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Copyright © 2016 by Immanuel Kant
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Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals
GENERAL DIVISIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
I. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF DUTIES GENERALLY.
DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO THE OBJECTIVE RELATION OF THE LAW OF DUTY.
II. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS ACCORDING TO RELATIONS OF OBLIGATION.
III. DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS AS A SYSTEM OF DUTIES GENERALLY.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
I. THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE MORAL LAWS.
II. THE IDEA AND NECESSITY OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS.
III. THE DIVISION OF A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS.
IV. GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONCEPTIONS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED.
Notes:
Translated by W. Hastie
1. All duties are either duties of right, that is, juridical duties (officia juris), or duties of virtue, that is, ethical duties (officia virtutis s. ethica). Juridical duties are such as may be promulgated by external legislation; ethical duties are those for which such legislation is not possible. The reason why the latter cannot be properly made the subject of external legislation is because they relate to an end or final purpose, which is itself, at the same time, embraced in these duties, and which it is a duty for the individual to have as such. But no external legislation can cause any one to adopt a particular intention, or to propose to himself a certain purpose; for this depends upon an internal condition or act of the mind itself. However, external actions conducive to such a mental condition may be commanded, without its being implied that the individual will of necessity make them an end to himself.
But why, then, it may be asked, is the science of morals, or moral philosophy, commonly entitled — especially by Cicero — the science of duty and not also the science of right, since duties and rights refer to each other? The reason is this. We know our own freedom — from which all moral laws and consequently all rights as well as all duties arise — only through the moral imperative, which is an immediate injunction of duty; whereas the conception of right as a ground of putting others under obligation has afterwards to be developed out of it.
2. In the doctrine of duty, man may and ought to be represented in accordance with the nature of his faculty of freedom, which is entirely supra-sensible. He is, therefore, to be represented purely according to his humanity as a personality independent of physical determinations (homo noumenon), in distinction from the same person as a man modified with these determinations (homo phenomenon). Hence the conceptions of right and end when referred to duty, in view of this twofold quality, give the following division:
I.Juridical Duties to
Oneself or OthersI. The Right of Humanity.
in our own person (juridicial
duties towards oneself)Perfect
Duty
II. The Right of Mankind.
in others (juridical duties
towards others.)
II.Ethical Duties to
Oneself or OthersIII.The End of Humanity.
in our person (eithical duties
toward oneself)Imperfect
Duty
IV.The End of Mankind.
in others (ethical duties
towards others.)
As the subjects between whom a relation of right and duty is apprehended — whether it actually exists or not — admit of being conceived in various juridical relations to each other, another division may be proposed from this point of view, as follows:
DIVISION POSSIBLE ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECTIVE RELATION OF THOSE WHO BIND UNDER OBLIGATIONS, AND THOSE WHO ARE BOUND UNDER OBLIGATIONS.
The juridical relation of man to beings who have neither right nor duty:
Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings are irrational, and they neither put us under obligation, nor can we be put under obligation by them.
The juridical relation of man to beings who have both rights and duties:
Adest. There is such a relation, for it is the relation of men to men.
The juridical relation of man to beings who have only duties and no rights:
Vacat. There is no such relation, for such beings would be men without juridical personality, as slaves of bondsmen.
The juridical relation of man to a being who has only rights and no duties (God):