Relativity: The special and the general theory E-Book

Einstein Albert

• Herausgeber: Youcanprint
• Kategorie: Wissenschaft und neue Technologien
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

Beschreibung

Relativity: The Special and the General Theory began as a short paper and was eventually published as a book written by Albert Einstein with the aim of giving: “an exact insight into the theory of relativity to those readers who, from a general scientific and philosophical point of view, are interested in the theory, but who are not conversant with the mathematical apparatus of theoretical physics.” It was first published in German in 1916 and later translated into English in 1920. It is divided into 3 parts, the first dealing with special relativity, the second dealing with general relativity and the third dealing with considerations on the universe as a whole.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

PREFACE

01. PHYSICAL MEANING OF GEOMETRICAL PROPOSITIONS

02. THE SYSTEM OF CO-ORDINATES

03. SPACE AND TIME IN CLASSICAL MECHANICS

04. THE GALILEIAN SYSTEM OF CO-ORDINATES

05. THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY (IN THE RESTRICTED SENSE)

06. THE THEOREM OF THE ADDITION OF VELOCITIES EMPLOYED IN CLASSICAL MECHANICS

07. THE APPARENT INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE LAW OF PROPAGATION OF LIGHT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY

08. ON THE IDEA OF TIME IN PHYSICS

09. THE RELATIVITY OF SIMULATNEITY

10. ON THE RELATIVITY OF THE CONCEPTION OF DISTANCE

11. THE LORENTZ TRANSFORMATION

12. THE BEHAVIOUR OF MEASURING-RODS AND CLOCKS IN MOTION

13. THEOREM OF THE ADDITION OF VELOCITIES. THE EXPERIMENT OF FIZEAU

14. THE HEURISTIC VALUE OF THE THEORY OF RELATIVITY

15. GENERAL RESULTS OF THE THEORY

16. EXPERIENCE AND THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

17. MINKOWSKI'S FOUR-DIMENSIONAL SPACE

18. SPECIAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY

19. THE GRAVITATIONAL FIELD

20. THE EQUALITY OF INERTIAL AND GRAVITATIONAL MASS AS AN ARGUMENT FOR THE GENERAL POSTULE OF RELATIVITY

24. EUCLIDEAN AND NON-EUCLIDEAN CONTINUUM

21. IN WHAT RESPECTS ARE THE FOUNDATIONS OF CLASSICAL MECHANICS AND OF THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY UNSATISFACTORY?

22. A FEW INFERENCES FROM THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY

23. BEHAVIOUR OF CLOCKS AND MEASURING-RODS ON A ROTATING BODY OF REFERENCE

25. GAUSSIAN CO-ORDINATES

26. THE SPACE-TIME CONTINUUM OF THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY CONSIDERED AS A EUCLIDEAN CONTINUUM

27. THE SPACE-TIME CONTINUUM OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY IS NOT A EUCLIDEAN CONTINUUM

29. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF GRAVITATION ON THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY

28. EXACT FORMULATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY

30. COSMOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES OF NEWTON'S THEORY

31. THE POSSIBILITY OF A "FINITE" AND YET "UNBOUNDED" UNIVERSE

32. THE STRUCTURE OF SPACE ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

APPENDIX I. SIMPLE DERIVATION OF THE LORENTZ TRANSFORMATION (SUPPLEMENTARY TO SECTION 11)

APPENDIX II. MINKOWSKI'S FOUR-DIMENSIONAL SPACE ("WORLD") (SUPPLEMENTARY TO SECTION 17)

APPENDIX III. THE EXPERIMENTAL CONFIRMATION OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

APPENDIX IV. THE STRUCTURE OF SPACE ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY (SUPPLEMENTARY TO SECTION 32)

Albert Einstein

Relativity: The special and the general theory

First digital edition 2018 by Fabio De Angelis

PREFACE

(December, 1916)

The present book is intended, as far as possible, to give an exact insight into the theory of Relativity to those readers who, from a general scientific and philosophical point of view, are interested in the theory, but who are not conversant with the mathematical apparatus of theoretical physics. The work presumes a standard of education corresponding to that of a university matriculation examination, and, despite the shortness of the book, a fair amount of patience and force of will on the part of the reader. The author has spared himself no pains in his endeavour to present the main ideas in the simplest and most intelligible form, and on the whole, in the sequence and connection in which they actually originated. In the interest of clearness, it appeared to me inevitable that I should repeat myself frequently, without paying the slightest attention to the elegance of the presentation. I adhered scrupulously to the precept of that brilliant theoretical physicist L. Boltzmann, according to whom matters of elegance ought to be left to the tailor and to the cobbler. I make no pretence of having withheld from the reader difficulties which are inherent to the subject. On the other hand, I have purposely treated the empirical physical foundations of the theory in a "step-motherly" fashion, so that readers unfamiliar with physics may not feel like the wanderer who was unable to see the forest for the trees. May the book bring someone a few happy hours of suggestive thought!

December, 1916 A. EINSTEIN

01. PHYSICAL MEANING OF GEOMETRICAL PROPOSITIONS

In your schooldays most of you who read this book made acquaintance with the noble building of Euclid's geometry, and you remember — perhaps with more respect than love — the magnificent structure, on the lofty staircase of which you were chased about for uncounted hours by conscientious teachers. By reason of our past experience, you would certainly regard everyone with disdain who should pronounce even the most out-of-the-way proposition of this science to be untrue. But perhaps this feeling of proud certainty would leave you immediately if some one were to ask you: "What, then, do you mean by the assertion that these propositions are true?" Let us proceed to give this question a little consideration.

Geometry sets out form certain conceptions such as "plane," "point," and "straight line," with which we are able to associate more or less definite ideas, and from certain simple propositions (axioms) which, in virtue of these ideas, we are inclined to accept as "true." Then, on the basis of a logical process, the justification of which we feel ourselves compelled to admit, all remaining propositions are shown to follow from those axioms, i.e. they are proven. A proposition is then correct ("true") when it has been derived in the recognised manner from the axioms. The question of "truth" of the individual geometrical propositions is thus reduced to one of the "truth" of the axioms. Now it has long been known that the last question is not only unanswerable by the methods of geometry, but that it is in itself entirely without meaning. We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line goes through two points. We can only say that Euclidean geometry deals with things called "straight lines," to each of which is ascribed the property of being uniquely determined by two points situated on it. The concept "true" does not tally with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word "true" we are eventually in the habit of designating always the correspondence with a "real" object; geometry, however, is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of these ideas among themselves.

It is not difficult to understand why, in spite of this, we feel constrained to call the propositions of geometry "true." Geometrical ideas correspond to more or less exact objects in nature, and these last are undoubtedly the exclusive cause of the genesis of those ideas. Geometry ought to refrain from such a course, in order to give to its structure the largest possible logical unity. The practice, for example, of seeing in a "distance" two marked positions on a practically rigid body is something which is lodged deeply in our habit of thought. We are accustomed further to regard three points as being situated on a straight line, if their apparent positions can be made to coincide for observation with one eye, under suitable choice of our place of observation.

If, in pursuance of our habit of thought, we now supplement the propositions of Euclidean geometry by the single proposition that two points on a practically rigid body always correspond to the same distance (line-interval), independently of any changes in position to which we may subject the body, the propositions of Euclidean geometry then resolve themselves into propositions on the possible relative position of practically rigid bodies.Geometry which has been supplemented in this way is then to be treated as a branch of physics. We can now legitimately ask as to the "truth" of geometrical propositions interpreted in this way, since we are justified in asking whether these propositions are satisfied for those real things we have associated with the geometrical ideas. In less exact terms we can express this by saying that by the "truth" of a geometrical proposition in this sense we understand its validity for a construction with rule and compasses.

Of course the conviction of the "truth" of geometrical propositions in this sense is founded exclusively on rather incomplete experience. For the present we shall assume the "truth" of the geometrical propositions, then at a later stage (in the general theory of relativity) we shall see that this "truth" is limited, and we shall consider the extent of its limitation.

02. THE SYSTEM OF CO-ORDINATES

On the basis of the physical interpretation of distance which has been indicated, we are also in a position to establish the distance between two points on a rigid body by means of measurements. For this purpose we require a " distance " (rod