Policy Paper on Iran’s Nuclear Program E-Book

Renard Teipelke

• Herausgeber: GRIN Verlag
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2010

Beschreibung

Seminar paper from the year 2010 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,0, University of California, San Diego (Department of Political Science), course: National Security Strategy , language: English, abstract: The Iranian nuclear program has been one of the major controversies in international affairs in the 21st century. While Iran insists on the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), the international community fears the secret weaponization of Iran’s program. Neither could Iran convince the international community that it does not (intend to) work on a program for nuclear weapons, nor could the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China + Germany (P5+1 countries) – implement effective measures in the form of diplomacy with sanctions to initially deter Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons capability. In the following policy paper, the problem will be first introduced by summarizing its history. A presentation of major players in the conflict and their preferences will help to analyze available strategy options for the United States as well as their possible consequences and chances of success. The following three strategies will be discussed...

Leseprobe

Table of Content

1. Executive Summary

2. Background of the Problem

2.1 History

2.2 Preferences of the Players

2.2.1 Iran

2.2.4 Israel

2.2.5 Arab States

3. Options and Analysis

3.1 Diplomacy with Sanctions

3.2 Limited Preemptive Air Strike

3.3 Massive Preemptive Strike with Regime Change

4. Conclusions

5. Bibliography

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Teipelke 1

1. Executive Summary

The Iranian nuclear program has been one of the major controversies in international affairs in the 21stcentury. While Iran insists on the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), the international community fears the secret weaponizationRI,UDQ·VSURJUDPNeither could Iran convince the international community that it does not (intend to) work on a program for nuclear weapons, nor could the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China + Germany (P5+1 countries)²implement effective measures in the form of diplomacy with sanctions to initially deter Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons capability.

In the following policy paper, the problem will be first introduced by summarizing its history. A presentation of major players in the conflict and their preferences will help to analyze available strategy options for the United States as well as their possible consequences and chances of success. The following three strategies will be discussed: 1) Diplomacy with sanctions: clear, timely limited, and achievable sanctions with immediate and directFRVWVRQ,UDQ·VOHDGHUVwouldbe imposed. A multilateral coalition through the United Nations would threaten the Iranian regime with sanctions and would simultaneously offer negotiations in which it clearly outlines possible benefits for Iran if the country meets the requests of the UNSC and IAEA. 2) Limited preemptive air strike: unilaterally or in a coalition with Israel, the US would command an air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities which would disrupt but not completely halt the program,UDQ·Vprotracted, multi-pronged, and fierce reaction could range from accusation (with inaction) to missile attacks against the state of Israel and US bases in the Middle East and increased support for terrorist insurgency groups. Such a deterrent threat could be escalated by attacking other (military, economic, civilian) targets. 3) Massive preemptive strike with regime change: unilaterally benefiting from a surprise attack the US would launch a massive strike against Iran in order to halt the nuclear program and replace the regime. The massive mobilization of military capacities and immediate successes are essential. Although similar to the second strategy option, a massive strike would result in much higher casualties and damages. By credibly tying its hands to this commitment, the US administration²without using military force²might compel Iran from enhancing its weaponization program.

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Teipelke 2

2. Background of the Problem

2.1 History1

The Iranian nuclear program started in the 1950s with US support through the Atoms for Peace program. In the following decades until 1979, all elements of a nuclear power program²including research, resources, and production facilities²were implemented, partly with the help of European countries like Germany and France. The Iranian Islamic Revolution by Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979 and the resulting shift of the Iranian regime²in religious, political, economic, and social terms²led to frictions between Iran and Western countries, especially the US. Furthermore, the war with Iraq during the 1980s resulted in the destruction of parts of,UDQ·Vnuclear facilities. While US pressure hindered the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the Iranian regime through its Technical Assistance Program, the Russian Federation helped Iran in the 1990s by forming a joint venture (Persepolis) that brought Russian experts and knowledge into the Iranian nuclear program. Until 2002, the IAEA could not find any evidence that proved that Iran was seeking to include the development of nuclear weapons capability in its current program. However, during the first years of the 21stcentury, the conflict emerged due to insider information about an extension of the nuclear program and hidden uranium enrichment and production facilities.

The three leading countries of the European Union, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (EU-3), tried to resolve the problem with the help of diplomacy which should have given Iran the opportunity to implement confidence building measures in its program. Eventually, Iran went into cooperation with the IAEA by the 2003 Tehran Declaration, which also included a halt to uranium enrichment and reprocessing as well as the implementation of the Additional Protocol of the NPT. During the course of the year, no evidence was found for a hidden atomic weapons program, but the IAEA made clear in its November 2003 report that Iran did not fulfill the obligations which were outlined in the so called Safeguards Agreement. The following years saw multiple diplomatic initiatives and IAEA reports. The EU-3 tried to ensure that Iran does not misuse its nuclear program for the development of atomic weapons, but the corresponding Paris Agreement from 2003 was abandoned by Iran two years later. This pattern of the Iranian regime to sign an agreement, promise a halt to uranium enrichment and the provision of complete information about all nuclear