1,82 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: Krill Press
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016
Das E-Book können Sie in Legimi-Apps oder einer beliebigen App lesen, die das folgende Format unterstützen:
Seitenzahl: 404
Ähnliche
THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
A. T. Mahan
FIREWORK PRESS
Thank you for reading. In the event that you appreciate this book, please consider sharing the good word(s) by leaving a review, or connect with the author.
This book is a work of nonfiction and is intended to be factually accurate.
All rights reserved. Aside from brief quotations for media coverage and reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced or distributed in any form without the author’s permission. Thank you for supporting authors and a diverse, creative culture by purchasing this book and complying with copyright laws.
Copyright © 2016 by A. T. Mahan
Interior design by Pronoun
Distribution by Pronoun
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BY: A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.: CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY: AUTHOR OF ‘THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,’ ‘THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1783-1812,’ ‘THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812,’ ‘NAVAL STRATEGY’ ETC.: WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS: LONDON SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED Overy House, 100 Southwark Street, S.E.
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VIII
CHAPTER IX
CHAPTER X
CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XII
CHAPTER XIII
CHAPTER XIV
INTRODUCTION: THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD
CHAPTER I: THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776
CHAPTER II: NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT BAY—ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON 1776
CHAPTER III: THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION 1777
CHAPTER IV: WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D’ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK, NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT IN D’ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND. 1778
CHAPTER V: THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT 1778
CHAPTER VI: OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA
CHAPTER VII: THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES GIBRALTAR
CHAPTER VIII: RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN’S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN RETURNS TO EUROPE, AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS TO WEST INDIES
CHAPTER IX: NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO DE GRASSE
CHAPTER X: NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN. CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS 1781
CHAPTER XI: NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY’S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK
CHAPTER XII: THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE. RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782
CHAPTER XIII: HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR 1782
CHAPTER XIV: THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE BAILLI DE SUFFREN
The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence
By
A. T. Mahan
The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence
Published by Firework Press
New York City, NY
First published circa 1914
Copyright © Firework Press, 2015
All rights reserved
Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
About Firework Press
Firework Pressprints and publishes the greatest books about American history ever written, including seminal works written by our nation’s most influential figures.
BY: A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.: CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY: AUTHOR OF ‘THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,’ ‘THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1783-1812,’ ‘THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812,’ ‘NAVAL STRATEGY’ ETC.: WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS: LONDON SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED OVERY HOUSE, 100 SOUTHWARK STREET, S.E.
, one of Benedict Arnold’s Schooners on Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga.Remains of the
, By
All rights reserved
Published, October, 1913
, U.S.A.
PREFACE
THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME were first contributed as a chapter, under the title of “Major Operations, 1762-1783,” to the “History of the Royal Navy,” in seven volumes, published by Messrs. Sampson Low, Marston, and Company, under the general editorship of the late Sir William Laird Clowes. For permission to republish now in this separate form, the author has to express his thanks to the publishers of that work.
In the Introduction following this Preface, the author has summarized the general lesson to be derived from the course of this War of American Independence, as distinct from the particular discussion and narration of the several events which constitute the body of the treatment. These lessons he conceives to carry admonition for the present and future based upon the surest foundations; namely, upon the experience of the past as applicable to present conditions. The essential similarity between the two is evident in a common dependence upon naval strength.
There has been a careful rereading and revision of the whole text; but the changes found necessary to be made are much fewer than might have been anticipated after the lapse of fifteen years. Numerous footnotes in the History, specifying the names of ships in fleets, and of their commanders in various battles, have been omitted, as not necessary to the present purpose, though eminently proper and indeed indispensable to an extensive work of general reference and of encyclopædic scope, such as the History is. Certain notes retained with the initials W.L.C. are due to the editor of that work.
A.T. MAHAN.
December, 1912.
Preface
List of Illustrations
List of Maps
List of Battle-Plans
INTRODUCTION
Macaulay quoted on the action of Frederick the Great
Illustration from Conditions of the Turkish Empire
Lesson from the Recent War in the Balkans, 1912-1913
The War of American Independence a striking example of the Tendency of Wars to Spread
Origin and Train of Events in that War, Traced
Inference as to possible Train of Future Events in the History of the United States
The Monroe Doctrine Simply a Formulated Precaution against the Tendency of Wars to Spread
National Policy as to Asiatic Immigration
Necessity of an Adequate Navy if these two National Policies are to be sustained
Dependence on Navy Illustrated in the Two Great National Crises; in the War of Independence and in the War of Secession
The United States not great in Population in proportion to Territory
Nor Wealthy in Proportion to exposed Coast-Line
Special Fitness of a Navy to meet these particular conditions
The Pacific a great World Problem, dependent mainly on Naval Power
CHAPTER I
Preponderant effect of Control of the Water upon the Struggle for American Independence
Deducible then from Reason and from Experience
Consequent Necessity to the Americans of a Counterpoise to British Navy
This obtained through Burgoyne’s Surrender
The Surrender of Burgoyne traceable directly to the Naval Campaigns on Lake Champlain, 1775, 1776
The subsequent Course of the War in all Quarters of the world due to that decisive Campaign
The Strategic Problem of Lake Champlain familiar to Americans from the Wars between France and Great Britain prior to 1775
Consequent prompt Initiative by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold
Energetic Pursuit of first Successes by Arnold
Complete Control of Lake Champlain thus secured
Invasion of Canada by Montgomery, 1775
Arnold marches through Maine Wilderness and joins Montgomery before Quebec
Assault on Quebec. Failure, and Death of Montgomery
Arnold maintains Blockade of Quebec, 1776
Relief of the Place by British Navy
Arnold Retreats to Crown Point
Arnold’s Schemes and Diligence to create a Lake Navy, 1776
Difficulties to be overcome
Superior Advantages of the British
The British by building acquire Superiority, but too late for effect in 1776
Ultimate Consequences from this Retardation
Constitution of the Naval Force raised by Arnold
He moves with it to the foot of Lake Champlain
Takes position for Defence at Valcour Island
Particular Difficulties encountered by British
Constitution of the British Lake Navy
Land Forces of the Opponents
Naval Forces of the Two at the Battle of Valcour Island
Magnitude of the Stake at Issue
Arnold’s Purposes and Plans
Advance of the British
Arnold’s Disposition of his Flotilla to receive Attack
The Battle of Valcour Island
The Americans Worsted
Arnold Retreats by night Undetected
Pursuit by the British
Destruction of the American Vessels
British Appreciation of the Importance of the Action, as shown
Criticism of the conduct of the Opposing Leaders
Arnold’s Merit and Gallantry
End of the Naval Story of the Lakes
Effect of the Campaign upon the Decisive Events of 1777
CHAPTER II
Necessity that Force, if resorted to, be from the first Adequate
Application to National Policy in peace
To the Monroe Doctrine
Failure of the British Government of 1775 in this respect
Consequences of such failure
General Howe evacuates Boston and retires to Halifax. Extent of his Command
Dissemination of Effort by British Government
Expedition against South Carolina
Local Conditions about Charleston
Description of Fort Moultrie
Plan of British Naval Attack
The Battle of Fort Moultrie
Failure of the Attack. British Losses
Comment upon the Action
The Expedition retires to New York
The Howes, Admiral and General, arrive in New York Bay
Operations about the City
Continuous and Decisive, but Inconspicuous, Part played by the British Navy
Description of Local Conditions about New York
American Preparations for Defence
Crucial Weakness of the Scheme
The Advance of the British
Washington withdraws his Army from the Brooklyn side
Success of this Withdrawal due to British Negligence
Subsequent Operations, and Retreat of Washington to New Jersey
Retreat continued to Pennsylvania, where he receives reinforcements
Slackness of Sir William Howe’s actions
The British take possession of Narragansett Bay. Importance of that position
Washington suddenly takes the Offensive. Battle of Trenton
He recovers most of the State of New Jersey
CHAPTER III
British Object in Campaign of 1777 the same as that in 1776
Part assigned to Burgoyne
Slowness of his Progress at the beginning
Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating, takes his Army to the Chesapeake
Criticism of this Course
Howe’s Progress to Philadelphia, and Capture of that City
Admiral Lord Howe takes the Fleet from the Chesapeake to the Delaware
Surrender of Burgoyne and his Army
British Naval Operations in Delaware Bay
Brief Tenure—Nine Months—of Philadelphia by British
The general Failure of the British Campaign determined by Howe’s move to the Chesapeake
General Results of the Campaign
Part played by the British Navy. Analogous to that in Spain, 1808-1812, and in many other instances
CHAPTER IV
France recognizes the Independence of the United States, and makes with them a defensive Alliance
A French Fleet sails for America under Comte d’Estaing
Unprepared condition of the British Navy
Admiral Byron sails with a Reinforcement for America
Ill effect of Naval Unreadiness upon British Commerce; and especially on the West Indies
Admiral Keppel puts to Sea with the British Channel Fleet
First Guns of the War with France
Extreme Length of Byron’s Passage
He turns back to Halifax
D’Estaing’s slowness allows Howe to escape from Delaware Bay. Howe’s Celerity
Evacuation of Philadelphia by British Army, and its precipitate Retreat to New York
Escape of both Army and Fleet due to d’Estaing’s Delays
Rapid Action of Lord Howe
D’Estaing Arrives off New York
Howe’s elaborate Dispositions for the Defence of New York Bay
Statement of British and French Naval Force
D’Estaing decides not to attempt Passage of the Bar, and puts to Sea
Anchors off Narragansett Bay
Forces the Entrance to Newport and Anchors inside the Bay
The British garrison besieged by superior American and French forces
Howe appears with his Fleet and anchors off the entrance, at Point Judith
Sustained Rapidity of his action at New York
D’Estaing Withdraws from Siege of Newport and puts to Sea
Manœuvres of the two Opponents
D’Estaing quits the Field, and both Fleets are scattered by a heavy Gale
Howe returns to New York and collects his Fleet
D’Estaing calls oft Newport; but abandons the Siege finally, taking his Fleet to Boston
Critical Condition of British garrison in Newport. D’Estaing’s withdrawal compels Americans to raise the siege
Howe follows d’Estaing to Boston
Discussion of the Conduct of the opposing Admirals
Howe gives up his Command and returns to England
CHAPTER V
Admirals Keppel and D’Orvilliers put to Sea from Portsmouth and Brest
Instructions given to the French Admiral
Preliminary Manœuvres after the two Fleets had sighted one another
The Battle of Ushant
A Drawn Battle. The respective Losses
The Significance of the Battle in the fighting Development of the British Navy
The “Order of Battle”
The Disputes and Courts Martial in Great Britain arising from the Battle of Ushant
Keppel Resigns his Command
CHAPTER VI
Influence of Seasonal Conditions upon Naval Operations in America
Commercial Importance of the West Indies
The French seize Dominica
D’Estaing Sails with his Fleet from Boston for Martinique
A British Squadron under Hotham sails the same day for Barbados, with Five Thousand Troops
Admiral Barrington’s Seizure of Santa Lucia
D’Estaing sails to Recapture it
Rapidity and Skill shown in Barrington’s Movements and Dispositions
D’Estaing’s attacks Foiled, both on Sea and on Shore
He Abandons the attempt and Returns to Martinique
Importance of Santa Lucia in Subsequent Operations
Byron Reaches Barbados, and takes over Command from Barrington
D’Estaing Captures the British Island Grenada
Byron goes to its Relief
The Action between the two Fleets, of Byron and d’Estaing, July 6, 1779
Criticism of the two Commanders-in-Chief
D’Estaing returns to Grenada, which remains French
Byron returns to England. British North American Station assigned to Admiral Arbuthnot, Leeward Islands to Rodney
British Operations in Georgia and South Carolina. Capture of Savannah
Fatal Strategic Error in these Operations
D’Estaing’s attempt to Retake Savannah Foiled
His appearance on the coast, however, causes the British to abandon Narragansett Bay
D’Estaing succeeded by de Guichen in North America. Rodney also arrives
CHAPTER VII
Spain declares War against Great Britain
Delays in Junction of French and Spanish Fleets
They enter the Channel. Alarm in England
Plans of the French Government
Their Change and Failure. The Allied Fleets return to Brest
Criticism of the British Ministry
Divergent views of France and Spain
Prominence given to Gibraltar, and the resulting Effect upon the general War
Exhaustion of Supplies at Gibraltar
Rodney with the Channel Fleet Sails for its Relief, with ultimate Destination to Leeward Islands Command
He Captures a large Spanish Convoy
And Destroys a Second Spanish Squadron of Eleven Sail-of-the-Line
Distinction of this Engagement
Gibraltar and Minorca Relieved
Rodney proceeds to the West Indies
The Channel Fleet returns to England
CHAPTER VIII
Rodney’s Force upon arrival in West Indies
Action between British and French Squadrons prior to his arrival
Rodney and de Guichen put to sea
Action between them of April 17, 1780
Cause of Failure of Rodney’s Attack
His Disappointment in his Subordinates
His Expression of his Feelings
Discussion of the Incidents and Principles involved
The Losses of the Respective Fleets
They Continue to Cruise
The Action of May 15, 1780
That of May 19, 1780
The Results Indecisive
Contrary Personal Effect produced upon the two Admirals by the encounters
De Guichen asks to be Relieved
Rodney’s Chary Approval of his Subordinates in these two instances
Suspicion and Distrust rife in the British Navy at this period
Twelve Spanish Sail-of-the-Line, with Ten Thousand Troops, Arrive at Guadeloupe
They refuse Coöperation with de Guichen in the Windward Islands
De Guichen Accompanies them to Haïti with his Fleet
He declines to Coöperate on the Continent with the Americans, and sails for Europe
Rodney Arranges for the protection of the Homeward West India Trade, and then proceeds to New York
Effect of his coming
The Year 1780 one of great Discouragement to Americans
Summary of the Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia, 1780, which led to Lord Cornwallis’s Surrender in 1781
Two Naval Actions sustained by Commodore Cornwallis against superior French forces, 1780
The Year 1780 Uneventful in European seas
Capture of a great British Convoy
The Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers
The Accession of Holland to this followed by a Declaration of War by Great Britain
The French Government withdraws all its Ships of War from before Gibraltar
CHAPTER IX
Effects of the Great Hurricanes of 1780 in West Indies
Rodney’s Diminished Force. Arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with reinforcements
Rodney receives Orders to seize Dutch Possessions in Caribbean
Capture of St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba
The large Booty and Defenceless state of St. Eustatius
Effect of these Conditions upon Rodney
Hood detached to cruise before Martinique
De Grasse arrives there with Twenty Ships-of-the-Line
Indecisive Action between de Grasse and Hood
Criticism of the two Commanders
Junction of Rodney and Hood
De Grasse attempts Santa Lucia, and Fails
He captures Tobago
CHAPTER X
Summary of Land Operations in Virginia early in 1781
Portsmouth Occupied
A French Squadron from Newport, and a British from Gardiner’s Bay, proceed to the Scene
They meet off the Chesapeake
Action between Arbuthnot and des Touches, March 16, 1781
The Advantage rests with the French, but they return to Newport. Arbuthnot enters the Chesapeake
Cornwallis reaches Petersburg, Virginia, May 20
Under the directions of Sir Henry Clinton he evacuates Portsmouth and concentrates his forces at Yorktown, August 22
The French Fleet under de Grasse Anchors in the Chesapeake, August 30
British Naval Movements, in July and August, affecting conditions in the Chesapeake
Admiral Graves, successor to Arbuthnot at New York, joined there by Sir Samuel Hood, August 28
Washington and Rochambeau move upon Cornwallis
The British Fleet under Graves arrives off the Chesapeake
Action between de Grasse and Graves, September 5
Hood’s Criticism of Graves’s Conduct
The British, worsted, return to New York. De Grasse, reinforced, re-enters the Chesapeake, September 11
Cornwallis Surrenders, October 19
De Grasse and Hood Return to West Indies
CHAPTER XI
Leading Objects of the Belligerents in 1781
The Relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Darby
Capture of British Convoy with the spoils of St. Eustatius
The French and Spanish Fleet under Admiral de Cordova again enters the English Channel
Darby in inferior Force shut up in Tor Bay
The Allies Decide not to attack him, but to turn their Efforts against British Commerce
Minorca Lost by British
The Battle of the Dogger Bank, between British and Dutch Fleets
CHAPTER XII
Capture and Destruction near Ushant of a great French Convoy for the West Indies opens the Naval Campaign of 1782
Attack upon the Island of St. Kitts by de Grasse and de Bouillé
Hood sails for its Relief from Barbados
His Plan of procedure
Balked by an Accident
He Succeeds in dislodging de Grasse and taking the Anchorage left by the French
Unsuccessful Attempt by de Grasse to shake Hood’s position
St. Kitts nevertheless compelled to Surrender owing to having insufficient Land Force
Hood Extricates himself from de Grasse’s Superior Force and Retires
Rodney arrives from England and joins Hood
Project of French and Spaniards against Jamaica
De Grasse sails from Martinique with his whole Fleet and a large Convoy
Rodney’s Pursuit
Partial Actions of April 9, 1782
British Pursuit continues
It is favored by the Lagging of two Ships in the French Fleet, April 11
An Accident that night induces de Grasse to bear down, and enables Rodney to force Action
The Battle of April 12 begins
A Shift of Wind enables the British to Break the French Order in three places
Consequences of this Movement
Resultant Advantages to the British
Practices of the opposing Navies in regard to the Aims of Firing
Consequences Illustrated in the Injuries received respectively
Inadequate Use made by Rodney of the Advantage gained by his Fleet
Hood’s Criticisms
Hood’s Opinion shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney’s Chief-of-Staff
Rodney’s own Reasons for his Course after the Battle
His Assumptions not accordant with the Facts
Actual Prolonged Dispersion of the French Fleet
Hood, Detached in Pursuit, Captures a small French Squadron
Rodney Superseded in Command before the news of the victory reached England
The general War Approaches its End
CHAPTER XIII
Howe appointed to Command Channel Fleet
Cruises first in North Sea and in Channel
The Allied Fleets in much superior force take Position in the Chops of the Channel, but are successfully evaded by Howe
The British Jamaica Convoy also escapes them
Howe ordered to Relieve Gibraltar
Loss of the Royal George, with Kempenfelt
Howe Sails
Slow but Successful Progress
Great Allied Fleet in Bay of Gibraltar
Howe’s Success in Introducing the Supplies
Negligent Mismanagement of the Allies
Partial Engagement when Howe leaves Gibraltar
Estimate of Howe’s Conduct, and of his Professional Character
French Eulogies
CHAPTER XIV
Isolation characteristic of Military and Naval Operations in India
Occurrences in 1778
Sir Edward Hughes sent to India with a Fleet, 1779
The Years prior to 1781 Uneventful
A British Squadron under Commodore Johnstone sent in 1781 to seize Cape of Good Hope
A Week Later, a French Squadron under Suffren sails for India
Suffren finds Johnstone Anchored in Porto Praya, and attacks at once
The immediate Result Indecisive, but the Cape of Good Hope is saved by Suffren arriving first
Suffren reaches Mauritius, and the French Squadron sails for India under Comte d’Orves
D’Orves dies, leaving Suffren in Command
Trincomalee, in Ceylon, captured by Hughes
First Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782
Second Engagement, April 12
Third Engagement, July 6
Suffren captures Trincomalee
Hughes arrives, but too late to save the place
Fourth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, September 3
Having lost Trincomalee, Hughes on the change of monsoon is compelled to go to Bombay
Reinforced there by Bickerton
Suffren winters in Sumatra, but regains Trincomalee before Hughes returns. Also receives Reinforcements
The British Besiege Cuddalore
Suffren Relieves the Place
Fifth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, June 20, 1783
Comparison between Hughes and Suffren
News of the Peace being received, June 29, Hostilities in India cease
Glossary of Nautical and Naval Terms used in this Book
Index
INTRODUCTION: THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD
MACAULAY, IN A STRIKING PASSAGE of his Essay on Frederick the Great, wrote, “The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America.”
Wars, like conflagrations, tend to spread; more than ever perhaps in these days of close international entanglements and rapid communications. Hence the anxiety aroused and the care exercised by the governments of Europe, the most closely associated and the most sensitive on the earth, to forestall the kindling of even the slightest flame in regions where all alike are interested, though with diverse objects; regions such as the Balkan group of States in their exasperating relations with the Turkish empire, under which the Balkan peoples see constantly the bitter oppression of men of their own blood and religious faith by the tyranny of a government which can neither assimilate nor protect. The condition of Turkish European provinces is a perpetual lesson to those disposed to ignore or to depreciate the immense difficulties of administering politically, under one government, peoples traditionally and racially distinct, yet living side by side; not that the situation is much better anywhere in the Turkish empire. This still survives, though in an advanced state of decay, simply because other States are not prepared to encounter the risks of a disturbance which might end in a general bonfire, extending its ravages to districts very far remote from the scene of the original trouble.
Since these words were written, actual war has broken out in the Balkans. The Powers, anxious each as to the effect upon its own ambitions of any disturbance in European Turkey, have steadily abstained from efficient interference in behalf of the downtrodden Christians of Macedonia, surrounded by sympathetic kinsfolk. Consequently, in thirty years past this underbrush has grown drier and drier, fit kindling for fuel. In the Treaty of Berlin, in 1877, stipulation was made for their betterment in governance, and we are now told that in 1880 Turkey framed a scheme for such,—and pigeonholed it. At last, under unendurable conditions, spontaneous combustion has followed. There can be no assured peace until it is recognised practically that Christianity, by the respect which it alone among religions inculcates for the welfare of the individual, is an essential factor in developing in nations the faculty of self-government, apart from which fitness to govern others does not exist. To keep Christian peoples under the rule of a non-Christian race, is, therefore, to perpetuate a state hopeless of reconcilement and pregnant of sure explosion. Explosions always happen inconveniently. Obsta principiis is the only safe rule; the application of which is not suppression of overt discontent but relief of grievances.
The War of American Independence was no exception to the general rule of propagation that has been noted. When our forefathers began to agitate against the Stamp Act and the other measures that succeeded it, they as little foresaw the spread of their action to the East and West Indies, to the English Channel and Gibraltar, as did the British ministry which in framing the Stamp Act struck the match from which these consequences followed. When Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain by vigorous use of small means obtained a year’s delay for the colonists, he compassed the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777. The surrender of Burgoyne, justly estimated as the decisive event of the war, was due to Arnold’s previous action, gaining the delay which is a first object for all defence, and which to the unprepared colonists was a vital necessity. The surrender of Burgoyne determined the intervention of France, in 1778; the intervention of France the accession of Spain thereto, in 1779. The war with these two Powers led to the maritime occurrences, the interferences with neutral trade, that gave rise to the Armed Neutrality; the concurrence of Holland in which brought war between that country and Great Britain, in 1780. This extension of hostilities affected not only the West Indies but the East, through the possessions of the Dutch in both quarters and at the Cape of Good Hope. If not the occasion of Suffren being sent to India, the involvement of Holland in the general war had a powerful effect upon the brilliant operations which he conducted there; as well as at, and for, the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch possession, on his outward voyage.
In the separate publication of these pages, my intention and hope are to bring home incidentally to American readers this vast extent of the struggle to which our own Declaration of Independence was but the prelude; with perchance the further needed lesson for the future, that questions the most remote from our own shores may involve us in unforeseen difficulties, especially if we permit a train of communication to be laid by which the outside fire can leap step by step to the American continents. How great a matter a little fire kindleth! Our Monroe Doctrine is in final analysis merely the formulation of national precaution that, as far as in its power to prevent, there shall not lie scattered about the material which foreign possessions in these continents might supply for the extension of combustion originating elsewhere; and the objection to Asiatic immigration, however debased by less worthy feelings or motives, is on the part of thinking men simply a recognition of the same danger arising from the presence of an inassimilable mass of population, racially and traditionally distinct in characteristics, behind which would lie the sympathies and energy of a powerful military and naval Asiatic empire.
Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peace amid international conflagration, neither the one nor the other can be sustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant navy. In the struggle with which this book deals, Washington at the time said that the navies had the casting vote. To Arnold on Lake Champlain, to DeGrasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege of exercising that prerogative at the two great decisive moments of the War. To the Navy also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eighty years later the successful suppression of the movement of Secession. The effect of the blockade of the Southern coasts upon the financial and military efficiency of the Confederate Government has never been closely calculated, and probably is incalculable. At these two principal national epochs control of the water was the most determinative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend the successful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned; the two most essential to the part this country is to play in the progress of the world.
For, while numerically great in population, the United States is not so in proportion to territory; nor, though wealthy, is she so in proportion to her exposure. That Japan at four thousand miles distance has a population of over three hundred to the square mile, while our three great Pacific States average less than twenty, is a portentous fact. The immense aggregate numbers resident elsewhere in the United States cannot be transfered thither to meet an emergency, nor contribute effectively to remedy this insufficiency; neither can a land force on the defensive protect, if the way of the sea is open. In such opposition of smaller numbers against larger, nowhere do organisation and development count as much as in navies. Nowhere so well as on the sea can a general numerical inferiority be compensated by specific numerical superiority, resulting from the correspondence between the force employed and the nature of the ground. It follows strictly, by logic and by inference, that by no other means can safety be insured as economically and as efficiently. Indeed, in matters of national security, economy and efficiency are equivalent terms. The question of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem of the twentieth century, in which no great country is so largely and directly interested as is the United States. For the reason given it is essentially a naval question, the third in which the United States finds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy.
CHAPTER I: THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776
AT THE TIME WHEN HOSTILITIES began between Great Britain and her American Colonies, the fact was realised generally, being evident to reason and taught by experience, that control of the water, both ocean and inland, would have a preponderant effect upon the contest. It was clear to reason, for there was a long seaboard with numerous interior navigable watercourses, and at the same time scanty and indifferent communications by land. Critical portions of the territory involved were yet an unimproved wilderness. Experience, the rude but efficient schoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledge only by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French wars the inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great superiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attained the unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early sought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the hereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found the counterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.
Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this object, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforced surrender of Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga. This event has merited the epithet “decisive,” because, and only because, it decided the intervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation, that this victory of the colonists was directly the result of naval force,—that of the colonists themselves. It was the cause that naval force from abroad, entering into the contest, transformed it from a local to a universal war, and assured the independence of the Colonies. That the Americans were strong enough to impose the capitulation of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of delay secured to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by the indomitable energy, and handled with the indomitable courage, of the traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America to Europe, from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi, and ultimately involved the waters of the remote peninsula of Hindustan, is traceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776 anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain. The events which thus culminated merit therefore a clearer understanding, and a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and petty scale would justify otherwise.
In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of the French from the North American continent. The concentration of their power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, had given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed upon men’s minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tributary Lake George, and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecutive, though not continuous, water line of communications from the St. Lawrence to New York. The strength of Canada against attack by land lay in its remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed before it was reached, and in the strength of the line of the St. Lawrence, with the fortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern bank. The wilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to attacks from Canada as well as to attacks upon it; but when it had been traversed, there were to the southward no such strong natural positions confronting the assailant. Attacks from the south fell upon the front, or at best upon the flank, of the line of the St. Lawrence. Attacks from Canada took New York and its dependencies in the rear.
Lake Champlain and Connected Waters
These elements of natural strength, in the military conditions of the North, were impressed upon the minds of the Americans by the prolonged resistance of Canada to the greatly superior numbers of the British Colonists in the previous wars. Regarded, therefore, as a base for attacks, of a kind with which they were painfully familiar, but to be undergone now under disadvantages of numbers and power never before experienced, it was desirable to gain possession of the St. Lawrence and its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned. At this outset of hostilities, the American insurgents, knowing clearly their own minds, possessed the advantage of the initiative over the British government, which still hesitated to use against those whom it styled rebels the preventive measures it would have taken at once against a recognised enemy.
Under these circumstances, in May, 1775, a body of two hundred and seventy Americans, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, seized the posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately garrisoned. These are on the upper waters of Lake Champlain, where it is less than a third of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point on a promontory twelve miles lower down. They were positions of recognised importance, and had been advanced posts of the British in previous wars. A schooner being found there, Arnold, who had been a seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake. The wind failed him when still thirty miles from St. John’s, another fortified post on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers down to the Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable to advance otherwise, Arnold took to his boats with thirty men, pulled through the night, and at six o’clock on the following morning surprised the post, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men. He reaped the rewards of celerity. The prisoners informed him that a considerable body of troops was expected from Canada, on its way to Ticonderoga; and this force in fact reached St. John’s on the next day. When it arrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a sloop which he found there and destroyed everything else that could float. By such trifling means two active officers had secured the temporary control of the lake itself and of the approaches to it from the south. There being no roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable to advance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Canada, strengthened the works at St. John’s, and built a schooner; but his force was inadequate to meet that of the Americans.
The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was not at once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung to the hope of reconciliation; but events were marching rapidly, and ere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. General Montgomery, appointed to that enterprise, embarked at Crown Point with two thousand men on September 4th, and soon afterwards appeared before St. John’s, which after prolonged operations capitulated on the 3d of November. On the 13th Montgomery entered Montreal, and thence pressed down the St. Lawrence to Pointe aux Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec. There he joined Arnold, who in the month of October had crossed the northern wilderness, between the head waters of the Kennebec River and St. Lawrence. On the way he had endured immense privations, losing five hundred men of the twelve hundred with whom he started; and upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the 10th of November, three days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass the river. Crossing on the night of the 13th, this adventurous soldier and his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the same path that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before. With characteristic audacity he summoned the place. The demand of course was refused; but that Carleton did not fall at once upon the little band of seven hundred that bearded him shows by how feeble a tenure Great Britain then held Canada. Immediately after the junction Montgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared on the 5th of December. Winter having already begun, and neither his numbers nor his equipments being adequate to regular siege operations, he very properly decided to try the desperate chance of an assault upon the strongest fortress in America. This was made on the night of December 31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of success there may have been vanished with the death of Montgomery, who fell at the head of his men.
The American army retired three miles up the river, went into winter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which was cut off from the sea by the ice. “For five months,” wrote Carleton to the Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, “this town has been closely invested by the rebels.” From this unpleasant position it was relieved on the 6th of May, when signals were exchanged between it and the Surprise, the advance ship of a squadron under Captain Charles Douglas, which had sailed from England on the 11th of March. Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence, on the morning of April 12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly twenty miles to sea, and packed too closely to admit of working through it by dexterous steering. The urgency of the case not admitting delay, he ran his ship, the Isis, 50, with a speed of five knots, against a large piece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the effect. The ice, probably softened by salt water and salt air, went to pieces. “Encouraged by this experiment,” continues Douglas, somewhat magnificently, “we thought it an enterprise worthy an English ship of the line in our King and country’s sacred cause, and an effort due to the gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt of pressing her by force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely connected fields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the western part of our horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm, we brought-to, or rather stopped), we had penetrated about eight leagues into it, describing our path all the way with bits of the sheathing of the ship’s bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater, but none of the oak plank; and it was pleasant enough at times, when we stuck fast, to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on the crusted surface of that fluid through which the ship had so recently sailed.” It took nine days of this work to reach Anticosti Island, after which the ice seems to have given no more trouble; but further delay was occasioned by fogs, calms, and head winds.
Upon the arrival of the ships of war, the Americans at once retreated. During the winter, though reinforcements must have been received from time to time, they had wasted from exposure, and from small-pox, which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May the returns showed nineteen hundred men present, of whom only a thousand were fit for duty. There were then on hand but three days’ provisions, and none other nearer than St. John’s. The inhabitants would of course render no further assistance to the Americans after the ships arrived. The Navy had again decided the fate of Canada, and was soon also to determine that of Lake Champlain.
When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Carleton marched out, “to see,” he said, “what these mighty boasters were about.” The sneer was unworthy a man of his generous character, for the boasters had endured much for faint chances of success; and the smallness of the reinforcement which encouraged him to act shows either an extreme prudence on his part, or the narrow margin by which Quebec escaped. He found the enemy busy with preparations for retreat, and upon his appearance they abandoned their camp. Their forces on the two sides of the river being now separated by the enemy’s shipping, the Americans retired first to Sorel, where the Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence, and thence continued to fall back by gradual stages. It was not until June 15th that Arnold quitted Montreal; and at the end of June the united force was still on the Canadian side of the present border line. On the 3d of July it reached Crown Point, in a pitiable state from small-pox and destitution.
Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake Champlain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the superiority obtained for them by Arnold’s promptitude a year before. On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding the Northern Department, wrote: “We have happily such a naval superiority on Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the enemy will not appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force is increasing by the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished. Arnold, however,"—whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted with the naval preparations,—"says that 300 carpenters should be employed and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built, twenty or thirty at least. There is great difficulty in getting the carpenters needed.” Arnold’s ideas were indeed on a scale worthy of the momentous issues at stake. “To augment our navy on the lake appears to me of the utmost importance. There is water between Crown Point and Pointe au Fer for vessels of the largest size. I am of opinion that row-galleys are the best construction and cheapest for this lake. Perhaps it may be well to have one frigate of 36 guns. She may carry 18-pounders on the Lake, and be superior to any vessel that can be built or floated from St. John’s.”
Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and means were far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able eventually to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold’s idea of a sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in inland waters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of somewhat similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was afloat, reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however, required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold’s two schooners exercised control. Baron Riedesel, the commander of the German contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at Ticonderoga, wrote, “If we could have begun our expedition four weeks earlier, I am satisfied that everything would have been ended this year (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things, we were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain.” So delay favors the defence, and changes issues. What would have been the effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the loss of New York, August 20th-September 15th, had come news of the fall of Ticonderoga, the repute of which for strength stood high? Nor was this all; for in that event, the plan which was wrecked in 1777 by Sir William Howe’s ill-conceived expedition to the Chesapeake would doubtless have been carried out in 1776. In a contemporary English paper occurs the following significant item: “London, September 26th, 1776. Advices have been received here from Canada, dated August 12th, that General Burgoyne’s army has found it impracticable to get across the lakes this season. The naval force of the Provincials is too great for them to contend with at present. They must build larger vessels for this purpose, and these cannot be ready before next summer. The design was that the two armies commanded by Generals Howe and Burgoyne should coöperate; that they should both be on the Hudson River at the same time; that they should join about Albany, and thereby cut off all communication between the northern and southern Colonies.”
As Arnold’s more ambitious scheme could not be realised, he had to content himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was to command as well as to build. The precise difference between the two kinds of rowing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer has not been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat, and inferior in nautical qualities—speed, handiness, and seaworthiness—to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The latter certainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating to windward. Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas. “The galleys,” he wrote, “are quick moving, which will give us a great advantage in the open lake.” The complements of the galleys were eighty men, of the gondolas forty-five; from which, and from their batteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one third and one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two were alike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. American accounts agree with Captain Douglas’s report of one galley captured by the British. In the bows, an 18 and a 12-pounder; in the stern, two 9′s; in broadside, from four to six 6′s. There is in this a somewhat droll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and broadside fire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion is much the same. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and two 6′s. All the vessels of both parties carried a number of swivel guns.
