The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics E-Book

Immanuel Kant

• Herausgeber: Booksell-Verlag
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019

Beschreibung

In "The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics," Immanuel Kant embarks on a profound exploration of moral philosophy, striving to establish a foundation for ethical principles grounded in rationality. The work exemplifies Kant'Äôs rigorous analytical style, characterized by precise definitions and systematic argumentation. By examining the nature of moral duties through the lens of pure reason, Kant delineates the categorical imperative, a cornerstone of his ethical framework that asserts the universality and necessity of moral laws. This text situates itself in the broader context of Enlightenment thought, challenging prevailing ethical theories by positing that moral obligations arise not from empirical conditions but from rational imperatives. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a pivotal figure in Western philosophy, was deeply influenced by the tumultuous intellectual climate of the Enlightenment. His lifelong commitment to reason and autonomy led him to question traditional moral frameworks, prompting the formulation of his own unique ethical system. Kant'Äôs diverse background, which encompassed theology, mathematics, and philosophy, equipped him with a multifaceted perspective that enriched his arguments in ethics. His conviction that morality must be grounded in rationality is a testament to his enduring influence on subsequent philosophical discourse. Readers seeking to comprehend the foundational aspects of ethical reasoning and its implications for human conduct will find "The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics" indispensable. Kant's clarity and depth foster an engagement with ethical questions that remain relevant today, encouraging reflection on how rationality underpins our moral judgments. For anyone interested in the intersection of ethics, reason, and autonomy, this book represents a crucial resource that illuminates the principles governing our moral lives.

Leseprobe

Immanuel Kant

The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics

Published by Good Press, 2022

[email protected]

EAN 4057664648181

Table of Contents

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS

I. Exposition of the Conception of Ethics

II. Exposition of the Notion of an End which is also a Duty

REMARK

III. Of the Reason for conceiving an End which is also a Duty

IV. What are the Ends which are also Duties?

V. Explanation of these two Notions

A. OUR OWN PERFECTION

B. HAPPINESS OF OTHERS

VI. Ethics does not supply Laws for Actions (which is done by. Jurisprudence) , but only for the Maxims of Action

VII. Ethical Duties are of indeterminate, Juridical Duties of strict,. Obligation

VIII. Exposition of the Duties of Virtue as Intermediate Duties

(1) OUR OWN PERFECTION as an end which is also a duty

(2) HAPPINESS OF OTHERS as an end which is also a duty

IX. What is a Duty of Virtue?

X. The Supreme Principle of Jurisprudence was Analytical; that of Ethics. is Synthetical

XI. According to the preceding Principles, the Scheme of Duties of Virtue. may be thus exhibited

XII. Preliminary Notions of the Susceptibility of the Mind for Notions of. Duty generally

A. THE MORAL FEELING

B. OF CONSCIENCE

C. OF LOVE TO MEN

D. OF RESPECT

XIII. General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of. Pure Ethics

XIV. Of Virtue in General

XV. Of the Principle on which Ethics is separated from Jurisprudence

REMARKS

Of the Doctrine of Virtue on the Principle Of Internal Freedom.

XVI. Virtue requires, first of all, Command over Oneself

XVII. Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)

REMARK

ON CONSCIENCE

THE END

PREFACE

Table of Contents

If there exists on any subject a philosophy (that is, a system of rational knowledge based on concepts), then there must also be for this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts, independent of any condition of intuition, in other words, a metaphysic. It may be asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every practical philosophy, which is the doctrine of duties, and therefore also for Ethics, in order to be able to present it as a true science (systematically), not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines (fragmentarily). As regards pure jurisprudence, no one will question this requirement; for it concerns only what is formal in the elective will, which has to be limited in its external relations according to laws of freedom; without regarding any end which is the matter of this will. Here, therefore, deontology is a mere scientific doctrine (doctrina scientiae). *

* One who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not, therefore, a practical philosopher. The latter is he who makes the rational end the principle of his actions, while at the same time he joins with this the necessary knowledge which, as it aims at action, must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic, unless a legal duty is in question; in which case meum and tuum must be accurately determined in the balance of justice, on the principle of equality of action and action, which requires something like mathematical proportion, but not in the case of a mere ethical duty. For in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to do (a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have can be easily decided), but the chief point is the inner principle of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the spring of action, in order that we may be able to say of the man who joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical philosopher.

Now in this philosophy (of ethics) it seems contrary to the idea of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make the notion of duty purified from everything empirical (from every feeling) a motive of action. For what sort of notion can we form of the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to overcome the vice-breeding inclinations, if Virtue is to borrow her "arms from the armoury of metaphysics," which is a matter of speculation that only few men can handle? Hence all ethical teaching in lecture rooms, pulpits, and popular books, when it is decked out with fragments of metaphysics, becomes ridiculous. But it is not, therefore, useless, much less ridiculous, to trace in metaphysics the first principles of ethics; for it is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty, otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the ethical teaching. To rely for this reason on a certain feeling which, on account of the effect expected from it, is called moral, may, perhaps, even satisfy the popular teacher, provided he desires as the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem: "If everyone in every case made your maxim the universal law, how could this law be consistent with itself?" But if it were merely feeling that made it our duty to take this principle as a criterion, then this would not be dictated by reason, but only adopted instinctively and therefore blindly.