9,59 €
In the aftermath of the devastating First World War, Rudolf Steiner gained a reputation as a leading social thinker. One mainstream reviewer of his book Towards Social Renewal referred to it as '… perhaps the most widely read of all books on politics appearing since the war'. Steiner's proposals for the reconstruction of Europe and the rebuilding of society's crumbling social structure were thus publicly discussed as a serious alternative to both Communism and Capitalism.Steiner's 'threefold' ideas involved the progressive independence of society's economic, political and cultural institutions. This would be realised through the promotion of human rights and equality in political life, freedom in the cultural realm and associative cooperation in economics or business.In this carefully assembled anthology of Steiner's lectures and writing, Stephen E. Usher gathers key concepts and insights to form a coherent picture of social threefolding. Apart from fundamental lectures on the theme, the volume also features the full content of Steiner's unique Memoranda of 1917. The original texts are complemented with the Editor's introduction, commentary and notes.
Das E-Book können Sie in Legimi-Apps oder einer beliebigen App lesen, die das folgende Format unterstützen:
RUDOLF STEINER
SOCIAL THREEFOLDING
Rebalancing Culture, Politics and Economics
An Introductory Reader edited by Stephen E. Usher
RUDOLF STEINER PRESS
All translations (apart from lecture 3) revised by Christian von Arnim
Rudolf Steiner Press
Hillside House, The Square
ForestRow, RH18 5ES
www.rudolfsteinerpress.com
First published by Rudolf Steiner Press under the title Social and Political Science in 2003 This expanded edition 2018
For earlier English publications of individual selections please see p. 209
The material by Rudolf Steiner was originally published in German in various volumes of the ‘GA’ (Rudolf Steiner Gesamtausgabe or Collected Works) by Rudolf Steiner Verlag, Dornach. This authorized volume is published by permission of the Rudolf Steiner Nachlassverwaltung, Dornach
This edition translated © Rudolf Steiner Press 2003
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 85584 618 0
Cover by Andrew Morgan Design including image © RobertHarding Typeset by DP Photosetting, Aylesbury, Bucks. Printed and bound in Great Britain by 4Edge Ltd., Essex
Introduction: Seminal Ideas and Historic Moments by Stephen E. Usher
1.Psychological Cognition
2.The Social Question
3.The Science of the Spiritual and the Social Question
4.The Social Question and Theosophy
5.Memoranda of 1917
6.The Metamorphosis of Intelligence
7.Culture, Law and Economy
8.Central Europe between East and West
Notes
Sources
Further Reading
by Stephen Usher
Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925) is best remembered today for establishing Waldorf education, a movement which has produced hundreds of schools around the world for children from kindergarten to school-leaving age. His reputation was different immediately after the First World War when he was recognized throughout Europe and the United States as a social thinker who had proposed an alternative to both communism and capitalism as a path for the reconstruction of post-war Central Europe. One British commentator, writing in the London Quarterly Review, stated that Steiner’s book Towards Social Renewal was ‘perhaps the most widely read of all books on politics appearing since the war’.1 That book was also reviewed in significant places in the US such as the New York Times Review of Books, Journal of Political Economy, and The American Economic Review.2
Of course the twentieth century witnessed the struggle of capitalism versus communism to become the model for human social organization. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, capitalism was declared the victor, a notion trumpeted particularly by Francis Fukuyama in his End of History and the Last Man. The struggle between those two world views left little room for awareness of a third alternative during the course of the last century, particularly as Steiner’s ideas lacked a ‘laboratory’ to unfold themselves.
But the victory of capitalism is hollow for it has failed to deliver even a tolerable material existence to much of the earth’s population, to say nothing of a more spiritual sense of fulfilment. For this reason it seems appropriate to bring before the public today this selection of Steiner’s social ideas, which are like seeds from some Vavilovian centre that have lain dormant for many years but still retain their power of germination. They offer something vital to humanity’s social thinking, which has grown sterile over the long course of the twentieth century.
The selection is arranged chronologically. It begins with the 24-year-old Steiner’s discussion of the difference between the methods of the life sciences and the social sciences from ‘Psychological cognition’, a chapter of his A Theory of Knowledge Based on Goethe’s World Conception. His 1898 article from Das Magazin fur Literatur, entitled ‘The social question’, is the second selection. Here Steiner develops what he calls the fundamental sociological law: ‘In the early stages of cultural evolution, mankind tends towards the formation of social units; initially the interests of individuals are sacrificed to the interests of those groupings; the further progress of development leads to the emancipation of the individual from the interests of the groupings and to the unrestricted development of needs and capacities of the individual.’ He describes the goal and social ideal of this evolution as ‘anarchistic individualism’.
In 1905 Steiner wrote an essay titled ‘Science of the Spiritual and the Social Question’3 in which he develops what is for him a fundamental social law: ‘The well-being of a total community of human beings working together becomes the greater the less the individual demands the products of his achievements for himself, that is, the more of these products he passes on to his fellow workers and the more his own needs are not satisfied out of his own achievements, but out of the achievements of others.’ After stating the law, Steiner observes that every institution in society that violates this law will engender suffering and privation somewhere. It is my contention that there exist occult groups that fully understand this law and who organize economic life from this insight. This organization consists of creating a polarity between a small elite group who obtain great wealth and a large group of poor who suffer privation. Thus they work from knowledge of the fundamental social law and its converse by planning where the privation and suffering will be experienced. By controlling the locus of suffering they can extract wealth and control society. The hollow victory of capitalism mentioned above is connected, in my view, with this perverse use of the fundamental social law by elite occult groups. Steiner speaks of the workings of such groups in his lectures entitled Secret Brotherhoods (CW 178). This seminal essay of Steiner’s, ‘The Science of the Spiritual and the Social Question’, is our third selection.
On 26 October 1905, Steiner delivered a lecture entitled ‘The Social Question and Theosophy’ where he develops the same concepts that appear in this essay and offers some very practical advice. He advises people who wish to make a small beginning to form ‘income communities’. The idea is for a group of people to pool their incomes and live out of a common pot. This is a step towards breaking the link between a person’s work and his income, that is, a way to not live from the achievements of one’s own work but from the work of others. In anthroposophical circles a number of experiments have been made in this direction, starting with the income community organized by the late Wilhelm Ernst Barkhoff (see Wikipedia entry for further details) who also founded the first anthroposophical bank in Bochum, Germany. This 1905 lecture is our fourth selection.
It is worth observing that on 26 July 1922, when he delivered the cycle of lectures published under the title World Economy,4 Steiner commented about this fundamental social law that ‘it would only have had real significance if it had been taken up by men of affairs and if they had acted accordingly. But it was left altogether unnoticed; consequently I did not complete it or publish any more of it.’ He proceeded, in these lectures of 1922, to link the concept of the division of labour to his concept of the fundamental social law, showing that when economic production was dominated by large-scale division of labour the law was achieved, in a certain sense, because then the worker in what he is actually doing is literally providing for the needs of others far more than is the case in more primitive economic conditions. (A worker on an assembly line, perhaps, stamps a single piece of metal thousands of times per day and these go into thousands of cars that meet the needs of thousands of people all around the world. By contrast, in a primitive community a person spends part of his time farming and part of his time spinning yarn, which meets his own needs and that of his immediate family and perhaps, through barter, the needs of a few more people in his immediate circle.) From this fact flows the great vitality of the modern economic process, but this vitality is contradicted by the selfish motivation that brings people to work. A particularly clear explanation of how Steiner’s threefold social organization would make possible a different type of motivation to work is found in the collection of Steiner’s newspaper articles of the early1920s published under the title Renewal of the Social Organism.5 The argument is ably summarized in Joseph Weizenbaum’s foreword to that volume.
Steiner’s ‘law of true price’, which he first formulated in a footnote to Towards Social Renewal6 (1919) and elaborated in the lecture of 29 July1922 in World Economy, is also closely related to his fundamental social law. Indeed, the law of true price is a way of bringing about the fundamental social law in an economy based on market prices in such a way that both the actual production and the motivation to work are consistent with the law and that maximum anarchical individualism is possible. Steiner states the law of true price as follows: ‘A true price is forthcoming when a man receives, as counter-value for the product he has made, sufficient to enable him to satisfy the whole of his needs, including of course the needs of his dependants, until he will again have completed a like product.’7
From these brief comments one gets a glimpse of how Steiner first developed his observations about the fundamental social law in seed form and how after an interval of 14 years he returned to it again and showed how the idea expanded and developed like a plant that metamorphoses from seed to leaf to blossom. During the period between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Steiner said little about social issues, at least in a direct way. Then in 1915 he returned to social concerns with his essay ‘Thoughts during the time of war, to the Germans and those who do not believe they have to hate them.’8
It was in June and July of 1917 that he introduced his seminal idea of the threefold social order. He developed the idea in response to the question of Otto Lerchenfeld (1868–1938), who worked in the Berlin government during these difficult war years. Lerchenfeld came to Steiner with the question: Is there any way out of the catastrophic situation that has engulfed Europe? (The war had raged for three long years and, before it was over, more than 30 million people had died.) Steiner responded by giving Lerchenfeld a three-week private seminar on the threefold social order. Lerchenfeld gave a brief description of his experience in his memoirs, as follows:
More than three weeks of day-long, hour-long work followed this first conference. They were weeks of the loftiest experience, the highest tension, the most intense learning; learning what logic of life is in truth; learning of becoming and fading away; learning how logic must encompass life in an artistic way; learning how it must not weaken upon contact with real life and become illogical. Politics is art and not science alone. When it is only mere science it makes the social organism ill because the organism is then handled as a dead thing.
And then one beautiful day the complete structure was there, put together stone upon stone in the utmost detail. There was nothing of the abstract, no theory, no programme, nothing merely thought out. These have nothing to do with the onward movement of life. In the building of this structure, on the other hand, everyone of the weighty relations of life was asked, as it were: ‘What do you need, and you and you, in order to prosper as freely, joyfully, and soundly as possible and to become what you might become and ought to become if you are to be able to fulfil your mission in the totality of the social order?’ And the answers of all, as if bound together in a garland, did not provide what was intended to become a definitive solution of the social question, and could naturally not be this by reason of the very nature of a living organism. Nevertheless, there did result out of this idea the way, the only straightforward way upon which the social conditions, the social difficulties with their eternally varying problems, might be guided again and again towards a solution appropriate to the period, towards their curing.9
Following this seminar, Steiner developed a plan together with Lerchenfeld and Ludwig Polzer-Hoditz (1869–1945) to bring about an armistice on the condition that Central Europe be permitted to reconstruct itself on the basis of the threefold social order. As such it was an alternative to the idea of a ‘peace without victory’10 then being circulated by the American president Woodrow Wilson.
To bring about this plan Steiner drafted his two memoranda of 1917 and these two memoranda constitute the next item presented in this collection. They are not easy reading for contemporaries because they are directed to the senior statesmen of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the Germany of that day. As such they assume a reader intimately familiar with the history of those regions, including all the important events of the war and its outbreak. Naturally they also assume a reader familiar with the state structures of these countries at that time.
In addition to introducing the concept of the threefold social order, the memoranda offered the statesmen a perspective on the outbreak of the war and where lay responsibility for that catastrophe; on the manner in which the British were managing war propaganda to their extreme advantage; and on esoteric considerations about the geo-political aspirations of the Anglo-American world and how these worked into the war. The memoranda really should be read together with two other documents that were known to Steiner and that support the position he took in the memoranda.11 The first is the 1914 memoir on the outbreak of the war12 written by Helmuth von Moltke, chief-of-staff of the German army at the outbreak of the war. This provides a unique insight into the state of the German leadership at that time and supports Steiner’s thesis that Germany was not solely responsible for the war, a view which is contrary to the weight of historical opinion and the clause of the Treaty of Versailles attributing sole guilt to the Germans.13
In particular, von Moltke’s memoir presents a symptomatological picture of the whole illness of the German leadership.14 Von Moltke describes how Kaiser Wilhelm briefly halted western mobilization of the German army due to a mistaken hope that the British were about to agree to remain neutral and guarantee that the French would not attack. Given the precision timing and coordination required in those times to mobilize an army of one million soldiers, interfering with the mobilization was extremely risky as it could have brought about complete chaos with catastrophic consequences for Germany. That the mobilization was halted indicates how little the political leadership understood the military’s Schlieffen Plan that was the only military option available.15 That plan called for a rapid dual front assault to the west and the east and was created out of an understanding of the complex treaties that governed international relations at the time. The treaty between the Russians and the French, in particular, required both to go to the defence of the other if war broke out. While the halt demonstrated that the political leadership was out of touch with reality when it entertained the idea that the British would give such a guarantee, it also shows that they were not hell bent on a two-front war and thus supports Steiner’s contention that the British bore part of the responsibility for the western war as they could have prevented it by making the guarantee.
When confronted with the Kaiser’s decision, von Moltke was greatly disturbed because he understood the implications of halting the mobilization and he entertained no delusions that such a guarantee would be forthcoming from England. In his memoir von Moltke explained how he argued that the mobilization should not be halted but rather carried forward so that the western part of the mobilization stop at the western German frontier. Then, if the guarantee were made, troops could be shifted to the east to counter the Russian mobilization that already was underway. Several hours after the Kaiser had called for the halt of the mobilization he received a telegram from his cousin, the King of England, advising that England would make no such guarantee. At this point the Kaiser summoned von Moltke and told him that he could do as he pleased.
This bizarre incident should be recognized for its value as a historical symptom. It is a historic experiment that reveals the intentions and confusion of the Kaiser and German government at the outbreak of the war. To use modern language, it is an asset-backed demonstration that they would not have invaded Belgium or France if they had received the British guarantee. Historians have largely ignored this remarkable piece of evidence.
Without the evidence of this symptom one might dismiss the conversation between the German ambassador to England, Lichnowsky, and the British Foreign Minister (Grey) as posturing on the part of the Germans, suggesting as Grey did that the ambassador was not speaking on behalf of his government. This conversation, which is itself another important symptom, is preserved in an official British telegram from Grey to the British ambassador to Berlin, Goschen:
I told the German ambassador today that the reply of the German government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurances as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and, as I was authorized to tell him this, I gave him an aide-mémoire of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion16 here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.17
The second item that deserves to be read together with Steiner’s memoranda is the book The Transcendental Universe: Six lectures on Occult Science, Theosophy and the Catholic Faith by C.G. Harrison.18 This volume was originally published in 1894 in England and it gives a unique look into the esoteric knowledge alive in England at the time and supports some of the statements made by Steiner in the memoranda.
Before leaving the theme of the Harrison book and Steiner’s remarks in the memoranda about the secret societies that worked behind the scenes of the British and American governments, it should also be remarked that Steiner was highly critical of what developed in Germany after 1871.19 In his preface to the von Moltke memoir Steiner argues that Germany had no business aspiring to become a world power based on ‘exercise of power’. Rather it should have developed itself along a line consistent with its pre-1871 history as a cultural power as reflected, for example, in the idealist philosophers, Goethe, Schiller, the great musicians etc.20 That was its rightful path of development. It also should be made clear that Steiner was not in sympathy with German nationalists. Indeed, Hitler attacked Steiner in print in 1921 and, in 1922, the early nationalists attempted to kill Steiner in Munich.21
The thrust of Steiner’s advice in the memoranda to the Central European statesmen is that they should find the courage to proclaim to the world that they intended to move Central Europe forward, beyond the war, with the threefold social order as the organizational principle. According to Steiner the very appearance of this concept, issuing from the governing power of Central Europe, would paralyse the esoteric ambitions of the hidden Anglo-American establishment. Had they found the courage to follow this advice they would have brought about a legitimate and balancing centre between West and East that would have allowed a much healthier evolution of mankind over the twentieth century. Steiner’s objective in giving this advice to the statesmen was to put Germany back on the course of its pre-1871 development. He viewed his threefold social order as arising from the real thread of middle European cultural development and history.
With the help of Ludwig Poltzer-Hoditz, Otto Lerchenfeld and others, the memoranda reached the hands of leading statesmen in Germany and Austro-Hungary. Ludwig Polzer-Hoditz had a brother, Arthur, who was the private secretary to the young emperor, Karl, of Austro-Hungary and through that channel Karl received a copy of the memoranda. But Karl never managed to pay sufficient attention to the ideas until it was too late.22
The memoranda also reached Prince Max von Baden who had several private conversations with Steiner on the topic of the threefold social order.23 This happened prior to the end of the war when von Baden was made Imperial Chancellor by Kaiser Wilhelm and charged with negotiating an armistice. Steiner had hoped that von Baden would put forth the threefold idea as an alternative to Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point programme. But at the last minute von Baden lost courage and on 5 October 1918 he accepted the Wilson programme as the basis of an armistice. Steiner refers to this failure in his 1919 book Towards Social Renewal with these words, ‘[T]he terrible spiritual capitulation came, brought on by a man in whom many in German lands had placed something like a last hope.’24,25
With von Baden’s failure there was no further hope that the threefold idea would be proposed to the world by Central European governments as the basis for an armistice. Steiner consequently turned his attention to bringing the idea to the grassroots in Central Europe. In his further attempts to promote the idea of the threefold social order Steiner never again referred to the secret esoteric circles of the Anglo-American world in such a direct fashion as he had done in the memoranda, as there was no longer any reason to do so. The only possibility of creating a countervailing power had been destroyed.26 Moreover, Steiner recognized that the leadership of the historic evolution of mankind had passed into the hands of the West and that civilization would only be prevented from ruin if the English-speaking world could find the insight to pour spirit into the economic impulses that it would pursue.27
The last three items in our selection can be viewed as part of this effort to stimulate a grassroots interest in the threefold idea, which also included his widely circulated ‘Appeal to the German People’.28 This was circulated as a newspaper insert by the hundreds of thousands across Central Europe in March of 1919. This effort also included the publication of Steiner’s Towards Social Renewal in April of 1919.
In two of the remaining selections of this volume Steiner describes his own insights into the esoteric make-up of the peoples of the West, the East and the middle. Here he tries to convey his understanding of the idiosyncratic characteristics of different parts of the globe at the time which he felt needed to be understood by the peoples of the world if they were ever to live in harmony with one another. The remaining chapter of this volume, ‘Culture, Law and Economy’, is a newspaper article Steiner wrote at the end of 1919 when he was attempting to gain grassroots support for his threefold idea. It gives what is for my mind a particularly clear, short statement of the central idea.
‘Psychological Cognition’ is a chapter from Rudolf Steiner’s first book, A Theory of Knowledge Based on Goethe’s World Conception.29Steiner wrote this work when he was 24 years of age. An earlier section of the book is an enquiry regarding the difference between the sciences that study inorganic nature and those that study organic nature. Steiner argues that the study of organic nature already requires a kind of consciousness that transcends what is needed to study the dead world. Moreover, modern civilization is based on the type of consciousness that is appropriate for penetrating the laws of the dead world. To grasp the world of living things already requires stepping beyond the consciousness of our time. He develops the concept of the ‘type’ as the way to approach the living world. The following section of the book is titled, ‘The spiritual or cultural sciences’. It is in this section that the chapter presented here is found. This section concerns itself with a form of consciousness that transcends what is needed to grasp the living world. It is what is needed to penetrate into the lawfulness of the world of ensouled beings. This realm includes what we know as psychology, sociology, political science, economics and history.
The first science in which the human spirit deals with itself is psychology. The mind here stands observing itself.
Fichte assigned an existence to the human being only to the extent that the human being ascribes this to himself. In other words, human personality has only those traits, characteristics, capacities which it ascribes to itself through insight into its own being. A human capacity of which the human being knew nothing would not be recognized by him as his own but would be attributed to someone alien to him. When Fichte supposed that he could base the whole knowledge of the universe on this truth, he was in error. It is appropriate to be the highest principle of psychology. It determines the method of psychology. If the human spirit possesses a characteristic only in so far as it attributes this to itself, then the psychological method consists in the immersion of the mind in its own activity. Here, then, self-apprehension is the method.
It is obvious that in this discussion we do not restrict psychology to being the science of the accidental characteristics of any single (this one or that one) human individual. We release the single mind from its accidental limitations, from its accessory traits, and seek to raise ourselves to a consideration of the human individual as such.
Indeed, the key is not that we consider the wholly accidental single individuality but that we understand the self-determining individual as such. Whoever says at this point that in that case we are dealing with nothing more than the type of humanity confuses the type with the generalized concept. It is essential to the type that it, as the general, confronts its single forms. Not so with the concept of the human individual. Here the general is active directly in the individual being, except that this activity expresses itself in various ways according to the object towards which it is directed. The type exists in single forms and in these enters into reciprocal activity with the external world. The human spirit has only one form. But in one set of circumstances certain objects move his feelings; in another an ideal inspires him to action etc. It is not a specialized form of the human spirit; it is always the entire and complete person with whom we have to deal. He must be separated from his surroundings if he is to be comprehended. If we wish to arrive at the type, we must ascend from the single form to the archetypal form; if we wish to arrive at the human spirit, we must ignore the expressions in which it manifests itself, the special acts which it performs, and observe it in and of itself. We must discover how it behaves in general, not how it has behaved in this or that situation. By comparison, in the case of the type we must separate the universal form from the single forms; in psychology we must separate the single forms only from their surroundings.
Here what applies to organic nature, namely, that we recognize the expression of the archetypal form in the specific being, is no longer valid; here, in perceiving the single forms we recognize the archetypal form itself. The human spiritual being is not one formation of its idea but the formation. When Jacobi believes that, in becoming aware of our inner entity, we at the same time attain the conviction that a unitary being lies at the basis of this entity (intuitive self-apprehension), his thinking is in error because in fact we become aware of this unitary being itself. What in other circumstances is intuition here becomes self-contemplation. With regard to the highest form of being this is also an objective necessity. What the human spirit reads out of phenomena is the highest form of content which it can attain. If the spirit then reflects upon itself, it must recognize itselfas the direct manifestation of this highest form—as, indeed, its very bearer. What the spirit finds as unity in the diversity of reality, it must find in its own singleness as immediate existence. What it contrasts with the particular as the general it must attribute to its own individuality as its innate being.
From all this it becomes clear that true psychology can be attained only when we enter into the character of the human spirit in its activity. In place of this method, the attempt has been made nowadays to establish another in which the subject matter of psychology is not the human spirit itself but the phenomena in which the spirit expresses its existence. It is assumed that the external expressions of the spirit can be placed in an external context as can be done with the facts of inorganic nature. In this way the effort is made to establish a ‘theory of the soul without the soul’. From our reflections it becomes evident that by such a method we lose sight of the very thing that is important. The spirit should be separated from its manifestations and one should return to the spirit itself as the producer of the latter. Psychologists restrict themselves to the manifestations and lose sight of the spirit. Here, too, people have allowed themselves to be seduced into the erroneous view that the methods of mechanics, physics, etc. should apply to all the sciences
We are able to experience the unity of the soul just as much as its single actions. Every person is conscious of the fact that his thinking, feeling and willing proceed from the ego. Every activity of our personality is bound up with this centre of our being. If we leave this link with the personality out of consideration in any action, it ceases to be a manifestation of the soul. The action then falls under the concept of either inorganic or organic nature. If two balls lie on the table and I push one against the other, the result of that action becomes a physical or physiological occurrence if my purpose and will are left out of consideration. In all manifestations of the spirit—thinking, feeling, willing—the important thing is to recognize these in their essential nature as expressions of the personality. This forms the basis of psychology.