PREFACE
They
who have presumed to dogmatize on nature, as on some well
investigated subject, either from self-conceit or arrogance, and in
the professorial style, have inflicted the greatest injury on
philosophy and learning. For they have tended to stifle and
interrupt
inquiry exactly in proportion as they have prevailed in bringing
others to their opinion: and their own activity has not
counterbalanced the mischief they have occasioned by corrupting and
destroying that of others. They again who have entered upon a
contrary course, and asserted that nothing whatever can be known,
whether they have fallen into this opinion from their hatred of the
ancient sophists, or from the hesitation of their minds, or from an
exuberance of learning, have certainly adduced reasons for it which
are by no means contemptible. They have not, however, derived their
opinion from true sources, and, hurried on by their zeal and some
affectation, have certainly exceeded due moderation. But the more
ancient Greeks (whose writings have perished), held a more prudent
mean, between the arrogance of dogmatism, and the despair of
scepticism; and though too frequently intermingling complaints and
indignation at the difficulty of inquiry, and the obscurity of
things, and champing, as it were, the bit, have still persisted in
pressing their point, and pursuing their intercourse with nature;
thinking, as it seems, that the better method was not to dispute
upon
the very point of the possibility of anything being known, but to
put
it to the test of experience. Yet they themselves, by only
employing
the power of the understanding, have not adopted a fixed rule, but
have laid their whole stress upon intense meditation, and a
continual
exercise and perpetual agitation of the mind.Our
method, though difficult in its operation, is easily explained. It
consists in determining the degrees of certainty, while we, as it
were, restore the senses to their former rank, but generally reject
that operation of the mind which follows close upon the senses, and
open and establish a new and certain course for the mind from the
first actual perceptions of the senses themselves. This, no doubt,
was the view taken by those who have assigned so much to logic;
showing clearly thereby that they sought some support for the mind,
and suspected its natural and spontaneous mode of action. But this
is
now employed too late as a remedy, when all is clearly lost, and
after the mind, by the daily habit and intercourse of life, has
come
prepossessed with corrupted doctrines, and filled with the vainest
idols. The art of logic therefore being (as we have mentioned), too
late a precaution,[1]
and in no way remedying the matter, has tended more to confirm
errors, than to disclose truth. Our only remaining hope and
salvation
is to begin the whole labor of the mind again; not leaving it to
itself, but directing it perpetually from the very first, and
attaining our end as it were by mechanical aid. If men, for
instance,
had attempted mechanical labors with their hands alone, and without
the power and aid of instruments, as they have not hesitated to
carry
on the labors of their understanding with the unaided efforts of
their mind, they would have been able to move and overcome but
little, though they had exerted their utmost and united powers. And
just to pause awhile on this comparison, and look into it as a
mirror; let us ask, if any obelisk of a remarkable size were
perchance required to be moved, for the purpose of gracing a
triumph
or any similar pageant, and men were to attempt it with their bare
hands, would not any sober spectator avow it to be an act of the
greatest madness? And if they should increase the number of
workmen,
and imagine that they could thus succeed, would he not think so
still
more? But if they chose to make a selection, and to remove the
weak,
and only employ the strong and vigorous, thinking by this means, at
any rate, to achieve their object, would he not say that they were
more fondly deranged? Nay, if not content with this, they were to
determine on consulting the athletic art, and were to give orders
for
all to appear with their hands, arms, and muscles regularly oiled
and
prepared, would he not exclaim that they were taking pains to rave
by
method and design? Yet men are hurried on with the same senseless
energy and useless combination in intellectual matters, as long as
they expect great results either from the number and agreement, or
the excellence and acuteness of their wits; or even strengthen
their
minds with logic, which may be considered as an athletic
preparation,
but yet do not desist (if we rightly consider the matter) from
applying their own understandings merely with all this zeal and
effort. While nothing is more clear, than that in every great work
executed by the hand of man without machines or implements, it is
impossible for the strength of individuals to be increased, or for
that of the multitude to combine.Having
premised so much, we lay down two points on which we would admonish
mankind, lest they should fail to see or to observe them. The first
of these is, that it is our good fortune (as we consider it), for
the
sake of extinguishing and removing contradiction and irritation of
mind, to leave the honor and reverence due to the ancients
untouched
and undiminished, so that we can perform our intended work, and yet
enjoy the benefit of our respectful moderation. For if we should
profess to offer something better than the ancients, and yet should
pursue the same course as they have done, we could never, by any
artifice, contrive to avoid the imputation of having engaged in a
contest or rivalry as to our respective wits, excellences, or
talents; which, though neither inadmissible nor new (for why should
we not blame and point out anything that is imperfectly discovered
or
laid down by them, of our own right, a right common to all?), yet
however just and allowable, would perhaps be scarcely an equal
match,
on account of the disproportion of our strength. But since our
present plan leads up to open an entirely different course to the
understanding, and one unattempted and unknown to them, the case is
altered. There is an end to party zeal, and we only take upon
ourselves the character of a guide, which requires a moderate share
of authority and good fortune, rather than talents and excellence.
The first admonition relates to persons, the next to things.We
make no attempt to disturb the system of philosophy that now
prevails, or any other which may or will exist, either more correct
or more complete. For we deny not that the received system of
philosophy, and others of a similar nature, encourage discussion,
embellish harangues, are employed, and are of service in the duties
of the professor, and the affairs of civil life. Nay, we openly
express and declare that the philosophy we offer will not be very
useful in such respects. It is not obvious, nor to be understood in
a
cursory view, nor does it flatter the mind in its preconceived
notions, nor will it descend to the level of the generality of
mankind unless by its advantages and effects.Let
there exist then (and may it be of advantage to both), two sources,
and two distributions of learning, and in like manner two tribes,
and
as it were kindred families of contemplators or philosophers,
without
any hostility or alienation between them; but rather allied and
united by mutual assistance. Let there be in short one method of
cultivating the sciences, and another of discovering them. And as
for
those who prefer and more readily receive the former, on account of
their haste or from motives arising from their ordinary life, or
because they are unable from weakness of mind to comprehend and
embrace the other (which must necessarily be the case with by far
the
greater number), let us wish that they may prosper as they desire
in
their undertaking, and attain what they pursue. But if any
individual
desire, and is anxious not merely to adhere to, and make use of
present discoveries, but to penetrate still further, and not to
overcome his adversaries in disputes, but nature by labor, not in
short to give elegant and specious opinions, but to know to a
certainty and demonstration, let him, as a true son of science (if
such be his wish), join with us; that when he has left the
antechambers of nature trodden by the multitude, an entrance may at
last be discovered to her inner apartments. And in order to be
better
understood, and to render our meaning more familiar by assigning
determinate names, we have accustomed ourselves to call the one
method the anticipation of the mind, and the other the
interpretation
of nature.We
have still one request left. We have at least reflected and taken
pains in order to render our propositions not only true, but of
easy
and familiar access to men’s minds, however wonderfully
prepossessed and limited. Yet it is but just that we should obtain
this favor from mankind (especially in so great a restoration of
learning and the sciences), that whosoever may be desirous of
forming
any determination upon an opinion of this our work either from his
own perceptions, or the crowd of authorities, or the forms of
demonstrations, he will not expect to be able to do so in a cursory
manner, and while attending to other matters; but in order to have
a
thorough knowledge of the subject, will himself by degrees attempt
the course which we describe and maintain; will be accustomed to
the
subtilty of things which is manifested by experience; and will
correct the depraved and deeply rooted habits of his mind by a
seasonable, and, as it were, just hesitation: and then, finally (if
he will), use his judgment when he has begun to be master of
himself.FOOTNOTE[1]
Because it was idle to draw a logical conclusion from false
principles, error being propagated as much by false premises, which
logic does not pretend to examine, as by illegitimate inference.
Hence, as Bacon says further on, men being easily led to confound
legitimate inference with truth, were confirmed in their errors by
the very subtilty of their genius.
APHORISMS—BOOK ION THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE AND THE EMPIRE OF MAN
I.
Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and
understands
as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with
regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is
capable of more.II.
The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess
but
little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and
helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and
as
instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so
those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the
understanding.III.
Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of
the
cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only subdued by
submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds
with the cause in practical science becomes the rule.IV.
Man while operating can only apply or withdraw natural bodies;
nature
internally performs the rest.V.
Those who become practically versed in nature are, the mechanic,
the
mathematician, the physician, the alchemist, and the
magician,[2]
but all (as matters now stand) with faint efforts and meagre
success.VI.
It would be madness and inconsistency to suppose that things which
have never yet been performed can be performed without employing
some
hitherto untried means.VII.
The creations of the mind and hand appear very numerous, if we
judge
by books and manufactures; but all that variety consists of an
excessive refinement, and of deductions from a few well known
matters—not of a
number of axioms.[3]VIII.
Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and
experiment
rather than to the sciences; for our present sciences are nothing
more than peculiar arrangements of matters already discovered, and
not methods for discovery or plans for new operations.IX.
The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sciences is
this, that while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the
human
mind, we do not search for its real helps.X.
The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the
understanding: so that the specious meditations, speculations, and
theories of mankind are but a kind of insanity, only there is no
one
to stand by and observe it.