The Art of Controversy E-Book

Arthur Schopenhauer

• Herausgeber: Lebooks Editora
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Seitenzahl: 156

Beschreibung

"The Art of Controversy," a notable work by Arthur Schopenhauer, explores the strategies and tactics employed in debates and discussions. Written around 1830-31, during Schopenhauer's final period in Berlin, this treatise, also known as "The Art of Being Right," was not published during his lifetime. Its first publication occurred in 1864 under the title "Eristik," by Julius Frauenstadt. The definitive edition, however, is attributed to Arthur Hübscher, who included it in a compilation of Schopenhauer's unpublished letters. This work is indispensable for anyone looking to engage effectively in debates. While identifying errors in others' arguments is valuable, recognizing flaws in our own discourse is crucial for continuous intellectual growth. "The Art of Controversy" serves as a guide to "intellectual fencing," emphasizing that rhetorical skill and strategic thinking are as important as the underlying truth in any debate.

Leseprobe

Arthur Schopenhauer

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY

Contents

INTRODUCTION

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY

PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC

THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC

STRATAGEMS

ON THE COMPARATIVE PLACE OF INTEREST AND BEAUTY IN WORKS OF ART

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS

GENIUS AND VIRTUE

INTRODUCTION

Arthur Schopenhauer

1788-1860

Arthur Schopenhauer was a 19th-century German philosopher. He is best known for his work "The World as Will and Representation" (1818), in which he characterizes the phenomenal world as the product of a blind, insatiable, and malevolent metaphysical will. He wrote other renowned works such as "The Pains of the World" and "Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life," among others.

Building on Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism, Schopenhauer developed an atheistic and ethical metaphysical system that has been described as an exemplary manifestation of philosophical pessimism.

Early Years

Arthur Schopenhauer, the son of Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, a wealthy merchant, and Johanna Henriette, was born in Danzig (now Gdańsk, Poland) in February 1788. The country's partition in 1793 led the family to move to Hamburg (Germany). Heinrich decided to begin his son's education and sent him to France, where he was well received by the Gregoire family.

He learned the language of that country in a few months and began to demonstrate his aptitude for study. In 1799, he was sent to the prestigious Runge Institute, intended for future merchants, where he remained for four years. After young Schopenhauer insisted on attending gymnasium to pursue university studies, Heinrich Schopenhauer proposed a choice: take a long trip with the family, with the promise of taking up the profession of merchant afterward or stay and follow his academic ambition.

After his father's death in April 1805, his mother decided to move to the city of Weimar with his younger sister, Luise Adelaide, where she established contact with several German intellectuals, including the great poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Arthur Schopenhauer, on the other hand, kept the promise made to his father for another two years until his mother, in response to one of his letters, encouraged him to seek happiness and advised him to make a decision about his future.

The young Schopenhauer traveled the world and learned languages. These experiences, however, only sharpened his philosophical curiosity.

Education

He then decided to resume his studies, learning Spanish and Italian during the same period, and later enrolled at the University of Göttingen in 1809. Initially, he chose the course of Medicine but soon switched to Philosophy. His records indicate that he studied many subjects with varied topics, such as psychology, poetry, zoology, and history.

He was introduced to the thoughts of Plato and Immanuel Kant, in addition to reading many classics.

Eager to study with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, he continued his education at the University of Berlin. It was in 1813 that he obtained his doctorate and moved to Dresden the following year, where he began writing his great work "The World as Will and Representation" (1818), which was re-edited twice (1844 and 1859). The work did not receive a good reception, and many criticisms were made of his proposals. Part of the first edition was even used as wrapping paper, and the second edition also did not find many readers.

He attempted an academic career in 1820 at the University of Berlin, but despite being admitted, his attempt to compete with Georg Wilhelm Hegel caused him to give it up, as he could not attract enough students to his course. In the following years, he offered translations but achieved nothing significant.

With the cholera epidemic of 1831, an event that fatally affected Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Schopenhauer left the capital, Berlin, and settled in Frankfurt. From 1836 onwards, he dedicated himself to reading and writing regularly, determined to gain popularity. There was a brief success in 1839 when he was awarded by the Norwegian Academy of Sciences for a dissertation.

The long-awaited recognition, however, only came with the publication of "Parerga and Paralipomena" (1851). This collection of short reflections on various topics was intended for the general public, and the philosopher wanted it published before his death. With the low sales of his earlier major work, few were willing to publish the book.

In correspondence with Julius Frauenstädt, he presented the problem and lamented it, comparing himself to a dancer who was receiving offers to publish her memoirs and gaining prominence in the newspapers. It was this admirer’s intervention that solved the problem and forwarded the book for publication.

He began to be visited by many admirers, intellectuals, and artists, and his books and thoughts gained prominence in magazines around the world. A course was opened in Leipzig to study his philosophy, and his bust was modeled by the artist Elisabet Ney.

In 1860, he began to experience tachycardia and breathing problems. On September 21, he was found in his apartment already deceased. With his mother and sister already deceased, he had left in his will funds destined for the Prussian soldiers who fought in 1848-1849.

Schopenhauer's Philosophy

Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy is influenced by Immanuel Kant, but without an imposing reason. He believed that what we know of the world is presented to us by the senses and is organized subjectively. Reason only forms abstract ideas from empirical data. It is intelligence, present in all living beings, that identifies an external cause for these impressions, but which is inaccessible to us.

Thus, we only have representations of the world. This would make the world an impenetrable fortress that prevents us from knowing it as it really is. Arthur Schopenhauer then proposes that we do not deny an immediate path opened through our voluntary acts. Through our bodies, we are simultaneously an object represented and a will that becomes objective in actions.

In human beings, there are no reactions of cause and effect as in nature; the will manifests itself directly and is known. What happens with my body can be attributed to other human beings, to all animals, and to nature in a certain sense. The will manifests itself specifically in humans, but every phenomenon would be the expression of a will. The word "will," therefore, does not refer to a conscious act and diverges from our common use; it indicates instead a power or drive of beings towards life, a will to live (Wille zum Leben in German).

It can be seen that Arthur Schopenhauer does not subscribe to the prevailing philosophical conception of his time, namely the Enlightenment, in his assertion that this power cannot be understood rationally. It is a constant and purposeless drive, not granting the intimate reality of things a sense to be understood. This pessimistic metaphysical observation will have implications for this philosopher’s moral conception.

His moral reflections are based on a critique of Immanuel Kant's ethical perspective. According to this critique, instead of assuming an a priori principle, we should undertake an empirical investigation and try to find actions with unquestionable moral value. Actions are manifestations of invariant internal dispositions, and interest is the basic explanation of any of our actions, which would explain selfish motivations. In any case, we find actions that are not based on interest, identified with compassion. Moral actions, therefore, are always related to the other.

These actions, however, are not expressions of a willing but of the denial of the will. It is the moment when the illusion of phenomena is understood, and the other is recognized as a fellow being. This process is identified by the philosopher himself as mysterious, in view of the selfishness observed in human actions, and its explanation represents a limit that human knowledge does not reach.

Main Works of Schopenhauer

The philosopher begins his great work, "The World as Will and Representation," with a statement he adopts as true: "the world is my representation." Although this truth holds for any being, only the human being can become conscious of it. Arthur Schopenhauer advised in the preface to the first edition of his great work that the book should be read twice. The first reading should be done patiently, and the second, already with the negative experience of acceptance, would indicate that the work is delivered to humanity, not to his contemporaries. The central thought was not altered, with the new editions consisting only of textual corrections and additions to the four books that composed the initial edition. Although the reading requires prior knowledge of Immanuel Kant's epistemological theory, as indicated by the author himself, the language is accessible, and the text contains many analogies and examples.

The various texts of "Parerga and Paralipomena" (1851) have been published in Brazil in books organized thematically, such as "Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life" (2002), "The Art of Writing" (2005), "On Ethics" (2012), and others. Some of his lectures have also been published, such as "Metaphysics of the Beautiful" (2003), in which he presents in a more didactic manner a study on the essence of beauty.

About the Work "The Art of Controversy"

"The Art of Controversy," a notable work by Arthur Schopenhauer, explores the strategies and tactics employed in debates and discussions. Written around 1830-31, during Schopenhauer's final period in Berlin, this treatise, also known as "The Art of Being Right," was not published during his lifetime. Its first publication occurred in 1864 under the title "Eristik," by Julius Frauenstadt. The definitive edition, however, is attributed to Arthur Hübscher, who included it in a compilation of Schopenhauer's unpublished letters.

This work is indispensable for anyone looking to engage effectively in debates. While identifying errors in others' arguments is valuable, recognizing flaws in our own discourse is crucial for continuous intellectual growth. "The Art of Controversy" serves as a guide to "intellectual fencing," emphasizing that rhetorical skill and strategic thinking are as important as the underlying truth in any debate.

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY

PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC

By the ancients, Logic and Dialectic were used as synonymous terms; although {Greek: logizesthai}, "to think over, to consider, to calculate," and {Greek: dialegesthai}, "to converse," are two very different things.

The name Dialectic was, as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius, first used by Plato; and in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Republic, bk. vii. and elsewhere, we find that by Dialectic he means the regular employment of the reason and skill in the practice of it. Aristotle also uses the word in this sense; but, according to Laurentius Valla, he was the first to use Logic too in a similar way{1}. Dialectic, therefore, seems to be an older word than Logic. Cicero and Quintilian use the words in the same general signification.{2}

This use of the words and synonymous terms lasted through the Middle Ages into modern times; in fact, until the present day. But more recently and in particular by Kant, Dialectic has often been employed in a bad sense, as meaning "the art of sophistical controversy"; and hence Logic has been preferred, as of the two the more innocent designation. Nevertheless, both originally meant the same thing; and in the last few years they have again been recognized as synonymous.

It is a pity that the words have thus been used from of old and that I am not quite at liberty to distinguish their meanings. Otherwise, I should have preferred to define Logic (from {Greek: logos}, "word" and "reason," which are inseparable) as "the science of the laws of thought, that is, of the method of reason"; and Dialectic (from {Greek: dialegesthai}, "to converse" — and every conversation communicates either facts or opinions, that is to say, it is historical or deliberative) as "the art of disputation," in the modern sense of the word. It it clear, then, that Logic deals with a subject of a purely à priori character, separable in definition from experience, namely, the laws of thought, the process of reason or the {Greek: logos}, the laws, that is, which reason follows when it is left to itself and not hindered, as in the case of solitary thought on the part of a rational being who is in no way misled. Dialectic, on the other hand, would treat of the intercourse between two rational beings who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but who, as soon as they cease to agree like two clocks keeping exactly the same time, create a disputation, or intellectual contest. Regarded as purely rational beings, the individuals would, I say, necessarily be in agreement and their variation springs from the difference essential to individuality; in other words, it is drawn from experience.

Logic, therefore, as the science of thought, or the science of the process of pure reason, should be capable of being constructed à priori. Dialectic, for the most part, can be constructed only à posteriori; that is to say, we may learn its rules by an experiential knowledge of the disturbance which pure thought suffers through the difference of individuality manifested in the intercourse between two rational beings and also by acquaintance with the means which disputants adopt in order to make good against one another their own individual thought and to show that it is pure and objective. For human nature is such that if A. and B. are engaged in thinking in common and are communicating their opinions to one another on any subject, so long as it is not a mere fact of history and A. perceives that B.'s thoughts on one and the same subject are not the same as his own, he does not begin by revising his own process of thinking, so as to discover any mistake which he may have made, but he assumes that the mistake has occurred in B.'s. In other words, man is naturally obstinate; and this quality in him is attended with certain results, treated of in the branch of knowledge which I should like to call Dialectic, but which, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I shall call Controversial or Eristical Dialectic. Accordingly, it is the branch of knowledge which treats of the obstinacy natural to man. Eristic is only a harsher name for the same thing.

Controversial Dialectic is the art of disputing and of disputing in such a way as to hold one's own, whether one is in the right or the wrong — per fas et nefas.{3} A man may be objectively in the right and nevertheless in the eyes of bystanders and sometimes in his own, he may come off worst. For example, I may advance a proof of some assertion and my adversary may refute the proof and thus appear to have refuted the assertion, for which there may, nevertheless, be other proofs. In this case, of course, my adversary and I change places: he comes off best, although, as a matter of fact, he is in the wrong.

Aristotle divides all conclusions into logical and dialectical, in the manner described and then into eristical. (3) Eristic is the method by which the form of the conclusion is correct, but the premises, the materials from which it is drawn, are not true, but only appear to be true. Finally (4) Sophistic is the method in which the form of the conclusion is false, although it seems correct. These three last properly belong to the art of Controversial Dialectic, as they have no objective truth in view, but only the appearance of it and pay no regard to truth itself; that is to say, they aim at victory. Aristotle's book on Sophistic Conclusions was edited apart from the others and at a later date. It was the last book of his Dialectic.}

If the reader asks how this is, I reply that it is simply the natural baseness of human nature. If human nature were not base, but thoroughly honorable, we should in every debate have no other aim than the discovery of truth; we should not in the least care whether the truth proved to be in favor of the opinion which we had begun by expressing, or of the opinion of our adversary. That we should regard as a matter of no moment, or, at any rate, of very secondary consequence; but, as things are, it is the main concern. Our innate vanity, which is particularly sensitive in reference to our intellectual powers, will not suffer us to allow that our first position was wrong and our adversary's right. The way out of this difficulty would be simply to take the trouble always to form a correct judgment. For this a man would have to think before he spoke. But, with most men, innate vanity is accompanied by loquacity and innate dishonesty. They speak before they think; and even though they may afterwards perceive that they are wrong and that what they assert is false, they want it to seem the contrary. The interest in truth, which may be presumed to have been their only motive when they stated the proposition alleged to be true, now gives way to the interests of vanity: and so, for the sake of vanity, what is true must seem false and what is false must seem true.

However, this very dishonesty, this persistence in a proposition which seems false even to ourselves, has something to be said for it. It often happens that we begin with the firm conviction of the truth of our statement; but our opponent's argument appears to refute it. Should we abandon our position at once, we may discover later on that we were right after all; the proof we offered was false, but nevertheless there was a proof for our statement which was true. The argument which would have been our salvation did not occur to us at the moment. Hence we make it a rule to attack a counter-argument, even though to all appearances it is true and forcible, in the belief that its truth is only superficial and that in the course of the dispute another argument will occur to us by which we may upset it, or succeed in confirming the truth of our statement. In this way we are almost compelled to become dishonest; or, at any rate, the temptation to do so is very great. Thus it is that the weakness of our intellect and the perversity of our will lend each other mutual support; and that, generally, a disputant fights not for truth, but for his proposition, as though it were a battle pro aris et focis. He sets to work per fas et nefas; nay, as we have seen, he cannot easily do otherwise. As a rule, then, every man will insist on maintaining whatever he has said, even though for the moment he may consider it false or doubtful.{4}