The Art of Logical Thinking Or The Laws of Reasoning - William Walker Atkinson - E-Book

The Art of Logical Thinking Or The Laws of Reasoning E-Book

William Walker Atkinson

0,0
0,99 €

oder
-100%
Sammeln Sie Punkte in unserem Gutscheinprogramm und kaufen Sie E-Books und Hörbücher mit bis zu 100% Rabatt.
Mehr erfahren.
Beschreibung

Experience the life-changing power of William Walker Atkinson with this unforgettable book.

Das E-Book können Sie in Legimi-Apps oder einer beliebigen App lesen, die das folgende Format unterstützen:

EPUB
Bewertungen
0,0
0
0
0
0
0
Mehr Informationen
Mehr Informationen
Legimi prüft nicht, ob Rezensionen von Nutzern stammen, die den betreffenden Titel tatsächlich gekauft oder gelesen/gehört haben. Wir entfernen aber gefälschte Rezensionen.



THE ART OF LOGICAL THINKING

 

OR

 

THE LAWS OF REASONING

William Walker Atkinson

 

 

 

CONTENTS

 

           

 

CHAPTER I.

 

REASONING

 

 

"Reasoning" is defined as: "The act, process or art of exercising the

faculty of reason; the act or faculty of employing reason in argument;

argumentation, ratiocination; reasoning power; disputation, discussion,

argumentation." Stewart says: "The word reason itself is far from

being precise in its meaning. In common and popular discourse it denotes

that power by which we distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from

wrong, and by which we are enabled to combine means for the attainment

of particular ends."

 

By the employment of the reasoning faculties of the mind we compare

objects presented to the mind as percepts or concepts, taking up the

"raw materials" of thought and weaving them into more complex and

elaborate mental fabrics which we call abstract and general ideas of

truth. Brooks says: "It is the thinking power of the mind; the faculty

which gives us what has been called thought-knowledge, in distinction

from sense-knowledge. It may be regarded as the mental architect among

the faculties; it transforms the material furnished by the senses ...

into new products, and thus builds up the temples of science and

philosophy." The last-mentioned authority adds: "Its products are

twofold, ideas and thoughts. An idea is a mental product which

when expressed in words does not give a proposition; a thought is a

mental product which embraces the relation of two or more ideas. The

ideas of the understanding are of two general classes; abstract ideas

and general ideas. The thoughts are also of two general classes; those

pertaining to contingent truth and those pertaining to necessary truth.

In contingent truth, we have facts, or immediate judgments, and

general truths including laws and causes, derived from particular

facts; in necessary truth we have axioms, or self-evident truths, and

the truths derived from them by reasoning, called theorems."

 

In inviting you to consider the processes of reasoning, we are

irresistibly reminded of the old story of one of Moliere's plays in

which one of the characters expresses surprise on learning that he "had

been talking prose for forty years without knowing it." As Jevons says

in mentioning this: "Ninety-nine people out of a hundred might be

equally surprised on hearing that they had been converting propositions,

syllogizing, falling into paralogisms, framing hypotheses and making

classifications with genera and species. If asked whether they were

logicians, they would probably answer, No! They would be partly right;

for I believe that a large number even of educated persons have no clear

idea of what logic is. Yet, in a certain way, every one must have been a

logician since he began to speak."

 

So, in asking you to consider the processes of reasoning we are not

assuming that you never have reasoned--on the contrary we are fully

aware that you in connection with every other person, have reasoned all

your mature life. That is not the question. While everyone reasons, the

fact is equally true that the majority of persons reason incorrectly.

Many persons reason along lines far from correct and scientific, and

suffer therefor and thereby. Some writers have claimed that the majority

of persons are incapable of even fairly correct reasoning, pointing to

the absurd ideas entertained by the masses of people as a proof of the

statement. These writers are probably a little radical in their views

and statements, but one is often struck with wonder at the evidences of

incapacity for interpreting facts and impressions on the part of the

general public. The masses of people accept the most absurd ideas as

truth, providing they are gravely asserted by some one claiming

authority. The most illogical ideas are accepted without dispute or

examination, providing they are stated solemnly and authoritatively.

Particularly in the respective fields of religion and politics do we

find this blind acceptance of illogical ideas by the multitude. Mere

assertion by the leaders seems sufficient for the multitude of followers

to acquiesce.

 

In order to reason correctly it is not merely necessary to have a good

intellect. An athlete may have the proper proportions, good framework,

and symmetrical muscles, but he cannot expect to cope with others of his

kind unless he has learned to develop those muscles and to use them to

the best advantage. And, in the same way, the man who wishes to reason

correctly must develop his intellectual faculties and must also learn

the art of using them to the best advantage. Otherwise he will waste his

mental energy and will be placed at a disadvantage when confronted with

a trained logician in argument or debate. One who has witnessed a debate

or argument between two men equally strong intellectually, one of whom

is a trained logician and the other lacking this advantage, will never

forget the impression produced upon him by the unequal struggle. The

conflict is like that of a powerful wrestler, untrained in the little

tricks and turns of the science, in the various principles of applying

force in a certain way at a certain time, at a certain place, with a

trained and experienced wrestler. Or of a conflict between a muscular

giant untrained in the art of boxing, when confronted with a trained and

experienced exponent of "the manly art." The result of any such conflict

is assured in advance. Therefore, everyone should refuse to rest content

without a knowledge of the art of reasoning correctly, for otherwise he

places himself under a heavy handicap in the race for success, and

allows others, perhaps less well-equipped mentally, to have a decided

advantage over him.

 

Jevons says in this connection: "To be a good logician is, however, far

more valuable than to be a good athlete; because logic teaches us to

reason well, and reasoning gives us knowledge, and knowledge, as Lord

Bacon said, is power. As athletes, men cannot for a moment compare with

horses or tigers or monkeys. Yet, with the power of knowledge, men tame

horses and shoot tigers and despise monkeys. The weakest framework with

the most logical mind will conquer in the end, because it is easy to

foresee the future, to calculate the result of actions, to avoid

mistakes which might be fatal, and to discover the means of doing things

which seemed impossible. If such little creatures as ants had better

brains than men, they would either destroy men or make them into slaves.

It is true that we cannot use our eyes and ears without getting some

kind of knowledge, and the brute animals can do the same. But what gives

power is the deeper knowledge called Science. People may see, and hear,

and feel all their lives without really learning the nature of things

they see. But reason is the mind's eye, and enables us to see why things

are, and when and how events may be made to happen or not to happen. The

logician endeavors to learn exactly what this reason is which makes the

power of men. We all, as I have said, must reason well or ill, but logic

is the science of reasoning and enables us to distinguish between the

good reasoning which leads to truth, and the bad reasoning which every

day betrays people into error and misfortune."

 

In this volume we hope to be able to point out the methods and

principles of correctly using the reasoning faculties of the mind, in a

plain, simple manner, devoid of useless technicalities and academic

discussion. We shall adhere, in the main, to the principles established

by the best of the authorities of the old school of psychology, blending

the same with those advanced by the best authorities of the New

Psychology. No attempt to make of this book a school text-book shall be

made, for our sole object and aim is to bring this important subject

before the general public composed of people who have neither the time

nor inclination to indulge in technical discussion nor academic

hair-splitting, but who desire to understand the underlying working

principles of the Laws of Reasoning.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II.

 

THE PROCESS OF REASONING

 

 

The processes of Reasoning may be said to comprise four general stages

or steps, as follows:

 

I. Abstraction, by which is meant the process of drawing off and

setting aside from an object, person or thing, a quality or

attribute, and making of it a distinct object of thought. For instance,

if I perceive in a lion the quality of strength, and am able to

think of this quality abstractly and independently of the animal--if the

term strength has an actual mental meaning to me, independent of the

lion--then I have abstracted that quality; the thinking thereof is an

act of abstraction; and the thought-idea itself is an abstract idea.

Some writers hold that these abstract ideas are realities, and "not mere

figments of fancy." As Brooks says: "The rose dies, but my idea of its

color and fragrance remains." Other authorities regard Abstraction as

but an act of attention concentrated upon but the particular quality

to the exclusion of others, and that the abstract idea has no existence

apart from the general idea of the object in which it is included. Sir

William Hamilton says: "We can rivet our attention on some particular

mode of a thing, as its smell, its color, its figure, its size, etc.,

and abstract it from the others. This may be called Modal Abstraction.

The abstraction we have now been considering is performed on individual

objects, and is consequently particular. There is nothing necessarily

connected with generalization in abstraction; generalization is indeed

dependent on abstraction, which it supposes; but abstraction does not

involve generalization."

 

II. Generalization, by which is meant the process of forming Concepts

or General Ideas. It acts in the direction of apprehending the common

qualities of objects, persons and things, and combining and uniting them

into a single notion or conception which will comprehend and include

them all. A General Idea or Concept differs from a particular idea in

that it includes within itself the qualities of the particular and other

particulars, and accordingly may be applied to any one of these

particulars as well as to the general class. For instance, one may

have a particular idea of some particular horse, which applies only

to that particular horse. He may also have a General Idea of horse, in

the generic or class sense, which idea applies not only to the general

class of horse but also to each and every horse which is included in

that class. The expression of Generalization or Conception is called a

Concept.

 

III. Judgment, by which is meant the process of comparing two objects,

persons or things, one with another, and thus perceiving their agreement

or disagreement. Thus we may compare the two concepts horse and

animal, and perceiving a certain agreement between them we form the

judgment that: "A horse is an animal;" or comparing horse and

cow, and perceiving their disagreement, we form the judgment: "A

horse is not a cow." The expression of a judgment is called a

Proposition.

 

IV. Reasoning, by which is meant the process of comparing two objects,

persons or things, through their relation to a third object, person or

thing. Thus we may reason (a) that all mammals are animals; (b) that a

horse is a mammal; (c) that, therefore, a horse is an animal; the

result of the reasoning being the statement that: "A horse is an

animal." The most fundamental principle of reasoning, therefore,

consists in the comparing of two objects of thought through and by means

of their relation to a third object. The natural form of expression of

this process of Reasoning is called a Syllogism.

 

It will be seen that these four processes of reasoning necessitate the

employment of the processes of Analysis and Synthesis, respectively.

Analysis means a separating of an object of thought into its constituent

parts, qualities or relations. Synthesis means the combining of the

qualities, parts or relations of an object of thought into a composite

whole. These two processes are found in all processes of Reasoning.

Abstraction is principally analytic; Generalization or Conception

chiefly synthetic; Judgment is either or both analytic or synthetic;

Reasoning is either a synthesis of particulars in Induction, or an

evolution of the particular from the general in Deduction.

 

There are two great classes of Reasoning; viz., (1) Inductive

Reasoning, or the inference of general truths from particular truths;

and (2) Deductive Reasoning, or the inference of particular truths from

general truths.

 

Inductive Reasoning proceeds by discovering a general truth from

particular truths. For instance, from the particular truths that

individual men die we discover the general truth that "All men must

die;" or from observing that in all observed instances ice melts at a

certain temperature, we may infer that "All ice melts at a certain

temperature." Inductive Reasoning proceeds from the known to the

unknown. It is essentially a synthetic process. It seeks to discover

general laws from particular facts.

 

Deductive Reasoning proceeds by discovering particular truths from

general truths. Thus we reason that as all men die, John Smith, being a

man, must die; or, that as all ice melts at a certain temperature, it

follows that the particular piece of ice under consideration will melt

at that certain temperature. Deductive Reasoning is therefore seen to be

essentially an analytical process.

 

Mills says of Inductive Reasoning: "The inductive method of the ancients

consisted in ascribing the character of general truths to all

propositions which are true in all the instances of which we have

knowledge. Bacon exposed the insufficiency of this method, and physical

investigation has now far outgrown the Baconian conception....

Induction, then, is that operation by which we infer that what we know

to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases

which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other

words, induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true

of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that

what is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at

all times."

 

Regarding Deductive Reasoning, a writer says: "Deductive Reasoning is

that process of reasoning by which we arrive at the necessary

consequences, starting from admitted or established premises." Brooks

says: "The general truths from which we reason to particulars are

derived from several distinct sources. Some are intuitive, as the axioms

of mathematics or logic. Some of them are derived from induction....

Some of them are merely hypothetical, as in the investigation of the

physical sciences. Many of the hypotheses and theories of the physical

sciences are used as general truth for deductive reasoning; as the

theory of gravitation, the theory of light; etc. Reasoning from the

theory of universal gravitation, Leverrier discovered the position of a

new planet in the heavens before it had been discovered by human eyes."

 

Halleck points out the interdependence of Inductive and Deductive

Reasoning in the following words: "Man has to find out through his own

experience, or that of others, the major premises from which he argues

or draws his conclusions. By induction we examine what seems to us a

sufficient number of individual cases. We then conclude that the rest of

these cases, which we have not examined, will obey the same general

laws.... The premise, 'All cows chew the cud,' was laid down after a

certain number of cows had been examined. If we were to see a cow twenty

years hence, we should expect that she chewed her cud.... After

Induction has classified certain phenomena and thus given us a major

premise, we proceed deductively to apply the inference to any new

specimen that can be shown to belong to that class."

 

The several steps of Deductive Reasoning shall now be considered in turn

as we proceed.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER III.

 

THE CONCEPT

 

 

In considering the process of thinking, we must classify the several

steps or stages of thought that we may examine each in detail for the

purpose of comprehending them combined as a whole. In actual thinking

these several steps or stages are not clearly separated in

consciousness, so that each stands out clear and distinct from the

preceding and succeeding steps or stages, but, on the contrary, they

blend and shade into each other so that it is often difficult to draw a

clear dividing line. The first step or stage in the process of thinking

is that which is called a concept.

 

A concept is a mental representation of anything. Prof. Wm. James says:

"The function by which we mark off, discriminate, draw a line around,

and identify a numerically distinct subject of discourse is called

conception." There are five stages or steps in each concept, as

follows:

 

I. Presentation. Before a concept may be formed there must first be a

presentation of the material from which the concept is to be formed. If

we wish to form the concept, animal, we must first have perceived an

animal, probably several kinds of animals--horses, dogs, cats, cows,

pigs, lions, tigers, etc. We must also have received impressions from

the sight of these animals which may be reproduced by the

memory--represented to the mind. In order that we may have a full

concept of animal we should have perceived every kind of animal, for

otherwise there would be some elements of the full concept lacking.

Accordingly it is practically impossible to have a full concept of

anything. The greater the opportunities for perception the greater will

be the opportunity for conception. In other books of this series we have

spoken of the value and importance of the attention and of clear and

full perception. Without an active employment of the attention, it is

impossible to receive a clear perception of anything; and unless the

perception has been clear, it is impossible for the mind to form a clear

concept of the thing perceived. As Sir Wm. Hamilton has said: "An act

of attention, that is an act of concentration, seems thus necessary to

every exertion of consciousness, as a certain contraction of the pupil

is requisite to every exertion of vision.... Attention, then, is to

consciousness what the contraction of the pupil is to sight, or to the

eye of the mind what the microscope or telescope is to the bodily

eye.... It constitutes the half of all intellectual power." And Sir B.

Brodie said: "It is attention, much more than in the abstract power of

reasoning, which constitutes the vast difference which exists between

minds of different individuals." And as Dr. Beattie says: "The force

with which anything strikes the mind is generally in proportion to the

degree of attention bestowed upon it."

 

II. Comparison. Following the stage of Presentation is the stage of

Comparison. We separate our general concept of animal into a number of

sub-concepts, or concepts of various kinds of animals. We compare the

pig with the goat, the cow with the horse, in fact each animal with all

other animals known to us. By this process we distinguish the points of

resemblance and the points of difference. We perceive that the wolf

resembles the dog to a considerable degree; that it has some points of

resemblance to the fox; and a still less distinct resemblance to the

bear; also that it differs materially from the horse, the cow or the

elephant. We also learn that there are various kinds of wolves, all

bearing a great resemblance to each other, and yet having marked points

of difference. The closer we observe the various individuals among the

wolves, the more points of difference do we find. The faculty of

Comparison evidences itself in inductive reasoning; ability and

disposition to analyze, classify, compare, etc. Fowler says that those

in whom it is largely developed "Reason clearly and correctly from

conclusions and scientific facts up to the laws which govern them;

discern the known from the unknown; detect error by its incongruity with

facts; have an excellent talent for comparing, explaining, expounding,