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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Serie: UFAW Animal Welfare
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
Animal Welfare An Accessible Overview of the Concept of Sentience Throughout the Animal Kingdom and Why It Matters to Humans Animal Welfare explores the concept of sentience and the development of sentient minds throughout the animal kingdom. The work provides improved definitions and analysis of the ideas of sentience, cognition, and consciousness, along with evidence of advanced mental formulation in birds, fish, and invertebrates. Considerations between humans and animals are also discussed, such as outcome-based ethics in relation to humans' duties of care and the rights and wrongs of domestication. The work is divided into three parts and covers key topics such as: * Specifics of animal sentience, from pain and suffering, to fear and dread, all the way to animals' social life and the comfort/joy/hope/despair they experience * What we know about the sentience of different classes of animals in the waters, air, savannah/plains, and forests * Considerations on human interactions based on animal sentience, including death (killing), animal farms, animals in laboratories, wild animals in captivity, and animals in sports and entertainment * Analysis on what humans can learn from animals based on what we know about their varying levels of sentience Animal Welfare serves as an invaluable analysis of animal sentience for students, teachers, and professionals directly involved in the study, teaching, and applications of animal behavior, motivation, and welfare. Thanks to the wide-ranging implications of animal sentience, the work will also appeal to everyone with a broader interest in animal behavior and human/animal interactions.
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Table of Contents
Cover
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
About the Author
Preface
Acknowledgements and Apologies
Part 1: The Sentient Mind
1 Setting the Scene
Human Attitudes to Animals
Animal Behaviour Science
Rules of Engagement
2 Sentience and the Sentient Mind
Sentience, Consciousness and the Mind
The Five Skandhas of Sentience
Understanding the Sentient Mind
Pain and Suffering
Fear and Dread
Coping with Challenge: Stress and Boredom
Social Life
Comfort and Joy
Hope and Despair
Sex and Love
Summary
3 Special Senses and Their Interpretation
Vision
Hearing
Smell and Taste
Cutaneous Sensation, Touch
Magnetoreception
Interpreting the Special Senses
Theory of Mind, or Metarepresentation
Summary
4 Survival Strategies
Foraging
Hunting Behaviour: The Predator and the Prey
Spatial Awareness and Navigation
Breeding Behaviour and Parental Care
5 Social Strategies
Sentient Social Life
Social Hierarchies: The Pecking Order
Communication
Cooperation and Empathy
Social Learning, Education and Culture
Territorial Behaviour and Tribalism
Part 2: Shaping Sentient Minds
6 Animals of the Waters
Pain and Fear
Survival Skills: Hunting, Hiding and Problem Solving
Migration
Communication and Social Behaviour
7 Animals of the Air
Feeding Strategies
Migration
Sentience and Breeding Behaviour
Social Behaviour, Culture and Education
Bats
8 Animals of the Savannah and Plains
Environmental Challenges
Animals of the Open Plains
Sheep
Goats
Cattle
Wild Bovidae
Feral Horses
Elephants
Predators
9 Animals of the Forest
The Boreal Forest
Cervidae
Beavers
Bears
The Tropical Rain Forests
Snakes
Primates
10 Close Neighbours
History of Domestication
Artificial Selection and Unnatural Breeding
Domestication, Sentience and Wellbeing
Pigs
Dogs
Cats
Dairy Cows
Horses and Donkeys
Chickens
Opportunist Neighbours: Rats and Urban Foxes
Coda
Part 3: Why it matters
11 Our Duty of Care
Sentience Revisited
Outcome‐based Ethics
Death and Killing
Farms, Farmed Animals and Food
Animals in Laboratories
Wild Animals in Captivity
Animals in Sport and Entertainment
Pets
What can We Learn from the Animals?
Further Reading
General Reading
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 10
Table 10.1 Threats to the physical and emotional wellbeing of breeding sows ...
Chapter 11
Table 11.1 Emotional and cognitive expressions of sentience with welfare imp...
Table 11.2 Food and farming: the ethical matrix.
Table 11.3 Application of the ethical matrix to procedures with laboratory a...
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 Cordelia at play. (from Webster, 1994)
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1 The five skandhas or circles of sentience. The solid arrows indic...
Figure 2.2 The sentient mind.
Figure 2.3 Fear, threats reactions and consequences.
Figure 2.4 Coping with challenge.
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1 Goats at salt licks in the Rocky Mountains. Raymond Gehman/Corbis...
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1 The honeybee’s waggle dance
Figure 4.2 Archerfish strike. FLPA/Alamy Stock Photo.
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1 A murmuration of starlings. Steve Littlewood/Photodisc/Getty Imag...
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1 A beaver dam and lodge. Note the separate ‘drying‐off’ and sleepi...
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1 The author relaxing among friends
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1 Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs
Guide
Cover Page
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication Page
About the Author
Preface
Acknowledgements and Apologies
Table of Contents
Begin Reading
Further Reading
General Reading
Index
Wiley End User License Agreement
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The Universities Federation for Animal Welfare
UFAW, founded in 1926, is an internationally recognised, independent, scientific and educational animal welfare charity that promotes high standards of welfare for farm, companion, laboratory and captive wild animals, and for those animals with which we interact in the wild. It works to improve animals’ lives by:
Funding and publishing developments in the science and technology that underpin advances in animal welfare;
Promoting education in animal care and welfare;
Providing information, organising meetings and publishing books, videos, articles, technical reports and the journal Animal Welfare;
Providing expert advice to government departments and other bodies and helping to draft and amend laws and guidelines;
Enlisting the energies of animal keepers, scientists, veterinarians, lawyers and others who care about animals.
Improvements in the care of animals are not now likely to come of their own accord, merely by wishing them: there must be research…and it is in sponsoring research of this kind, and making its results widely known, that UFAW performs one of its most valuable services.
Sir Peter Medawar CBE FRS, 8 May 1957
Nobel Laureate (1960), Chairman of the UFAW Scientific Advisory Committee (1951–1962)
UFAW relies on the generosity of the public through legacies and donations to carry out its work, improving the welfare of animals now and in the future. For further information about UFAW and how you can help promote and support its work, please contact us at the following address:
Universities Federation for Animal Welfare
The Old School, Brewhouse Hill, Wheathampstead, Herts AL4 8AN, UK
Tel: 01582 831818 Website: www.ufaw.org.uk
Email: [email protected]
UFAW’s aim regarding the UFAW/Wiley‐Blackwell Animal Welfare book series is to promote interest and debate in the subject and to disseminate information relevant to improving the welfare of kept animals and of those harmed in the wild through human agency. The books in this series are the works of their authors, and the views they express do not necessarily reflect the views of UFAW.
Animal Welfare
Understanding Sentient Minds and Why it Matters
John Webster, MA, Vet MB, PhD, DVM (Hon)
Emeritus Professor of Animal Husbandry
University of Bristol School of Veterinary Science
Bristol Centre for Animal Behaviour and Welfare Science
Bristol, UK
This edition first published 2022© 2022 Universities Federation for Animal Welfare. Published 2022 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data
Names: Webster, John, 1938– author.Title: Animal welfare. Understanding sentient minds and why it matters / John Webster.Other titles: Understanding sentient minds and why it matters | UFAW animal welfare seriesDescription: Hoboken, NJ : Wiley‐Blackwell, 2022. | Series: UFAW/Wiley‐Blackwell animal welfare book seriesIdentifiers: LCCN 2022001000 (print) | LCCN 2022001001 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119857068 (paperback) | ISBN 9781119857075 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781119857082 (epub)Subjects: MESH: Animal WelfareClassification: LCC HV4708 (print) | LCC HV4708 (ebook) | NLM HV 4708 | DDC 636.08/32–dc23/eng/20220204LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022001000LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022001001
Cover Design: WileyCover Images: © Judy Tomlinson/Getty Images; Agus Mahmuda/Getty Images; Paul Souders/ Getty Images; Pakkawit Anantaya/Getty Images
To a startled mouse, and a serene rat, who gave me the idea.
About the Author
John Webster
John Webster is Emeritus Professor of Animal Husbandry, University of Bristol School of Veterinary Science and founder of the internationally recognised Bristol Centre for Animal Behaviour and Welfare Science. His previous books include Animal Welfare: A Cool Eye towards Eden, Limping towards Eden and Animal Husbandry Regained.
Preface
This is the third Animal Welfare book that I have written in a series published by the Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW). Each book has been designed to reflect stages on a journey. The first in the series, ‘A Cool Eye towards Eden’ (1994) imagined an ideal world for all sentient animals defined by a perfect expression of the five freedoms, acknowledged that while this was unachievable, it was the right way to travel and outlined the path. It posed two questions: ‘How is it for them?’ and ‘What can we do for them?’ It addressed the physiological and psychological (body and mind) determinants of animal welfare and outlined an approach to promoting their wellbeing on the farm, in the laboratory and in the home. It closed with a restatement of the view of Eden in the words of Albert Schweitzer ‘Until he extends his circle of compassion to all living things, man himself will not find peace.’
My second book, ‘Limping towards Eden’ (2005), was written at a time of intensive activity in animal welfare science and sought to incorporate this new knowledge into good practice in regard to our approach to, and treatment of, animals in our care. Its closing words were more downbeat. We are on an endless journey towards an impossible dream but ‘the path of duty lies in what is near. We may never expect to see our final destination but, for those who are prepared to open their eyes, the immediate horizon is full of promise.’
What these first two books had in common is that both were primarily concerned with practical solutions to problems of animal welfare based on better understanding of their physical and behavioural needs. While this latest book is based on the same principles of respect for animals‐ my views haven’t changed – the subject matter is very different. It is a very different journey: a voyage of exploration into the animal mind, the nature and extent of sentience and consciousness in different species and how these have been shaped by the challenges of their environment. In Part 1, I set out the operation manual and toolbox of special senses, physical and mental faculties available to all sentient animals as their instinctive birth‐right and explore how animals with the properties of a sentient mind are able to build on this birth‐right and develop survival and social strategies to promote their wellbeing and perfect their use of the tools available to them at birth. In Part 2 I review how sentient minds have been shaped through adaptation to their natural environments. I consider first animals of the waters and the air; least subject to interference from that most invasive of terrestrial species, mankind. Terrestrial mammals are considered in two groups, first the herbivores, carnivores and omnivores of the open plains, then the animals of the forests and jungles, with special attention to the physical and social skills needed for life in the three dimensions of the tree canopy. In this section there is some repetition of the themes introduced in Part 1. This is necessary to put these properties of sentience into their environmental context and (under pressure) I have tried to keep them as brief as possible. The last chapter in this section considers how the finely tuned balance between inherited and acquired senses and skills in different natural environments has been affected by domestication, giving special concern to those animals whose behaviour has been most affected by human interference, dogs, pigs and horses. Since my aim is to look at animals through their eyes, not ours, human attitudes are kept, wherever possible, off the page. However, in the final chapter, ‘Our duty of care’, I address the second clause in my title. I examine human attitudes and actions in regard to other animals on the basis that animals with sentient minds have feelings that matter to them, so they should matter to us too. I review how we can apply our understanding of the sentient mind to meet our responsibilities and govern our approach to animals in the home, on farms, in sport and entertainment, in laboratories and in the wild. This brief voyage into the animal mind is based, wherever possible on evidence from science and sound practice. However, it regularly ventures into uncharted waters so contains almost as much speculation as hard evidence and makes no claim to be definitive. It has not been my aim to present a comprehensive, balanced review of existing knowledge and understanding in relation to animal minds but to stimulate the desire in your mind to learn more. The better we understand our fellow mortals, the more likely it is that we can be good neighbours.
Acknowledgements and Apologies
The aim of all educational books is to contribute to knowledge and understanding. My book is addressed to all who care for sentient animals, which is a much broader reading public than just academics and students diligently studying animal welfare as a part of their formal education. However, it must carry the authority that comes from diligent research. Just as the animals acquire different skills to meet different challenges, being expert in some things, ignorant of others, so too the academics. With this I mind, I must acknowledge at the outset that this book is crazily ambitious in scope. It carries the scent of ‘life, the universe and everything’ in that it seeks to embrace the full extent of our knowledge and understanding of the sentient minds of animals in the context of the full range of challenges and opportunities presented by life on earth. Moreover, I acknowledge, it abounds in speculation. Many millions of words have been written by scientists, philosophers and fellow travellers seeking to understand the minds of animals, how they are shaped by their environments and how these are linked to the workings of the brain. My reading of this is wide but, inevitably less wide than it could be. If I were to attempt to acknowledge the sources of every assertion made in this book, the list of references would be longer than the book itself and even then, I would be guilty of omitting at least as many seminal references as I included. Moreover, a comprehensive list of references intended to direct a library search no longer carries the importance it once had. In recent years, my research, like that of everybody else, has been made so much quicker and more comprehensive by the reading and careful interpretation of on‐line information from sources such as Google Scholar and Wikipedia. Readers wishing to confirm or contest my assertions in regard to well‐documented issues, or simply seek further and better particulars, should be able to get access to almost all my sources in two to three clicks. In the section ‘Further Reading’, I list a number of good books that expand on some of the big topics presented here in brief. Most of the specific references listed under further reading deal with material taken from a specific scientific communication. When I speculate beyond the constraints of the literature and cannot therefore stand on the shoulders of others, I strive always to conform to first principles of science that apply across a broad spectrum so do not need the support of written evidence relating to every possible circumstance. Water runs downhill, wherever one happens to be.
I have spent over 60 years working with animals, thinking about animals, discussing animals with wise colleagues, writing and teaching about animals. I cannot possibly acknowledge by name all those who have guided and developed my thoughts: distinguished colleagues who have enriched my understanding; razor‐sharp students who have challenged my convictions. I have therefore taken the easy option and never (well, almost never) named names. Those of you who read this book and recognise that I am talking about you, please accept my heartfelt thanks. I would make one exception to my policy of not naming names. I am deeply indebted to Birte Nielsen of UFAW, who has conscientiously and wisely helped to knock this manuscript into shape, purged me of repetitions and reined me in whenever my imagination was getting out of hand.
Part 1The Sentient Mind: Skills and Strategies
I think I could turn and live with animals…I look at them long and long.
They do not sweat and whine about their condition.
They do not lie awake at night and whine about their sins.
Not one is dissatisfied. Not one is demented by the mania of owning things.
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.
From Walt Whitman, Song of Myself
1 Setting the Scene
Some years ago, I took part in a late night, ‘bear‐pit’ style television debate on the rights and wrongs of fishing. My role was to present scientific evidence as to whether fish can experience pain and fear. In brief, the evidence shows they can. After I had outlined the results of this work, a member of the audience got up and said ‘This is all rubbish. These scientists don’t know what they are talking about. I have been fishing all my life and I know for certain that fish don’t feel anything’. He then added ‘What sort of fish were they anyway? and when I said ‘carp’ he said: ‘Ah well, carp are clever buggers’. These four words encapsulate the need for this book. We sort of assume animals have minds. We may even think we understand the meaning of sentience but most of us don’t give it much thought, because, for most of us, most animals don’t much matter.
Figure 1.1 Cordelia at play. (from Webster, 1994)
This book is written for those for whom it matters a lot. My central aim is to equip you to seek a better understanding of the minds of sentient animals. To this end, it will not only give an outline review of existing knowledge relating to the mental processes that determine animal behaviour and welfare but also offer suggestions and guidance on how to approach subjects where we know little or have been relying on easy preconceptions. Those of us who embark on the scientific study of animal welfare, their needs, their behaviour and their motivation, are cautioned to avoid the fallacy of anthropomorphism: the fallacy of ascribing human characteristics to other animals. However, I suggest at the outset, that it is valid to apply a principle of reverse anthropomorphism that asks not ‘how would this chicken, cow, horse’ feel if it were me but how would I feel if I were one of them?’ As we shall see, thought experiments based on the principle of reverse anthropomorphism provide the basis for most studies in motivation analysis.
This voyage into the minds of sentient minds is going to be quite a journey. The nature of sentience is far too complex to be encapsulated within a one‐line definition, such as ‘the capacity to experience feelings’. Chapter 2 examines in detail the meaning and nature of consciousness and the sentient mind within the animal kingdom. To keep this enquiry as simple as possible, I shall consider the animal mind almost entirely as an abstract concept, within the brain and powered by the brain (mostly), but as an intangible compendium of information bank, instruction manual, filter and digital processor of incoming sensations and information. It is not too far‐fetched to make the analogy with the digital computer and describe the brain as the hardware and the mind as the software. The neurophysiology involved in driving the hardware has its own beauty, but that is another story.
Through evolution by natural selection, animals have acquired behavioural skills appropriate to their design (phenotype) and natural environment. All animals are equipped at birth with a basic set of mental software: instructions genetically coded as a result of generations of adaptation to the physical and social challenges of the environments in which they evolved. This, which I shall hereafter refer to as their mental birth‐right, is instinctive and hard wired. In some species that we may define as primitive, their responses to stimuli may always be restricted to invariant, hard‐wired, pre‐programmed responses to sensations induced by environmental stimuli. According to one’s definition, this alone may be sufficient to classify them as sentient. However, throughout the animal kingdom, from the octopus to the great apes, we find overwhelming evidence of species that exhibit sentience to a higher degree. They build on this instinctive birthright and develop their minds. They learn to recognise, interpret and memorise new experiences in the form of feelings, good, bad or indifferent, and develop patterns of behaviour designed to promote their wellbeing measured, in all cases, in terms of primitive needs such as the relief of hunger and pain and, within the deeper, inner circles of sentience, feelings of companionship, comfort and joy. The ability to operate on the basis of knowledge acquired from experience, rather than pure instinct, enriches the physical and mental skills the sentient animal can recruit to cope with the challenges of life and promote an emotional sense of wellbeing. It also carries the potential for suffering when coping becomes too difficult.
The physical and mental skills and resources present at birth are those acquired through adaptation of their ancestors to the ancestral environment, because these were the skills that mattered the most. Animals that demonstrate deeper degrees of sentience have the capacity to develop these inborn, instinctive skills throughout their lifetime and teach these new skills to subsequent generations. Differing demands of differing environments mean that each species exhibits a portfolio of skills most appropriate to their special needs. It follows that, in our eyes, individual species may appear to be brilliant at some things and dumb at others. Raptor birds that hunt by day develop an exquisite visual ability to locate their prey whereas bats that hunt at night use radar based on ultrasound. The albatross can navigate its way home to its nest across the barren expanses of the Southern Ocean but will fail to recognise its chick if it has blown out of the nest. Domestication distorts the process of natural selection in two ways. We compel these animals to adapt to an environment largely determined by us, and this may be very different from that of their ancestors. We also introduce the entirely unnatural business of breeding: we tinker with the physical and mental phenotype of our animals to suit our needs for food, fashion, recreation or unqualified love.
We cannot observe animals through our eyes and conclude that any one species is better, or more highly developed than another. Each species adapts to meet its own special needs and the skills required to meet these needs vary in their nature and complexity. Pigs are good at being pigs, sheep are good at being sheep. Rats are very good at being rats because they have had to develop the physical and mental skills necessary for survival in a complex and frequently hostile environment. Sharks are very good at being sharks but, because they have thrived for millennia in a food‐rich, stable environment, they have never really had to think. Many dogs are not very good at being dogs because they have not had the chance to grow up in an environment of dogs.
Human Attitudes to Animals
Most of this book is devoted to an exploration of the minds of sentient animals, their feelings, thoughts and motivation to behaviour seen so far as possible, through their own eyes. Human attitudes to animals would be irrelevant were it not for the fact that our actions, based on our attitudes, can have such a profound effect on their lives. In an earlier book, ‘Animal Welfare: A Cool Eye towards Eden’ (76) I wrote ‘Man has dominion over the animals whether we like it or not. Wherever we share space on the planet, and this includes all but the most inaccessible regions of land, sea and air, it is we that determine where and how they shall live. We may elect to put a battery hen in a cage or establish a game reserve to protect the tiger but in each case the decision is ours, not theirs. We make a pet of the hamster but poison the rat. These human decisions are driven by the same incentives that motivate non‐human animals since they reflect the will of us as individuals and as a species to survive and achieve a sense of well‐being. We need good food and we seek highly nutritious eggs at little cost. We need good hygiene and seek to remove rats that carry germs. We choose to provide for our pets in sickness and in health because they enrich the lives of us and our children. We admire the tiger not only for its fearful symmetry but as a symbol of freedom itself, so we offer it more freedom than we give the laying hen. However, in either case it is impossible to escape the conclusion that both are living on our terms.’
The history of human attitudes to animals (and to other humans) is awash with ignorance and inhumanity. The European Judeo‐Christian belief was inscribed in Genesis as ‘every beast of the earth and every fowl of the air…I have given for meat’. The attitude of other religions to non‐human animals varies. Of the Eastern religions, Taoism and Buddhism recognise the sentience of our fellow mortals and treat them with respect. More of this later. So far as I can gather, Confucianism regards non‐human animals as commodities or tools, and therefore ‘off the page’ so far as philosophy is concerned. Islam and Judaism display rituals of respect for their food animals at the point of slaughter but these bring no comfort to the conscious animal while it bleeds to death. The Hindu veneration of the Holy Cow is driven more by fear of divine retribution than any concern for animal welfare.
The French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596–1650) sought to justify the Judeo‐Christian attitude by asserting that humans are fundamentally different from all other animals because we alone possess mind, or consciousness. His notorious phrase Cogito ergo sum – I think, therefore I am – further implied non cogitant ergo non sunt – they don’t think therefore they aren’t. He saw non‐human animals as automata, equivalent to clockwork toys, and thereby provided an ‘ethical’ basis for treating them simply as commodities on the assumption that it is not possible to be cruel to animals because they lack the capacity to suffer. His view may appear to us as totally lacking in any understanding of animals. However, he was not alone. For most of history, the moral concepts of right and wrong were applied only to intentions and actions within the human species. The utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) was an exception when he wrote of animals ‘the question is not can they reason…. but can they suffer?’. The supreme challenge to this limited concept of morality came from Albert Schweitzer who wrote ‘the great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they believed themselves to have to deal only with the relations of man to man. In reality, the question is what is his attitude to the world and all that comes within his reach’. This became the basis for his principle of reverence for life (10).
The last Century has seen a steady progression of the evolution of morality into law. The UK Protection of Animals Act (1911) made it an offence to ‘cause unnecessary suffering by doing or omitting to do any act’ (59). The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam acknowledged that ‘since animals are sentient beings, members should pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals’ (73). The UK Animal Welfare Act (2006) imposed a duty of care on responsible persons to provide for the basic needs of their animals (both farmed animals and pets) (25). This act signified a considerable advance, since it is no longer necessary to prove that suffering has occurred, it is only necessary to establish that animals are being kept or being bred in such a way that is liable to cause suffering. These proscriptive laws are written in broad terms, which gives them the flexibility to deal with a range of specific circumstances. However, they beg several questions: ‘what constitutes suffering, especially necessary suffering? ‘what are the welfare requirement of animals?’, and (above all) ‘what is meant by sentience?’ One of the main aims of this book is to guide all those directly and indirectly involved in matters of animal welfare (which means almost everybody) towards a deeper understanding of the complex biological and psychological properties of animal minds that determine their perception and their behaviour, thus determining the principles that should govern our approach to their welfare.
Despite the evidence of progress in the law relating to the protection of animals, there is still too much evidence of cruelty, both deliberate and mindless. Deliberate cruelty is a crime punishable by law and relatively rare. Mindless cruelty is far more common. It reflects a mindset conditioned by ignorance or training to the assumption that animals are automata, thus incapable of suffering. We are constantly presented with images of abuses to animals from all over the world. I cite only three examples.
A few years ago, Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) released a shocking video of behaviour in a small abattoir. Lambs for slaughter were hung up by driving a hook through their legs behind the Achilles tendon prior to stunning and having their throats cut. In this video, four lambs were hung on hooks and left to struggle while the slaughterman went off to smoke a cigarette. From the lambs’ perspective, this was cruelty in the extreme. I suggest, however, that from a human perspective this may not have been deliberate cruelty but an extreme case of mindlessness. It had never occurred to him, or been explained to him, that sentient animals are capable of suffering. If he had been really cruel, he would have watched.
My most extreme personal experience of the mindless ill‐treatment of animals came from a large commercial pig abattoir in Beijing. Pigs transported to the abattoir in crates had been gaffed by the neck and hauled out of their crates on long poles like inert sacks of corn. This was not only appallingly cruel, to our eyes, but spectacularly counterproductive because the pigs fought them every inch of the way. The Bristol team designed a humane handling system whereby the pigs were able to move out of the vehicles and down a well‐designed passage at their own speed with minimal stress and human interference. The abattoir owners were delighted with this new system because they were able to reduce the number of staff needed to ‘handle’ the pigs by over 50%.
These two instances of mindless ill‐treatment may be attributed to ignorance. However, ill‐treatment on an industrial scale, carried out with the approval of the highest authorities, remains a problem in the so‐called developed world and to the present day. The number of chickens killed and consumed by humans every day is approximately 70 million. Furthermore, most of them are unlikely to experience much that could be quality of life before they die. In the words of Ruth Harrison, the godmother of the Animal Welfare movement: ‘If one person is unkind to one animal, it is considered as cruelty but when a lot of people are unkind to a lot of animals, especially in the name of commerce, the cruelty is condoned and, once large sums of money are at stake, will be defended to the last by otherwise intelligent people’ (29). It was Ruth who pointed out the absurdity of the UK Protection of Birds Act (1964) which required any caged bird to be given enough space to flap its wings but then stated ‘provided this subsection does not apply to poultry’. This subsection meant that, at the time, the Act did not apply to about 99% of caged birds. This is perhaps the most egregious example of the fallacy of classifying animals as commodities in term of their utility to us, rather than as sentient beings whose minds have been shaped by their genetic inheritance and their individual experience of life. It was sustained public pressure generated by pioneers like Ruth Harrison that compelled the European Union to pronounce in the Treaty of Amsterdam that ‘Members shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals’ (73). This is a clumsy sentence from a clumsy clause that is also littered with caveats and exceptions for regional and religious practices. Nevertheless, it did recognise in law the principle that animals used by us for food, scientific enquiry, or health and safety legislation should not be considered simply as commodities but treated with respect and concern for their wellbeing.
Animal Behaviour Science
This exploration of the minds of sentient animals draws heavily on scientific studies of animal psychology and behaviour. The scientific investigation of animal behaviour is concentrated on two main themes. The first is the study of how animals behave in their natural habitat. This can establish their behavioural needs and the actions they perform to meet these needs. From this, we can build up a reasonably comprehensive picture of the resources (e.g. diet, physical and social environment) they require to achieve a sense of physical and mental wellbeing. With this information to hand, we can devise management policies that seek to address these needs whenever we modify their natural habitat to suit our own needs for food, companionship, sport, safety or scientific endeavour.
The second approach is to present animals with a set of questions relating to their perceived needs and measure their responses. This is the science of motivation analysis (16). The simplest version of this approach is the Preference Test. In a typical experiment, the animal is given a choice, e.g. between two foods or two environments and invited to demonstrate a preference. The choice may be between options that we guess might create more or less satisfaction (e.g. two types of bedding material for pigs), or between options that may be more or less aversive (e.g. barren vs. enriched cages for hens). One classic approach is to place the animal in a T maze that allows it to choose between the two options of taking the path to the right or the left. This can tell us quite a lot. Pet food manufacturers may discover flavours preferred by cats (although cats are fickle creatures). Designers of enriched environments for intensively reared pigs or chickens can get some idea of the fixtures and fittings that these animals appear to favour or avoid. However, preference tests can sometimes reveal evidence to indicate that the scientist and the experimental animals are not thinking the same way. In one such experiment, mice were asked to choose between two environments deemed by the scientist to be more or less enriched by traversing a narrow tunnel between the two. Most mice chose to spend the majority of time in the tunnel. For them, this was better than either of the choices on offer (66). The scientists had assumed the mice would choose on the basis of comfort, whereas, in their minds, we must assume that the primary need was for a sense of security. The scientists posed a specific question to these mice and got an unexpected answer. It was the wrong question, but they had a better understanding of mice as a result.
The main limitation of the preference test is that it makes no distinction between choices that are trivial and those that really matter. A more advanced approach to motivation analysis is to measure the strength of motivation by how hard an animal is prepared to work to get a reward in the form of a pleasant experience such as food, or relief from an unpleasant experience such as cold, pain, isolation, or a barren environment (16,45). Examples of the currency used to measure cost include the number of times the animal has to press a lever, or the amount of pressure it has to exert on a gate to obtain the reward. Specific rewards are ranked as more or less price elastic or price inelastic. Most animals, unless satiated, will continue to work for a food reward as the price is increased, which makes it price inelastic. The marginal reward of a different lying surface, e.g. straw vs. wood shavings may be price elastic: i.e. not worth too much effort. While the preference test can do no more than establish behavioural priorities, motivation analysis can determine how much these things matter.
The aim of motivation analysis is to devise tests that enable an animal (e.g. a rat or chicken) to demonstrate, by way of its actions, how it feels about the challenge with which it is faced, positive, negative, or indifferent. Having demonstrated that the test animal is motivated to act to receive a specific reward such as food or avoid a potentially unpleasant experience such as isolation or confinement, the scientist then measures the price the animal is prepared to pay to improve its welfare. They observe this behaviour, review the results in the light of current understanding as already described in the scientific ‘literature’ and form conclusions based on evidence as to the preferences and strength of motivation of the animal. This will be set out for publication in words, tables and diagrams. The scientist has used the medium of language to describe conclusions and decisions that arose first in the mind of the rat or chicken in order that other humans might better understand how it feels to be that chicken. This is reverse anthropomorphism, pure and simple.
There is another profound conclusion to be drawn from studies such as these; one that is key to our understanding of the minds of our fellow mortals. Presented with a specific question, which can be quite complex, the rat or chicken has analysed the problem, worked out a satisfactory response and memorised the actions necessary to achieve that response without recourse to the uniquely human medium of the spoken and written language. Moreover, as we shall see later, the ability to solve simple problems set by scientists in the laboratory can be a very limited measure of an animal’s mental capacity. It pales into insignificance when set, for example, alongside the detailed large‐scale maps that a pigeon needs to carry in its head if it is to navigate its way home. Animals with sentient minds have the ability to acquire and retain a great deal of knowledge and understanding without the need for language as we understand it nor reference to external banks of information stored in libraries and/or Google. What is more, these animals may be able to convey this understanding to their offspring, i.e. to engage in the process of education. We are only just beginning to understand the capacity of non‐human animals to develop thought without language and convey these thoughts to others, but it is an ability worthy of the greatest respect.
Rules of Engagement
Two main themes run throughout this exploration of the minds of sentient animals.
Theme 1: The needs of a sentient animal are defined entirely by its own physical and emotional phenotype, its environment and its education, and these are independent of our own definition of the animals as:
Wild: subsets, game, (e.g. fox) vermin (rat), protected (badger)
Domestic: subsets, pet (dog), farm (pig), sport (horse)
In ‘A Cool Eye towards Eden’ I illustrated this theme with a picture of a brown rat in a larder. (Figure 1.1). I wrote at the time: ‘A normal reaction to the brief glimpse of a rat in one’s larder would be horror or, at least, a cold resolve to destroy the rat as quickly as possible, together with any others who happen to be around. Now study the picture more carefully. The rat is not only sleek to the point of being chubby but completely unalarmed by the flash photography, totally at ease in human company and altogether charming. Her name is Cordelia’. Once we give the rat a name we provoke a shift in attitude. Nevertheless, Cordelia was a rat, and a rat is a rat, whether we classify it as laboratory animal, vermin or pet. She adapted wonderfully well to an enriched environment with loving human contact (my adult daughter, also an academic). If she had grown up in the company of other rats in the wild, she would have adapted equally well to that and, in the interests of her own survival, become fearful and dangerous in the presence of humans. If she had spent most of her life isolated in a barren laboratory cage, she would have had limited opportunity to develop her mind through lack of experience and thus be unable to handle complex decisions such as how to reconcile fear and curiosity in the presence of a novel stimulus. However, the essence of the rat mind is the same, whatever its circumstances. We have no right to assume that some rats are more equal than others. The behavioural and emotional needs of any sentient animal are determined by its own sentience, and these are entirely independent of our perception of its lovability, palatability, utility or nuisance value. In the case of wild animals, be they rats, badgers or, indeed, elephants, there are valid reasons ranging from human health to sustainable management of habitat to operate a form of population control. However, the principle of respect for all life directs that this should be as humane as possible. Where there is no clear need for population control, the policy for wild animals should be to leave them well and leave them alone. The most humane approach to the sensitive and sustainable management of wild animals is to preserve their natural habitat and stay out of their way.
Theme 2: It is an anthropocentric fallacy to assume that the greater the similarity of an animal species to the human species, the more intelligent they are and the more worthy they are of our concern and respect.
It is in our human nature to express most concern for the animals that look and appear to behave most like us. We are conditioned to believe that humans are the most intelligent of the animal species, so assume that animals that evolved in ways most similar to us must rank second. Thus, not only in popular opinion but also in legislation we give more rights to primates than to pigs. The anthropocentric fallacy was well recognised by Darwin and is implicit in the title of his seminal work ‘The Descent (not the Ascent) of Man’. To give just one illustration of the flaw in this argument, corvid birds (e.g. crows) are better at problem solving than chimpanzees. Much more of this anon. However, this argument based simply on the basis of problem‐solving skills is, like all arguments based on selected evidence, far too simplistic. I shall seek to persuade you that it is pointless to claim that one animal species is more intelligent than another. Each sentient animal is born with, and further develops the mindset and skills most appropriate to its needs and these needs are defined by the environment to which it must adapt. When we seek to measure the intelligence of animals according to criteria that we humans would define as measures of intelligence, such as the ability to associate symbols with boxes that contain food rewards, we may conclude that the most advanced of non‐human animals can just about match the intelligence of a three‐year‐old child. When we start to wonder about the skills that animals display in relation to things that matter to them, but which we cannot measure in the laboratory, like navigating the world, we can only conclude that, in some respects, their skills may be superhuman. These two themes crystallise into one single, central message. Our respect for, and actions towards, all species of sentient animals should be based on our best possible understanding of their life as they see it, not as we see it. In matters of human respect for animals, the question ‘What is this animal for?’ has no meaning.
The essence of this book is an exploration of animal sentience: how it is determined by, and how it adapts to the physical and mental challenges of the specific environments to which they are exposed. Part 1
