ADVERTISEMENT.
INTRODUCTION.
BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC.
PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.
PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY.
PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.
INTRODUCTION.
Nothing
is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover
anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to
insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those,
which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content
with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most
important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human
reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences,
that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of
judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those
systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried
their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning.
Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them,
want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these
are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent
philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.Nor
is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present
imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without
doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that
all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject
of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions.
The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the
most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes
are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes
are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain.
Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but
eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the
most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in
any favourable colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms,
who manage the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers,
and musicians of the army.From
hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical
reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves
scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature.
By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any
particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is
any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We
have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly
reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a
prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and
entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism,
along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to
metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human
capacity, it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to
hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses
have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed
sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in
the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong
presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious.It
is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less,
to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run
from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even.
Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some
measure dependent on the science of MAN; since the lie under the
cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties.
It is impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make
in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and
force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the
ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings.
And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural
religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of
superior powers, but carries its views farther, to their disposition
towards us, and our duties towards them; and consequently we
ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the
objects, concerning which we reason.If
therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and
Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man,
what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with
human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to
explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and
the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and
sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and
dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals,
Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost everything, which it
can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either
to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.Here
then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our
philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method,
which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a
castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the
capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which
being once masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy
victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those
sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may
afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are
the objects of pore curiosity. There is no question of importance,
whose decision is not comprised in the science of man; and there is
none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become
acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain
the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat
system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new,
and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.And
as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other
sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science
itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no
astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of
experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to
natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in
fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of
these sciences; and that reckoning from THALES to SOCRATES, the space
of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late
philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr.
Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in England, who have begun to put the
science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and
excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however
other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other
agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be
owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.Nor
ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man
will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural
philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon
account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the
necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems
evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us
with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form
any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful
and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular
effects, which result from its different circumstances and
situations. And though we must endeavour to render all our principles
as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the
utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest
causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities
of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and
chimerical.I
do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to
the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show
himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he
pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally
satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than
that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and
that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying
any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we
have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down
contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our
ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most
general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their
reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required
no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most
extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any
farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may
derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his
ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which
so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on
the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual
contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and
scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.But
if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be
esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm,
that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the
arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are
cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the
shops of the meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond experience,
or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority.
Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is
not found in natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot
make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as
to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may
be. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another
in any situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe
what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up after the
same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the
same case with that which I consider, it is evident this reflection
and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural
principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion
from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in
this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them
as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour
in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of
this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to
establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty,
and will be much superior in utility to any other of human
comprehension.
PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC.
SECT.
I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.All
the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two
distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The
difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and
liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way
into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter
with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this
name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they
make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint
images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are
all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only
those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the
immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will
not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this
distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the
difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these
are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in
particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other.
Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent
emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on
the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so
faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But
notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in
general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank
them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark
the difference [FN 1.].[FN
1. I here make use of these terms, impression and
idea, in a sense different from what is usual, and I hope
this liberty will be allowed me. Perhaps I rather restore
the word, idea, to its original sense, from which Mr LOCKE
had perverted it, in making it stand for all our
perceptions. By the terms of impression I would not be
understood to express the manner, in which our lively
perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the
perceptions themselves; for which there is no particular
name either in the English or any other language, that I
know of.]There
is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient
to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and
ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions
or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor
separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be
distinguished into parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and
smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, it is easy to
perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from
each other.Having
by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we
may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their
qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye,
is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every
other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one
seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the
perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions
and ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I
form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is
there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the
other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same
resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always
to correspond to each other. This circumstance seems to me
remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment.Upon
a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the
first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of
perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision,
that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that
many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to
them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly
copied in ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New
Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, though I
never saw any such. I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form
such an idea of that city, as will perfectly represent all its
streets and houses in their real and just proportions?I
perceive, therefore, that though there is in general a great,
resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule
is not universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We
may next consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions.
After the most accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture
to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that
every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and
every simple impression a correspondent idea. That idea of red, which
we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes our eyes in
sun-shine, differ only in degree, not in nature. That the case is the
same with all our simple impressions and ideas, it is impossible to
prove by a particular enumeration of them. Every one may satisfy
himself in this point by running over as many as he pleases. But if
any one should deny this universal resemblance, I know no way of
convincing him, but by desiring him to shew a simple impression, that
has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a
correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as it
is certain he cannot, we may from his silence and our own observation
establish our conclusion.Thus
we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other;
and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general,
that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent.
Having discovered this relation, which requires no farther
examination, I am curious to find some other of their qualities. Let
us consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which
of the impressions and ideas are causes, and which effects.The
full examination of this question is the subject of the present
treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with
establishing one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN
THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE
CORRESPONDENT TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.In
seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of
two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and
conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I
have already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with
a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent
impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions
I immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our
correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the
one has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a
constant conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can
never arise from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the
impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I
may know on which side this dependence lies, I consider the order of
their first appearance; and find by constant experience, that the
simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent
ideas, but never appear in the contrary order. To give a child an
idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects,
or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not
so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting
the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance produce not their
correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any colour, or feel any
sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the other hand we find,
that any impression either of the mind or body is constantly followed
by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees
of force and liveliness, The constant conjunction of our resembling
perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of
the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof,
that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of
our impressions.To
confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phaenomenon;
which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give
rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when
one is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but
also their correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the
mind the least traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where
the organs of sensation are entirely destroyed, but likewise where
they have never been put in action to produce a particular
impression. We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a
pine apple, without having actually tasted it.There
is however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that it is
not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent
impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed that the several
distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of
sounds, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from
each other, though at the same time resembling. Now if this be true
of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades
of the same colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea,
independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is
possible, by the continual gradation of shades, to run a colour
insensibly into what is most remote from it; and if you will not
allow any of the means to be different, you cannot without absurdity
deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose therefore a person to have
enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well
acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade
of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet
with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single
one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to
the lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that
shade is wanting, said will be sensible, that there is a greater
distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any
other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him, from his own
imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the
idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to
him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion
that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are
not always derived from the correspondent impressions; though the
instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth our
observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our
general maxim.But
besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on this head,
that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be
understood with another limitation, viz., that as our ideas are
images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are
images of the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning
them. This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so
much as an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of themselves
in new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from
impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed
either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent
impressions.This
then is the first principle I establish in the science of human
nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its
appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present question
concerning the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same
with what has made so much noise in other terms, when it has been
disputed whether there be any INNATE IDEAS, or whether all ideas be
derived from sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order
to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate,
philosophers do nothing but shew that they are conveyed by our
senses. To prove the ideas of passion and desire not to be innate,
they observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions in
ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find
that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more
lively perceptions, from which the are derived, and which they
represent. I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all
disputes concerning it, and win render this principle of more use in
our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been.SECT.
II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.Since
it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their
correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method
seems to require we should examine our impressions, before we
consider our ideas. Impressions way be divided into two kinds, those
Of SENSATION and those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the
soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is derived in a
great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An
impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat
or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of
this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains
after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of
pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new
impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly
be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These
again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas;
which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas.
So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their
correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived
from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to
anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore
shall not at present be entered upon. And as the impressions of
reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally
deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas, it will be necessary
to reverse that method, which at first sight seems most natural; and
in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind, give
a particular account of ideas, before we proceed to impressions. For
this reason I have here chosen to begin with ideas.SECT.
III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.We
find by experience, that when any impression has been present with
the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it
may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it
retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat
intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea: or when it entirely
loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we
repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and
the other the IMAGINATION. It is evident at first sight, that the
ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the
imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more
distinct colours, than any which are employed by the latter. When we
remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a
forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint
and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserved by the mind
steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible
difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. But of this more
fully hereafter.[Part II, Sect. 5.]There
is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no
less evident, namely that though neither the ideas, of the memory nor
imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their
appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have
gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not
restrained to the same order and form with the original impressions;
while the memory is in a manner tied down in that respect, without
any power of variation.It
is evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its
objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in
recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection
in that faculty. An historian may, perhaps, for the more convenient
Carrying on of his narration, relate an event before another, to
which it was in fact posterior; but then he takes notice of this
disorder, if he be exact; and by that means replaces the idea in its
due position. It is the same case in our recollection of those places
and persons, with which we were formerly acquainted. The chief
exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their
order and position. In short, this principle is supported by such a
number of common and vulgar phaenomena, that we may spare ourselves
the trouble of insisting on it any farther.The
same evidence follows us in our second principle, OF THE LIBERTY OF
THE IMAGINATION TO TRANSPOSE AND CHANGE ITS IDEAS. The fables we meet
with in poems and romances put this entirely out of the question.
Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but winged
horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants. Nor will this liberty of
the fancy appear strange, when we consider, that all our ideas are
copyed from our impressions, and that there are not any two
impressions which are perfectly inseparable. Not to mention, that
this is an evident consequence of the division of ideas into simple
and complex. Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among
ideas, it can easily produce a separation.SECT.
IV. OF THE CONNEXION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.As
all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be
united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more
unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided
by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure,
uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely
loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them; and it is
impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex
ones (as they Commonly do) without some bond of union among them,
some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces
another. This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered
as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from
the imagination: Nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind
cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty:
but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly
prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so
nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to
every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united in a
complex one. The qualities, from which this association arises, and
by which the mind is after this manner conveyed from one idea to
another, are three, viz. RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place,
and CAUSE and EFFECT.I
believe it will not be very necessary to prove, that these qualities
produce an association among ideas, and upon the appearance of one
idea naturally introduce another. It is plain, that in the course of
our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our
imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it,
and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and
association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing
their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take
them as they lie CONTIGUOUS to each other, the imagination must by
long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the
parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. As to the
connexion, that is made by the relation of cause and effect, we shall
have occasion afterwards to examine it to the bottom, and therefore
shall not at present insist upon it. It is sufficient to observe,
that there is no relation, which produces a stronger connexion in the
fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the
relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects.That
we may understand the full extent of these relations, we must
consider, that two objects are connected together in the imagination,
not only when the one is immediately resembling, contiguous to, or
the cause of the other, but also when there is interposed betwixt
them a third object, which bears to both of them any of these
relations. This may be carried on to a great length; though at the
same time we may observe, that each remove considerably weakens the
relation. Cousins in the fourth degree are connected by causation, if
I may be allowed to use that term; but not so closely as brothers,
much less as child and parent. In general we may observe, that all
the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect, and are esteemed
near or remote, according to the number of connecting causes
interposed betwixt the persons.Of
the three relations above-mentioned this of causation is the most
extensive. Two objects may be considered as placed in this relation,
as well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the
other, as when the former is the cause of the existence of the
latter. For as that action or motion is nothing but the object
itself, considered in a certain light, and as the object continues
the same in all its different situations, it is easy to imagine how
such an influence of objects upon one another may connect them in the
imagination.We
may carry this farther, and remark, not only that two objects are
connected by the relation of cause and effect, when the one produces
a motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of
producing it. And this we may observe to be the source of all the
relation, of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in
society, and are placed in the ties of government and subordination.
A master is such-a-one as by his situation, arising either from force
or agreement, has a power of directing in certain particulars the
actions of another, whom we call servant. A judge is one, who in all
disputed cases can fix by his opinion the possession or property of
any thing betwixt any members of the society. When a person is
possessed of any power, there is no more required to convert it into
action, but the exertion of the will; and that in every case is
considered as possible, and in many as probable; especially in the
case of authority, where the obedience of the subject is a pleasure
and advantage to the superior.These
are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple
ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable
connexion, by which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of
ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as
many and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous;
but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved
into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to
explain. Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to
restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes, and having
established any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments,
rest contented with that, when he sees a farther examination would
lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations. In that case his
enquiry would be much better employed in examining the effects than
the causes of his principle.Amongst
the effects of this union or association of ideas, there are none
more remarkable, than those complex ideas, which are the common
subjects of our thoughts and reasoning, and generally arise from some
principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex ideas may be
divided into Relations, Modes, and Substances. We shall briefly
examine each of these in order, and shall subjoin some considerations
concerning our general and particular ideas, before we leave the
present subject, which may be considered as the elements of this
philosophy.SECT.
V. OF RELATIONS.The
word RELATION is commonly used in two senses considerably different
from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are
connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally
introduces the other, after the manner above-explained: or for that
particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of
two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them. In
common language the former is always the sense, in which we use the
word, relation; and it is only in philosophy, that we extend it to
mean any particular subject of comparison, without a connecting
principle. Thus distance will be allowed by philosophers to be a true
relation, because we acquire an idea of it by the comparing of
objects: But in a common way we say, THAT NOTHING CAN BE MORE DISTANT
THAN SUCH OR SUCH THINGS FROM EACH OTHER, NOTHING CAN HAVE LESS
RELATION: as if distance and relation were incompatible.It
may perhaps be esteemed an endless task to enumerate all those
qualities, which make objects admit of comparison, and by which the
ideas of philosophical relation are produced. But if we diligently
consider them, we shall find that without difficulty they may be
comprised under seven general heads, which may be considered as the
sources of all philosophical relation.(1)
The first is RESEMBLANCE: And this is a relation, without which no
philosophical relation can exist; since no objects will admit of
comparison, but what have some degree of resemblance. But though
resemblance be necessary to all philosophical relation, it does not
follow, that it always produces a connexion or association of ideas.
When a quality becomes very general, and is common to a great many
individuals, it leads not the mind directly to any one of them; but
by presenting at once too great a choice, does thereby prevent the
imagination from fixing on any single object.(2)
IDENTITY may be esteemed a second species of relation. This relation
I here consider as applied in its strictest sense to constant and
unchangeable objects; without examining the nature and foundation of
personal identity, which shall find its place afterwards. Of all
relations the most universal is that of identity, being common to
every being whose existence has any duration.(3)
After identity the most universal and comprehensive relations are
those of SPACE and TIME, which are the sources of an infinite number
of comparisons, such as distant, contiguous, above, below, before,
after, etc.(4)
All those objects, which admit of QUANTITY, or NUMBER, may be
compared in that particular; which is another very fertile source of
relation.(5)
When any two objects possess the same QUALITY in common, the DEGREES,
in which they possess it, form a fifth species of relation. Thus of
two objects, which are both heavy, the one may be either of greater,
or less weight than the other. Two colours, that are of the same
kind, may yet be of different shades, and in that respect admit of
comparison.(6)
The relation of CONTRARIETY may at first sight be regarded as an
exception to the rule, THAT NO RELATION OF ANY KIND CAN SUBSIST
WITHOUT SOME DEGREE OF RESEMBLANCE. But let us consider, that no two
ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and
non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying both of them
an idea of the object; though the latter excludes the object from all
times and places, in which it is supposed not to exist.(7)
All other objects, such as fire and water, heat and cold, are only
found to be contrary from experience, and from the contrariety of
their causes or effects; which relation of cause and effect is a
seventh philosophical relation, as well as a natural one. The
resemblance implied in this relation, shall be explained afterwards.It
might naturally be expected, that I should join DIFFERENCE to the
other relations. But that I consider rather as a negation of
relation, than as anything real or positive. Difference is of two
kinds as opposed either to identity or resemblance. The first is
called a difference of number; the other of KIND.SECT.
VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCESI
would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their
reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine
we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived
from the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed
to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If
it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a
sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I
believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or
sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived
from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the
impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and
emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have
therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of
particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either
talk or reason concerning it.The
idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a
collection of Simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and
have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall,
either to ourselves or others, that collection. But the difference
betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities,
which form a substance, are commonly referred to an unknown
something, in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this
fiction should not take place, are at least supposed to be closely
and inseparably connected by the relations of contiguity and
causation. The effect of this is, that whatever new simple quality we
discover to have the same connexion with the rest, we immediately
comprehend it among them, even though it did not enter into the first
conception of the substance. Thus our idea of gold may at first be a
yellow colour, weight, malleableness, fusibility; but upon the
discovery of its dissolubility in aqua regia, we join that to the
other qualities, and suppose it to belong to the substance as much as
if its idea had from the beginning made a part of the compound one.
The principal of union being regarded as the chief part of the
complex idea, gives entrance to whatever quality afterwards occurs,
and is equally comprehended by it, as are the others, which first
presented themselves.That
this cannot take place in modes, is evident from considering their
mature. The simple ideas of which modes are formed, either represent
qualities, which are not united by contiguity and causation, but are
dispersed in different subjects; or if they be all united together,
the uniting principle is not regarded as the foundation of the
complex idea. The idea of a dance is an instance of the first kind of
modes; that of beauty of the second. The reason is obvious, why such
complex ideas cannot receive any new idea, without changing the name,
which distinguishes the mode.SECT.
VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.A
very material question has been started concerning ABSTRACT or
GENERAL ideas, WHETHER THEY BE GENERAL OR PARTICULAR IN THE MIND'S
CONCEPTION OF THEM. A great philosopher [Dr. Berkeley.] has disputed
the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all
general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain
term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them
recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As
I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable
discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of
letters, I shall here endeavour to confirm it by some arguments,
which I hope will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.It
is evident, that in forming most of our general ideas, if not all of
them, we abstract from every particular degree of quantity and
quality, and that an object ceases not to be of any particular
species on account of every small alteration in its extension,
duration and other properties. It may therefore be thought, that here
is a plain dilemma, that decides concerning the nature of those
abstract ideas, which have afforded so much speculation to
philosophers. The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes
and all qualities; which it is concluded it cannot do, but either by
representing at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities,
or by, representing no particular one at all. Now it having been
esteemed absurd to defend the former proposition, as implying an
infinite capacity in the mind, it has been commonly inferred in
favour of the latter: and our abstract ideas have been supposed to
represent no particular degree either of quantity or quality. But
that this inference is erroneous, I shall endeavour to make appear,
first, by proving, that it is utterly impossible to conceive any
quantity or quality, without forming a precise notion of its degrees:
And secondly by showing, that though the capacity of the mind be not
infinite, yet we can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of
quantity and quality, in such a manner at least, as, however
imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflection and conversation.To
begin with the first proposition, THAT THE MIND CANNOT FORM ANY
NOTION OF QUANTITY OR QUALITY WITHOUT FORMING A PRECISE NOTION OF
DEGREES OF EACH; we may prove this by the three following arguments.
First, We have observed, that whatever objects are different are
distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are
separable by the thought and imagination. And we may here add, that
these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that whatever
objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever
objects are distinguishable, are also different. For how is it
possible we can separate what is not distinguishable, or distinguish
what is not different? In order therefore to know, whether
abstraction implies a separation, we need only consider it in this
view, and examine, whether all the circumstances, which we abstract
from in our general ideas, be such as are distinguishable and
different from those, which we retain as essential parts of them. But
it is evident at first sight, that the precise length of a line is
not different nor distinguishable from the line itself nor the
precise degree of any quality from the quality. These ideas,
therefore, admit no more of separation than they do of distinction
and difference. They are consequently conjoined with each other in
the conception; and the general idea of a line, notwithstanding all
our abstractions and refinements, has in its appearance in the mind a
precise degree of quantity and quality; however it may be made to
represent others, which have different degrees of both.Secondly,
it is contest, that no object can appear to the senses; or in other
words, that no impression can become present to the mind, without
being determined in its degrees both of quantity and quality. The
confusion, in which impressions are sometimes involved, proceeds only
from their faintness and unsteadiness, not from any capacity in the
mind to receive any impression, which in its real existence has no
particular degree nor proportion. That is a contradiction in terms;
and even implies the flattest of all contradictions, viz. that it is
possible for the same thing both to be and not to be.Now
since all ideas are derived from impressions, and are nothing but
copies and representations of them, whatever is true of the one must
be acknowledged concerning the other. Impressions and ideas differ
only in their strength and vivacity. The foregoing conclusion is not
founded on any particular degree of vivacity. It cannot therefore be
affected by any variation in that particular. An idea is a weaker
impression; and as a strong impression must necessarily have a
determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its
copy or representative.Thirdly,
it is a principle generally received in philosophy that everything in
nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a
triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides
and angles. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must
also be absurd in idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear
and distinct idea is absurd and impossible. But to form the idea of
an object, and to form an idea simply, is the same thing; the
reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination,
of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Now as it is
impossible to form an idea of an object, that is possest of quantity
and quality, and yet is possest of no precise degree of either; it
follows that there is an equal impossibility of forming an idea, that
is not limited and confined in both these particulars. Abstract ideas
are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become
general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that
of a particular object, though the application of it in our reasoning
be the same, as if it were universal.This
application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds from our collecting
all their possible degrees of quantity and quality in such an
imperfect manner as may serve the purposes of life, which is the
second proposition I proposed to explain. When we have found a
resemblance [FN 2.] among several objects, that often occur to us, we
apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may
observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever
other differences may appear among them. After we have acquired a
custom of this kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one
of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive it with all its
particular circumstances and proportions. But as the same word is
supposed to have been frequently applied to other individuals, that
are different in many respects from that idea, which is immediately
present to the mind; the word not being able to revive the idea of
all these individuals, but only touches the soul, if I may be allowed
so to speak, and revives that custom, which we have acquired by
surveying them. They are not really and in fact present to the mind,
but only in power; nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the
imagination, but keep ourselves in a readiness to survey any of them,
as we may be prompted by a present design or necessity. The word
raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom; and that
custom produces any other individual one, for which we may have
occasion. But as the production of all the ideas, to which the name
may be applied, is in most eases impossible, we abridge that work by
a more partial consideration, and find but few inconveniences to
arise in our reasoning from that abridgment.[FN
2. It is evident, that even different simple ideas
may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is
it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance
shoud be distinct or separable from that in which they
differ. BLUE and GREEN are different simple ideas, but are
more resembling than BLUE and SCARLET; tho their perfect
simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or
distinction. It is the same case with particular sounds, and
tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon
the general appearance and comparison, without having any
common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain,
even from the very abstract terms SIMPLE IDEA. They
comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each
other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature,
which excludes all composition, this circumstance, In which
they resemble, Is not distinguishable nor separable from the
rest. It is the same case with all the degrees In any
quality. They are all resembling and yet the quality, In any
individual, Is not distinct from the degree.]For
this is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the present
affair, that after the mind has produced an individual idea, upon
which we reason, the attendant custom, revived by the general or
abstract term, readily suggests any other individual, if by chance we
form any reasoning, that agrees not with it. Thus should we mention
the word triangle, and form the idea of a particular equilateral one
to correspond to it, and should we afterwards assert, that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the other individuals
of a scalenum and isosceles, which we overlooked at first,
immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the falshood of
this proposition, though it be true with relation to that idea, which
we had formed. If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon
occasion, it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties; and
such a one as is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry.
But this is principally the case with those ideas which are abstruse
and compounded. On other occasions the custom is more entire, and it
is seldom we run into such errors.Nay
so entire is the custom, that the very same idea may be annext to
several different words, and may be employed in different reasonings,
without any danger of mistake. Thus the idea of an equilateral
triangle of an inch perpendicular may serve us in talking of a
figure, of a rectilinear figure, of a regular figure, of a triangle,
and of an equilateral triangle. All these terms, therefore, are in
this case attended with the same idea; but as they are wont to be
applied in a greater or lesser compass, they excite their particular
habits, and thereby keep the mind in a readiness to observe, that no
conclusion be formed contrary to any ideas, which are usually
comprized under them.Before
those habits have become entirely perfect, perhaps the mind may not
be content with forming the idea of only one individual, but may run
over several, in order to make itself comprehend its own meaning, and
the compass of that collection, which it intends to express by the
general term. That we may fix the meaning of the word, figure, we may
revolve in our mind the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms,
triangles of different sizes and proportions, and may not rest on one
image or idea. However this may be, it is certain that we form the
idea of individuals, whenever we use any general term; that we seldom
or never can exhaust these individuals; and that those, which remain,
are only represented by means of that habit, by which we recall them,
whenever any present occasion requires it. This then is the nature of
our abstract ideas and general terms; and it is after this manner we
account for the foregoing paradox, THAT SOME IDEAS ARE PARTICULAR IN
THEIR NATURE, BUT GENERAL IN THEIR REPRESENTATION. A particular idea
becomes general by being annexed to a general term; that is, to a
term, which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other
particular ideas, and readily recalls them in the imagination.The
only difficulty, that can remain on this subject, must be with regard
to that custom, which so readily recalls every particular idea, for
which we may have occasion, and is excited by any word or sound, to
which we commonly annex it. The most proper method, in my opinion, of
giving a satisfactory explication of this act of the mind, is by
producing other instances, which are analogous to it, and other
principles, which facilitate its operation. To explain the ultimate
causes of our mental actions is impossible. It is sufficient, if we
can give any satisfactory account of them from experience and
analogy.First
then I observe, that when we mention any great number, such as a
thousand, the mind has generally no adequate idea of it, but only a
power of producing such an idea, by its adequate idea of the
decimals, under which the number is comprehended. This imperfection,
however, in our ideas, is never felt in our reasonings; which seems
to be an instance parallel to the present one of universal ideas.Secondly,
we have several instances of habits, which may be revived by one
single word; as when a person, who has by rote any periods of a
discourse, or any number of verses, will be put in remembrance of the
whole, which he is at a loss to recollect, by that single word or
expression, with which they begin.Thirdly,
I believe every one, who examines the situation of his mind in
reasoning will agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and
compleat ideas to every term we make use of, and that in talking of
government, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread out in
our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are
composed. It is however observable, that notwithstanding this
imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects, and may
perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a fall
comprehension of them. Thus if instead of saying, that in war the
weaker have always recourse to negotiation, we should say, that they
have always recourse to conquest, the custom, which we have acquired
of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words,
and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition;
in the same manner as one particular idea may serve us in reasoning
concerning other ideas, however different from it in several
circumstances.Fourthly,
As the individuals are collected together, said placed under a
general term with a view to that resemblance, which they bear to each
other, this relation must facilitate their entrance in the
imagination, and make them be suggested more readily upon occasion.
And indeed if we consider the common progress of the thought, either
in reflection or conversation, we shall find great reason to be
satisfyed in this particular. Nothing is more admirable, than the
readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and
presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or
useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in
collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject. One would think
the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our
view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper
for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present, beside those
very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of magical faculty in
the soul, which, though it be always most perfect in the greatest
geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is however
inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding.Perhaps
these four reflections may help to remove an difficulties to the
hypothesis I have proposed concerning abstract ideas, so contrary to
that, which has hitherto prevailed in philosophy, But, to tell the
truth I place my chief confidence in what I have already proved
concerning the impossibility of general ideas, according to the
common method of explaining them. We must certainly seek some new
system on this head, and there plainly is none beside what I have
proposed. If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same
time finite in their number, it is only by custom they can become
general in their representation, and contain an infinite number of
other ideas under them.Before
I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain
that distinction of reason, which is so much talked of, and is so
little understood, in the schools. Of this kind is the distinction
betwixt figure and the body figured; motion and the body moved. The
difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle
above explained, that all ideas, which are different, are separable.
For it follows from thence, that if the figure be different from the
body, their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable: if
they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor
distinguishable. What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since
it implies neither a difference nor separation.To
remove this difficulty we must have recourse to the foregoing
explication of abstract ideas. It is certain that the mind would
never have dreamed of distinguishing a figure from the body figured,
as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor
separable; did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there
might be contained many different resemblances and relations. Thus
when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the
impression of a white colour disposed in a certain form, nor are we
able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But
observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and
comparing them with our former object, we find two separate
resemblances, in what formerly seemed, and really is, perfectly
inseparable. After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to
distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason;
that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are
in effect the same and undistinguishable; but still view them in
different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are
susceptible. When we would consider only the figure of the globe of
white marble, we form in reality an idea both of the figure and
colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe
of black marble: And in the same manner, when we would consider its
colour only, we turn our view to its resemblance with the cube of
white marble. By this means we accompany our ideas with a kind of
reflection, of which custom renders us, in a great measure,
insensible. A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a
globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an
impossibility but his meaning is, that we should consider the figure
and colour together, but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the
globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour
or substance.