The subject of this Essay
is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed
to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or
Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be
legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question
seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but
which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age
by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself
recognised as the vital question of the future. It is so far from
being new, that in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost
from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the
more civilised portions of the species have now entered, it
presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and
more fundamental treatment.
The struggle between Liberty and
Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of
history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that
of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was
between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government.
By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the
political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the
popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic
position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a
governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their
authority from inheritance or conquest, who, at all events, did not
hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men
did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever
precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their
power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a
weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no
less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members
of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it
was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than
the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the
vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any
of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual
attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore,
of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should
be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was
what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by
obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political
liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of
duty in the ruler to infringe, and which if he did infringe,
specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be
justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the
establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the
community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its
interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more
important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes
of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was
compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second;
and to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to
attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object
of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to
combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on
condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against
his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this
point.
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