The Standard History of The War, Vol 3 - Edgar Wallace - E-Book

The Standard History of The War, Vol 3 E-Book

Edgar Wallace

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Beschreibung

The Standard History of the War, Vol. 3 by Edgar Wallace is an authoritative and vivid account of one of the most tumultuous periods in world history. In this third volume, Wallace provides gripping details of key battles, strategies, and the men who shaped the course of the war. Drawing from firsthand accounts and meticulous research, he delves into the triumphs and tragedies of both soldiers and civilians. With a focus on the human element, Wallace brings to life the heroic and heart-wrenching moments that defined the conflict. Perfect for history enthusiasts and readers seeking an immersive, detailed chronicle of war, this volume is an essential addition to your collection.

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The Standard History of The War,  Vol 3

COMPRISING THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES FROM GENERAL FRENCH AND STAFF WITH DESCRIPTIVE NARRATIVE INCLUDING THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES FROM GENERAL FRENCH, FEB. 2—JUNE 15, 1915, WITH FULL DESCRIPTIVE NARRATIVE

Author: Edgar Wallace

Edited by: Seif Moawad

Copyright © 2024 by Al-Mashreq eBookstore

First published by George Newnes, Ltd., London, 1915

No part of this publication may be reproduced whole or in part in any form without the prior written permission of the author

All rights reserved.

Table of Contents

The Standard History of The War, Vol 3

CHAPTER I. — THE FIGHT FOR YPRES

CHAPTER II. — THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE BRITISH LINE

CHAPTER III. — THE TAKING OF NEUVE CHAPELLE

CHAPTER IV. — THE FIGHT FOR HILL 60

CHAPTER V. — THE SECOND ATTACK ON YPRES

DESPATCHES RECEIVED FROM GENERAL FRENCH,

Landmarks

Cover

CHAPTER I. — THE FIGHT FOR YPRES

"AS I close this despatch," wrote Sir John French in his memorable despatch of November 20th, "there are signs in evidence that we are possibly in the last stages for the battle of Ypres-Armentières." But for many weary weeks longer the struggle was to continue. Nothing on the scale of the great and disastrous effort of the Prussian Guards which shattered the German hopes to break through the Allied lines was witnessed, but many a severe and desperate encounter took place. The Germans were no longer on the offensive, it had become impossible for them to get round the flank of the Allies, whose lines stretched to the sea. If, therefore, they were to proceed they must pierce the Allies' lines at some point. The despairing effort of the Prussian Guards probably convinced the higher German Command that not much hope lay that way. From that moment the offensive passed to the Allies.

Although the offensive had now passed to the Allies, it was not to be expected that there would be an immediate advance to a decisive attack. The time for that was not yet. The position was almost an unparalleled one in the history of warfare; the extraordinary number of combatants engaged, the length of the opposing lines stretching from the sea coast to the frontier of Switzerland, the immense stretch of trenches of the opposing forces, the unprecedented nature of the weapons; the whole line resembling an endless fortress. It was a new kind of war and demanded a new kind of strategy and novel tactics. The airmen also played a new part, giving gunners precise information of which the accuracy and effectiveness of modern weapons were quick to take full advantage. We shall see in the course of this narrative what deadly work could be done under these novel conditions, and how much was yet to be accomplished before the Allies' offensive could become really effective. It was going on all the time, and of what the Allies' stubborn work meant in endurance and heroism I hope to give some idea.

Meantime the district round Ypres was still the scene of fierce combat.

We know fairly well the extraordinary reason which led the Kaiser and his Generals to concentrate their attentions upon this unhappy town. Ypres represented the last rallying point of citizenship in Belgium. Nearly all the other towns in this great country, great in spirit and in soul if not in acres, were either in the enemy's hands or were battered into confused heaps of brick and mortar.

At Ypres by the beginning of December the enemy approached so close that he could bring his smaller howitzers to work and reduce the pride of the ages to smoking ruins. Attack and counter-attack had been the order of the day. Entrenchments hastily dug had been elaborated until they were permanent earthworks, and a succession of charges made by the flower of the German Army was thrown back in confusion. Sometimes the controlling force directing the British operations would order an advance, and slipping their bayonets from their sheaths and fixing them to the muzzles of their rifles, thousands of men would creep out from their earth defence, and moving forward cautiously, availing themselves of every bit of cover, would finally, in one reckless charge, work their way into the enemy's line.

On one wet night, 35 men of a regiment, taking advantage of a pitiless downpour, moved stealthily forward on an advance trench of the enemy, and reached their objective without a shot being fired. It was cold-blooded bayonet work for ten minutes, and the little party retired, having wrecked the trench, leaving behind 20 dead. No one knew what object was served—-it was all part of the general scheme planned and ordered miles and miles away. There, in some quaint little town, occupying what houses were available, was the General Staff. Here were big rooms filled with large-scale maps, where the position of every British unit was marked, and where, with remarkable accuracy, every detail concerning the enemy's strength was also displayed. There was one portion of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff which had nothing else to do but to examine the shoulder badges and the collar ornaments and the various parts of the equipment of dead German soldiers. From this slight evidence these patient men would piece together not only the numbers of the regiments, but the Army Corps and the Army to which they were attached. Every change that the German made in his dispositions had been revealed by this painstaking method, and in consequence the British Commander has always been prepared for every fresh development.

To Headquarters, too, came the thousands of reports from various parts of the field. It was in telephonic communication with London, and in addition there was a large telegraph staff supplied with the very finest and newest of instruments for dealing with the mass of correspondence which was constantly pouring through Army Headquarters.

Not the least important correspondents of the main General Staff were the Corps Staffs which were situated nearer to the firing line, and these in turn were fed by the Divisional Staffs who received their reports from the Brigade Majors, who in turn relied upon regimental reports. In addition to these sources of information, General Headquarters must necessarily keep in close touch with all that was happening at the French and Belgian Headquarters, for only by the closest co-operation could a successful defensive be maintained.

The offensive in Flanders, as already stated, now rested with the Allies, and it was on December 14, 1914, that fresh activities commenced and pressure was brought to bear along the whole line. Fierce conflicts were waged and violent struggles went on from day to day, entailing heavy losses on German and British alike. On one occasion the Indian troops suffered severely in a surprise attack made with great ferocity. The Guards also suffered the brunt of another attempt to carry a position. The same stubborn fighting was going on during December on the coast line. The Belgians were holding on with heroic patience and courage the line of the Yser. Holding Nieuport as they did, supported by the monitors and cruisers of the British fleet, they essayed again and again to advance toward Ostend.

Lombartzyde, a small village to the north of Nieuport, was shelled and taken first by the Belgians and then retaken by the Germans, and then yet again by the Belgians, until nothing was left but crumbling walls and hot ashes of what had once been a prosperous little community. The village of Westende suffered no better fate. Westende Bains, a beautiful plage upon the sea front, was wholly destroyed in order to get at the batteries of the enemy, which were sheltered behind.

It may be of interest to refer to what "Eye-Witness" calls the change that had come over what may be termed the "atmosphere" of the battlefield at this date. It had been one of the wettest Decembers on record, and everything had been made worse by the trying condition of the ground and the trenches. The floods were as embarrassing to our advance as they were to the enemy. Our soldiers were for days standing almost knee-deep in mud and water, often almost without shelter, against the pelting sleet and rain and the bursting shrapnel. The marshy nature of the soil intensified the discomfort; altogether it bore a grim aspect, this trial of heroic endurance, more especially during an advance or retreat, when there was little protection against the enemy's fire. During the long watches our soldiers endured the terrible hardships in their deep ditches and trenches of vile mud and rainwater with remarkable composure.

"Eye-Witness" described the conditions where the combatants were entrenched thus:—

The cannonade has now decreased to such an extent that for hours on end nothing is heard but the frequent boom of one of the Allies' heavy guns, the occasional rattle of machine guns, and the intermittent "pop "—for that word expresses the sound best—of the snipers of either side.

And in certain quarters, where the combatants are close and operations appertain to those of siege warfare, the bombs of the Minenwerfer and the smaller bombs thrown by hand are detonating almost continuously.

But the air no longer throbs to the continuously dull roar of heavy artillery and the detonations of great projectiles. Of course, if an attack is in progress, there is again turmoil, but it is more local, and does not approach in intensity that which recently reigned on a large scale.

The scene, as a whole, as viewed from one of the few commanding points in our front, is almost one of peace as compared with that of a week or two ago. The columns of black smoke vomited by the exploding howitzer shell are as rare as those from burning villages.

The only generally visible signs of war are the occasional puffs of bursting shrapnel opening out above woods and villages and floating slowly away on the still air.

It was mentioned in the account of the fighting on the Aisne that so far as we were concerned the struggle had to some extent assumed the character of siege operations. The same can be said with still greater truth of the battle in which we are now engaged.

Both sides have had time to dig themselves in and to strengthen their positions with all the resources available in the field.

In spite of this the Germans, urged by weighty motives, limited as to time, and confident in their numerical superiority and the weight of a very powerful siege armament—such as has indeed never before been brought into the field— have when face to face with the Allies' line attempted to break it by frontal attacks.

Having failed in this, in spite of desperate efforts, they are now endeavouring in some quarters to progress by the slower methods of siege warfare. Until recently they have attempted to gain ground by assaulting our position across the open, seizing what they can of it, retaining and strengthening that and using it as a starting point for a fresh assault.

Their aim is still the same—to gain ground and drive us back—but owing to the immense loss entailed in the summary method of assaulting across the open for any distance the means employed are modified.

General Sir Leslie Rundle.

When bombardment is or has been severe everyone within range of the enemy's guns, the brigadier not excepted, will be found ensconced underground in "dug- outs" or "funk-holes," as they are familiarly called, for in the zone under fire houses are no better than shell traps.

Behind the firing line trenches are found the shelters for the men holding the line and those for the supports. These are more elaborate and comfortable than the fire trenches, usually are roofed over, and contain cooking places and many conveniences.

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For some time the character of the artillery fire has been such as to force both combatants even for some distance behind the firing line to burrow into the earth in order to obtain shelter and to conceal their works as far as possible in order to gain protection both from guns and aeroplanes.

This has been carried on to such an extent that behind the front fire trenches of British, French, and Germans are perfect labyrinths of burrows of various types. The principal feature of the battlefield, therefore, as has often been pointed out, is the absence of any signs of human beings.

Most of this trench fighting takes place at such close range that the guns of either side cannot fire at the enemy's infantry without great risk of hitting its own men. The rôle of artillery projectiles, however, is well played by bombs of all descriptions, which are used in prodigious quantities.

The larger ones projected by the Minenwerfer, of which the Germans employ three sizes, correspond to the heavy howitzer shells of the distant combat, and have much the same effect. They have a distinctive nickname of their own, but they may be termed the "Jack Johnsons" of the close attack of siege warfare.

The smaller bombs or grenades are thrown by hand from a few yards' distance, perhaps just lobbed over a parapet.

They are charged with high explosive and detonate with great violence; and since their impetus does not cause them to bury themselves in the earth before they detonate, their action, though local, is very unpleasant in the enclosed space between two traverses in a trench.

These grenades of various types are being thrown continuously by both sides, every assault being preluded and accompanied by showers of them. In fact, the wholesale use of these murderous missiles is one of the most prominent features of the close attack now being carried on.

As may be imagined, what with sharpshooters, machine guns and bombs, this kind of fighting is very deadly, and somewhat blind, owing to the difficulty of observation.

CHAPTER II. — THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE BRITISH LINE

REVIEWING the situation after six months of war, it could not be doubted that Germany was feeling the pinch in her great struggle. In the West and the East she was firmly held, and in the West each day was adding to the strength of the Allied line, though General Joffre, patient and careful, was content to wait his time.

At home Germany was displaying significant foresight. The Federal Council was empowered to take over the entire stock of bread cereals; all the grain and flour of the German Empire were to pass into possession of the State. In plain English, Germany was hoarding her food supplies, and taking steps to put her population on rations.

The relentless pressure of our sea-power had all but cut her off from the world. She had suffered enormous losses upon her huge battle-fronts. The great effort essential to German success had so far been foiled; it was estimated that Germany had lost two and a quarter millions of her best soldiers, and that her fresh efforts would have necessarily to be made with greatly inferior and disheartened troops.

It became more and more evident that this tremendous loss in men, combined with the failure of countless attacks that had been attempted in France and Flanders, had its effect on the moral of the enemy. Practically every attempt of the enemy at an offensive during the four long months that the rival forces had faced each other in the trenches had proved at best ineffective, at the worst a costly failure.

The official "Eye-Witness" commented on the mental and physical change which had come over the German soldiers. There did appear, he wrote in the middle of January, a difference in the state of feeling of the German rank and file from that which existed some weeks previous. Prisoners now seemed to realise that a victorious advance was out of the question, and that all that they could expect was to hold their ground. The immense sacrifices the enemy had made had proved to be without avail, and the weary, nerve-racked regiments were beginning to realise it. As regards physical well-being the German troops were not so favourably circumstanced as our own. They were less warmly clad, their medical arrangements were much inferior, and the conditions of the trenches in the trying weather were deplorable. Nevertheless, they showed the greatest bravery, and it almost seemed that the rank and file of the army were not backward in their efforts to support the overwhelming ambitions of the Prussian military caste and their vainglorious Kaiser.

Other signs of the impaired moral of the Germans were the extraordinary outburst of hatred against Great Britain and the despairing methods of warfare Germany began to adopt. There could be no doubt that at the end of six months of war a consciousness of ultimate impotence was beginning to come home to her. She was beginning to realise that her failure to end the war in less than six months, as she had fondly anticipated, was due to her plans being impossible of realisation. What was weighing heavily on the hearts of Germans was the sense of lost opportunity. They were face to face with tactical failure. There was now no question of Paris, of Calais, or of Warsaw. There was nothing but deadlock. And all this after the mighty efforts they had made, the vast losses they had suffered—losses which they had been prepared to make to attain success.

While they were being firmly held everywhere, and every attempt at offensive frustrated, they could not but realise that while they must grow weaker and weaker, the Allies would grow in strength from day to day. Germany alone, amongst all the belligerents, had prepared and was ready for war. She was equipped with men and guns to the highest point of possibility. And now, after six months, although she had still probably a preponderance of men in the field, it was certain, with the French reserves in readiness, and the great new Kitchener Army almost ready to take their place in the fighting line, that the conditions would be equalised, nay, reversed. Not only would the Allies have a greater number of men and a preponderance in artillery, but the advantage in moral superiority.

And it must be remembered that all the while Germany continued to lose more men than the Allies in the trench warfare. Their method was nearly always the same. They sent forward wave after wave of men, the invariable result being losses out of all proportion to any advantage gained. Sometimes the great pressure of men they threw forward resulted in their overwhelming the defenders and occupying the trenches temporarily. The vigorous counter-attacks of the Allies resulted in their winning back the ground which might have been lost. There were enormous losses on both sides, but the disadvantage was always on the side of the enemy. This kind of warfare was one of attrition and the Allies were well able to stand the test.

In the Caucasus, the enemy's newest ally, Turkey, had been soundly trounced by the Russians, and in Egypt we had beaten off the invading Turkish army. In the west, everywhere, our Allies were confident that it was well-nigh impossible for Germany to score any decisive success. A French official account of the progress of operations summed up the position thus:—

"It can then be affirmed that, in order to obtain a complete success, France and her Allies have only to wait and prepare for it with untiring patience. The offensive power of the Allies, constantly reinforcing their Armies in strength, officers and supplies, is daily increasing, and it is therefore to their interest to make their maximum effort at the moment when they will have at their disposition the maximum of means. This is what they will do; all that matters is to achieve a complete result without useless sacrifices."

Also—and this was another factor of great importance—the artillery of the Allies was slowly acquiring an equality with the artillery of the Germans. It had been the other way in the beginning, but now nearly every conflict of the guns showed things to be otherwise. In successive days of one week of fierce artillery duels, when the German expended twice as many projectiles as his opponent, the big French guns achieved marked successes. On one day they destroyed two enemy guns; on the next they demolished two batteries and silenced another; the day after they accounted for a battery of 15-centimetre guns; and on the fourth day, near Béthencourt (this illuminating little record covers only a small section of the four hundred mile line), they destroyed two batteries of 77-millimetre guns. Equal in effectiveness was the work of the British artillery. In more than once place, too, it was found that the German shells were ineffective, and did not burst well. Over all the western battlefield, as we left the old year behind and came, full of hope, into the New Year, the success of our artillery was established.

To this brief summary of how things stood there should be added a last word. The British and French airmen, by their initiative and daring, had secured the whip-hand in the air. Capable and cool, temperamentally more adventurous than their adversaries, the flying man of the Allies proved himself continually more than a match for his enemy.

Every day there were instances of the courage and resource of our men, for hardly a day passed, whatever the conditions, that British and French airmen did not ascend. On more than one occasion our airmen carried out observations not more than a thousand feet above the enemy's trenches. British airmen threw bombs on the enemy's aviation camp at Linselles, and paid several marauding visits to Ostend, both by night and day. Only when the weather was clear and calm did they encounter enemy machines, and not infrequently the Germans fled at their approach. Very often the former would make a half turn immediately they perceived their more daring adversaries, but it was not often that a combat took place; when it did, almost invariably the French or British airmen came off victorious.

A fine example of an aerial flight was supplied by an exploit of one of the French aviators in the region of Cernay. In the course of a reconnaissance the Frenchman gave chase to a German opponent and twice obliged him to make a half turn, thus preventing him from flying over the Allies' lines.

The moment the German reached the safety of his own lines the Frenchman perceived another German aeroplane going towards Belfort and immediately gave chase. He soon came within range of the German and opened a lively fusillade, which was returned and kept up for a distance of 150 metres until they reached the environs of Mulhouse, where the German was compelled to descend before he was able to reach his own sheds.

In the course of reconnaissances, the Allied airmen often experienced a fusillade from the guns of the enemy. The machines were on some occasions pierced by shot and by the bursting of shells, but the sang-froid of the pilots enabled them to return safely, sometimes under the most perilous conditions. One airman, in consequence of a mishap to his engine, was obliged to cross the enemy's lines at a height of 150 metres in the region of Hartmannsweilerkopf, which is very hilly. In spite of a fierce fire directed at him when crossing a wooded part, the airman gained the valley of the Thur and descended in the French lines safe and sound.

"Eye-Witness" gave us some interesting details about the work of aerial reconnaissance. The observer either travels above a previously selected line of country, or passes to and fro over a certain area, recording everything of value that he sees. This latter method is the slower, and is used only when very detailed information is required.

This is not work which can be carried out by everyone. The really first-rate observer must possess extensive military knowledge in order to know what objects to look for and where to look for them; he must have very good eyesight in order to pick them up, and he must have a knack of reading a map quickly both in order to mark correctly their positions and to find his way. To reconnoitre is not easy even in fine weather; but in driving rain or snow, in a temperature perhaps several degrees below zero, or in a gale, when an aeroplane travelling with the wind rocks and sways like a ship in a heavy sea, and may attain a speed of 150 miles an hour, the difficulties are immense.

In these circumstances, and from the altitude at which it is necessary to fly in order to escape the projectiles of anti-aircraft guns, columns of transport or of men are easily missed. Indeed, at a first attempt an observer will see nothing which is of military value, for it is only after considerable practice that the eye becomes accustomed to scouring a great stretch of country from above, and acquires the power of distinguishing objects upon it.

Psychology also comes in, and the temperament of an observer is of the greatest importance. He must be cool and capable of great concentration in order to keep his attention fixed upon his objective in spite of all distractions, such as, for instance, the bursts of shell close to him, or the noise of rifle bullets passing through the planes of his machine. He must withstand the temptation to make conjectures, or to think that he has seen something when he is not absolutely certain of the fact, since an error in observing or an inaccuracy in reporting may lead to false conclusions and cause infinite harm.

Many men are absolutely unfitted for such duty, and even trained observers, observed "Eye-Witness," vary in their powers of reconnaissance.

January 27th was the Kaiser's birthday. It was generally expected that to mark this event the Germans would attempt to gain something that would have the appearance of a signal victory.

Not only would a German offensive success have been a pleasant offering on the part of the Army to the Kaiser to celebrate his fifty-sixth birthday, but it would have had much more important results if it had succeeded in heartening Berlin, where the population was beginning to be doubtful and dispirited.

So the days immediately preceding the War Lord's birthday saw violent efforts by the enemy to secure a decisive victory at various points.

The Kaiser himself came to the German Headquarters in France, and made a tour of the positions of his troops in the region of La Bassée, where very large forces had been concentrated, obviously with the set purpose of a desperate offensive movement. The presence of the Kaiser indicated clearly enough the importance the enemy attached to this projected effort. The first of the birthday honours, therefore, was to be sought for here, in the region of La Bassée and Festubert, where many sanguinary battles had been fought during these last months.