “anarchy of a mixed monarchy,” p. 239, objects to Mr. Hunton in these words: “Where first I charge the A. that he hath not given us any definition or description of monarchy in general; for by the rules of method he should have first defined.” And by the like rule of method, sir Robert should have told us what his fatherhood, or fatherly authority is, before he had told us in whom it w as to be found and talked so much of it. But, perhaps, sir Robert found, that this fatherly authority, this power of fathers and of kings, for he makes them both the same, p. 24, would make a very odd and frightful figure and very disagreeing with what either children imagine of their parents, or subjects of their kings, if he should have given us the whole draught together, in that gigantic form he had painted it in his own fancy; and therefore, like a wary physician, when he would have his patient swallow some harsh or corrosive liquor, he mingles it with a large quantity of that which may dilute it, that the scattered parts may go down with less feeling and cause less aversion.

§8. Let us then endeavor to find what account he gives us of this fatherly authority, as it lies scattered in the several parts of his writings. And first, as it was vested in Adam, he says, “Not only Adam, but the succeeding patriarchs, had, by right of fatherhood, royal authority over their children, p. 12. This lordship, which Adam by command had over the wholes world and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample as the absolute dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation, p. 15. Dominion of life and death, making war and concluding peace, p. 13. Adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death, p. 35. Kings, in the right of parents, succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction, p. 19. As kingly power is by the law of God, so it hath no inferior law to limit it; Adam was lord of all, p. 40. The father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will, p. 78. The superiority of princes is above laws, p. 79. The unlimited jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by Samuel, p. 80. Kings are above the laws,” p. 93. And to this purpose see a great deal more, which our A. delivers in Bodin’s words: “It is certain, that all laws, privileges and grants of princes, have no force but during their life, if they be not ratified by the express consent, or by sufferance of the prince following, especially privileges, O. p. 279. The reason why laws have been also made by kings, was this: when kings were either busied with wars, or distracted with public cares, so that every private man could not have access to their persons, to learn their wills and pleasure, then were laws of necessity invented, that so every particular subject might find his prince’s pleasure deciphered unto him in the tables of his laws, p. 92. In a monarchy, the lying must by necessity be above the laws, p. 100. A perfect kingdom is that, wherein the king rules all things, according to his own will, p. 100. Neither common nor statute laws are, or can be, any diminution of that general power, which kings have over their peon pie, by right of fatherhood, p. 115. Adam was the father, king and lord over his family; a son, a subject and a servant or slave, were one and the same thing at first. The father had power to dispose or sell his children or servants; whence we find, that, in the first reckoning up of goods in Scripture, the manservant and the maid-servant are numbered among the possessions and substance of the owner, as other goods were, O. pref. God also hath given to the father a right or liberty to alien his power over his children to any other; whence we find the sale and gift of children to have been much in use in the beginning of the world, when men had their servants for a possession and an inheritance, as well as other goods; whereupon we find the power of castrating and making eunuchs much in use in old times, O. p. 155. Law is nothing else but the will of him that hath the power of the supreme father, O. p. 223. It was God’s ordinance that the supremacy should be unlimited in Adam and as large as all the acts of his will; and as in him, so in all others that have supreme power,” O. p. 245.

§9. I have been fain to trouble my reader with these several quotations in our A.’s own words, that in them might be seen his own description of his fatherly authority, as it lies scattered up and down in his writings, which he supposes was first vested in Adam and by right belongs to all princes ever since. This fatherly authority there, or right of fatherhood, in our A.’s sense, is a divine unalterable right of sovereignty, whereby a father or a prince hath an absolute, arbitrary, unlimited and unlimitable power over the lives, liberties and estates of his children and subjects; so that he may take or alienate their estates, sell, castrate, or use their persons as he pleases, they being all his slaves and he lord or proprietor of everything and his unbounded will their law.

§10. Our A. having placed such a mighty power in Adam and upon that supposition founded all government and all power of princes, it is reasonable to expect that he should have proved this with arguments clear and evident, suitable to the weightiness of the cause. That since men had nothing else left them, they might in slavery have such undeniable proofs of its necessity, that their consciences might be convinced and oblige them to submit peaceably to that absolute dominion, which their governors had a right to exercise over them. Without this, what good could our A. do, or pretend to do, by erecting such an unlimited power, but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men, too apt of itself to grow and increase with the possession of any power? And by persuading those, who, by the consent of their fellowmen, are advanced to great but limited degrees of it, that by that part which is given them, they have a right to all that was not so; and therefore may do what they please, because they have authority to do more than others and so tempt them to do what is neither for their own, nor the good of those under their care; whereby great mischief cannot but follow.

§11. The sovereignty of Adam being that on which, as a sure basis, our A. builds his mighty absolute monarchy, I expected, that, in his Patriarcha, this his main supposition would have been proved and established with all that evidence of arguments that such a fundamental tenet required; and that this, which the great stress of the business depends, would have been made out, with reasons sufficient to justify the confidence with which it was assumed. But, in all that treatise, I could find very little tending that way; the thing is there so taken for granted, without proof, that I could scarce believe myself, when, upon attentive reading that treatise, I found there so mighty a structure raised upon the bare supposition of this foundation. For it is scarce credible, that in a discourse, where he pretends to confute the erroneous principle of man’s natural freedom, he should do it by a bare supposition of Adam’s authority, without offering any proof for that authority. Indeed, he confidently says, that Adam had “royal authority, p. 12 and 13. Absolute lordship and dominion of life and death, p. 13. A universal monarchy, p. 83. Absolute power of life and death,” p. 35. He is very frequent in such assertions; but, what is strange, in all his whole Patriarcha, I find not one presence of a reason to establish this his great foundation of government; not anything that looks like an argument, but these words: “To confirm this natural right of regal power, we find in the Decalogue, that the law which enjoins obedience to kings, is delivered ill the terms, honor thy father; as if all power were originally in the father.” And why may I not add as well, that in the Decalogue the law that enjoins obedience to queens, is delivered in the terms of “Honor thy mother,” as if all power were originally in the mother? The argument, as sir Robert puts it, will hold as well for one as the other; but of this more in its due place.

§12. All that I take notice of here is, that this is all our A. says, in this first, or any of the following chapters, to prove the absolute power of Adam, which is his great principle: and yet, as if he had there settled it upon sure demonstration, he begins his second chapter with these words, “By conferring these proofs and reasons, drawn from the authority of the Scripture.” Where those proofs and reasons for Adam’s sovereignty are, bating that of Honor thy father, above-mentioned, I confess, I cannot find; unless what he says, p. 11, “In these words we have an evident confession,” viz., of Bellarmine, “that creation made man prince of his posterity,” must be taken for proofs and reasons drawn from Scripture, or for any sort of proof at all: though from thence, by a new way of inference, in the words immediately following, he concludes the royal authority of Adam sufficiently settled in him.

§13. If he has in that chapter, or anywhere in the whole treatise, given any other proofs of Adam’s royal authority, other than by often repeating it, which, among some men, goes for argument, I desire anybody for him to show me the place and page, that I may be convinced of my mistake and acknowledge my oversight. If no such arguments are to be found, I beseech those men, who have so much cried up this book, to consider, whether they do not give the world cause to suspect that it is not the force of reason and argument that makes them for absolute monarchy, but some other by interest and therefore are resolved to applaud any author that writes in favor of this doctrine, whether he support it with reason or no. But I hope they do not expect, that rational and indifferent men should be brought over to their opinion, because this their great doctor of it, in a discourse made on purpose to set up the absolute monarchical power of Adam, in opposition to the natural freedom of mankind, has said so little to prove it, from whence it is rather naturally to be concluded, that there is little to be said.

§14. But that I might omit no care to inform myself in our author’s full sense, I consulted his Observations on Aristotle, Hobbes, &c. to see whether in disputing with others he made use of any arguments for this his darling tenet of Adam’s sovereignty; since in his treatise of the Natural Power of Kings, he hath been so sparing of them. In his Observations on Mr. Hobbes’s Leviathan, I think he has put, in short, all those arguments for it together, which in his writings I find him anywhere to make use of: his words are these: “If God created only Adam and of a piece of him made the woman and if by generation from them two, as parts of them, all mankind be propagated: if also God gave to Adam not only the dominion over the woman and the children that should issue from them, but also over all the earth to subdue it and over all the creatures on it, so that, as long as Adam lived, no man could claim or enjoy anything but by donation, assignation, or permission from him, I wonder,” &c. Obs. 165. Here we have the sum of all his arguments, for Adam’s sovereignty and against natural freedom, which I find up and down in his other treatises: and they are these following; “God s creation of Adam, the dominion he gave him over Eve and the dominion he had as father over his children; all which I shall particularly consider.

Chapter III - Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty by Creation.

§15. Sir Robert, in his preface to his Observations on Aristotle’s Politics, tells us, “A natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed, without the denial of the creation of Adam:” but how Adam’s being created, which was nothing but his receiving a being, immediately from Omnipotency and the hand of God, gave Adam a sovereignty over anything, I cannot see; nor consequently understand, how a supposition of natural freedom is a denial of Adam’s creation; and would be glad anybody else (since our A. did not vouchsafe us the favor) would make it out for him. For I find no difficulty to suppose the freedom of mankind, though I have always believed the creation of Adam. He was created, or began to exist, by God’s immediate power, without the intervention of parents, or the pre-existence of any of the same species to beget him, when it pleased God he should; and so did the lion, the king of beasts, before him, by the same creating power of God: and if bare existence by that power and in that way, will give dominion, without any more ado, our A. by this argument, will make the hon have as good a title to it as he and certainly the ancienter. No; for Adam had his title “by the appointment of God,” says our A. in another place. Then bare creation gave him not dominion and one might have supposed mankind free, without the denying the creation of Adam, since it was God’s appointment made him monarch.

§16. But let us see how he puts his creation and this appointment together. “By the appointment of God, says sir Robert, as soon as Adam was created, he was monarch of the world, though he had no subjects; for though there could not be actual government till there were subjects, yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity: though not in act, yet at least in habit, Adam was a king from his creation.” I wish he had told us here, what he meant by God’s appointment. For whatsoever providence orders, or the law of nature directs, or positive revelation declares, may be said to be by God s appointment: but I suppose it cannot be meant here in the first sense, i.e., by providence; because that would be to say no more, but that as soon as Adam was created, he was de facto monarch, because by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity. But he could not, de facto, be by providence constituted the governor of the world, at a time when there was actually no government, no subjects to be governed, which our A. here confesses. Monarch of the world is also differently used by our A., for sometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world, exclusive of the rest of mankind and thus he does in the same page of his preface before cited: “Adam, says he, being commanded to multiply and people the earth and subdue it and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world; none of his posterity had any right to possess anything but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him.” 2. Let us understand then, by monarch, proprietor of the world and, by appointment, God’s actual donation and revealed positive grant made to Adam, Gen. i. 28, as we see sir Robert himself does in this parallel place; and then his argument wills tend thus: “by the positive grant of God: as soon as Adam was created, he was proprietor of the world, because by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity.” In which way of arguing there are two manifest falsehoods. First, it is false, that God made that grant to Adam, as soon as he was created, since, though it stands in the text immediately after his creation, yet it is plain it could not be spoken to Adam till after Eve was made and brought to him; and how then could he be monarch by appointment as soon as created, especially since he calls, if I mistake not, that which God says to Eve, Gen. iii. 16, the original grant of government, which not being till after the fall, when Adam was somewhat, at least in time and very much distant in condition, from his creation, I cannot see, how our A. can say in this sense, that, “by God’s appointment, as soon as Adam was created, he was monarch of the world.” Secondly, were it true, that God’s actual donation “appointed Adam monarch of the world, as soon as he was created,” yet the reason here given for it would not prove it; but it would always be a false inference that God, by a positive donation, “appointed Adam monarch of the world, because by right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity:” for having given him the right of government by nature, there was no need of a positive donation; at least it will never be a proof of such a donation.

§17. On the other side, the matter will not be much mended, if we understand by God’s appointment the law of nature, (though it be a pretty harsh expression for it in this place) and by monarch of the world, sovereign ruler of mankind: for then the sentence under consideration must run thus: “By the law of nature, as soon as Adam was created he was governor of mankind, for by right of nature it divas due to Adam to be governor of his posterity;” which amounts to this, he was governor by right of nature, because he was governor by right of nature. But supposing we should grant, that a man is by nature governor of his children, Adam could not hereby be monarch as soon as created: for this right of nature being founded in his being their father, how Adam could have a natural right to be governor, before he was a father, Men by being a father only he had that right, is, methinks, hard to conceive, unless he would have him to be a father before he was a father and have a title before he had it.

§18. To this foreseen objection, our A. answers very logically, “He was governor in habit and not in act:” a very pretty way of being a governor without government, a father without children and a king without subjects. And thus sir Robert was an author before he writ his book; not in fact, it is true, but in habit; for when he had once published it, it was due to him, by the right of nature, to be an author, as much as it was to Adam to be governor of his children, when he had begot them; and if to be such a monarch of the world, an absolute monarch in habit, but not in act, will serve the turn, I should not much envy it to any of sir Robert’s friends, that he thought fit graciously to bestow it upon; though even this of act and habit, if it signified anything but our A.’s skill in distinctions be not to his purpose in this place. For the question is not here about Adam’s actual exercise of government, but actually having a title to be governor. Government, says our A. was “due to Adam by the right of nature:” what is this right of nature? A right fathers have over their children by begetting them; generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos, says our A. out of Grotius, de J. B. P. L. 2. C. 5. S. 1. The right then follows the begetting as arising from it; so that, according to this way of reasoning or distinguishing of our A. Adam, as soon as he was created, had a title only in habit and not in act, which in plain English is, he had actually no title at all.

§19. To speak less learnedly and more intelligibly, one may say of Adam, he was in a possibility of being governor, since it was possible he might beget children, laid thereby acquire that right of nature, be it what it will, to govern them, that accrues from thence: but what connexion has this with Adam’s creation, to make him say, that “as soon as he was created, he was monarch of the world?” For it may as well be said of Noah, that as soon as he was born he was monarch of the world, since he was in possibility (which in our A.’s sense is enough to make a monarch, “a monarch in habit,”) to outlive all mankind but his own posterity. What such necessary connexion there is betwixt Adam’s creation and his right to government, so that a “natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of Adam,” I confess for my part I do not see; nor how those words, “by the appointment,” &c. Obs. 254, however explained, can be put together, to make any tolerable sense, at least to establish this position, with which they end, viz., “Adam was a king from his creation;” a king, says our author, “not in act, but in habit,” i.e., actually no king at all.

§20. I fear I have tried my reader’s patience, by dwelling longer on this passage than the weightiness of any argument in it seems to require: but I have unavoidably been engaged in it by our author’s way of writing, who, huddling several suppositions together and that in doubtful and general terms, makes such a medley and confusion, that it is impossible to show his mistakes, without examining the several senses wherein his words may be taken and without seeing how, in any of these various meanings, they will consist together and have any truth in then: for in this present passage before us, how can anyone argue against this position of his, “that Adam was a king from his creation,” unless one examine, whether the words, “from his creation,” be to be taken, as they may, for the time of the commencement of his government, as the fore going words import, “as soon as he was created he was monarch;” or, for the cause of it, as he says, p. 11, “creation made man prince of his posterity?” How farther can one judge of the truth of his being thus king, till one has examined whether king be to be taken, as the words in the beginning of this passage would persuade, on supposition of his private dominion which was, lay God’s positive grant, “monarch of the world by appointment;” or king on supposition of lies fatherly power over his offspring, which was by nature, “due by the right of nature;” whether, I say, king be to be taken in both, or one only of these two senses, or in neither of them, but only this, that creation made him prince, in a way different from both the other? For though this assertion, that “Adam was king from his creation,” be true in no sense, yet it stands here as an evident conclusion drawn from the preceding words, though in truth it be but a bare assertion joined to other assertions of the same kind, which confidently put together in words of undetermined and dubious meaning, look like a sort of arguing, when there is indeed neither proof nor connexion; a way very familiar with our author; of which having given the reader a taste here, I shall, as much as the argument will permit me, avoid touching on hereafter; and should not have done it here, were it not to let the world see, how incoherences in matter and suppositions without proofs, put handsomely together in good words and a plausible style, are apt to pass for strong reason and good sense, till they come to be looked into with attention.

Chapter IV - Of Adam’s Title to Sovereignty, by Donation, Gen. i. 28.

§21. Having at last got through the foregoing passage, where we have been so long detained, not by the force of arguments and opposition, but by the intricacy of the words and the doubtfulness of the meaning; let us go on to his next argument, for Adam’s sovereignty. Our author tells us in the words of Mr. Selden, that “Adam by donation from God, Gen. i. 28, was made the general lord of all things, not without such a private dominion to himself, as without his grant did exclude his children. This determination of Mr. Selden, says our author, is consonant to the history of the Bible and natural reason,” Obs. 910. And in his Pref. to his Observations on Aristotle, he says thus, “The first government in the world was monarchical in the father of all flesh, Adam being commanded to multiply and people the earth and to subdue it and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world. None of his posterity had any right to possess anything, but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him. The earth, saith the Psalmist, hath he given to the children of men, which shows the title comes from fatherhood.”

§22. Before I examine this argument and the text on which it is founded, it is necessary to desire the reader to observe, that our author, according to his usual method, begins in one sense and concludes in another; he begins here with Adam’s propriety, or private dominion, by donation; and his conclusion is, “which shows the title comes from fatherhood.”

§23. But let us see the argument. The words of the text are these: “And God blessed them and God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth,” Gen. i. 28; from whence our author concludes, “that Adam, having here dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world:” whereby must be meant, that either this grant of God gave Adam property, or, as our author calls it, private dominion over the earth and all inferior or irrational creatures and so consequently that he was thereby monarch; or, 2dly, that it gave him rule and dominion over all earthly creatures whatsoever and thereby over his children; and so he was monarch: for, as Mr. Selden has properly worded it, “Adam was made general lord of all things,” one may very clearly understand him, that he means nothing to be granted to Adam here but property and therefore he says not one word of Adam’s monarchy. But our author says, “Adam was hereby monarch of the world,” which, properly speaking, signifies Sovereign ruler of all the men in the world; and so Adam, by this grant, must be constituted such a ruler. If our author means otherwise, he might with much clearness have said, that “Adam was hereby proprietor of the whole world.” But he begs your pardon in that point: clear distinct speaking not serving everywhere to his purpose, you must not expect it in him, as in Mr. Selden, or other such writers.

§24. In opposition, therefore, to our author’s doctrine, that “Adam was monarch of the whole world,” founded on this place, I shall show:

1. That by this grant, Gen. i. 28, God gave no immediate power to Adam over men, over his children, over those of his own species; and so he was not made ruler, or monarch, by this charter.

2. That by this grant God gave him not private dominion over the inferior creatures, but right in common with all mankind; so neither was he monarch upon the account of the property here given him.

§25. 1. That this donation, Gen. i. 28, gave Adam no power over men, will appear if we consider the words of it: for since all positive grants convey no more than the express words they are made in will carry, let us see which of them here will comprehend mankind or Adam’s posterity; and those I imagine, if any, must be these, “every living thing that moveth:” the words in Hebrew, i.e., bestiam reptantem, of which words the Scripture itself is the best interpreter: God having created the fishes and fowls the 5th day, the beginning of the 6th, he creates the irrational inhabitants of the dry land, which, ver. 24, are described in these words, “Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind; cattle and creeping thins and beasts of the earth, after his kind; and ver. 2 and God made the beasts of the earth after his kind and cattle after their kind and everything that creepeth on the earth after his kind:” here, in the creation of the brute inhabitants of the earth, he first speaks of them all under one general name, of living creatures and then afterwards divides them into three ranks, 1. Cattle, or such creatures as were or might be tame and so be the private possession of particular men; 2, ver. 24, 25, in our Bible, is translated beasts and by the Septuagint wild beasts and is the same word, that here in our text, ver. 28, where we have this great charter to Adam, is translated living thing and is also the same word used, Gen. ix. 2, where this grant is renewed to Noah and there likewise translated beast. 3. The third rank were the creeping animals, which, ver. 24, 25, are comprised, the same that is used here, ver. 28 and is translated moving, but in the former verses creeping and by the Septuagint in all these places, reptiles; from whence it appears, that the words which we translate here in God’s donation, ver. 28, “living creatures moving,” are the same, which in the history of the creation, ver. 24, 25, signify two ranks of terrestrial creatures, viz., wild beasts and reptiles and are so understood by the Septuagint.

§26. When God had made the irrational animals of the world, divided into three kinds, from the places of their habitation, viz., fishes of the sea, fowls of the air and living creatures of the earth and these again into cattle, wild beasts and reptiles; he considers of making man and the dominion he should have over the terrestrial world, ver. 26 and then he reckons up the inhabitants of these three kingdoms, but in the terrestrial leaves out the second rank wild beasts: but here, ver. 28, where he actually exercises this design and gives him this dominion, the text mentions the fishes of the sea and fowls of the air and the terrestrial creatures in the words that signify the wild beasts and reptiles, though translated living thing that moveth, leaving out cattle. In both which places, though the word that signifies wild beasts be omitted in one and that which signifies cattle in the other, yet, since God certainly executed in one lilacs, what he declares he designed in the other, we cannot but understand the same in both places and have here only an account how the terrestrial irrational animals, which were already created and reckoned up at their creation, in three distinct ranks of cattle, wild beasts and reptiles, were here, ver. 28, actually put under the dominion of man, as they were designed, ver. 26; nor do these words contain in them the least appearance of anything that can be wrested to signify God’s giving to one man dominion over another, to Adam over his posterity.

§27. And this further appears front Gen. ix. 2, where God renewing this charter to Noah and his sons, he gives them dominion over the fowls of the air and the fishes of the sea and the terrestrial creatures, expressed by wild beasts and reptiles, the same words that in the text before us, Gen. i. 28, are translated every moving thing that moveth on the earth, which by no means can comprehend man, the grant being made to Noah and his sons, all the men then living and not to one part of men over another; which is yet more evident from the very next words, ver. 3, where God gives every “every moving thing,” the very words used ch. i. 28, to them for food. By all which it is plain that God’s donation to Adam, ch. i. 28 and his designation, ver. 26 and his grant again to Noah and his sons; refer to and contain in them, neither more nor less than the works of the creation the fifth day and the beginning of the sixth, as they are set down from the both to 26th ver. inclusively of the 1st ch. and so comprehend all the species of irrational animals of the terraqueous globe; though all the words, whereby they are expressed in the history of their creation, are nowhere used in any of the following grants, but some of them omitted in one and some in another From whence I think it is past all doubt that man cannot be comprehended in this grant, nor any dominion over those of his own species be conveyed to Adam. All the terrestrial irrational creatures are enumerated at their creation, ver. 25, under the names, “beasts of the earth, cattle and creeping things;” but man, being not then created, was not contained under any of those names; and therefore, whether we understand the Hebrew words right or no, they cannot be supposed to comprehend man, in the very same history and the very next verses following, especially since that Hebrew word which, if any in this donation to Adam, ch. i. 28, must comprehend man, is so plainly used in contradistinction to him, as Gen. vi. 20. vii. 14, 21, 28. Gen. viii. 17, 19. And if God made all mankind slaves to Adam and his heirs, by giving Adam dominion over “every living thing that moveth on the earth,” ch. i. 28, as our author would have it; methinks sir Robert should leave carried his monarchical power one step higher and satisfied the world that princes might eat their subjects too, since God gave as full power to Noah and his heirs, ch. ix. 2, to eat “every living thing that moveth,” as he did to Adam to have dominion over them; the Hebrew word in both places being the same.