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Vom Kriege is a book on war and military strategy by Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), written mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wife Marie von Brühl in 1832.
It has been translated into English several times as On War. On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.
Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831) was a Prussian general and military theorist who stressed the "moral" (meaning, in modern terms, psychological) and political aspects of war. His most notable work, Vom Kriege (On War), was unfinished at his death. Clausewitz was a realist in many different senses and, while in some respects a romantic, also drew heavily on the rationalist ideas of the European Enlightenment.
TRANSLATED BY COLONEL J.J. GRAHAM
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Introduction
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
NOTICE
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR
BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ
ON THE NATURE OF WAR
What is War?
Ends and Means in War
The Genius for War
Of Danger in War
Of Bodily Exertion in War
Information in War
Friction in War
Concluding Remarks, Book I
ON THE THEORY OF WAR
Branches of the Art of War
On the Theory of War
Art or Science of War
Methodicism
Criticism
On Examples
OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL
Strategy
Elements of Strategy
Moral Forces
The Chief Moral Powers
Military Virtue of an Army
Boldness
Perseverance
Superiority of Numbers
The Surprise
Stratagem
Assembly of Forces in Space
Assembly of Forces in Time
Strategic Reserve
Economy of Forces
Geometrical Element
On the Suspension of the Act in War
On the Character of Modern War
Tension and Rest
THE COMBAT
Introductory
Character of a Modern Battle
The Combat in General
The Combat in General (continuation)
On the Signification of the Combat
Duration of Combat
Decision of the Combat
Mutual Understanding as to a Battle
The Battle(*)
Effects of Victory
The Use of the Battle
Strategic Means of Utilising Victory
Retreat After a Lost Battle
Night Fighting
MILITARY FORCES
General Scheme
Theatre of War, Army, Campaign
Relation of Power
Relation of the Three Arms
Order of Battle of an Army
General Disposition of an Army
Advanced Guard and Out-Posts
Mode of Action of Advanced Corps
Camps
Marches
Marches (Continued)
Marches (continued)
Cantonments
Subsistence
Base of Operations
Lines of Communication
On Country and Ground
Command of Ground
DEFENCE
Offence and Defence
The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Tactics
The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Strategy
Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defence
Character of the Strategic Defensive
Extent of the Means of Defence
Mutual Action and Reaction of Attack and Defence
Methods of Resistance
Defensive Battle
Fortresses
Fortresses (Continued)
Defensive Position
Strong Positions and Entrenched Camps
Flank Positions
Defence of Mountains
Defence of Mountains (Continued)
Defence of Mountains (continued)
Defence of Streams and Rivers
Defence of Streams and Rivers (continued)
A. Defence of Swamps
Defence of Forests
The Cordon
Key to the Country
Operating Against a Flank
Retreat into the Interior of the Country
Arming the Nation
Defence of a Theatre of War
Defence of a Theatre of War—(continued)
Defence of a Theatre of War (continued)
Defence of a Theatre of War (continued)
THE ATTACK
The Attack in Relation to the Defence
Nature of the Strategical Attack
Of the Objects of Strategical Attack
Decreasing Force of the Attack
Culminating Point of the Attack
Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies
The Offensive Battle
Passage of Rivers
Attack on Defensive Positions
Attack on an Entrenched Camp
Attack on a Mountain
Attack on Cordon Lines
Manœuvring
Attack on Morasses, Inundations, Woods
Attack on a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision
Attack on a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision
Attack on Fortresses
Attack on Convoys
Attack on the Enemy’s Army in its Cantonments
Diversion
Invasion
On the Culminating Point of Victory(*)
PLAN OF WAR
Introduction
Absolute and Real War
Interdependence of the Parts in War
Ends in War More Precisely Defined
Ends in War More Precisely Defined (continued)
Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object
Limited Object—Offensive War
Limited Object—Defence
Plan of War when the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object
The Germans interpret their new national colours—black, red, and white—by the saying, “Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht.” (“Through night and blood to light”), and no work yet written conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical analysis of “War” by Clausewitz.
It will naturally excite surprise that a preface by a female hand should accompany a work on such a subject as the present. For my friends no explanation of the circumstance is required; but I hope by a simple relation of the cause to clear myself of the appearance of presumption in the eyes also of those to whom I am not known.
I look upon the first six books, of which a fair copy has now been made, as only a mass which is still in a manner without form, and which has yet to be again revised. In this revision the two kinds of War will be everywhere kept more distinctly in view, by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning, a more precise direction, and a closer application. The two kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether it be that we aim at his destruction, politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and next, those in which our object is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matter of exchange in the settlement of a peace. Transition from one kind to the other must certainly continue to exist, but the completely different nature of the tendencies of the two must everywhere appear, and must separate from each other things which are incompatible.
That the conception of the scientific does not consist alone, or chiefly, in system, and its finished theoretical constructions, requires nowadays no exposition. System in this treatise is not to be found on the surface, and instead of a finished building of theory, there are only materials.
The Author of the work here translated, General Carl Von Clausewitz, was born at Burg, near Magdeburg, in 1780, and entered the Prussian Army as Fahnenjunker (i.e., ensign) in 1792. He served in the campaigns of 1793-94 on the Rhine, after which he seems to have devoted some time to the study of the scientific branches of his profession. In 1801 he entered the Military School at Berlin, and remained there till 1803. During his residence there he attracted the notice of General Scharnhorst, then at the head of the establishment; and the patronage of this distinguished officer had immense influence on his future career, and we may gather from his writings that he ever afterwards continued to entertain a high esteem for Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served as Aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia; and being wounded and taken prisoner, he was sent into France until the close of that war. On his return, he was placed on General Scharnhorst’s Staff, and employed in the work then going on for the reorganisation of the Army. He was also at this time selected as military instructor to the late King of Prussia, then Crown Prince. In 1812 Clausewitz, with several other Prussian officers, having entered the Russian service, his first appointment was as Aide-de-camp to General Phul. Afterwards, while serving with Wittgenstein’s army, he assisted in negotiating the famous convention of Tauroggen with York. Of the part he took in that affair he has left an interesting account in his work on the “Russian Campaign.” It is there stated that, in order to bring the correspondence which had been carried on with York to a termination in one way or another, the Author was despatched to York’s headquarters with two letters, one was from General d’Auvray, the Chief of the Staff of Wittgenstein’s army, to General Diebitsch, showing the arrangements made to cut off York’s corps from Macdonald (this was necessary in order to give York a plausible excuse for seceding from the French); the other was an intercepted letter from Macdonald to the Duke of Bassano. With regard to the former of these, the Author says, “it would not have had weight with a man like York, but for a military justification, if the Prussian Court should require one as against the French, it was important.”