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At the beginning of the new millennium, the social sciences discover an epochal “turn” making it necessary to revolutionize their theory-building: As a response to what they call the globalization of the social, they find the need to globalize their theorizing as well. It is odd to discover after two centuries of colonialism and imperialism, after two world wars and several economic world crises that there is a world beyond the national socials; it is even more strange that the social sciences globalize their theorizing by comparing theories about nationally confined socials and by creating all sorts of, preferably, “local theories”, just as if any national social was a secluded social biotope. Discussing how to globalize the social sciences, they argue that globalizing social science theorizing means finding a way of theorizing that must, above all, be liberated from “scientism” in order to allow a “provincialization” of thinking. Not surprisingly, the globalizing social sciences also rediscover mythological and moral thinking as a means for a “true scientific universalism”. Michael Kuhn’s new book presents many thought-provoking arguments on the oddities of the globalizing social sciences and on how these oddities are not accidents, but a consequence of the nature of how the social sciences theorize about the social.
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ibidemPress, Stuttgart
This book is an outcome of the project"Social Sciences in the Era of Globalisation", funded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundationin Lisbon.
It was only possible to write it thanks to all the controversial discourses with numerous colleaguesaround the world committedto discussthe issue of the above project.
Outlining a theory about the social sciences andcritiquing social science thinking as thinking that creates false theories must fail—according to social science thinking.Thanks to their concept of critique social science thinking is immune against a critique that critiques false thought.Since social sciences deny that theorizing about the social—and since T. Kuhn's book interpretation through the social sciences alsotheorizing innatural sciencesabout the nature—are able to createrighttheories, there cannot be any critique that a theory is a false theory. Social science theories may well be critiqued, but this critique is not a critique of any false theory, but a critique that argues against all the ex-ante definitions anysocial sciencetheorizing requires to revealallitsethical, ontological and methodological choicestheorizing must make, choicesofwhat a theory is about andhow a theoryintends tothinkaboutany object of thinking.It is not at all the case that social sciences are not inviting critique. However it is a critique that does not allow critiquing theories as false theories.It is theex-ante definitions and choices which opena widefield for critique about all those choices and definitions,however,a critique that a theory creates false thought is no optionin this kind of critique, since any theory can be only false in relation to the choices and definitionsit mustmakefor theorizing.Nevertheless, since even all these tautological cognitive operationsof acritique ofin thissensefalse thought in social sciences,like any scientific thought,require to be made plausible,becausethey are cognitive operations of scientific thinking, they need to befoundedwithreasons. Though some social sciences meanwhilesimplypresent data and consider this as having created afoundedtheory, creating scientific thought cannot just statewhat a scientistthinks without anyargumentsreasoning why he thinks what he thinks. And this is the weak point in thisveryimmune system of social sciencescritiqueagainst a critique of false thought, because even the immune systemof criticism, immune against a critique of false thought,mustargue why there is no false and right thought and why thethoughtthat there is no right thoughtmaking social science immune against the critique of false thought,is right thought.This is why it is worth trying to critique social sciences thought where they create false theories, though such things like false thought—according to the social sciences theories about social sciences theorizing—do not exist in social science theorizing.
'Globalization'is—according to the social sciences—not onlytheessential, crafting the contemporary social life, but also the reason urging the'internationalization'of the social sciences. This statement contains at least two falsethought and one odd confession,bought witha discreetmyth, a self-deception about the social sciences.
To start with theconfession:The fact thatcontemporarysocial sciencesarequite heavilyengaged indiscussingthe need to internationalize thinking about the social, isas odd astelling, since it confessesthat thinking about the social beyond individual nation state socialsat leastuntil nowwasnot at alla topicfor social sciences.
This confessioncontains the false thought,that thetoday's discovered"globalization"of the social means that there was no global social before social sciences found out that there is global social. Itisonlythe discovery forthe social sciences that there is a social world beyondwhattheir theoriesarenormallyabout, whichhaveobviouslyso far beenfocusingon any nationally confined objects of thinking, just as if there was no global social in theprevious—colonized—world's social.It needed the global spread of nation state socials to make social sciencesdetecta'globalization'of the social beyondthe individualnational social entities.A social world that is not a world ofnation statesocialsfor social sciences obviously is noglobalsocial. Only the postcolonial transformation of the world into a world of nation states makes thesocial sciencesrealizethat there is a worldsocialbeyond the secluded national socials.
And this, recognizing a global socialafter the world became a world of nation statesis adiscreetmythof the social sciencesabout the social sciences, sincethesocial sciencesdid very well know a social world beyond the nation state socials;theyeven created a particular discipline, anthropology,that was and is in charge of the"non-civilized"social,that is all socials which wereno nation state social.[1]It isthough tellingthat with the exception ofanthropology, reserved for the non-nation state socials, a world social did not existfor the social sciences until the world was made a world of nation state socials.
The notion'globalization'articulates this image of adetectedworld's social,social sciences identify with the agglomeration of individual nation state socials, justas if a world of nation state socials was thefinal completion of theworld'ssocial nature:'Globalization'is theworld-wide spatial spreadof something, which does neitherhave any subjectthat makes anything global,nor any object, any what that isglobalized, nor does the notionreveal any forces orreasons,which are responsible for this mysterious global spread of a subject—and objectless something, just as if the worldfinally became what it ever quasi naturally was.
From the fact that social sciences are advocatingthe need for internationalizing social science thinkingtoday,onemustin factconclude, that ittook200 years to make the social sciences in the imperial worldnotice that therewas andis a world beyond the nation state socialof the imperial nation states. As if the establishment of theimperial countrieswas not the result ofthecolonial subjugation of the world by the imperial nation states,exploiting thecolonizedworld andsetting the economic basis for the economic wealth and the global powerof the imperial world, as ifthe world of nation statesand their imperialism subordinatingthe world under their commandwas not theway the global social wasand ismade,the social sciences,more precisely the social sciences in the imperial nation states,apparentlyonly noticedthat there is asocialworld outside of their nationalsocialbiotopes,after theirnationalscience policies detected science as a means fortheglobal competition about economic growthand political power andthereforeforced the sciencesto pay more attentionto the world beyond the national socials.The fact that it wasindeednationalscience policiesthat"encourage"social sciencesto work internationally istelling. It obviously needed and needssuch political"incentives"to make social science detect an era of"globalization", just as if the world before consistedonlyof their secludednationalsocialbiotopes.[2]
For social sciences, theirdiscovery of a world's social,therefore, still is rather the detection of an exotic elsewhere.Despiteall the debates onthe need to internationalize social thought, the main social sciences theory productionisyet tobebothered by such debates and continuestheirroutine work creating knowledge not only confinedto nation state socials, butknowledgeconstructed through the perspectives of the peculiarities of individual nation states socials, namely those of the imperial world.Still, thinking beyond a nation state social,is a rather exceptional and adventurous scientific undertaking, despite all the debates aboutinternationalizingsocial sciences.
Not that muchinspiredby their ownintellectual curiosityaboutwhat is happening in the world,not to mention any theoretical needs to understand any social phenomena in an imperial world,social sciences,askedand pushedby the political elites,of course,not to paymoreattention to the world beyond their national social islands,but to take part in profiling the national knowledge resources asan appealingresource fortheglobal capital,callingthis the need of"globalization"forglobalizingsocial sciences,reveals thatnot onlythe existenceof aworldof nationally constructed socialswas a new phenomenonfor social sciences, namely in the imperial world.
Consequently, theinternational or globalknowledge respondingto their new discovery ofaworld'ssocialstillcontinues toconsistof nationally constructedknowledge: The mainwaythat comes to themindof social science thinkersto look at the world'ssocial,is to compare their knowledgesabout the confined national socials.It seems, social sciences,confronted with theirenforced detection of a world's social beyond their theoretical constructs of secluded national social biotopes,apparently do not know anythingelsebut theorizing aboutthe world's social other but asa multiplicity ofnational socials andcannotinterpret thinking about the global social otherbut accumulating nationally constructed social thought. Justas if they wouldsimplynot know howelsethey could theorize about a world'ssocial other thanassemblingnationally confined social thought.
However, there are afewsocial sciences, mainlyfrom the"developing"world,whichinsistthat there is a view ofthe world'ssocialbeyond the illusionary construct of national socialsandwhichvery well know that constructing a world of secluded national socials, is an imaginary imageof the social sciencesin the imperial world.
Such anodd imaginary construct, thinking about any social only as nationally confined biotopes, could certainly hardly happen to scientistsin those parts of the world, where the dependence of any aspect of the very national social reality from imperial countries would hardly allow such a"zombie"[3]science, presupposing this national social as a secluded national biotope unaffected by the world's social,andthat detects the world's socialonly once it became a world of nation state socials.
From theirpoint of view, creating such an illusionary knowledge view on the social is too odd whenthinking aboutnationalsocials, which are—thoughin a rather formal sense—alsonationally constructed,butare national socialswherethe political andeconomic substance of thesenation statesocials are entirelyunder the command ofand for the service oftheimperial nation stateand donot allow the illusion of individual nation states as the exclusive agent craftinga secludedsocial,as the social sciencesin the imperial worldwant to believe.
However, rather than being irritated abouttheexplanatory abilities of such illusionary social thought,itseemsthattheorizing inanysocial sciencesanywheresimply doesnot know what knowledge that is not constructed about nation state socials andnot seenthrough the parochial view of nationally confinedtheorizing,could be at all about.It seemsthatit is the nature ofsocial science thinkingthat thinking about the socialmust benothing butthinking about and through the constructs of nation state socials and that the only way for social thought in the social sciences to recognize the world beyond national socials is, therefore,the aggregation of nationally constructed social thought.
Hence, despite of the difficulties, to think the former colonial nation state socials assecluded national biotopes, applyingsocial science thinkingto the former coloniesthe social sciences in the newnation states also think about the world'ssocial through such national constructs.Indeed, observing the global debates about theglobalizingsocial sciences, theirmainarguments about"scientific power", the"in-equalities","scientific imperialism"and alike,are alsoalwaysdiscussed alongnationally constructed entities, may this bea"North"versusa"South", local versus global, Eurocentrism orOccidentalism,rather than having any hesitations about the preoccupations of evernationally constructed global social thought, alwaysassuming the national social could be understood asnationally constructed social.Practicing the newly detected mission to"globalize"social thought,under theregime of social sciencesiseverinterpreted asthe need formore"local"thought,morenationally constructed theories,to take part in the creation and debates about global social thoughtasan"equal"contribution to theassemblageof nationally constructed theories.
Thus, strikingly, the more social sciencesstrive forinternationalizingsocial thought, the more they devote social thought to the world'ssocial,the more they stress theneed for thinking aboutnationalsocials, not only as their unit of analysis,but as their way of thinking aboutthe world's social as an collection of theories aboutnational socials.To create global social thought,social sciencesnot onlythink about their nation statesocials, theyunderstand the creation of global social thoughtasto look at their national socialsthrough an exclusive national perspective that only works for thinking about the social within these nation statesocialislands and, thus, makingitevenimpossible,to shareand assembleall thoseparochially constructedknowledgesacross theseclandestinely constructed local/nationalknowledge bodies.
Rather than questioning the national knowledge constructs,globalizedsocial sciencethinkingthat confines thinking to individual nation state socials,in a world consisting not only of a multiplicitybut also of an essentialdiversity of nation statesocials, introduces and insists ona distinction between theepistemological impacts of themany'wheres'of knowledge.To join global social thought under the regime of the social sciences, social sciencesin thedecolonizedworldcreateall kindsof spatially distinguished knowledges, local, global, southern, northern,universal and alikeknowledges—and wonderabout a reciprocal ignoranceabout what is going on beyond theirindividualsecluded"wheres".
Not only is thecontemporarydetection of a global social and theillusionary way of theorizing in the social sciences about the world's social, a way of thinkingthat seemingly is not able to think about the world's social other than through constructing a world of secluded national islands, even when the social reality in the ever"developing"world obviously disobeys this way of thinking about the socialareenoughreasontourgethinkingabout social thought under the global regime of the social sciencesand to find out what the nature of social science thinking is
Yet, there is another observationregarding the theoretical substance of the knowledge social sciences createsince now more than 200 yearsof social science theorizingthatalsourgesto think about social thought under theglobalregime of the social sciences and this is towonderwhatthe influenceis thatthealways criticalknowledgesocialsciences create has on the socialworld?
What dothe social scienceslet us know about the world's social, a world'ssocial which is,since the social science create knowledge, a world ofwar and the coexistence of growing wealth and growing poverty[4]andit isthis for more than 200 years of social science thinking?Certainly, one cannot make the social sciences responsible for what is happening in the world: the globe, social sciences call"modernity", a place characterized by war, poverty and wealth. Is there any place on the globe that is not involved in any wars? Is there any place in the world, where the growth of wealth does not co-exist with to the growth of poverty? Certainly, war, wealth and poverty are the essentials of"modernity"and they have been this for more than 200 years.
And, not to forget, for more than 200 years the social sciences think about the social world with an army of professional thinkersand create ever critical theories. Has the knowledge they have created and create at least helped to make anything to the better or atleasttoreduce wars and the co-existence of wealth and poverty? Obviously, not, rather the opposite is the case: There are increasingly more wars and there is a growing gap between wealth and growing poverty and this, where ever, across the whole world.
Again, one cannot blame the social sciences for this, after all, knowledge is knowledge, but what is the impacton the social worldof all themainly criticalknowledge these armies of professional thinkers create about thesocialworld? Nothing much, one must conclude,if one assumes that social sciences aim at reducing wars andpoverty[5]. And since it is alsosure, thatsocial sciences do not propagate war and poverty, but rather critique them, one must raise the question, what the impact of social thought under the regime of the social science, what the impact of all thecriticalknowledge the armies of social scientists create about the world's social since 200 years, is after all?Still, it is the social science theories not only providing their societies with the knowledge they have about themselves, it is also this knowledge the society acquires through education and it is this education system from which they recruit all the governing positions.What is the rolesocial sciencesplay in the reproduction of the nation state societies and their market economy,whydoes200 years of researching the worldof nation states and market economies and all the critical theories about themobviously haveno impact on a world ruled by wars, wealth andpoverty—again, assuming that social sciencesnot only critically argue about, but reallyaimwith their knowledgeat reducing wars and poverty,as in our example from Skinner,not to mentionatabolishing both. Or is this anywayalreadya wrong assumption, considering how the world is developing—despite the critical social science knowledge?Oris itbecause ofallits critical knowledge or neither nor?
Distinguishing in the following reflections in this book about social thought under theglobalregime of the social sciencesbetween social thought and the social sciences,theorizingabout the social,implies, in fact, that the social sciences are only a particular historical form of social thought. Indeed, the reflectionsin this theory about the social sciences,about global social thought[6]under the regime of the social sciences,hold that the way social sciences think about the world's social not only results in particular theories about the world's social, but that the way they reflect on social phenomena is a very particular way oftheorizing, typical for how only social sciencestheorizeand typical for the role the knowledge they create plays in the social world. In fact, this implies that social sciences are only a particular interpretation oftheorizingabout the social, not at all congruent with the nature of scientific thinking, and that it is only the social sciences way oftheorizingthat is responsible for the phenomena only social science thinking creates andthat isresponsible for the knowledge the social science approach to social thought contributes to the world's social, a world ruled by wars and poverty.
Interpreting the historical form of any social human practices as coinciding with their nature might be understandable from the practical point of view of a practitioner, who is too much caught by the practical necessities of what he is doing, to reflect upon such ontological issues. However, if scientific thinking about the social is identified with the way of thinking in the social sciences, it indicates an irritating ignorance of the very social sciences about their particular format of thinking. It does this the more, if one not only remembers that thinking about the social had historical predecessors theorizing about the social, among which a number of essentials, characterizing the particular nature of social sciences, were unknown, such as the plurality of social sciences.[7]
In the first place and on the first glance one couldindeednotice that the historical predecessors of scientific thinking about the social, thinking divided in scientific disciplines did not exist and only occurred with the emergence of the social sciences.
One could, secondly, also easily notice that thinking about any social phenomenon was thinking about this phenomenon and that this thinking was not confined to any spatially constructed unit of analysis, mostly nation states[8], as this is the case in the way, social sciences think about any social phenomenon. None of the classical theoreticians such asKant,Hegel, Marx, Smith or Hobbes constructed theories about an issue spatially confined to a particular country, such as confining a critique of rationalism to a critiqueabouttheorizingabout rationalism in Germany, to mention only the example of Kant's work. And, needless to say, such theories contained reflections about modifications to the topic they reflected on, may they be historical, local or any conceptual diversities of the issue they discussed—just as Marx and Smith did it while working on theories about capitalism, distinguishing phenomena of capitalism in England, Germany and in India, to only mention the example of variations—not of theories about capitalism, but of capitalism.
Apart from such obvious historical differences between social thought in the classic philosophies and the social sciences, thinking about the social and, as this book does, discussing how the social scienceslast but not least currentlyreflect on the—global—social, face a number of paradoxes, which could at least prompt the question of why theorizing in the social science creates such odd phenomena, odd phenomena that should raise the attention of social thought andmotivate themto reflect on how social thought under the—global—regime of the social sciences works.
This book discusses,why all these odditiesof social sciencetheorizingencountering a world's socialand whythe dubious impact all the critical social science knowledge hasare not a200 years lasting accident, but the inevitable result of the particular way social sciencestheorizeabout the social,a necessity of theparticularnature of how social sciences think about the world.
It discusses this in five chapters:
A.Theworld's socialin social science thinking
B.Categorical essentials of disciplinary thinking
C.The social science approach to scientific thinking—advancements of teleological theorizing
D.The discourse about and the progress of social science knowledge
E.Going beyond the social sciences
Social sciencesareseriouslychallenged if they are requested to think beyond their national biotopes, especially in thosecountriesfrom where they originate.One hundredandfifty years of colonizing the world, exploiting the world to build the basis fortheireconomic and political global reignover the world, and another half century after the post-colonial US model of imperialism, transforming theformercolonial part of the world into players ontheglobalbattlefield, making thewhole worldintoa world ofnation states, all substantially constructed along the US nation state rationale,a world of nation statesdivided in—competing—imperial powers and rathermoreformal nation states,allboundunder the supervision of the US empiretoserveandtomake their global power dependent on thebenefitthey gainfrom the growth ofglobalcapitalthey serve, it took social sciencesthinkingin the imperial countriesanother50 years torealizethat there is a worldoutsideof their nation states,a worldtheyfeel they shouldnolongerignore.In particular,the social sciences in theimperialnation statescall for aninternationalizationof social sciences—andtointer—nationalize(sic)theorizingabout the world's social, performedby comparing nationally constructed social thought.
Strictly speaking, as said before,one should saythat it was not thesocial sciences thatdetected that there was a world beyond the uniqueness of their nationally constructed societies. It was the national science policiesin the imperial nation states,laterfollowed by the dependentworld thatforced the social sciences to shift theirthinking from their nationallyconfined unit of analysis towardsother nationally constructed societies, at least to those, science policies detectedand detectanypolitical or economicinterests in.In fact, the selection of the nation state socials attracting more attention by social sciences are those, in which the imperial world has anyeconomic or political interest, may this be becausethey are under the exclusive grip ofanothercompeting imperial power. The newly detected interest of the Europeans in Latin Americaquestioning the scientific monopolyof the US,or the interest of Japan inSouth East Asia, promoted byaccordingly directivefundingprograms,may serveas examples.
Andeven this is not the full truth. Really strictly speaking, it was not even the science policiesin the imperial worldthatdetected the world beyond their territoriesas a topic for science. It was theglobally actingcapital whichthroughout its historyfoundand findsthe confined territories of their nation states as confining their business and pulled down any local barriers makingthe world intoa means forthe growth of capital.And, since the global capital discoveredwith the emergence of the new technologiesscienceas a wholeas a crucial means for their competitiveness, science as a whole, including the social sciences, raised the interests of the economy and, as a consequence, the interests of the nation state,gettingscience under their political controlfor these newly defined objectives of science policies.Science policiesdetected the new interests of capital in science andserved thesenewneeds, awakened science, at least the nation state driven parts, from its ivory tower and transformed nationally directed sciences intoa global knowledge market, a globaleconomicresource,once global capitaldetected science as a major means for theirglobalbusiness. It issince thenthat the global capitaluses the world's knowledgeas an economic resource, reorganizedby policy reformsto servethe rationalesof the global political and economic players.
To do this, national science policiestransformed their sciences towards one of themajorpoliticallysupervisedeconomic resourcesof nation states,offered to the global capital andforced theirnationalsciences to competeon an international knowledge marketabout the attractiveness of the national science markets, sociologists emphatically like to call"national science communities".Not onlyhavethe institutional settings of sciencestherefore been adjustedto the needs of the world's business demands,forcingknowledgeto obey the rules ofaglobalcommodity; the whole set of categories, in which in particular social sciences think about the social have accommodated themselves to think in categories, which reflect the transformation of the whole former world of scienceand education,until theninsisting on their independence from politics and business, into an subsection of the national economic infrastructure.[9]
What all thenewly emergingdebatespromotingtheglobalization, theinternationalizationorthecosmopolitanisationof socialsciences do not want to know,isthe reasonwhy social sciences should shiftsocialthought towards a global social,allimplying the assumption that they are not global.Arguing that it is the currentglobalizationof the world's social, that requires theglobalizationof the social sciences,presents the false ideas of the social sciences, that theyso farwere not globaland became global due the new globalnature of the global reality, which is justas false.
They are false,firstly,because they arguethat the world's socialrealitywas not a global social in the colonial world period and secondly, thatthe social sciences so far have not beenglobal.And thesetwofalsestatementsaboutglobalizingsocial sciences are already telling about the nature of social sciences:Firstly, monopolizing social sciences in the imperial world and excluding thecolonizedworld, the world without nation states,from social sciencethinkingin the classicalsocial sciencedisciplineswasthe very way of global social science theorizing. And, secondly, becausethe colonized socials were no nation state social, theirsocial was, indeed,no topicforthosesocial sciences,which reflect about the national biotopes, the classical social science disciplines,andwhich werereserved for thinking about nation state socials.Therefore,within the very nomenclature of the social sciences, the colonized world, the world without nation states,wasa case for Anthropology and thus, in this very way,theywerea very topic of the social sciences.[10]
The fact, that the de-colonized countries, once they gained the status ofa nation state, concluded from the monopolythe imperial world held on classical social sciences disciplines, that it was an opposition tothe ways the social sciences reflected on the de-colonized social to implement social sciences in their countries, was and is one of the tragic errors of an opposition, that wants to be part of what it opposes. A view on theunbroken reign of the racisttheories fromthe imperial world about the new decolonizednation state socials,could signal thiswrong conclusion as this tragic error.
The fact thatthesocial sciences reflect in nationally constructed entitiesacross the globe about the national socials, reserving a particular disciplines for the non-nation state social in the colonies,is and was their very way of a very inter-national reflexivity.And, indeed,the current practiceswhich haveshiftedsocial sciencetheorizingtowards the rightly called—inter-nationalizationof social sciences—, not abolishingor at least questioningthe national outlook, but extending thesevery national views on the world's socialtowardsother nationally constructed socials,confirm thatthe least theywere andare interested in,isto think aboutthe world's social, if at all, other than through an assemblageof nationally constructed theories.Social science thoughtcontinuesthinkingin secluded nation state social units and if they are requested to think beyond these social biotopes, they compile and compare these biotope-like, nationally constructedtheories.
As if the world constructed from nation states was not a way to construct theworld, a world's social consisting of a multiplicity ofnation state socials and of therationalesof nation states, which all consider theterritories, the people and the natural resources in these territories as means to combatother nation states of the very same kindoverusing each other across the world for their economic growth and their political power over each other,allnation states, striving to subordinateothers of the same kind across the world under their political and economic command, social science thinking considers the individual national socials as secluded biotopes,exclude the"outside"that mainly crafts the"inside"across the world,just as if reflecting about any nation state social would allowonetounderstand this secluded social, not to mention, that the agglomeration of nationally constructed social thoughts was the same as theorizing about the global social.
Social science thinking not coincidentallyonce named"Staatswissenschaft", presupposes an image of the world of nation states, in which their humans inhabit secluded islands that are not affected by what is going on beyond them. Thinking about the"beyond"is no topic for social sciences; they are the subject of a sub-department of political science, reflecting—if at all—on foreign affair policies and of Anthropology, today more and more replaced by"intercultural studies", acknowledging after more than50 years of a de-colonized world other nation state socialsas socials generalizing racist reflections about"others", so far reserved for the non-nation state socials, now to the whole world's nation state socials.
Social sciencesseemingly derive from the fact that caring and thinking about other nation states is the business of a selected and limited number of humans, the politicaland economicelites,that humans'lifewithinthese biotopesisnotmainly made by inter-national relationsof nation states, that is their battles about political and economic power,anillusion created by the sovereignty of nation states over their people and territories,anillusion that can hardly occur in nation states where this sovereignty is only a formal sovereignty.Inhabitants of nation states in those parts of the world,in developing countries, that served and serve throughthe exploitation of the products of their work and with their natural resources for thegrowth ofwealthinthe imperial countries,do not only know that nation states are no secluded islands andcan easily experiencethat their life ismainly defined by those who exploittheir work and their resources. And they do not onlynotsharethe illusion that the sovereignty of nation states over their people makes people's life unaffected from other nation states. They also donotsee the need forglobalizingsocial thought, asthe social sciencesin theimperial countries, the beneficiaries of the world of nation statesdo since theydetected that there is a world of nation states beyond theirown nation statein whichthey detect their political and economic interest,they since then callan era of"globalization", just as if the whole world wasa worldonlymost recently ruled by the imperial nation states.
As if the history of nation states, more precisely the foundation of the imperial nation states, namely those in Europe, and their economic wealth, their genuine economic accumulationofcapital, was not the result of expropriating the former colonized world, a wealth they use until today to dictate the terms of business and power in a post-colonial world, social science thinking discoverswith the help of a hint from their political and economic elites, that there is a world beyond the biotopes of the imperialnation states, finding aworld of nation states that wascompleted by the formercolonizedpart of the world.
However, from the point of view ofsocial sciencesand their routine work, especially those in the imperial world,there was and, looking at how they detect the world beyond the imperial countries social, there is no need to pay muchattention to the world other thantheorizing about the individual nation state socials.Inter-national social science is still an exceptional adventure and the majority of the social science armies across the world'snation statesstillconfine theorizing to the secluded nation socials, mainly those in the imperial world.
Just like theinhabitants of the national social entities do not need to know any much about the world beyond their national socialto get on with their life as nation state citizens, with the exception of a few specialists dealing with the other biotopes, a few business people and politicians, the professional thinkers of these societies are not seriously interestedor engagedin thinking about the social beyond their national social islands—not to mention if and how the global interaction of nation states craft the social life within them.Next to the debate about the need tointernationalizesocial science theorizing themajority ofsocialsciences can carry on with the illusion on which their theorizing is constructed, that is that any individually national social is what social science theorize aboutconvinced to thus understand the nationally confined social.
Ignorance, exoticism and demonization are notbad attitudes of social scientists, namely"Western"social scientists, but apparently an epistemological presuppositionof social science thinking, whichconsiders the secluded nation state social as their topic of reflections and, if at all,the outside world as the complementary topic social sciences in other national biotopesthey need tocare about, toarrive at inter-national social sciences asthe assemblage of nationally constructed knowledge bodies.
As a result,after 200 years of social science theorizing about the world's socialand the more recent shift towards globalizing social sciences,social thought under the regime of social sciencesstill consists of thinking about secluded island of national socials, pre-supposing that the social within these national social islands could be understood by confining social thought to reflecting on nation state socials. Social sciences have more or less no clue about any social beyond the borders of their nation states, not to mentionany insightsabout how the global battles about political and economic power craft the entire social life within all those seemingly secluded social entities as a means for these very battles. Accusing them that they are ignorant about other state social is not only downplaying that social science thinking doesnot care about socials beyond any nation states, it misunderstands that thinking about national social is the natural unit of analysis in which social sciences think, thanks to their illusion about nation state socials as a secluded entity, in which their national social could be understood.
Despite of the fact thatthe very whole postworldwarIIworld sharesessentiallythe same society system, the capitalist economy andthe—US—concept ofnation statesall using theirindividual state social for their global business and policy affairs,globalsocial thought under the regime of social sciencethinkingdoes notwant tothink about the social asaworld's nationstatesocial, butis—stillcaught be the sovereignty of nation states—committed tothe idea ofthe reign of parochial thoughtcreated inand aboutsecluded islands of knowledge,all creating their island-liketheories.And, if they do deal withany other island-likesocial,mainly comparingnationally constructed theories, they are seriously challenged if social science thinking crosses the borders of any nation state social.
Global social thought in the social sciencesthat detects the world's socialand that crosses the borders of the national socialis the assemblage of the secluded knowledge about nation state socials.
If social science thinking crosses the borders of its national social biotopes—it continues to look at the world's social as an agglomeration of nation statesocialtheories and becomes"inter-national"bycomparing their nationally constructed thought, theories created from the very state science thinkingviewon the social within their state biotopes.
What elsewhere would be considered as violating the most fundamental rulesofsocial sciences theorizing andrejected also within the social sciences asnationally"biased"thought, thinking in national"perspectives"is ordinary practice in international social science activities.The national social is not only the unit of analysis but anexplanatory framework through which social science thinking theorizes about the national social.Presenting social thought under headlines like"…..from a Chinese perspective", are not rejected as obviously biased knowledge, but very welcome as enriching the assemblage of theories, not only constructed about nationally confined knowledge, but knowledge constructed through the pre-supposed thinking of a nationally biased view about any topics.
Assembling knowledge bypreferably carryingoutand comparingcountry studies, inter-national theorizing in the social sciences, consists of additive knowledge about multiple nation state socials that is lacking any commensurability. Since such knowledge assemblagecomparesnation state social without knowing any tertium comparationis the nation state socials share and against which they could be compared, the result of these studiesis to detect a never ending round-aboutof non-understooddivergences.How could they?Since social sciencesonly know how to think about the individual nation states social, they have noconcepts of what a nation state essentiallyis,and are thusunable to identify and distinguish what nation statesand national societiesacross the world share and what not.
As a result,thinking in nation state"perspectives"introduces any national, mostly historical peculiarities of nation states,as an imperativetheoretical meansneededto theorize about the nation state socials—and discloses the extentto which international social science theorizingdrownstheorizing in the monstrous cognitive circle, that provides to share the nationally peculiar constructs and categories, the national"perspectives"as a pre-conditional means to understand them.To give just one example of this dead end road thinking insuchinternationalcomparative country studies:
"These difficulties are not only due to the difference between English and French. They probably also reflect the French conception of knowledge, which puts an emphasis on explicit and scientific knowledge, and the French conception of learning, which traditionally puts the emphasis on formal education and training."[11]
Since socialscience have no clue about what the essentials ofanation state socialisand, hence,have no categories theorizing aboutanation statesocial, theycannot distinguish between any essential ofanation state socialas suchand their historic peculiarities. Hence, social science thinkingconsiders any social phenomenon in any individual nation state social as a unique phenomenon of any individual nation state social.
Thus, any general features of the nature of humans, essentials of the construct of nation states or historical peculiarities of a particular nation state are undistinguishable for social science thinking.Hence, social sciencethinkingnot only knows things like a"French conception of knowledge".Nation states undoubtedlycraft the living conditions and the life of humansand do thisto an extend that made Marx talk about his notion of a"Charaktermaske", critiquing that the most liberate inhabitants of the nation state societieswithout having a clue about thisonly execute what they are forced to doby law and consider this as only executing their most individual peculiar views and life agendasThus, do the social sciences, when they assemble knowledge about nation state socialsand when they comparethem, identifying the historical peculiarities of their nation state social with what their nation state social is: Unlike China, France is the French"manifestation"of the French nation state
Undoubtedly, humans have created different concepts of what they consider as knowledge. However, imagining a concept of knowledge, that defines anationallypeculiar mode to construct thinking, a national concept of what is human's nature, can only be imagined by thinkers for whom the nation state is the almighty power even able to implant a nation state view on humans, here on how humans think, as a second,quasinational human nature.
Once any national peculiarities are identified as the particular nature of a nationstatesocial, for social science theorizing lookingbeyond the borders of their national social requirestosharethese nationally unique concepts as a precondition to understand them in the comparative view on the world'snational socials. Not surprisingly these studies ever end up in the complaintsamong all the inter-nationally thinking social scientists, that the others are never understood by the others.
Theorizing in national perspectivesand assembling such nationally constructed knowledge,is the only way social science know to creating social thought namely in the rightly called inter-national science encounters, thathas indeed so muchinternalizedthe constructs of state constructed societies, that thenaturalizationof these state constructs only allow them torecognizethe national peculiarities, the historically particular interpretations of these constructs as the essentials of the individual nation states and,hence lead to a new version ofglobalizedignorance among social sciences about the other national socials.
Asin our example aboutan international comparative view onthe sphere of education,social sciencethinkingisnot able to seewhat this particular national systemsessentiallyshares with the education systems of the countries against which it is compared, but, falsely—locked in their thinking in comparative national"perspectives"—identifiestheparticularismof the nationalinterpretation of the stateeducation system, here the French education withthe nature of educationin France,what is only the peculiarvariation of thewayto interpret essentially the same education system,the French education shares with the education systems against which it is compared. Excluding thesystemic fundaments from reflecting about educationin thinking in national"perspectives", results in considering the peculiarities of the nation state constructs as their essentials and creates the, indeed,very national viewnot onlythis French scholar advocates as the key to understandeducation in this countryand across the world's national state socials.[12]The global indifferenceamong social sciences about the other nation state social is thus the inevitable consequence of theorizing about the world's social through thinkingin national"perspectives"about the national socials, the particularisms of nationally constructedcategories, presentinganationally peculiarconcept of humans astheessential of a nationally constructed human nature—theelementary"enlightened"form ofa theoreticalracism in social science thinking.
Constructing theories that present the social as secluded national entities, and consequently, as in our example,presentingthe national fabrication of humans as the nature of humans,is a construct of the social sciences in the imperial nation states and the claim to international social sciences,internationalizesthe social sciences approach to global social thought thatis thatthe world's social must be reflectedonas accumulatingsuchnationally constructed theories about secluded national socials,interpreted through the national peculiarities constituting the uniquenational"perspectives".
Presupposing the national socials in developing countries as such social entities secluded from the world is most obviously almost impossible, since it is too obvious that their national socialsare a product of the imperial nation states. Societies that only exist as a means to serve the economic and political power needs of the imperial countries could hardly create social thought about their national socials that presents the image of national socials and of the world consisting of such social biotopes, the social sciences in the imperial world present as thetheoreticalentities through which theorizingabout the social must and could only be understood.
However, also within these imperial nation states socials,thinking about the nationalsocial as secluded from the world'ssocialimplies tooff-think the impact the world'socials have on each other via their nation states and via their economies.
Social science theorizing in the imperial countriesdoes,in fact,precisely this, theorizing about the world'ssocialastheorizing aboutsecluded social biotopes,unaffected by eachother. Theorizinginglobalizingsocial sciencethinkingis in the first place tooff-think the world beyond their national biotopes.
A few examples may show that this presupposition, thinking national socials as socials secluded from other national socials, requires to practicethinking asthedetermined ignorance even about what social sciencesurelydo know about how the world beyond theindividualnational biotopes affects the national socials.
That thinking about the"happiness"of people—let aside what this dubious categoryever means—for social science theorizing must beas any other phenomenon of global theorizingconsideredas an issuerelated to nation states constitutes for social science thinkers the nation state as theircomparativeunit of analysis, tofind out in which country one canfind"differences in happiness":
"This item response theory methodology is first applied to assess the differences in happiness across selected European states."[13]
Admittedly, theorizing about the happiness of people is certainlyquiteanodd topic for social sciences and has the strong taste of EU-propaganda, comparing happiness across European nation states, nation states, which day by day boast with theiragendas making Europeansan attractive"human recourse"and thus Europe an attractiveglobal business location.
However, it is not the odd topic and the propagandamissionofsuchstudies, butwhat is important is that this way of thinkingisamost typicalexample for theglobalizedway ofsocial sciencethinking, may this be about the happiness of European humans. It is in fact very typical forglobalsocial science thinking thatthinking about happiness must be thinking aboutthe"happiness across selected European states"and, thus,must be a matter of comparing nationally constructed humans and the differences of their happiness a matter of nationally constructed data,"indicating"how they feel as nationals, as citizens of each country. Thinking about national socials, dividing people into different national socials and, hence,off-thinking any other national socialsof the same shared political bodyas separate social entitieswhile theorizing about a group of national socialthough allstrongly politically and economically bound to each otherin the same"European states", is a masterpiece of social science thinking. It isa masterpiece of ignorance,tooff-think theveryrelatednessof thesenation state socials, thinking them as nationals,thoughthey areall made the same European socials. Off-thinking the other national socialwhile comparing them, even when they aresubjects of the same political entityillustratesatypicalmethod ofglobal social sciencetheorizingoff-thinking the world while thinking about the world.
Especially within a group of countries, wherethesocial life of its citizens is so much a product of the all kind of carefully administrated interactions of the nation state socials ruled by a joint currency and a supra national governing body, only a view that does not know any other access to thinking about the social than the presupposition of the social sciences, that any social must be understand as a national social, can present the happiness of citizens as nationally constructed features of humans, off-thinking that the social reality of EU-citizens is more than in many other national socials,a product of the interaction of the nation state socialswithin theshared political body of theEuropean Union. Even in a case, where the social reality is so obviouslymadeby the interactions of nation statesand an inter-national, here the Europeaneconomy, social science theorizingmustthink about the social as carefully secluded national social biotopes, off-thinking that it is only the interrelations between the national subjects which craft their life, may it be their"happiness".
Presupposing that the world's social must be explained as theorizing about secludednation state socials and the determined ignorance it needs for social sciences to think about any social phenomenon as a nationallyconstructed phenomenon,might be illustrated by another example,aboutacertainlyless dubious topic,the famous study by Bourdieu aboutnothing less serious buta studyaboutthe academia.[14]
The fact that the title of the famous book"Homo Academicus"insinuates that Bourdieu—a social scientists, who certainly cannot be suspected asbeingan a priorynationalist thinker—presents under this title his thought about a particular human species one canfind across the world, the academic,obviouslydoes not irritate this prominent social science thinker,thatthis book presents under this most generaltitle a study about two faculties at one university inone country,France,not to say anything about who the homo academicus is, butto theorizeunder this very titleabout the question,why academicsin those two faculties,onestanding for conservative andthe other one forprogressive academics,joined or did not jointhe protest movements in France in the1970s.
As if there was nosuchacademic species beyond France, thinking about a university in France under a title that discusses arelevantspecies ofnation state humansanywhere in the world,a speciesone can find in any of thosenationalbiotopesacross the world,itdoes not violate social thought in social science thinking to think under this title about the members of a national university,since social sciences thinking is thinkingin national entities. It simply does not come to asocial science thinkers mind that looking atthe"homo academicus"beyond a singular national social,might not onlybeenlighteningtostudythistypicalnation state creatureand, by doing this,tojustify thevery generalclaim of this book title, the"Homo Academicus".If social science thinking creates social thought it is social thought that identifies any human or human activities with their nationally confined existence and itdoes not come toa social sciencemind to consider reflecting about the phenomena outside or even beyond theirindividualstate constructed socials islands, because they are obviously not able to see any nation state construct of humans other than as their nature—just as if the homo academicus was a mere variation of the very same human mankind.
Scrutinizingthe question, why different departments in the Sorbonne university have different political positions about what moved the student movements in France,somebody like Bourdieuknowsof coursevery well, that this protestof—firstly—many intellectuals was massively causedbytheir opposition againstthe US war in Vietnam, an object of concernthat,hethoughvery well knows,cannot be found inhis study abouttheSorbonnelife offaculties in Paris.This isabout world politicsand, thus,not a matter of sociological thinking.And Bourdieu, a social scientist, a sociologist,a leftistthinker,what is he doing to answer his question, what made academics join the protestabout a waror not, a war in which France was massively involved as the former colonial power? He digs intotons of data which allhave absolutely nothing to do with this warand, instead,he searches in all sorts ofdata that deal with the most ordinarynational categories,any sociological studies finds enlightening, when they investigate whatever sociologist find exciting to knowabout,seriously believing he could find the reasons for the different political positions in the different departments of sociologyand the law faculties in things, sociologist make responsible for whatever they research, may thisbeto find out why people demonstrate against a war anywhere in the world, why they drink Coca Cola or why they beat up their children: Social science thinkers,heretheorizing about academics, know where to find the answersfor anythingand dig into data aboutthings such as:their family status,theirsex,theirage, the newspapers they read, the carsthey drive, the districtsin whichthey live, the size of their apartment, the number of children, the age when they marry,etc.etc., in short, all the utterly nationally constructed featuresallserving as"indicators"for a sociological thinkershowing to a sociologist the extent to which citizens accommodate themselves to what sociologists have defined astheir ordinary national"roles", ever—strictly tautologically—carefully observingtheirone and onlyconcern if any citizens deviatesfrom their rolesthatbuild their community.For Bourdieuanswering his question about who joins the protest is as easy to be answered as any of these sociologically constructed tautologies is: People who conserve the roles, live in posh apartments in Bois de Boulogne,etc.etc., indicators they were attributed, are conservatives and—smartly concluded—do not join the protests; and, people, who do not marry when they should, drive a 2CV, live in cheap flats in Montmatre are those who deviate from their roles and—jointhe protest. The obvious nonsense of this way of provinganytheoriesabout what ever, is not the point here, the point isherehow this nonsense manages to pull the issue of a protest against awartowards what sociological thinkers do with any topic, that is that any sociological explanation, evenforthosephenomenawhichmostobviously are motivated by anything beyondthe insideofnation states, are torn towards refle