America and the Imperialism of Ignorance E-Book

Andrew Alexander

• Herausgeber: Biteback Publishing
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Seitenzahl: 705

Beschreibung

American incomprehension of the outside world has been the chief problem in international affairs since the end of World War II. In America and the Imperialism of Ignorance, veteran political journalist Andrew Alexander constructs a meticulous case, including evidence gleaned from the steady opening up of Soviet archives, demonstrating why this is so. From starting the Cold War to revisiting unlearned lessons upon Cuba and Vietnam, the Middle East has latterly become the arena in which the American foreign policy approach proved wretchedly consistent. This has created six decades in which war was not the last resort of diplomacy but an early option, and where peace and order breaking out was thought to be the natural conclusion of military intervention. Alexander traces this 'shoot-first' tendency from 1945, arguing that on a grand scale the Cold War was a red herring in which the US and her proxies set out to counter a Soviet expansionism that never truly existed, and that by the time of the George W Bush era, the 'Industrial-Military-Complex' was in office offering little hope of a change in approach.

Leseprobe

ANDREW ALEXANDER

AMERICAAND THE IMPERIALISM OF IGNORANCE

US FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945

To my numerous friends in the Conservative Party whose relentless belief remains to this day that the Cold war arose from the aggressive ambitions of the Kremlin, thwarted by the bold response of our American friends. Their refusal to contemplate any other explanation has spurred me on in this, my survey of US foreign policy over the last sixty-five years.

‘To lose an empire is not easy. The British did it and they learned how. The French did it and they learned how. Then the Russians did it – and have not quite learned how. Now I think the Americans should learn how to lose an empire.’

Hans Blix

CONTENTS

Title Page

Dedication

Epigraph

A note on the sources

PART 1: THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE

1. The flawed Cold War orthodoxy

2. Two Long Telegrams: mutually assured distrust

3. The expansion of America: from colony to superpower

4. American entanglement in Europe

5. The red menace as a political tool

6. Hitler presses on

7. War begins

8. A strained coalition

9. Soviet diplomats in optimistic mood

10. False harmony at Yalta

11. A new US President meets his Allies

12. Hiroshima ends the war but peace seems distant

13. Truman’s Navy Day speech

14. Churchill warns of the Iron Curtain

15. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

16. The Berlin Air Lift

17. The Cold War hots up: Korea and China

18. Death of Stalin: an opportunity ignored

19. 1956: the year of shattered illusions

20. American relations with China

21. The Cuban Missile Crisis: armageddon narrowly averted

22. Debacle in Vietnam

23. American idealism collapses: the CIA ‘rogue elephant’

24. The Prague Spring and Brezhnev Doctrine

25. The Reagan era: Gorbachev takes over in Moscow

26. In retrospect

PART2: THE MIDDLE EAST

27. Maintaining the military machine

28. Oil becomes a political weapon

29. The Shah of Iran: America’s policeman in the Gulf

30. The Lebanese cockpit

31. Saddam: from American ally to ‘most wanted’

32. The rise of neocons

33. Planning to invade Iraq

34. Victory in Iraq

35. The lost peace

36. Being too powerful for one’s own good

Appendix

Bibliography

Index

Plates

Copyright

A NOTE ON THE SOURCES

Where references are made to secondary sources (which usually cite primary sources themselves) the relevant books and papers are being suggested for further reading. Frequent use is made of the Cold War International History Project website (http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm? fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409). This huge American-sponsored project cannot be too highly recommended. It contains a variety of sources, principally American and Russian, and makes use of Soviet archives as they are being opened. Translations are made by scholars of international standing who also hold conferences to discuss the implications and backgrounds of the material.

The USA expands from shore to shining shore

PART 1: THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE

CHAPTER 1

THE FLAWED COLD WAR ORTHODOXY

The historical consistency of US policy – Soviet fears ignored – Stalin’s fears of Communist revolutions outside Russia – Truman’s view of Soviet ambitions – the Russia military threat imaginary – Stalin not a repeat of Hitler – Truman initiates the Cold War – Washington rejects Moscow’s peace overtures

‘One of the delightful things about Americans is that they have absolutely no historical memory.’ Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai

‘Scare the hell out of the American people!’ Senator Vandenberg’s advice to President Truman on persuading voters to accept the cost of aid for Greece and Turkey.

American incomprehension of the outside world, combined with a determination to lead it, has been the principal problem in international affairs since the end of the Second World War. The stubbornly orthodox view remains that despite ‘aberrations’ ranging from Vietnam to Iraq, the balance sheet remains in the USA’s favour, given the triumph of the Cold War, the defeat of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Communism. America thus deserves the West’s gratitude for leading it to victory after forty-five years of confrontation with an aggressive Russia. It adds some logic to the view that it is essential for the Western alliance to hold firm behind Washington as it faces the newer menace of Islamic terrorism.

However, this orthodoxy is based on the premise that the Soviet threat at the end of the Second World War was a real one.1 But, as one of Britain’s leading military commentators, Sir Michael Howard, observed during the last days of the Soviet Union: ‘No serious historian any longer argues that Stalin ever had any intention of moving his forces outside the area he occupied in Eastern Europe.’ Yet many historians, perhaps not serious but widely read, still argue that the Soviet leader had such aggressive ambitions. A proper military analysis of the situation in 1945 would have shown that the prospect of Russian armies invading Western Europe was a fantasy, like Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction ready for launch in forty-five minutes. Also like the domino theory reigning in Washington during the Vietnam conflict that if the North won, the whole of South East Asia would go Communist.

The opening up of the Soviet archives underlines the fantasy of the old view of the Russian ‘threat’. The USA’s allies today may be anxious to believe that such manifest follies as Vietnam and Iraq were uncharacteristic of a nation dedicated to peace. But both demonstrate an unmistakeable continuity of a fiercely assertive foreign policy, flourishing under presidencies of both parties. The unwinnable war in Vietnam started under President Kennedy, was stepped up by President Johnson and finally lost by President Nixon despite ferocious bombings of Laos and Cambodia, plus raids on Hanoi itself, in an effort to force North Vietnam to negotiate.

The first Gulf War, launched by President George H. Bush to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, achieved its UN-legitimised end. But the subsequent programme of militarily-supported sanctions produced appalling hardship and death for the ordinary people of Iraq, whom Washington was claiming to rescue. As the death toll mounted, the sanctions were notoriously dubbed ‘worthwhile’ during the Clinton regime. The second Gulf War launched by President George W. Bush is only defended by those hemmed in by their former enthusiasm. Its cost since 2003 has been prodigious for Iraq, supposedly being rescued from tyranny while the Middle East and the world was simultaneously saved from Saddam’s WMDs.

The prolonged and unwinnable war in Afghanistan appeared to follow the decision by the second Bush to extend the original punitive expedition launched after the 9/11 atrocity in New York. But it transpired that an attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was already being planned in Washington to settle old scores with al Qaeda for previous terrorist assaults. The subsequent ‘war on terror’ became a general campaign against Islamic militants, extending into Pakistan and Yemen. In the case of Afghanistan it was accompanied by a high-minded claim that a Western-style democratic state was being created which would be a barrier to Jihadists. By the time Bush left office, the conflict had lasted seven years – longer than the Second World War – and the position was deteriorating. The succeeding Obama administration’s policy on Afghanistan, despite pledges of a swift removal of American forces, was to leave US policy little changed. He agreed to send more troops in the hope that – reminiscent of Vietnam – they might inflict sufficient damage on the insurgents to ease the early US withdrawal he called for during his election campaign.

Correspondingly, Washington’s almost unquestioning support for Israel in its collisions with its Arab neighbours seemed to underline a US instinct for the solution of problems by force, or the support of force by a surrogate. Washington was the vital provider of military, economic and political aid. It bore a key responsibility for Israel’s prolonged assault on insurgents in the Lebanon in the late 1970s, in the brief repeat of this exercise in 2006 and similarly in Gaza in 2008 – all expeditions which aroused widespread condemnation. US policy in Latin America, regularly in assistance with notoriously brutal regimes, also demonstrated the continuity of outlook in Washington, regardless of party.

Criticism of these unfortunate chapters in American foreign policy is now commonplace. However, a readiness to recognise the folly of the Cold War and how the US began it is much harder to find, despite the high quality of ‘revisionist’ histories by American historians in particular. There are obviously other reasons for a reluctance to face this. It rebels against sense to accept that the world came close to nuclear Armageddon on half a dozen occasions and expended so much blood and treasure for forty years against a threat that was never real. To accept this raises serious doubt about the integrity and basic intelligence of a whole succession of Western governments and the political institutions for which they make such high claims. In mitigation of the European powers’ readiness to follow the American lead, two points might be made.

The first is, ironically, that the launch of the Cold War by the USA did in due course bring into existence the very danger which had been imagined. It made frantic defence measures seem sensible. Threatened by President Truman, Russia responded by a vigorous programme of rearmament and an even tighter clampdown on Eastern Europe. With the refusal of the USA to respond to peace initiatives launched by the Soviet leadership on the death of Stalin in 1953, the Kremlin fought back under the new and more assertive leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. American and Western power in general was challenged wherever it could be found. It became rational to talk of a Communist threat and of the danger of a Soviet Union with a nuclear armoury. What was inaccurate was the assumption that a new military threat had come into being when the wartime allies finally came face to face in Germany.

A second excuse may be pleaded for Western governments following American policy: the sheer power of the dollar. What Washington decreed was little challenged by its European allies. There were dangers in objecting to the foreign policy of the USA. It was like criticising the bank manager when loans were desperately needed. Accepting the American view helped by the expenditure involved in US bases in Europe was the easiest route. The normal-give-and-take between allies declined into a subservient attitude. Britain was trying to rebuild a shattered economy with the assistance of an American loan. In 1948 it became further dependent on US aid under the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. Britain was particularly reliant on US support for sterling, foolishly on a fixed exchange rate which was regularly in crisis. Ironically the instability in sterling owed much to Britain’s attempts to maintain its own military bases around the world, a policy warmly supported by the Americans.

This economic dependence had an inevitable effect on British policy from the start. Clement Attlee, newly elected as Labour Prime Minister in 1945, was not by instinct a hardliner when it came to the Soviet Union, though his ebullient Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was. His outlook was coloured by his experience of Communist manoeuvrings as a trade union leader. There were strong doubts about the American attitude in the mind of Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary during Churchill’s wartime leadership and a veteran of dealings with the Kremlin. He regarded the Soviet position after the end of the war as driven by natural motives of defence. Churchill himself with his long history of hostility to everything Soviet shared none of his deputy’s reservations. But hardliners and doubters had one view in common. To defy US policy was financially perilous. The Suez crisis was to demonstrate this dramatically a decade later.

The consequences of prolonged and unquestioning support for the USA have been disastrous. It has led to friends of America being dragged into the front line of a ‘war on terror’ which served as a recruiting sergeant for Jihadists from all parts of Islam. The world is a much more dangerous place as a result of America’s determination to save it.

A wider look at history shows that a strongly interventionist US foreign policy is nothing new – though the current power to intervene globally is. A century ago, an American incomprehension of the outside world was exemplified by President Woodrow Wilson, so determined to remake countries in the American image after the First World War. His mixture of benevolence and ruthlessness may be summed up in a dispute with Mexico in 1913, when he announced ‘I will teach the Latin-Americans to elect good men’ followed by bombarding the town of Vera Cruz. His gunboat diplomacy intensified such feelings of nationalism and anti-Americanism that Germany hoped to make Mexico an ally in an attack on the USA in 1917 – famously exposed in the Zimmermann telegram, decoded by London.

In 1945, the USA dedicated itself in Wilsonian language to bringing ‘democracy and freedom’ to the countries occupied by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War. The goal was high-minded. But there was a puzzling refusal to acknowledge the Soviet claim that two invasions by Germany in twenty-seven years made the firm control of Eastern Europe essential to Russian security. Truman insisted on seeing the Soviets as the determinedly expansionist enemy of the free world almost from the day he assumed office. They were, he said, ‘planning world conquest’.2

The United States over which he presided had emerged from the Second World War with a military and economic supremacy unparalleled in history. Of the three powers which defeated the Axis alliance, the USA was unique in ending the war wealthier than when it began. By contrast, Britain’s income was down by a third with much of its overseas assets sold to buy armaments from the USA. In the case of Russia, which had been responsible for destroying the vast bulk of Hitler’s forces, the loss of income was immeasurable. Soviet statistics, always dubious, have never provided a wholly reliable picture of national income. But the scale of the devastation, involving at least twenty-two million and possibly twenty-seven million military and civilian deaths, speaks for itself.

There was in fact no evidence in 1945 that the Soviet Union had a sinister plan to conquer the West. The threat perceived by Truman and others was imaginary – though no less powerful for that – stoked up by years of fearing the deadly spread of Communism. We can gain a genuine insight into the Kremlin mood from opened Soviet archives. As the end of the war came in sight in 1944, the analyses of Moscow’s senior diplomats anticipated a period of post-war East–West cooperation, if with reservations about possible future developments in American internal political rivalries. Nor did the Kremlin intend, as some feared, to mount a Communist takeover of Italy and France. Moscow wanted to see strong Communist parties in both countries able to influence policies in a way which would be advantageous to Russia. But having Communist governments in either country would have been contrary to the policy which Stalin always maintained: keeping Moscow as the absolute centre of the Communist world and thus something he alone could control. In any case, maintaining Communist governments in either country would have demanded the presence of Soviet troops which would have embroiled Moscow in the war which the Kremlin had every reason to avoid.

Stalin’s attitude to the so-called world proletarian revolution is essential to understanding his personal and political motivation. He was, like the despot throughout the ages, principally concerned with his own survival rather than with ideological issues. He abandoned the grand global ambition of the world proletarian revolution in 1924 when he proclaimed that, henceforth, the aim was to be ‘socialism in one country’. To believe that he remained at all times a devout ideologue is to misread his character.

Milovan Djilas, at one time Vice President of Yugoslavia, observed in Conversations with Stalin3 that it was not altogether true, as some Communists complained, that Stalin was wholly against revolutions abroad. He was only in favour of those which he could control. He lost control of Yugoslavia. He was later to lose it in China – insofar as he ever had it.4

Stalin’s attitude to Communist parties abroad was really very simple. They were not there to win elections, only to act as his underlings, aiding Soviet foreign policy in all its shifts and changes, sometimes assisting one party or country, sometimes another. The overall aim was simply to promote weakness among nations which might be rivals or opponents or otherwise unhelpful to Russia. This was dramatically illustrated in the role allotted to the German Communist Party in the early 1930s. In combination with the left-wing Socialist Party it could have been enough to stop Hitler’s rise to power.

But a Communist Party with real power in a German government, ruling an infinitely more advanced nation, was too much of a risk. The centre of gravity of Communism would shift away from Moscow, thus threatening Stalin’s power and personal status. The German Communists were ordered not just to stay out of any coalition with the Socialists, but to attack them as ‘social fascists’. George Kennan, who had been the State Department’s leading Russian expert, wrote in 1962 (abandoning his famous analysis of a dire Soviet threat in 1946), ‘From the bourgeois world as from his political entourage in the world of communism, Stalin only wanted one thing: weakness. This was not at all identified with revolution.’5

In the case of China, Stalin called on Mao to join with the Nationalists, not fight them. As the Communist forces swept south and came within sight of victory, Stalin pleaded with Mao to negotiate, not fight. The determination of the West to see every Soviet move as explicable in terms of the pursuit of the world proletarian revolution provides one of history’s great ironies: the West took Communist doctrine more seriously than Stalin.

Truman claimed in his memoirs that it was at Potsdam that he finally concluded that the Soviet Union aimed at world conquest. Yet nothing that was said or done there could conceivably justify such a conclusion. The Russians were proving difficult and obstinate on certain issues but not aggressive. It was the issue of the internationalisation of waterways – a Truman obsession – which brought the President to his historically epic conclusion. The fate of the world in Truman’s mind seemed to turn on, of all things, the Danube delta.

If Russia was in a demanding mood at Potsdam, it was not surprising. The Red Army had borne the brunt of the war. Of all the Germans killed, nearly nine out of ten perished on the Russia front. The Wehrmacht had thrown nearly ten times as many divisions at the Red Army as it did against Britain and the USA. And while Britain had been impoverished by the war, much of Russia had been laid waste. The USA – without a single bomb dropped on its mainland – had enjoyed a remarkable prosperity.

On the east European issue, it should have been evident enough at the time how Russia was driven by a desire to seek security in depth after the two devastating German invasions in twenty-seven years.6 Moscow wanted a buffer between Russia and Germany and control over these territories. Stalin himself predicted to Djilas that the Germans would be back on their feet in twelve to fifteen years.7 Though this seemed a daring prophecy at the time, given the wretched condition of Germany in 1945, he was to be proved too cautious. The German Federal Republic was not just back on its feet by the early 1950s, it was soon being asked to join NATO, precisely the sort of development which the Kremlin feared.

Given the German invasions, it would not have mattered whether the government in Moscow had been Communist, Tsarist or Social Democrat. It would still have insisted on firm control of these countries through which invasion had come; and bound to regard with deep suspicion any attempts to prevent it. In any case, Moscow could never forget that it was British and French policy in the interwar years to make Eastern Europe a barrier against the Soviet Union, even to consider – crucially – allowing Hitler a free hand against Russia. Colonel, later President, de Gaulle noted that even after the start of the Second World War:

Certain circles saw the enemy in Stalin rather than Hitler. They busied themselves with finding means of striking Russia, either by aiding Finland or bombarding Baku or landing at Istanbul, much more than in coming to grips with Hitler.8

Nor could the Soviets overlook the fact that, among its new satellites, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria had fought on the Axis side. Moreover, Poland could be blamed for the Russo-Polish war in 1920 which followed the creation of the Soviet Union.

Only someone who had already made up his mind about Soviet intentions could have claimed that the aim was ‘world conquest’. The suspicions which seemed to lurk constantly in Russian minds about the West were widely viewed as paranoid, given that the world was hungry for peace and cooperation. But it could be argued that the Kremlin had much to be paranoid about, given the history of the interwar years. British and French policy seemed so ready to solve the problem of Hitler by turning him eastwards. It is impossible to understand the Kremlin’s fears without recounting those extraordinary manoeuvres, culminating in serious proposals in Britain and France that the two countries should be prepared to go to war against Russia – just after the war with Germany had broken out – in defence of Finland, then under attack from the Red Army. The country held a strategic key for Russia against Germany.

The wartime alliance of Britain, Russia and the USA certainly showed that East–West cooperation was possible. Friendly gestures by President Roosevelt made an impression on both the Kremlin and opinion at home. A friendly post-war settlement was seen as possible not just in the West but also in the extensive analyses made in the Soviet Foreign ministry by its senior diplomats. But that was while Roosevelt was alive. Once Truman took over on the President’s death in 1945, it quickly became apparent that old ferocious suspicions of expanding Communism, dating back to the Bolshevik revolution, had made their return, this time with the USA indisputably the most powerful nation on earth. This made conditions all too well suited for a collision of mammoth proportions.

Yet it must be said that the great bulk of Americans, when peace broke out in 1945, were full of good intentions – though intertwined with a belief that what was good for the USA must be good for mankind, particularly where open markets and free trade were concerned. The new-found strength of the USA provided a chance to mould the post-war world, to propagate democracy, plus liberal capitalism, which, in American minds, would constitute a safeguard against future wars. This faith in democracy conveniently overlooked, among other things, the fact that Hitler had advanced to power in 1933 through a democratic vote.

The real problem at this point was not the generally benevolent intentions of the USA but its naivety about the outside world’s complexities, its varied cultures, its long-standing nationalistic rivalries and in particular often strong feelings of insecurity. These were feelings hard to comprehend in a nation which could not remember any invasion and which had not suffered a single bullet or bomb fall on its mainland during the Second World War. However, it was not just the USA which insisted on misreading the post-war conditions. Some of Europe’s statesmen with long histories of fearing the Communist virus also believed that the battered Soviet Union was ready to fight the West. This should have been seen as absurd. It requires no technical knowledge of military matters to appreciate the point.

Suppose, even ignoring the deterrent of the A-bomb, that the Red Army had attacked the West soon after the end of the war. It would have encountered strong resistance from the British, the Americans and hastily rearmed elements of the Wehrmacht. It would have been a hard fight but let us suppose that the Russian forces reached the Channel ports. What then?

The invasion of Britain would have been virtually impossible. The Soviets had neither the air nor sea power to make the crossing and huge numbers of troops would have been needed as occupying forces throughout Europe. Meanwhile American troops, aircraft and war supplies would have been pouring into Britain. However, let us suppose, again for the sake of argument, and against all conceivable odds, that the Russians had succeeded in occupying Britain as well as all of Western Europe. What then? The Soviet Union would have been left facing the Americans across three thousand miles of ocean. It would be the ultimate unwinnable war, a military planners’ ultimate nightmare.

In short, the threat was a hallucination. The USA’s Central Intelligence Agency carried out a study in 1946 which concluded that the shattered Soviet Union would not even be in a position to wage a war for fifteen years. Yet the fear of a Russian onslaught persisted. The sheer size of the Red Army, only slowly being demobilised, was regularly advanced as evidence of malign intentions. But the desire to retain large forces against the possibility of another German revival plus the need – as Moscow saw it – to maintain a grip on Eastern Europe was logical.

We have to wonder why the West was consumed by fears of Russia when the war ended. To a considerable extent, it was inspired by a seductively simple belief that Stalin was another Hitler. The USA and Britain were emerging from a war which it was generally accepted started because Hitler had been appeased. The parallel with Stalin seemed irresistible. He was no less of a dictator than Hitler and just as brutal, certainly more whimsical in his ruthlessness. Moreover Marxist doctrine in its purer and original form proclaimed the inevitability of a Communist world. Hitler had finally revealed the full scale of the Nazi menace when he seized Czechoslovakia. Now Stalin, after the war, was refusing to give up control of Eastern Europe. The parallel seemed easy enough. In fact this was another of those historical examples of ‘over-learning’ the apparent lessons of the day.

This simplistic view of 1945 took no account of the differences between the two episodes. Hitler had no need of Czechoslovakia, except to continue his surge eastwards. Stalin saw control of Poland as essential to Russian security against Germany. The occupation of that country and the imposition of a Communist government in Warsaw was a very sore issue for Britain which had gone to war ostensibly to save Poland. It was seen as a mark of failure and a breach of honour that the country should be left occupied by another dictator. The USA, for its part, had been dragged into the war but was eager to convince itself that it was embarking on a high-minded crusade to save democracy and all the values associated with it. Less high-mindedly, as President Roosevelt reminded Stalin at the Yalta conference, there were some six to seven million Polish-American voters in the USA to say nothing of others with links to the occupied east European countries – the so-called hyphenate vote (capable, he was warned, of turning a presidential election). Both Britain and the USA insisted on seeing Poland as the acid test of Moscow’s goodwill and peaceful intentions. Minds refused to meet.

Where Truman stood on Eastern Europe was never in much doubt. His Navy Day speech in October 1945, with its declarations about firm American resistance to tyrannies and its assistance to those opposing them, sent a plain enough message to Moscow. The fact that its belligerent tone had a limited impact in the US at that moment must be attributed to the fact that the war had finally ended only weeks before. Assertions about American righteousness were only to be expected.

There was also the history of the Russian civil war which helped to stoke up the deep and at times apparently neurotic suspicions of the Soviet Union towards the West, an instinct which was also very Russian and existed well before the revolution. In the first three years after the 1917 revolution the new Bolshevik government faced military help provided by the west European powers to its internal rivals in efforts to destroy the Soviet state. This wish seemed to persist even after Stalin soft-pedalled the notion of the world proletarian revolution.9 In the 1930s, the Russians had good reason to fear that at least part of British and French policy towards Hitler was inspired by a desire to turn him eastwards. Both Britain and the USA, but more particularly Britain, had managed to convince themselves in the interwar years that the Red Menace remained serious. Any protestations of peaceful intentions from Moscow were seen as just a disguise for the underlying purposes of revolutionary Marxism–Leninism. Besides and perhaps even more important, playing up the Communist threat was proving a serious vote winner for the British Conservatives – as indeed it was to prove a vote winner for American politicians from the late 1940s onwards.

As a consequence, the wartime alliance of Russia and the West was a brittle affair on both sides. Any sign that Britain and the USA were reluctant to throw everything they had at Germany – there were unfulfilled promises of a Second Front in 1942 and then in 1943 – fuelled Soviet suspicion. The Allies, Moscow claimed, were not seriously drawing off German divisions but were leaving Russia to do the hard fighting.

There was also the problem of Churchill’s own attitude to Russia. In December 1918 he had called unavailingly for an anti-Communist crusade, to include the defeated Germans, to march on Moscow. It is true that he was one of the few Western politicians in the late 1930s calling for an alliance with Russia to contain Hitler. But as early as 1943 his old hostility resurfaced and he was saying that it might be wrong to disarm the Germans too far since they might be needed against the Russians. He repeated it in 1944. The Kremlin knew of this.

Russian fears that the West might sign a separate peace with Germany – at times reciprocated in the West by a fear that Russia might do the same – were regular. Churchill was also to write in a memorandum in 1944 that if the issues of Poland and, oddly, Soviet reparations from Germany were not settled, it would be hard to avoid a third world war. Churchill’s argument over Poland was at least an obvious one. But treating the reparations issue as a potential casus belli was eccentric. After victory in 1918, Lloyd George had promised to ‘squeeze Germany until the pips squeak’. The reparations forced on Berlin after the First World War then were a mistake which Churchill in particular recognised. He argued that a weakened Germany would hinder the economic recovery of Europe as well as leave a bitter legacy. The Russian demands for reparations from Germany after the Second World War, thought unreasonable by the USA and Britain, were no more than an echo of Lloyd George. Russia wanted revenge for the devastation caused by the Germans.

Churchill has long been associated with the start of the Cold War because of his famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946 at Fulton, Missouri. But his active role in the early years of the Cold War should not be exaggerated; he was only the Leader of the Opposition in the Commons. In mid-1945 he was voted out of office and replaced by Clement Attlee, halfway through the vital Potsdam conference. The new Prime Minister was far less inclined to see a great Soviet threat in the making. Churchill’s prestige, on the other hand, even out of office, was enormous and global. He was one of history’s truly great men. He had saved Britain, if not civilisation, from Nazi Germany. For many his Fulton speech – though the Labour government contemplated openly disowning it – was proof to many that the West was now faced with a new version of Hitler.

In allotting blame for the start of the Cold War, Churchill certainly has to bear some share. But predominantly, as the evidence shows, it was the Americans who must shoulder the main responsibility. They were to blame too for the continuation of the struggle when détente was on the cards. Washington, under the influence of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, ignored overtures from Moscow after the death of Stalin in 1953. Churchill, back in power by then, was by contrast eager to follow up these offers but was firmly warned off by Dulles.

Russia played a role, but a small one, in stimulating the onset of the Cold War. Soviet tactics in negotiations on matters large and small could be extremely tiresome, at times suggesting little desire for serious cooperation. And the ruthlessness which Stalin’s forces displayed in the occupied and reoccupied territories as they swept westwards was bound to outrage Western feelings. But it did not in itself presage any intentions to occupy areas outside the sphere seen as essential to strategic defence.

Despots, though always repugnant, are not necessarily dangerous outside their own borders. The fact that Stalin was evil did not necessarily mean that his foreign policy was evil. And in the later stages of the Cold War, the USA itself was to back decidedly repressive and brutal regimes. These were vital tactics for defence, ran the argument. The Kremlin would not have argued with that general principle, though it was always ready during the Cold War to exploit the embarrassment that backing dictators was to cause within the USA.

The level of mutual suspicion which came to exist within months of the end of the Second World War was graphically illustrated by the two secret long telegrams of 1946 which travelled between Moscow and Washington as each nation’s ambassador warned his government to beware of the other side’s imperialist ambitions.

1 The orthodox view and its persistence is summarised in the claim in 2003 by former Times Editor William Rees-Mogg: ‘After the Second World War, the US saved Europe from Soviet rule.’ See http://dailyreckoning.com/the-transatlantic-gulf. The consequences of a Third World War are not explored by him.

2Years of Decision by Harry S. Truman, Hodder and Stoughton, 1955, p. 342

3Conversations with Stalin by Milovan Djilas, New York, 1961, p. 114 et seq

4 Soviet archive material shows that Stalin’s attitude was far from forgotten at the testy Sino-Soviet summit of July 1958. The minutes show Mao Zedong complaining about Stalin’s lack of support. At the end of the Second World War he helped himself to territory which should have gone to the Chinese Communists: ‘His first major error was one as a result of which the Chinese Communist Party was left with one tenth of the territory that it had. His second error was that, when China was ripe for revolution, he advised us not to rise in revolution and said that if we started a war with Chiang Kai-shek that might threaten the ght threaten the entire nationght threaten the entire nationtruction … after the victory of our revolution Stalin had doubts about its character. He believed that China was another Yugoslavia.’

‘When I came to Moscow (in December 1949) he did not want to conclude a treaty of friendship with us and did not want to annul the old treaty with the Kuomintang.’ (source: Cold War International History Project)

5Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, by George Kennan, Little, Brown, 1961. p. 253

6 In the Second World War estimates of combined Soviet military and civilian deaths range widely, but 23m is a widely accepted figure, possibly conservative. Town and cities partially wrecked or burnt down: 1,700; villages destroyed: 70,000; railway lines destroyed: 65,000 kms; livestock killed or shipped to Germany: 7m horses, 17m head of cattle. Estimates of Russian deaths in the First World War vary considerably but it is widely accepted that 2m soldiers were killed. Territory lost by the old Russia ran to over 300,000 sq. miles. Much of it, most importantly the Ukraine, was recovered by Bolshevik forces with the Baltic States, including Finland, becoming independent nations. For comparison, Anglo-American deaths in the Second World War amounted to less than 1m.

7 When Djilas suggested that Germany would take a long time to recover, Stalin replied: ‘No, they will recover very quickly. It is a highly industrialised country with an extremely skilled and numerous working class and technical intelligentsia. Give them 12–15 years and they’ll be on their feet again.’

8The Collapse of the Third Republic by William L. Shirer, Simon and Schuster, 1969, p. 544

9 Djilas recorded that Stalin felt instinctively that the creation of revolutionary centres outside Moscow would endanger its supremacy in world Communism and that of course is exactly what happened. That is why he helped revolutions up to a certain point – as long as he could control them, ‘but he was always ready to leave them in the lurch’. Djilas, op. cit., pp. 114 et seq.

CHAPTER 2

TWO LONG TELEGRAMS: MUTUALLY ASSURED DISTRUST

1946: Moscow and Washington’s envoys in mirror image warnings – George Kennan later regrets his message – Truman steps up military assistance to Greece and Turkey – the military–industrial complex – problems in US diplomatic methods

In the earliest years of the Cold War, George Kennan was seen as the US State Department’s top Russian expert. Author of the famous Long Telegram to Washington in February 1946 – nearly 8,000 words – he was at the time chargé d’affaires in Moscow. (For full text see Cold War International History Project.) Kennan had not just the advantage of being fluent in Russian, a historian and a professional diplomat. He was also the sort of cultured figure who might be cited to show that it was not just untravelled, inexperienced, hard bitten individuals from business or the military who dreamt about the Red Menace.

However, as will be seen, there were two George Kennans. The first fitted the outlook if not the character of a typical Cold War warrior. The later Kennan Mk II was to prove a prolonged critic of the USA’s aggressive policies, ironically so inspired by Kennan Mk I.

In his original message he argued that the Soviet Union still saw itself as living ‘in a world of antagonistic world encirclement’ which owed much to a traditional, ‘neurotic and instinctive’ Russian view of the world. Marxism was a perfect vehicle for this sense of insecurity; and the importance of Marxist dogma in Soviet affairs must not be underrated. The Soviet Union did not believe that peaceful coexistence was possible and would seek to accomplish its goals by the ‘total destruction of rival power’.

America had to face ‘a political force committed fanatically to the belief … that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the internal authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to survive’.

Kennan’s views, with an initially limited circulation in Washington, were more widely aired when he wrote the next year in the magazine Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym ‘Mr X’.10 (His authorship was soon unmasked.) He explained how Russia with its ‘aggressive intentions’ could be ‘contained’.

‘It will be seen that Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western World is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy but which cannot be talked or charmed out of existence.’

Between the time of the Long Telegram and Article X, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Andrei Novikov, settled down to a similar analysis.11 It was to prove a mirror image of Kennan’s. In September 1946, Novikov summarised the purposes and motives of American foreign policy. They had become as clear to him as the Kremlin’s were to Kennan. Novikov explained in 4,000 words that ‘American monopoly capitalism’ was aiming at world domination.

The two warning messages encapsulate much of the tragedy of the Cold War. Each side was convinced of the other’s aggressive ambitions – as convinced in fact as each was of the rectitude of its own policies, seen clearly as defensive. Both telegrams stated a number of truths, but not enough to justify their conclusions.

Kennan Mk I was surprisingly insensitive about Soviet security fears. He stated at one point that with Germany and Japan eliminated, it was ‘sheerest nonsense’ for Moscow to fear military attack from anyone. But as the Russians could remember, German military power had been severely limited by the Treaty of Versailles. Yet little more than a decade later Hitler embarked on a rearmament campaign which produced a vast war machine. If Kennan could not foresee the possibility of another German revival, the Russians certainly could. And with the new Federal Republic of Germany called on by the West to rearm (less than a decade after Kennan’s comments), Soviet apprehension could hardly be deemed ‘sheerest nonsense’.

It was certainly true, as Kennan argued, that convinced Marxists foresaw the inevitable triumph of Communism across the globe as proletariats everywhere shook off the bonds of capitalism – or in the case of Asia, of feudalism. But much as they would welcome that occurring soon, the sheer inevitability of the process meant that time and example were on their side. Communism would prove to be irresistible, both as a political system and as an economic form of organisation. True Marxist-Leninists had only to wait, meanwhile looking to their own safety, in case the capitalist world resorted to the use of military or semi-military means against the USSR. A certain missionary zeal meant that a push here or there was a duty, as was their theoretical obligation to support Communist parties across the globe. But Russia after the Second World War was not in a position to do much pushing. No less significant was Stalin’s hostility to the establishment of Communist states which he could not directly control. He may have been a Marxist (of sorts) but he was foremost an exponent of realpolitik.

The Americans also had their own ideas about inevitability: the eventual global triumph of democracy and liberal capitalism. Like the Soviets, they too were convinced that time and example was on their side. The immediate need was safety from another war and a world in which American prosperity could continue. That meant a world where American business could flourish on the international stage, untrammelled by the tariff wars and economic chauvinism which had impoverished everyone in the interwar years.

This point was recognised in the second telegram, Novikov emphasising American ambitions to open up markets throughout the world for the access of trade and capital. The fact that the war had left the USA with military bases all round the world which it showed no sign of vacating underlined the American desire in Novikov’s analysis to encircle the Soviet Union.12

Of the two views, Novikov’s was backed up by a greater proportion of facts rather than surmise. The USA, he correctly said, was worried that the end of the war might bring a severe recession to its factories and the repetition of the trade wars of the 1930s. Fears were indeed being voiced in the administration that the impoverished post-war world might be unable to buy American goods. The need for free trade in goods and capital throughout the world was to prove a constant theme of the US government from the earliest stages of the Cold War.

Whether the Americans as a whole were quite as politically and economically ambitious in 1946 as Novikov maintained is questionable. The need for action to advance American economic interests was not questioned. An active global policy for political domination and involvement on the other hand had little popular appeal at that time. But it was to grow over the next decades to the point where the affairs of every nation came to be seen as the legitimate political (and moral) interest of the USA. Seen from the standpoint of the 21st century, Novikov had the best of the argument.

Both the Kennan documents, the Long Telegram and X Article, provided authority for views which had been taking root in most parts of the administration. Yet Kennan himself was later to say that he looked back on the Long Telegram ‘with a sort of horrified amusement’. It might have been written, he said in his memoirs, for the (fiercely conservative) Daughters of the American Revolution. He was to go on in the 1950s to preach the virtues of détente with the Soviets.

He also complained that his call for Russia to be ‘contained’ had been taken to mean militarily. He had wanted, he said, to stress ‘political containment’. It was not a very convincing argument since it was hard to see, particularly for a man of his intellectual background, how an idea or an ideology could be ‘contained’. The reality was that he changed his mind when he returned from Moscow to the State Department and saw at first hand the belligerent attitudes which were coming to dominate US policy.

Following the lines of the two telegrams each side was to attribute aggressive motives to the other. This had inevitable consequences. Every move by either side was seen as part of a plan to weaken the other – politically, economically or strategically. The USA’s diplomacy was not subtle. It was often conducted in the glare of publicity which is habitual in American politics and was in many instances driven by the urge to score points for electoral purposes. If it was not for the Presidential elections, it was for the intervening Congressional elections. The so-called hyphenate vote (Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, etc.) was strongly anti-Soviet and could swing a national result.

The Russians had no such electoral or publicity problems. But, suspicious by nature, they were among the most tiresome of negotiators, sometimes seeming like the Red Army itself, determined to wear down the other side by sheer stamina. The personality of the granite-faced Molotov as Soviet Foreign Minister played a part in this process. There was also the problem during the Cold War that no Soviet official, if he valued his position – or even his skin – would dare to take an initiative on his own. The rigidity of the system meant that clearance at the top was always necessary for any gesture which smacked of friendliness. Niet was always the easiest answer.

Nikita Khrushchev, who rose to the Soviet leadership in the mid-1950s, was to describe Molotov’s character as showing on occasions ‘unbelievable stubbornness, bordering on stupidity’.13 Yet various issues remaining from the war were in fact eventually resolved with him through foreign ministers’ conferences, such as the peace treaties with Germany’s former allies. But the process was wearisome and there were rarely any displays of goodwill or friendship. The Russians, questions of defence apart, thought the USA remarkably insensitive about the huge sacrifices in men, material and infrastructure they had suffered in destroying the Wehrmacht.

The Americans found it genuinely hard to understand how Russian propaganda could ascribe imperialist ambitions to them. Had not the USA been a champion of freedom and democracy and an outspoken enemy of colonialism? The Russians, still mired in Marxism, could not understand how the USA could attribute imperialism to the Soviet Union. Was not the point of Marxism–Leninism that it liberated the proletariat? The two powers used the same word but refused to share its meaning.

The Soviets in 1945 were also convinced that they brought liberation (of another kind) to the territories they took. The governments of Poland, Hungary and Romania between the wars were hardly model democracies. The new forms of government allowed in Hungary and Romania had, at first, some elements of democracy; and Czechoslovakia returned to its fuller pre-war pattern. But after 1948 all elements of democracy were removed. The full Communist pattern was imposed which – the Soviets liked to believe – would also bring clear economic progress.

KENNAN MK II

The belief that Kennan Mk I was calling for military containment was readily accepted in Washington. Indeed that seemed to be understood by him at that time. He observed the sharp rise in the defence budget and the warlike pronouncements of the administration without immediately seeking to correct the impression that containment had to be essentially military. He should not have been surprised either that the logic of his warning led to a high degree of interference by the USA in the affairs of countries close to the Soviet bloc. If the Russians had to be contained militarily, the effective frontiers against them had to be manned. He was remarkably slow to correct this impression. His doubts about his own ‘X’ article became evident when he pleaded later that it had only been written originally for the ‘private edification’ of James Forrestal, the Defense Secretary (later to commit suicide after a bout of persecution mania).

The fact that the article helped to stimulate policies of rearmament went down particularly well with what President Eisenhower later dubbed ‘the industrial-military complex’ in his departing address to the nation. Left so abruptly with redundant military plant when the war ended, the defence industries were delighted at the prospect of new orders and the military with rising budgets.

The policy of containment was taken up with enthusiasm by Clark Clifford, a White House adviser to President Truman. In September 1946, he wrote a memorandum declaring that coexistence was impossible and advocating a worldwide strategy based on the A-bomb to ‘restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area’.14 The language was violent. The stage seemed to be set for a military confrontation with the Soviets, despite the CIA study suggesting it would remain militarily ineffective for some years. An updated version of the memorandum, with no dilution of its extreme views, was to become NSC-68 (National Security Council) in 1950.

Kennan’s disillusionment about the effect of his earlier analyses started during his brief tenure as Ambassador to Moscow from 1952–53. He wrote in his memoirs:

A particularly violent jolt was received one day when one of the service attachés showed me a message he had received from Washington concerning a certain step of a military nature that the Pentagon proposed to take for the purpose of strengthening our military posture in a region not far from the Soviet frontier. I paled when I read it. It was at once apparent to me that had I been a Soviet leader and had I learned that such a step was being taken I would have concluded that the Americans were shaping their preparations towards a target of a war within six months.15

In 1952 Kennan was to send another telegram to Washington attempting to undo the hardline attitudes he had reinforced. He called for moderation in relations with the Soviet Union. He described this later telegram at the time as: ‘… The strongest statement I ever made of my views on this general subject of our responsibility for the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West in the late 1940s.’16

He went on to write that the USA was determined to:

Teach itself and the NATO associates never to refer to the most menacing element of our military potential otherwise than as ‘the nuclear deterrent’ – the unmistakable implication being that the Russians, longing for inauguration of World War III, would at once attack if not deterred by the agency of retribution. Year after year nothing would be omitted to move American air bases and missile sites as close as possible to Soviet frontiers. Year after year, American naval vessels would be sent on useless demonstration expeditions into the Black Sea – thus, by implication, imputing to the Russians a degree of patience which our own public and congressional opinion would be most unlikely to master had the shoe been on the other foot.

Time after time, as in Pakistan and Okinawa, the maintenance and development of military or air bases would be stubbornly pursued with no evidence of any effort to balance this against the obvious political costs. Political interests would similarly be sacrificed or put in jeopardy by the avid and greedy pursuit of military intelligence.17

One hardliner who would not repent was Dean Acheson, Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953. While Under Secretary during the Truman period, he propounded his version of what was later called the domino theory, which was so effective in entangling the USA in the Vietnam war. Acheson argued that a victory for Communism in Greece, Turkey or Iran or any of the other countries of the Near East or the Mediterranean region would lead rapidly to the collapse of pro-Western governments throughout Europe.

The seeds of the Cold War which had been sown in warlike warnings to Russia by Truman were to grow thick and fast in the wake of the Long Telegram. The influential Senator Arthur Vandenberg spoke in the Senate of the need to stop ‘appeasement’ of the Soviet Union. James Byrnes, the Secretary of State, delivered a warning that no country had the right to station troops in the territories of other sovereign nations ‘without their consent’. That of course sounded fine and even-handed. But the point was that other countries which agreed to American bases were so much in need of US economic assistance that they could rarely resist Washington’s military planners.

Byrnes also criticised the Soviets for taking, or looting, Japanese industrial equipment in Manchuria before any formal agreement had been reached on reparations. But such an agreement, as the Russians knew, would be hard to achieve with the Americans. In any case it was easy for the USA to take this high-minded attitude on reparations. It had emerged from the war with a surplus of industrial plant.

It was also time, Washington decided, to deter suspected Russian ambitions in Turkey and – as they supposed – in Greece, even though the aid for rebels there came from Yugoslavia against Stalin’s specific wishes. He told Djilas:

The uprising in Greece will have to fold up. Do you think that Great Britain and the USA – the USA the most powerful nation in the world – will permit you to break the line of communication in the Mediterranean? And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped as quickly as possible.18

But Washington’s view persisted that the menace in Greece was from the Soviets. Truman agreed to a proposal from Forrestal that a task force including an aircraft carrier should be earmarked for a display of American power in the eastern Mediterranean. ‘The Truman Doctrine’ was being created.

THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Given the gap between the two powers as demonstrated by the two telegrams, it would have needed the most skilful diplomacy to bring either side to an understanding of the other’s position. Sadly, the quality of diplomacy during the early years of the Cold War was lamentable – and it was to get no better with the passage of time. On the US side, the reign of John Foster Dulles at the State Department (1953–1959) was to see a foreign policy designed to scare the Soviet Union into submission. The death of Stalin and gestures of détente by the new leadership opened up new prospects which were promptly rebuffed. The British and French governments tried to redress the balance but, as decidedly junior partners in the alliance were unable to do so. There was also an inclination in Washington to listen to military hotheads in formulating policy.

On the Soviet side, the interregnum of Georgii Malenkov, Stalin’s immediate successor, was followed by the reign of Nikita Khrushchev whose volatile and emotional behaviour made East–West negotiations difficult. His erratic behaviour was to upset not just Western leaders but also his colleagues – and be a key factor in his ultimate downfall

The problems of American diplomacy arose from certain national psychological characteristics which lent an aggressive edge to the country’s foreign policy. The USA has always been a fiercely competitive society in fields ranging from business to sport and many other fields. It has long been characterised by the unmatched flow of ‘how to succeed’ books. It is an important cause of the country’s success as a leader in those and so many other fields.

The will to win is a fine thing but in diplomacy it can be a recipe for trouble. The United States expected not just to win but also to win demonstrably. Yet draws are the essence of successful diplomacy. Each side should be able to conclude negotiations without humiliation or loss of pride; otherwise disagreements are likely to fester. European nations with a long history of sometimes winning, sometimes losing are more ready to accept draws.

Matters were inevitably made worse in the USA by that constant glare of publicity. Positions were expounded before negotiations. The progress of talks was described in detail while they were still ongoing. And the negotiator was expected to return with the laurels of a winner. And where Eastern Europe was concerned, the importance of the hyphenate vote was never forgotten.

Rigidity was certainly a charge that stuck to both sides during the Cold War. But at least the Kremlin did not have to worry much about public opinion or announce the results of negotiations other than in the most considered form. Nor was it obliged to care about the political views of the military which were to become so marked and so well publicised in the USA. This was a problem – along with the influence of the defence industries – which was to seriously worry President Eisenhower by the time he left office.

Once the Cold War was well under way, the rigidity of American diplomacy became particularly marked. So much effort had been expended in describing the wickedness of communism that compromises were liable to look immoral in themselves – and sure to be labelled as such by numerous, rabidly anti-Soviet (and often highly religious) elements in the USA. The rigidity was certainly liable to be made worse by the American taste for military men – not given by nature to compromises – in top political or diplomatic positions. Three Secretaries of State since the late 1940s have been generals: George Marshall, Alexander Haig and Colin Powell. General Bedell Smith became Under Secretary of State. Haig sought the Republican nomination for the Presidency, withdrawing at the last minute when George H Bush was overhauling him. Air Force General ‘Hap’ Arnold became the Vice Presidential candidate alongside segregationist George Wallace in a third party campaign. The highly politicised CIA had three directors from the armed forces.

The practice of entrusting supreme power to military men reaches back into the 19th century when three generals were voted into the White House – Andrew Jackson, Zachary Taylor and Ulysses Grant. No other Western democracy adopted a remotely comparable practice of militarisation.

For an understanding of the deep-seated Soviet fear of the West and its response when it was stimulated, it is essential to look back beyond even the interwar years to the longer historical background. For the Cold War was a clash of two long-established empires, often mirroring each other in their urge to expand. But, remarkably, it was also a clash in which both sides made such a point of denying their imperial history.

10 See The Cold Warriors, John Donovan, Heath and Co, 1976, pp. 65–70

11 For full text see CWIHP

12 See CWIHP, 1990 documents collection

13The Glasnost Tapes by Tr Slector and Luchknow, Little, Brown, 1990, pp. 77, 87

14 The full Clifford-Elsey report was unexpectedly made public through the veteran White House journalist Arthur Krock, see appendix in Memoirs by Arthur Krock, Cassel & Co, 1968

15 George Kennan Memoirs, Boston, 1972, pp. 136–137

16 Ibid. p. 137

17 Ibid. pp. 142–143

18 Milovan Djilas, op. cit., p. 114 et seq