Boards That Deliver E-Book

Ram Charan

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Serie: J-B US non-Franchise Leadership
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Seitenzahl: 305

Beschreibung

Finally, a book that brings the vision of truly good governance down to earth. Ram Charan, expert in corporate governance and best-selling author, packs this book with useful tools and techniques to take boards and their companies to a higher level of performance. Charan puts his finger on a growing problem for boards: the disconnect between directors' efforts and their results. The added time and attention boards invest is not translating into better governanceâ??that is, governance that adds value to the business. Boards That Deliver gets beyond the rhetoric of corporate governance reform. It captures the tried-and-true practices used by high-performance boards. In contrast to experts who base prescriptions on number-crunching exercises, Charan identifies the real problems that drain directors' time and suppress their best judgmentsâ??and explains clearly and succinctly how boards can solve those problems. These battle-tested solutions help boards achieve what rules and regulations alone cannotâ??to get succession right, refine a winning strategy, and design a rational CEO compensation package. Good governance requires leadership. Boards That Deliver is the no-nonsense guide for directors and CEOs who are rising to the leadership challenge to make their boards a competitive advantage.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Other Books by Ram Charan

Title Page

Copyright Page

Introduction

The Road Map

Looking Ahead

Part One - Boards in Transition

Chapter One - The Three Phases of a Board’s Evolution

The Real Risk of Value Destruction

The Evolution of Boards

Chapter Two - What Makes a Board Progressive

The Basic Building Blocks

Contributions That Count

Beware of Mechanics

Part Two - The Three Building Blocks of Progressive Boards

Chapter Three - Group Dynamics

The Rules of Engagement

Board Leadership

Executive Sessions

Board Evaluation

Managing the Unwanted Director

Chapter Four - Information Architecture

Designing the Information Architecture

Channel 1—Board Briefing

Channel 2—Management Letter

Channel 3—Employee Surveys

Channel 4—Director Outreach

Channel 5—Reports from Committees

Chapter Five - Focus on Substantive Issues

The Ten Questions Every Director Should Ask

The Twelve-Month Agenda

Part Three - Contributions That Count

Chapter Six - The Right CEO and Succession

Defining the Selection Criteria

The Inside Track

Assessing Candidates

Supporting the New CEO

Feedback and Reviews

The Faltering CEO

Chapter Seven - CEO Compensation

Defining a Compensation Philosophy

Multiple Objectives

Matching Objectives with Cash and Equity

The Total Compensation Framework

Evaluating Performance

Severance Pay

Using HR and Compensation Consultants

Chapter Eight - The Right Strategy

What Strategy Is—and Isn’t

Strategy Immersion Sessions

Strategy Blueprint

Strategy Monitor

Chapter Nine - The Leadership Gene Pool

Keeping the Leadership Gene Pool Relevant

An Overview of the Leadership Gene Pool

Sampling the Leadership Gene Pool

Chapter Ten - Monitoring Health, Performance, and Risk

Monitoring Financial Health

Monitoring Operating Performance

Monitoring Risk

Part Four - Maintaining Momentum

Chapter Eleven - Board Operations

Board Composition

Separating the CEO and Chair Positions

Committees

Continuing Education

Meeting Logistics

Chapter Twelve - Working with Investors

Sources the Board Should Listen To

Legitimate Concerns

Beware of Self-Interest

Conclusion

Appendix A: Sample Strategy Blueprint

Appendix B: The Research Agenda

Acknowledgments

About the Author

Index

Other Books by Ram Charan

Profitable Growth Is Everyone’s Business: 10 Tools You Can Use Monday Morning

What the CEO Wants You to Know

Boards at Work

Books coauthored by Ram Charan:

Confronting Reality: Doing What Matters to Get Things Right

(a best-seller with Larry Bossidy)

Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done

(a best-seller with Larry Bossidy)

The Leadership Pipeline: How to Build the Leadership-Powered Company (with James L. Noel and Steve Drotter)

Every Business Is a Growth Business: How Your Company Can Prosper Year after Year (with Noel Tichy)

E-Board Strategies (with Roger Kenny)

Strategic Management: A Casebook in Policy and Planning

(with Charles W. Hofer, Edwin A. Murray Jr., and Robert A. Pitts)

Custom books for in-house use:

Business Acumen

Making Matrix Organizations a Competitive Advantage

Action, Urgency, Excellence

Copyright © 2005 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.

Published by Jossey-Bass A Wiley Imprint 989 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94103-1741 www.josseybass.com

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Charan, Ram.

Boards that deliver : advancing corporate governance from compliance to competitive advantage / by Ram Charan.—1st ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-7879-7139-1 (alk. paper)

1. Boards of directors. 2. Corporate governance. I. Title. HD2745.C44 2005 658.4’22—dc22

2004025829

Introduction: Advancing the Practice of Corporate Governance

Make no mistake about it, corporate governance is on the move. New rules and regulations, along with a genuine desire to improve, have caused a perceptible shift in boardrooms across America and around the world. Most CEOs and directors recognize that the journey has just begun, and that they, not regulators, must now lead the way.

This is a book for directors, CEOs, and other business leaders who want corporate governance to be the best it can be. Yes, boards have changed in recent years for the better. But they are not yet fully evolved. Most boards are in flux and still not living up to their potential of providing truly good governance—that is, governance that doesn’t just prevent misdeeds but actually improves the corporation. They haven’t figured out the “how” of adding value.

That’s where this book comes in. It provides the guidance boards need to go from being merely active and in full compliance to making an important contribution to the business. It is a road map for how boards can make the transition to the next step in their evolution, becoming a competitive advantage for their companies. And it is a guidebook for CEOs to see how they can get the most out of their boards.

Beginning with my doctoral work on governance at the Harvard Business School more than thirty years ago, I have closely studied the inner workings of boards. I haven’t performed quantitative or statistical correlations between corporate performance and variables of corporate governance. Frankly, such research doesn’t get to the causality of what leads to good governance. Rather, I have focused on what happens behind the curtain, so to speak, inside the boardroom. My first book on this subject, Boards at Work (published in 1998), described what the best boards were doing at that time.

Since then, through continued research and analysis, I have come to identify three factors that create the foundation for good governance. I have also identified the essential practices and collective behaviors needed to build that foundation—and to build on it. These are practices and behaviors I have observed to have a positive impact on governance for the companies that used them. That is, they seem to be causal factors. They can be adopted by any board to make good governance a reality.

My view of what makes governance good differs from that of so-called board watchers. To them, governance is measured by inputs—the processes and structures used by the board. To the contrary, I believe governance is measured by outputs—the value that a board adds to a corporation. A board’s practices are a means by which it can perform good governance, not ends in and of themselves.

Though this book mostly describes practices in the United States, the principles of a board’s work hold true around the world. Virtually all nations’ corporate codes charge some form of board with the task of ensuring the successful perpetuation of the firm over the long term. The influence of shareholders may be stronger in nations such as the United Kingdom or weaker in nations such as Korea. The composition of boards may emphasize employees in nations like Germany or emphasize independent directors in nations like the United States. Regardless of the differences in mechanics and rules, the board’s fundamental mandate is the same—and the characteristics necessary for it to function well are universal.

This book does not describe the myriad requirements for compliance. It doesn’t list the rules prescribed by Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, and by the stock market exchanges. CEOs, directors, and general counsels know these rules intimately by now, or have access to comprehensive sources of advice on compliance. The aim here is to prompt boards to continue their momentum, to build on their accomplishments to date, and to put in place the collective behaviors and practices that will allow them to deliver on the promise of good governance once and for all.

The Road Map

Part One of this book identifies the current state of transition many boards find themselves in. Chapter One defines the three evolutionary stages of corporate boards: Ceremonial, Liberated, and Progressive. It ends with a self-test for boards to evaluate themselves—“Where Does Your Board Stand?”

Chapter Two describes the three building blocks that are essential to move from Liberated, where most boards are today, to Progressive. These building blocks are not what external observers are focusing on. Board watchers have become preoccupied with the size of a board, the degree of independence, the number of committees and meetings, the separation of the CEO and Chair positions, and other such variables, none of which gets at the heart of Progressive governance. The true causal factors that lead to better governance are group dynamics, information architecture, and focus on substantive issues, which I outline.

Part Two of the book includes a chapter on each of the three building blocks, to present an in-depth look at the practices and collective behaviors that boards can use to transform themselves into Progressive boards. Chapter Three describes the practices that are essential to the board’s group dynamics, the first building block of Progressive boards. Readers will quickly understand how simple techniques can transform the manner in which directors interact with each other, and with management, and become a productive force for governance.

Chapter Four describes the best practices that Progressive boards use to ensure an efficient and productive exchange of information between management and the board. Getting the information architecture right has profound effects on the quality of dialogue in the boardroom.

Chapter 5 describes the best practices that Progressive boards use to focus on substantive issues. Boards’ time and attention are very precious. The trap some boards fall into is to allow their time to be dominated by routine financial monitoring and compliance activities. Progressive boards use simple tools to remind themselves of the most critical areas and improve the return on their time.

Part Three of the book includes a chapter on each of five substantive areas where boards can make their most important contributions: the right CEO and succession, CEO compensation, the right strategy, the leadership gene pool, and monitoring health, performance, and risk. In practice, boards tend to give these areas relatively little of their time and attention, yet these are the real opportunities for a board to become a true competitive advantage.

Chapter Six describes tools boards use to ensure they have the leadership they need today and in the future. The right CEO and succession remains job number one for all boards. Every board needs a succession process that draws on the judgments of all directors and leads to high-quality decisions.

Chapter Seven captures an emerging approach to defining CEO compensation, one that provides true alignment between CEO pay and performance. This is an area of critical importance and intense public scrutiny; it behooves all boards to pay close attention to the philosophy behind CEO compensation, as well as to the process of defining the package and the framework that links pay with performance.

Chapter Eight describes how boards can ensure they stand behind the right strategy. There are very specific practices that Progressive boards use with great effectiveness to get a full and shared understanding of strategy—a source of misunderstanding on Liberated boards—as well as to help shape the strategy. Appendix A builds on this chapter to present a sample of a strategy blueprint that can jump-start discussion.

Chapter Nine lays out the approach that Progressive boards use to make sure the company is developing its leaders at all levels. The leadership gene pool is an essential component of the company’s ability to create value and sustain a competitive advantage over the long term. And a strong leadership gene pool will make the CEO succession process more robust in the future.

Chapter Ten helps boards go beyond the usual in monitoring health, performance, and risk. Progressive boards dwell relatively little on routine financial figures that describe yesterday’s performance; they cut to the core issues of financial health, the factors that drive tomorrow’s performance, and the dangerous interactions of risk.

Finally, Part Four provides a pragmatic approach to maintaining momentum. Chapter Eleven contains advice on a range of less important factors under the rubric of board operations, including the logistics of board meetings. Chapter Twelve deals with investors, who are increasingly vocal constituencies. But not all investors are alike. Boards should know how to filter the legitimate concerns from the self-serving voices.

Appendix B is addressed to readers interested in pursuing research in this area. I propose an approach that will generate better insights into corporate governance and uncover the real factors that underlie effective governance. Resulting research will provide boards with better guidance on how to improve.

Looking Ahead

The opportunity for boards to add value is very real. What’s more, the desire and motivation of directors to realize the opportunity is evident. With the right set of practices, any group of directors can become a board that delivers value to management and to investors.

The board sits in a critical position in the modern free enterprise system. It has the responsibility, as well as the opportunity, to make a significant difference. The chapters that follow are suggestions to all directors so they can fulfill their responsibility and achieve their opportunity.

Part One

Boards in Transition

Around the world, boards have accepted a new mandate and are adopting a new mindset toward their work. But living up to new expectations is posing a challenge for many boards. Understanding the true nature of the transformation corporate governance is undergoing can help directors recognize where they are getting stuck, why, and how to move forward.

Chapter One describes three phases boards go through—from Ceremonial to Liberated to Progressive—as they try to increase their contribution to the corporation. Many boards today are stuck in the middle phase and therefore do not add as much value as they could.

Chapter Two explains what makes a board Progressive, the third phase of board evolution. Three building blocks must be in place for boards to make a substantive contribution to the business.

Chapter One

The Three Phases of a Board’s Evolution

Boards of directors have undergone a rapid transformation since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The shift in power between the CEO and the board is perceptible. Directors are taking their responsibilities seriously, speaking up, and taking action. It’s a positive trend and an exciting time for boards.

But the evolving relationship between the CEO and the board has yet to find the right equilibrium in most cases. It’s important that boards become active, but there is danger in letting the pendulum swing too far. Astute directors and CEOs sense the tension. They recognize that just as past practices have failed them, recent attempts to make the board a true competitive advantage are not always hitting the mark.

Here’s one example. In the spring of 2003, a CEO approached me at a conference. “Something’s gnawing at me,” he said.

“What do you mean?” I asked, with some surprise. “I saw your latest earnings report and it looks like you’re really delivering.” This was true. I knew the company went through a period of adjustment following the recession, but business had rebounded and the company was turning niche products into real growth opportunities both domestically and abroad. “Is there some bad news that you’re not making public?”

“No, no. It’s not that, Ram,” said the CEO, whom I’ll call Jim Doyle. (He, like some of the other executives I spoke with in researching this book, would prefer to remain anonymous.) “The business is rock solid. We’re executing well.”

“Well, it sounds like you’ve got it all together,” I said.

Then came the punchline: “It’s the board.”

I let Jim continue. “I took over from Alan three years ago. Before that, I was president and I remember how Alan ran board meetings. There was essentially no dialogue; communication was a one-way street. When I became CEO, I wanted the board to help me. I wanted to make it a modern board. So we made all the structural changes that have been asked of us, like changing the composition of the Audit Committee. We now have eleven directors; eight of whom are independent by any definition. Only two directors are holdovers from the old board. We have eight full-day meetings per year, and everyone participates. The boardroom is very lively,” Jim explained.

“Sounds like you’re doing all the right things,” I said.

“I thought so. But lately, I’ve heard more and more questions in our meetings. Now I don’t mind fielding questions from directors. In fact, I consider it their job to ask questions and my job to address those questions. But some of the questions and the analyses directors ask for are off the wall. I’m getting sidetracked covering all of them. And the same questions keep coming up. It’s frustrating and I know some directors are frustrated, too.”

“Give me an example, Jim?”

“Sure. I presented our new strategy to the board several times and they tell me in the boardroom that they support it. But after some one-on-one chats, I began to realize that not everyone gets it. So we held a retreat last weekend, and I brought in the brandname strategy firm that helped design the strategy to present it,” Jim said.

“Let me guess, they flipped through a deck of a hundred PowerPoint slides,” I conjectured.

“I admit that I probably let the consultants show a few too many slides,” Jim said. “But within thirty minutes, two directors began to go off on minutiae. Charlie told us he didn’t believe the media strategy was appropriate. Then he said he didn’t like the national TV ads he saw last week. He thought regional advertising would be more effective than national TV ads. This was during a discussion that was supposed to be dedicated to strategy. The other directors bit their tongues. Later on, Jeff started in on how he thought discounts were too high for large customers. He wouldn’t let it go, even though he knew we depend on our ten biggest customers for thirty percent of our revenues. Needless to say, the retreat fell apart and we accomplished very little. When we adjourned, everyone told me, ‘we support you,’ but their body language said something different.”

“How long has this been going on?” I asked.

“I’d say off and on for the past three meetings. Some directors keep coming back with the same questions over and over. It’s very draining. I need to find a way to get us on track.”

Jim’s five-minute story matched what I’ve seen happen too often. Since Sarbanes-Oxley, I’ve heard variations of his story many times. Directors have turned the corner in their attitudes toward directorship and are devoting more time and energy to the job. But they are still searching for ways to make a meaningful contribution to the business.

The Real Risk of Value Destruction

Jim’s board, like most boards in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley world of corporate governance, is very different from its counterpart of a dozen years earlier. It’s not that the directors themselves are markedly different. By and large, boards still consist of smart, trustworthy people—individuals with backgrounds of achievement and ability who are a credit to the firms on whose boards they serve. In some cases, in fact, the new directors of a dozen years ago are the very same wise sages on today’s boards.

The change in boardrooms today is not marked by the people but rather by the social atmosphere. Boardrooms have more energy, liveliness, inquisitive interactions among directors, and thoughtful engagement by CEOs. The difference today is a mindset, an emerging collective desire to do something meaningful. It appears that boards of directors, as an institution, are coming of age.

Much of the public outcry—and resulting regulation—of recent years is based on the failure of boards to root out fraud, some of which destroyed whole companies. But boards are recognizing that they have failed in another, arguably more widespread, way: by allowing (sometimes inadvertently contributing to) faltering performance. Entire industries collapsed in the wake of the dot-com bust; too many companies failed to adapt their businesses to the different external environment after the recession began and after the 9/11 tragedy. No one could have foreseen global terrorism, but what about anticipating the fallout from the go-go years of the New Economy, or not recognizing the importance of emerging new channels? Couldn’t boards have prompted their managements to pinpoint and consider these issues?

In some cases, boards have made costly mistakes. How about hiring a CEO from the outside who is a master of cost-cutting—when the company needed a leader who could grow the business? Or tying the CEO’s incentives to the wrong goals? Or approving a grand growth strategy with an unhealthy appetite for risk?

Most boards want to do the right thing, whether it’s complying with the new rules (and there are a lot of them) or contributing in substantive ways on matters of choosing the CEO, compensating top management, ensuring that the company has the right strategy, and providing continuity of leadership and proper oversight. Their commitment and level of engagement marks a new stage in their evolution.

The good news is that these boards are unlikely to commit the sins of omission that were common among the passive, CEO-dominated boards just a few years ago. The bad news is that they are now vulnerable to committing sins of commission. That’s because past board experience has not fully prepared directors and CEOs for the challenges they face today. Without clear guidelines to take them forward, well-meaning boards such as Jim Doyle’s can actually erode the vitality of the company and drain time and energy from the CEO. It’s a real danger, and companies truly suffer when this happens.

To achieve their full potential, boards must continue to evolve. They must make a conscious effort to go to the next level.

The Evolution of Boards

Boards began their evolution in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era of passivity. Back then, they were “Ceremonial” boards, because they existed only to perform their duties perfunctorily. Sarbanes-Oxley has driven many boards to a second evolutionary phase; directors have become active and “Liberated” themselves from CEOs who previously dominated the boardroom. But there is also a third phase awaiting boards, when active directors finally gel as a team and become “Progressive.”

The Ceremonial Board

A decade ago, when one non-executive director joined the board of a paragon of American industry, a long-serving colleague told him, in private, “New directors shouldn’t speak up during board meetings for the first year.” That attitude is untenable today and, in fact, that board is much different now. But such comments are indicative of the culture of passivity that permeated the Dark Ages of corporate governance.

Some readers may remember when such Ceremonial boards were commonplace. Management had all its ducks in a row by the time a board meeting began. There was a scripted morning presentation that was rehearsed to the second in a tight agenda. The CEO communicated very little with the board between meetings, other than with the one or two confidants the CEO trusted and worked with if the need arose.

These boards perfunctorily performed a compliance role. Many directors served for the prestige and rarely spoke among themselves without the CEO present. They made sure to fulfill their explicit obligations, including attending the required board meetings and rubber-stamping resolutions proposed by management. “An important trait of boards during this era,” observes Geoff Colvin, senior editor at large at Fortune magazine and co-host of the Fortune Boardroom Forum, “is that they were largely anonymous to the public. The general interest media rarely reported directors’ names. So back then, the prospect of shame and embarrassment when a company ran into trouble wasn’t much of a threat.” Such were the norms and expectations of directorship during this era.

Most readers will recall a few boards that fit this description at some point in time. Hopefully, it doesn’t sound like any boards on which they now serve, though these boards do still exist.

The Liberated Board

Most boards left their Ceremonial status behind after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. A new generation of CEOs now expects boards to contribute. And candidates for directorship now expect active participation as a condition of their acceptance. There is a general sense of excitement as directors embrace an active mindset.

The transition to liberation had really begun about a decade earlier. In 1994, the General Motors board, advised by Ira Millstein, first published its “Guidelines for Corporate Governance.” The document was widely praised as a model for corporate boards. BusinessWeek even called it a “corporate Magna Carta,” referring to the document signed in 1215 by King John that stipulated, among other things, that no one, including the King, is above the law.

The comparison was fitting; GM’s CEO and Chair, Robert Stempel, stepped down late in 1992 after losing the confidence of GM’s non-executive directors. When the non-executive directors named one of their own as Chair, it signaled a distinct change in the general attitude of boards as passive bodies. No one dreamed such a thing would happen at the world’s largest company. Many directors around the country took note. In particular, the boards of several prominent bellwether companies, including those at American Express, AT&T and IBM, followed GM’s lead.

Still, not that many boards entered the ranks of the Liberated in the 1990s. Though board watchers and activists such as Bob Monks, Nell Minow, Sarah Teslik, Richard Koppes (of Calpers), and others pressed for reform, many companies under fire were reluctant to make wholesale changes in their governance practices.

There was no urgency for change until the scandals broke at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, HealthSouth, Adelphia, and elsewhere. Then came the rapidly passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, with its broad provisions on Audit Committee work, internal controls, and fraud prevention, along with the ensuing reforms enacted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the stock exchanges, lawsuits filed against directors and corporate officers, and the public embarrassment of some very experienced directors. With so much shareholder and bondholder value evaporated in the scandals, the capital markets also began paying closer attention to corporate governance and to the possibility of pricing the perceived quality of transparency and governance into securities.

Directors saw their peers chastised and overwhelmingly heard investors’ calls to become active. Although some boards remain Ceremonial today, the pendulum swung decidedly toward Liberated boards. In many cases, incoming CEOs helped drive the change.

Liberation is good news. But while liberation can mean a highfunctioning team, it can also mean each director singing a different tune. If it’s not handled effectively, liberation can inadvertently make CEOs and management less effective, and can adversely affect the creation of shareholder value. It happens. Liberated directors often play to their own strengths individually, not as a collective body. They ask of their CEOs too many things, some of which are plainly minutiae or irrelevant. The limited time that these CEOs have to run their companies gets further diluted. This is the state in which so many Liberated boards sit today—though certainly not by intention.

The Progressive Board

The intent of directors who have liberated themselves is for their boards to become what I call “Progressive.” They comply meticulously with the letter of the law, and they also embrace its spirit. Further, they aim, as Andy Grove, founder, former CEO, and current Chair of Intel, is quoted by Fortune magazine as saying, “to ensure that the success of a company is longer lasting than any CEO’s reign, than any market opportunity, than any product cycle” (August 23, 2004, p. 78).

To achieve this broader mandate, these boards become uniformly effective as a team, and they make their value evident while maintaining an independent viewpoint. Directors on a Progressive board gel into a coherent and effective group. All directors contribute to a dialogue that has lively debates, sticks to key issues while dropping tangents, and leads to consensus and closure. They challenge each other directly, without breaking the harmony of the group and without going through the CEO. Directors find the give-and-take in board meetings energizing. They enjoy the intellectual exchange, and they learn from each other. They look forward to meetings.

The board and the CEO have a working relationship that is constructive and collaborative, but board members are not afraid to confront hard issues. The lead director, or whoever facilitates executive sessions, is a liaison between the board and management who keeps executive sessions focused and running smoothly, and is very effective at communicating the heart of the board’s viewpoint, not a collection of opinions from individual directors, to the CEO. Feedback is constructive and highly focused in a way that helps the CEO. CEOs respect the Progressive board’s role and contribution, and are collaborative in their approach to the board.

The Progressive board adds value on many levels without becoming a time sink for management. The diverse perspectives of directors on the external environment, including legislative affairs, economic changes, global business, and financial markets, are a boon to management’s strategy-setting and decision-making efforts. Directors contribute most where their interest, experience, and expertise are greatest, and they know their viewpoints are expected. Directors also add value through their judgments on and suggestions for the CEO’s direct reports.

Progressive boards take their own self-evaluation—of the collective body as well as of individual board members—very seriously. There is a sincere effort to implement the findings of the evaluation on both a board and individual director level.

In short, Progressive boards move the essence of their governance activities to comprise not only complying with changing rules and norms but also adding value to the long-term potential of the company. These boards are a competitive advantage in and of themselves.

Becoming a Progressive board is not beyond reach. Such boards exist at some of the largest companies in America, like General Electric, as well as at mid-caps like MeadWestvaco and smaller public companies, like PSS/World Medical. The completion of this transformation is very much up to the CEO and the board. The first step is to realize where you are today; the diagnostic at the end of this chapter can help a board realize where it stands and in what areas it could improve. Liberated boards like Jim Doyle’s don’t need dramatic overhauls. But they do need to recognize what is holding them back; the diagnostic can help. After that, it’s up to the directors and management to take conscious steps to change. The next three chapters are designed to help boards speed their transition.

Where Does Your Board Stand?

The following questions constitute a diagnostic to help boards figure out where they stand. Answering these questions is not an academic exercise. The goal is to identify how a board could improve and move to the next level. Indeed, the awareness of the need for continuous improvement is one characteristic of a Progressive board.

The numerical scores in the diagnostic don’t lead to a “rating” of a board’s effectiveness. Rather, the pattern of responses will reveal the areas that a given board might wish to address. Lower scores in any one category—group dynamics, information architecture, or focus on substantive issues—should be a flag that the board needs to focus on those issues.

Group Dynamics

1. Does the board consistently bring dialogue on critical topics to a clear closure, with consensus? Or is dialogue fragmented?

2. Do all directors freely speak their minds on key points?

3. Do directors respond to each other during board meetings, particularly when they don’t agree with each other? Or do directors engage in dialogue solely addressing the CEO?

4. Have board meetings focused on the most important issues, as defined jointly by the board, the committee Chairs, and management? Or have they wandered into minutiae or tangents?

5. Does the board feel that the company is getting a return on the time the board is spending on corporate affairs? Or does the board feel their time is not very productive?

6. Do directors individually feel they get something out of board meetings? Or is it a chore and a burden?

7. Is the dynamic between the board and the CEO adversarial or constructive?

8. Have directors acted on feedback that emerged from a real and constructive self-evaluation?

Information Architecture

9. Is sufficient time given for discussion in the boardroom? Or are presentations scripted to the second with no time left for dialogue?

10. Is information presented in a way that leads to useful insights that facilitate productive discussion?

11. Does the board go out on its own to learn about the company (visiting plants) and the industry?

12. Does the CEO feel comfortable discussing bad news and uncertainties with the board?

Focus on Substantive Issues

13. Has the board discussed succession in depth during recent meetings? Or is it waiting until succession nears?

14. Do all directors fully understand the philosophy underlying their CEO compensation plan?

15. How clear is each director on the strategy going forward?

16. How well has the board bought into the company’s strategy?

17. Has the board discussed with management the potential risks inherent in its strategy? Or has it left risk management to management?

18. Does the board explicitly monitor financial health and operating performance relative to the competition by focusing on causal factors?

19. How familiar is the board with the leadership gene pool and efforts to develop up-and-coming managers?

Chapter Two

What Makes a Board Progressive

An energized and active board is no guarantee of good governance. Indeed, when a Liberated board fails to fully evolve and gel into a cohesive body, it can be a serious problem for the business.

In one board meeting, for example, a director demanded that a version of the company’s strategy be produced with a ten-year time horizon. “What will we be when we grow up?” he asked, just before he expounded on the ten-year master plan for his own company. After an awkward silence, the CEO promised to come up with an analogous ten-year plan. The other directors knew the company was in a turnaround; the industry was changing so rapidly that mapping out actions beyond three or four years was pointless. Hearing the one director’s request with no dissenting opinions, the CEO and his team burned valuable time developing this academic exercise.

At another company’s board meeting, a director asked detailed questions about productivity and utilization at the plant level. This director, a manufacturing vice president at his own company, felt a need to show off his expertise in this area. But the minutiae evident in his questions was irrelevant to the board.

Even more extreme, though rare, is the situation at a third company, a market share leader for thirty years that lost its way. The CEO saved the company from a hostile takeover and had the company operating respectably. Furthermore, he was successful in activating his board of directors, convincing them to speak up in the boardroom and emerge from Ceremonial status.

Unfortunately, two articulate and outspoken directors hijacked boardroom dialogue. One, a tenured finance professor at one of the top business schools in the nation, hounded the CEO for achieving 8.5 percent return on assets—within the top industry quartile but below his target of 10 percent. The second, a driven executive who had been denied the CEO position at two other companies, continually nitpicked over similar minutiae. The CEO repeatedly told the board that these discussions were narrow, but no other directors rose to his defense.

Eventually, the CEO left the firm in frustration. A successor was promoted internally, and conditions got worse. Return on assets dropped to 5 percent and growth was stagnant for years. Later, the successor took on a huge amount of debt to make an acquisition—and the company went bankrupt as the business cycle changed. The first CEO, incidentally, is doing very well for his new firm.