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"The Classic Collection of Henri Bergson" brings together some of the most influential philosophical works of Henri Bergson, the renowned French philosopher and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1927. This collection showcases Bergson's groundbreaking ideas and profound insights into the nature of time, consciousness, memory, evolution, laughter, and dreams. In "Time and Free Will," Bergson challenges traditional concepts of time and argues for the existence of subjective time, exploring the relationship between time, perception, and human freedom. "Matter and Memory" delves into the interplay between matter and consciousness, examining how memory shapes our understanding of reality. Bergson's "Creative Evolution" presents a groundbreaking theory of evolution that goes beyond the mechanistic view of life, emphasizing the vital force and the continuous emergence of novelty in the evolutionary process. "Laughter" explores the nature of humor, its role in human social interaction, and its connection to the human condition. Finally, "Dreams" offers a deep exploration of the realm of dreams, unveiling their significance in understanding the workings of the human mind and their potential for revealing hidden truths. Through his eloquent and thought-provoking writing, Bergson challenges established philosophical frameworks, offering fresh perspectives on fundamental concepts of existence and human experience. This collection is a valuable resource for scholars, students, and anyone interested in the philosophical inquiries that shaped the 20th century and beyond. Contents: TIME AND FREE WILL MATTER AND MEMORY CREATIVE EVOLUTION LAUGHTER DREAMS
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The Classic Collection of Henri Bergson. Nobel Prize 1927
Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution, Laughter, Dreams
Illustrated
"The Classic Collection of Henri Bergson" brings together some of the most influential philosophical works of Henri Bergson, the renowned French philosopher and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1927. This collection showcases Bergson's groundbreaking ideas and profound insights into the nature of time, consciousness, memory, evolution, laughter, and dreams.
In "Time and Free Will," Bergson challenges traditional concepts of time and argues for the existence of subjective time, exploring the relationship between time, perception, and human freedom. "Matter and Memory" delves into the interplay between matter and consciousness, examining how memory shapes our understanding of reality.
Bergson's "Creative Evolution" presents a groundbreaking theory of evolution that goes beyond the mechanistic view of life, emphasizing the vital force and the continuous emergence of novelty in the evolutionary process. "Laughter" explores the nature of humor, its role in human social interaction, and its connection to the human condition.
Finally, "Dreams" offers a deep exploration of the realm of dreams, unveiling their significance in understanding the workings of the human mind and their potential for revealing hidden truths.
Through his eloquent and thought-provoking writing, Bergson challenges established philosophical frameworks, offering fresh perspectives on fundamental concepts of existence and human experience. This collection is a valuable resource for scholars, students, and anyone interested in the philosophical inquiries that shaped the 20th century and beyond.
TIME AND FREE WILL
MATTER AND MEMORY
CREATIVE EVOLUTION
LAUGHTER
DREAMS
TIME AND FREE WILL
An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Καὶ εἴ τις δὲ τὴν φύσίν ἔροιτο τίνος ἔνεκα ποίεῐ
εἰ τοῡ ἐρωτῶντος ἐθέλοι ἐπαΐειν καὶ λέγειν, εἴποι
ἄν "ἐχρῆν μὲν μὴ ἐρωτἂν, ἀλλὰ συνιέναι καὶ αὐτὸν
σιωπῇ, ὤσπερ ἐγὼ σιωπώ καὶ οὐκ εἴθισμαι λέγειν."
PLOTINUS
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
Henri Louis Bergson was born in Paris, October 18, 1859. He entered the École normale in 1878, and was admitted agrégé de philosophie in 1881 and docteur ès lettres in 1889. After holding professorships in various provincial and Parisian lycées, he became maître de conférences at the École normale supérieure in 1897, and since 1900 has been professor at the Collège de France. In 1901 he became a member of the Institute on his election to the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.
A full list of Professor Bergson's works is given in the appended bibliography. In making the following translation of his Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience I have had the great advantage of his co-operation at every stage, and the aid which he has given has been most generous and untiring. The book itself was worked out and written during the years 1883 to 1887 and was originally published in 1889. The foot-notes in the French edition contain a certain number of references to French translations of English works. In the present translation I am responsible for citing these references from the original English. This will account for the fact that editions are sometimes referred to which have appeared subsequently to 1889. I have also added fairly extensive marginal summaries and a full index.
In France the Essai is already in its seventh edition. Indeed, one of the most striking facts about Professor Bergson's works is the extent to which they have appealed not only to the professional philosophers, but also to the ordinary cultivated public. The method which he pursues is not the conceptual and abstract method which has been the dominant tradition in philosophy. For him reality is not to be reached by any elaborate construction of thought: it is given in immediate experience as a flux, a continuous process of becoming, to be grasped by intuition, by sympathetic insight. Concepts break up the continuous flow of reality into parts external to one another, they further the interests of language and social life and are useful primarily for practical purposes. But they give us nothing of the life and movement of reality; rather, by substituting for this an artificial reconstruction, a patchwork of dead fragments, they lead to the difficulties which have always beset the intellectualist philosophy, and which on its premises are insoluble. Instead of attempting a solution in the intellectualist sense, Professor Bergson calls upon his readers to put these broken fragments of reality behind them, to immerse themselves in the living stream of things and to find their difficulties swept away in its resistless flow.
In the present volume Professor Bergson first deals with the intensity of conscious states. He shows that quantitative differences are applicable only to magnitudes, that is, in the last resort, to space, and that intensity in itself is purely qualitative. Passing then from the consideration of separate conscious states to their multiplicity, he finds that there are two forms of multiplicity: quantitative or discrete multiplicity involves the intuition of space, but the multiplicity of conscious states is wholly qualitative. This unfolding multiplicity constitutes duration, which is a succession without distinction, an interpenetration of elements so heterogeneous that former states can never recur. The idea of a homogeneous and measurable time is shown to be an artificial concept, formed by the intrusion of the idea of space into the realm of pure duration. Indeed, the whole of Professor Bergson's philosophy centres round his conception of real concrete duration and the specific feeling of duration which our consciousness has when it does away with convention and habit and gets back to its natural attitude. At the root of most errors in philosophy he finds a confusion between this concrete duration and the abstract time which mathematics, physics, and even language and common sense, substitute for it. Applying these results to the problem of free will, he shows that the difficulties arise from taking up one's stand after the act has been performed, and applying the conceptual method to it. From the point of view of the living, developing self these difficulties are shown to be illusory, and freedom, though not definable in abstract or conceptual terms, is declared to be one of the clearest facts established by observation.
It is no doubt misleading to attempt to sum up a system of philosophy in a sentence, but perhaps some part of the spirit of Professor Bergson's philosophy may be gathered from the motto which, with his permission, I have prefixed to this translation:—"If a man were to inquire of Nature the reason of her creative activity, and if she were willing to give ear and answer, she would say—'Ask me not, but understand in silence, even as I am silent and am not wont to speak.'"
F. L. POGSON.
OXFORD,
June,1910.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. WORKS BY BERGSON.
(a) Books.
Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit, (Thesis), Paris, 1889. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris, 1889, 1910.7
Matière et Mémoire, Essai sur la relation du corps avec l'esprit, Paris, 1896, 1910.6
Le Rire, Essai sur la signification du comique, Paris, 1900, 1910.6 (First published in the Revue de Paris, 1900, Vol. I., pp. 512-545 and 759-791.)
L'Évolution créatrice, Paris, 1907, 1910.6
(b) Articles.
La Spécialité. (Address at the distribution of prizes at the lycée of Angers, Aug. 1882.)
De la simulation inconsciente dans l'état d'hypnotisme. Revue philosophique, Vol. 22, 1886, pp. 525-531. Le bon sens et les études classiques. (Address at the distribution of prizes at the "Concours général des lycées et collèges," 1895.)
Mémoire et reconnaissance. (Revue philos. Mar., Apr. 1896, pp. 225-248 and 380-399. Republished in Matière et Mémoire.)
Perception et matière. (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. May 1896, pp. 257-277. Republished in Matière et Mémoire.)
Note sur les origines psychologiques de notre croyance à la loi de causalité. (Lecture at the Philosophical Congress in Paris, 1900, published in the Bibliothèque du Congrès International de Philosophie; cf. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Sept. 1900, pp. 655 ff.)
Le Rêve. (Lecture at the Institut psychologique international: published in the Bulletin de l'Institut psych. intern. May 1901; cf. Revue scientifique, 4e S., Vol. 15, June 8, 1901, pp. 705-713, and Revue de Philosophie, June 1901, pp. 486-488.)
Le Parallélisme psycho-physique et la métaphysique positive. Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie, June 1901.
L'Effort intellectuel. Revue philosophique, Jan. 1902. Introduction à la métaphysique. Revue de Mét. et de Mor. Jan. 1903.
Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique. (Lecture at the Philosophical Congress in Geneva, 1904, published in the Revue de Mét. et de Mor. Nov. 1904, pp. 895-908; see also pp. 1027-1036.)
L'Idée de néant, Rev. philos. Nov. 1906, pp. 449-466. (Part of Chap. 4 of L'Évolution créatrice.)
Notice sur la vie et les œuvres de M. Félix Ravaisson-Mollien. (Lecture before the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques: published in the Proceedings of the Academy, Vol. 25, pp. 1 ff. Paris, 1907.)
Le Souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance. Rev. philos. Dec. 1908, pp. 561-593.
(c) Miscellaneous.
Lucrèce: Extraits ... avec une étude sur la poésie, la philosophie, la physique, le texte et la langue de Lucrèce. Paris, 1884.
Principes de métaphysique et de psychologie d'après M. Paul Janet. Revue philos., Vol. 44, Nov. 1897, pp. 525-551.
Collaboration au Vocabulaire philosophique, Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Phil. July 1902, Aug. 1907, Aug. 1908, Aug. 1909.
Remarques sur la place et le caractère de la Philosophie dans l'Enseignement secondaire, Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Phil. Feb. 1903, pp. 44 ff.
Remarques sur la notion de la liberté morale, Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Phil. Apr. 1903, pp. 101-103.
Remarques à propos de la philosophie sociale de Cournot, Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Phil. Aug. 1903, p. 229.
Préface de la Psychologie rationnelle de M. Lubac, Paris, Alcan, 1904.
Sur sa relation à W. James, Revue philosophique, Vol. 60, 1905, p. 229 f.
Sur sa théorie de la perception, Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Philos. Mar. 1905, pp. 94 ff.
Rapport sur le concours pour le prix Bordin, 1905, ayant pour sujet Maine de Biran. (Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, Vol. 25, pp. 809 ff., Paris, 1907.)
Rapport sur le concours pour le prix Le Dissez de Penanrun, 1907. (Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, Vol. 26, pp. 771 ff. Paris, 1909.)
Sur l'Êvolution créatrice, Revue du Mois, Sept. 1907, p. 351.
A propos de l'évolution de l'intelligence géométrique, Revue de Mét. et de Mor. Jan. 1908, pp. 28-33.
Sur l'influence de sa philosophie sur les élèves des lycées, Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Philos., Jan. 1908, p. 21; cf. L'Année psychologique, 1908, pp. 229-231.
Réponse à une enquête sur la question religieuse (La Question religieuse par Frédéric Charpin, Paris, 1908).
Remarques sur l'organisation des Congrès de Philosophie. Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Phil. Jan. 1909, p. 11 f.
Préface à un volume de la collection Les grands philosophes, (G. Tarde, par ses fils). Paris. Michaud, 1909.
Remarques à propos d'une thèse soutenue par M. Dwelshauvers "L'inconscient dans la vie mentale." Bulletin de la Soc. fr. de Phil., Feb. 1910.
A propos d'un article de Mr. W. B. Pitkin intitule "James and Bergson." Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. VII, No. 14, July 7, 1910, pp. 385-388.
II. SELECT LIST OF BOOKS AND ARTICLES DEALING IN WHOLE OR IN PART WITH BERGSON AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.
(Arranged alphabetically under each language.)
S. Alexander, Matière et Mémoire, (Mind, Oct. 1897, pp. 572-3).
B. H. Bode, L'Évolution créatrice, (Philosophical Review, 1908, pp. 84-89).
W. Boyd, L'Évolution créatrice, (Review of Theology and Philosophy, Oct. 1907, pp. 249-251).
H. Wildon Carr, Bergson's Theory of Knowledge, (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, London, 1909. New Series, Vol. IX, pp. 41-60).
H. Wildon Carr, Bergson's Theory of Instinct, (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, London, 1910, N.S., Vol. X).
H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy of Bergson, (Hibbert Journal, July 1910, pp. 873-883).
W. J. Ferrar, L'Évolution créatrice, (Commonwealth, Dec. 1909, pp. 364-367).
H. N. Gardiner, Mémoire et reconnaissance, (Psychological Review, 1896, pp. 578-580).
T. E. Hulme, The New Philosophy, (New Age, July 1, 29, 1909).
William James, A Pluralistic Universe, London, 1909, pp. 225-273.
William James, The Philosophy of Bergson, (Hibbert Journal, April 1909, pp. 562-577. Reprinted in A Pluralistic Universe; see above).
William James, Bradley or Bergson? (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. VII, No. 2, Jan. 20, 1910, pp. 29-33).
H. M. Kallen, James, Bergson and Mr. Pitkin, (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, June 23, 1910, pp. 353-357).
A. Lalande, Philosophy in France, 1907, (Philosophical Review, May, 1908).
J. A. Leighton, On Continuity and Discreteness, (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Apr. 28, 1910, pp. 231-238).
T. Loveday, L'Évolution créatrice, (Mind, July 1908, pp. 402-8).
A. O. Lovejoy, The Metaphysician of the Life-Force, (Nation, New York, Sept. 30, 1909).
A. Mitchell, L'Évolution créatrice, (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. V, No. 22, Oct. 22, 1908, pp. 603-612).
W. Scott Palmer, Presence and Omnipresence, (Contemporary Review, June 1908, pp. 734-742).
W. Scott Palmer, Thought and Instinct, (Nation, June 5, 1909).
W. Scott Palmer, Life and the Brain, (Contemporary Review, Oct., 1909, pp. 474-484).
W. B. Pitkin, James and Bergson; or, Who is against Intellect? (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Apr. 28, 1910, pp. 225-231).
G. R. T. Ross, A New Theory of Laughter, (Nation, Nov. 28, 1908).
G. R. T. Ross, The Philosophy of Vitalism, (Nation, Mar. 13, 1909)
J. Royce, The Reality of the Temporal, (Int. Journal of Ethics, Apr. 1910, pp. 257-271).
G. M. Sauvage, The New Philosophy in France, (Catholic University Bulletin, Washington, Apr. 1906, Mar. 1908).
Norman Smith, Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy, (Philosophical Review, Apr. 1908, pp. 138-148).
G. F. Stout, Free Will and Determinism, (Speaker, London, May 10, 1890).
J. H. Tufts, Humor, (Psychological Review, 1901, pp. 98-99).
G. Tyrrell, Creative Evolution, (Hibbert Journal, Jan. 1908, pp. 435-442).
T. Whittaker, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, (Mind, Apr. 1890, pp. 292-3).
G. Aimel, Individualisme et philosophie bergsonienne, (Revue de Philos., June 1908).
Balthasar, Le problème de Dieu d'après la philosophie nouvelle, (Revue néo-scolastique, Nov. 1907).
G. Batault, La philosophie de M. Bergson, (Mercure de France, Mar. 16, 1908, pp. 193-211).
G. Belot, Une théorie nouvelle de la liberté, (Revue philosophique, Vol. XXX, 1890, pp. 360-392).
G. Belot, Un nouveau spiritualisme, Matière et Mémoire, (Rev. philos. Vol. XLIV, 1897, pp. 183-199).
Jean Blum, La philosophie de M. Bergson et la poésie symboliste, (Mercure de France, Sept. 15, 1906).
C. Bougie, Syndicalistes et Bergsoniens, (Revue du Mois, Apr. 1909, pp. 403-416).
G. Cantecor, La philosophie nouvelle et la vie de l'esprit, (Rev. philos. Mar. 1903, pp. 252-277).
P. Cérésole, Le parallélisme psycho-physiologique et l'argument de M. Bergson, (Archives de Psychologie, Vol. V, Oct. 1905, pp. 112-120).
A. Chaumeix, La philosophie de M. Bergson, (Journal des Débats, May 24, 1908. Reprinted in Pragmatisme et Modernisme, Paris, Alcan, 1909).
A. Chaumeix, Les critiques du rationalisme, (Revue Hebdomadaire, Paris, Jan. I, 1910, pp. 1-33).
A. Chide, Le mobilisme moderne, Paris, Alcan, 1908. (See also Revue philos., Apr. 1908, Dec. 1909).
C. Coignet, Kant et Bergson, (Revue Chrétienne, July 1904).
C. Coignet, La vie d'après M. Bergson, (Bericht über den III Kongress für Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1909, pp. 358-364).
L. Constant, Cours de M. Bergson sur l'histoire de l'idée de temps, (Revue de Philos. Jan. 1904, pp. 105-111. Summary of lectures).
P. L. Couchoud, La métaphysique nouvelle, à propos de Matière et Mémoire de M. Bergson, (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Mar. 1902, pp. 225-243).
L. Couturat, La théorie du temps de Bergson, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. 1896, pp. 646-669).
Léon Cristiani, Le problème de Dieu et le pragmatisme, Paris, Bloud et Cie., 1908.
F. Le Dantec, L'Évolution créatrice, (Revue du Mois, Aug. 1907. Reprinted in Science et Conscience, Paris, Flammarion, 1908).
L. Dauriac, Le Rire, (Revue philos. Dec. 1900, pp. 665-670).
V. Delbos, Matière et Mémoire, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. May 1897, pp. 353-389).
G. L. Duprat, La spatialité des faits psychiques, (Rev. philos., May 1907, pp. 492-501).
G. Dwelshauvers, Raison et Intuition, Étude sur la philosophie de M. Bergson, (La Belgique artistique et littéraire, Nov. Dec. 1905, Apr. 1906).
G. Dwelshauvers, M. Bergson et la méthode intuitive, (Revue du Mois, Sept. 1907, pp. 336-350).
G. Dwelshauvers, De l'intuition dans l'acte de l'esprit, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. Jan. 1908, pp. 55-65).
A. Farges, Le problème de la contingence d'après M. Bergson, (Revue pratique d'apologétique, Apr. 15, 1909).
A. Farges, L'erreur fondamentale de la philosophie nouvelle, (Revue thomiste, May-June, 1909).
A. Farges, Théorie fondamentale de l'acte, avec la critique de la philosophie nouvelle de M. Bergson, Paris, Berche et Tralin, 1909.
Alfred Fouillée, Le mouvement idéaliste et la réaction contre la science positive, Paris, Alcan, 1896, pp. 198-206.
Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques, Paris, Beauchesne, 1909.
Jules de Gaultier, Le réalisme du continu, (Revue philos., Jan. 1910, pp. 39-64).
René Gillouin, Henri Bergson, Paris, 1910. (A volume in the series Les grands philosophes).
A. Hollard, L'Évolution créatrice, (Foi et Vie, Sept. 16, 1907, pp. 545-550).
B. Jacob, La philosophie d'hier et celle d'aujourd'hui, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. Mar. 1898, pp. 170-201).
G. Lechalas, Le nombre et le temps dans leurs rapports avec l'espace, (Ann. de Phil, chrét. N.S. Vol. 22, 1890, pp. 516-540).
G. Lechalas, Matière et Mémoire, (Ann. de Phil. chrét. N.S. Vol. 36, 1897, pp. 149-164 and 314-334)
A. Joussain, Romantisme et Religion, Paris, Alcan, 1910.
Legendre, M. Bergson et son Évolution créatrice, (Bulletin de la Semaine, May 6, 1908).
Lenoble, L'Évolution créatrice, (Revue du Clergé français, Jan., 1908).
E. Le Roy, Science et Philosophie, (A Series of articles in the Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. 1899 and 1900).
L. Lévy-Bruhl, L'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, (Rev. philos., Vol. 29, 1890, pp. 519-538).
G. H. Luquet, Idées générales de psychologie, Paris, 1906.
J. Lux, Nos philosophes, M. Henri Bergson, (Revue Bleue, Dec. 1, 1906).
X. Moisant, La notion de multiplicité dans la philosophie de M. Bergson, (Revue de Philos., June, 1902).
X. Moisant, Dieu dans la philosophie de M. Bergson, (Revue de Philos., May, 1905).
G. Mondain, Remarques sur la théorie matérialiste, (Foi et Vie, June 15, 1908, pp. 369-373).
D. Parodi, Le Rire, par H. Bergson, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. Mar. 1901, pp. 224-236).
T. M. Pègues, L'Évolution créatrice (Revue thomiste, May-June 1908, pp. 137-163).
C. Piat, De l'insuffisance des philosophies de l'intuition, Paris, 1908.
Maurice Pradines, Principes de toute philosophie de l'action, Paris, 1910.
G. Rageot, L'Évolution créatrice, (Rev. philos., July 1907). Reprinted and enlarged in Les savants et la philosophie, Paris, Alcan, 1907.
F. Rauh, La conscience du devenir, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. Nov. 1897, pp. 659-681, and Jan. 1898, pp. 38-60).
F. Rauh, Sur la position du problème du libre arbitre, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. Nov. 1904, pp. 977-1006).
P. P. Raymond, La philosophie de l'intuition et la philosophie du concept, (Études franciscaines, June 1909).
E. Seillière, L'Allemagne et la philosophie bergsonienne, (L'Opinion, July 3, 1909).
G. Sorel, L'Évolution créatrice, (Le Mouvement socialiste, Oct. Dec. 1907, Jan. Mar. Apr. 1908).
T. Steeg, Henri Bergson: Notice biographique avec portrait, (Revue universelle, Jan. 1902, pp. 15-16).
J. de Tonquébec, La notion de la vérité dans la philosophie nouvelle, Paris, 1908.
J. de Tonquébec, Comment interpréter l'ordre du monde à propos du dernier ouvrage de M. Bergson, Paris, Beauchesne, 1908.
H. Trouche, L'Évolution créatrice, (Revue de Philos. Nov. 1908).
H. Villassère, L'Évolution créatrice, (Bulletin critique, Sept. 1908, pp. 392-411.)
Tancrède de Visan, La philosophie de M. Bergson et le lyrisme contemporain, (Vers et Prose, Vol. XXI, 1910, pp. 125-140).
L. Weber, L'Évolution créatrice, (Rev. de Mét. et de Mor. Sept. 1907, pp. 620-670).
V. Wilbois, L'esprit positif, (A series of articles in the Rev. de Mét. et de Mor.1900 and 1901).
I. Benrubi, Henri Bergson, (Die Zukunft, June 4, 1910).
K. Bornhausen, Die Philosophie Henri Bergsons und ihre Bedeutung für den Religionsbegriff, (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, Jahrg. XX, Heft I 1910, pp. 39-77.)
O. Braun, Materie und Gedächtnis, (Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, Vol. 15, 1909, Heft 4, pp. 13-15).
Hans Driesch, H. Bergson, der biologische Philosoph., (Zeitschrift für den Ausbau der Entwickelungslehre, Jahrg. II, Heft 1/2, Stuttgart, 1908).
V. Eschbach, Henri Bergson, (Kölnische Volkszeitung, Jan. 20, 1910).
Giessler, Le Rêve, (Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, Vol. 29, 1902, p. 231).
J. Goldstein, Henri Bergson und der Zeitlosigkeitsidealismus, (Frankfurter Zeitung, May 2, 1909).
J. Goldstein, Henri Bergson und die Sozialwissenschaft, (Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Bd. XXXI, Heft 1, July 1910, pp. 1-22).
A. Gurewitsch, Die französische Metaphysik der Gegenwart (Archiv für system. Philos. Bd. IX, Heft 4, Nov. 1903, pp. 462-490).
Heymans, Le Rire, (Zeitsch. f. Psychol, u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane, Vol. 25, 1901, pp. 155-6).
K. Joël, Neues Denken, (Neue Rundschau, Apr. 1910, pp. 549-558).
H. von Keyserling, Bergson, (Allgemeine Zeitung, München, Nov. 28, 1908).
R. Kroner, Henri Bergson, (Logos, Bd. I, Heft 1, Tübingen, 1910).
A. Lasson, H. Bergson, (Deutsche Literaturzeitung, May 28, 1910).
R. Müller-Freienfels, Materie und Gedächtnis, (Zeitsch. f. Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane, May 1910, Vol. 56, Heft 1/2, pp. 126-129).
Α. Pilzecker, Mémoire et reconnaissance, (Zeitsch. f. Psychol. u. Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane, Vol. 13, 1897, pp. 229-232).
Hans Prager, Henri Bergsons metaphysische Grundanschauung, (Archiv für system. Philos. 1910, Bd. XVI, Heft 3, pp. 310-320).
G. Seliber, Der Pragmatismus und seine Gegner, (Archiv für system. Philos. 1909, pp. 287-298).
A. Steenbergen, Henri Bergsons Intuitive Philosophie, Jena, 1909.
W. Windelband, Preface to Materie und Gedächtnis, Jena, 1908, pp. I-XV.
Th. Ziehen, Matière et Mémoire, (Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philos. Kritik, Dec. 1898, pp. 295-299).
Roberto Ardigò, Una pretesa pregiudiziale contro il positivismo, (Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze affini, Jan.-Feb., Mar.-Apr. 1908. Reprinted in Collected Works, Vol. 10).
A. Crespi, La metafisica di H. Bergson, (Coenobium, July-Aug. 1908).
L. Ferri, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, (Rivista Italiana di Filosofia, Mar.-Apr. 1890, pp. 248-9).
A. Levi, Sulle ultime forme dell' indeterminismo francese, Firenze, Civelli, 1903.
A. Levi, L'Indeterminismo nella filosofia francese contemporanea, Firenze, Seeber, 1905.
F. Masci, L'idealismo indeterminista, Napoli, 1899.
E. Morselli, Un nuovo idealismo, (H. Bergson), Udine, Tosolini, 1900.
I. Petrone, Sui limiti del determinismo scientifico, Modena, 1900; Roma, 1903.
G. Prezzolini, Del linguaggio come causa di errore, (H. Bergson), Firenze, Spinelli, 1904.
G. Prezzolini, La filosofia di H. Bergson, (in La Teoria Sindacalista, Napoli, Perrella, 1909, pp. 283-335).
F. de Sarlo, Le correnti filosofiche del secolo XIX, (Flegrea, III 6; Sept. 20, 1901, pp. 531-554).
G. Tarozzi, Della necessità nel fatto naturale ed umano, Torino, Loescher, 1896-97.
B. Varisco, La filosofia della contingenza, (Rivista filosofica, Vol. VIII, 1905, pp. 1-37).
B. Varisco, La Creazione, (Rivista filosofica, Mar.-Apr. 1908, pp. 149-180).
C. Antoniade, Filosofia lui Henri Bergson, (Studii filosofice, Bucarest, 1908, Vol. II, pp. 161-192 and 259-278).
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE
We necessarily express ourselves by means of words and we usually think in terms of space. That is to say, language requires us to establish between our ideas the same sharp and precise distinctions, the same discontinuity, as between material objects. This assimilation of thought to things is useful in practical life and necessary in most of the sciences. But it may be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties presented by certain philosophical problems do not arise from our placing side by side in space phenomena which do not occupy space, and whether, by merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round which we are fighting, we might not bring the fight to an end. When an illegitimate translation of the unextended into the extended, of quality into quantity, has introduced contradiction into the very heart of the question, contradiction must, of course, recur in the answer.
The problem which I have chosen is one which is common to metaphysics and psychology, the problem of free will. What I attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity, of succession with simultaneity, of quality with quantity: this confusion once dispelled, we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the objections raised against free will, of the definitions given of it, and, in a certain sense, of the problem of free will itself. To prove this is the object of the third part of the present volume: the first two chapters, which treat of the conceptions of intensity and duration, have been written as an introduction to the third.
H. BERGSON.
February, 1888.
CHAPTER I
THE INTENSITY OF PSYCHIC STATES
Can there be quantitative differences in conscious states?
It is usually admitted that states of consciousness, sensations, feelings, passions, efforts, are capable of growth and diminution; we are even told that a sensation can be said to be twice, thrice, four times as intense as another sensation of the same kind. This latter thesis, which is maintained by psychophysicists, we shall examine later; but even the opponents of psychophysics do not see any harm in speaking of one sensation as being more intense than another, of one effort as being greater than another, and in thus setting up differences of quantity between purely internal states. Common sense, moreover, has not the slightest hesitation in giving its verdict on this point; people say they are more or less warm, or more or less sad, and this distinction of more and less, even when it is carried over to the region of subjective facts and unextended objects, surprises nobody. But this involves a very obscure point and a much more important problem than is usually supposed.
When we assert that one number is greater than another number or one body greater than another body, we know very well what we mean.
Such differences applicable to magnitudes but not to intensities.
For in both cases we allude to unequal spaces, as shall be shown in detail a little further on, and we call that space the greater which contains the other. But how can a more intense sensation contain one of less intensity? Shall we say that the first implies the second, that we reach the sensation of higher intensity only on condition of having first passed through the less intense stages of the same sensation, and that in a certain sense we are concerned, here also, with the relation of container to contained? This conception of intensive magnitude seems, indeed, to be that of common sense, but we cannot advance it as a philosophical explanation without becoming involved in a vicious circle. For it is beyond doubt that, in the natural series of numbers, the later number exceeds the earlier, but the very possibility of arranging the numbers in ascending order arises from their having to each other relations of container and contained, so that we feel ourselves able to explain precisely in what sense one is greater than the other. The question, then, is how we succeed in forming a series of this kind with intensities, which cannot be superposed on each other, and by what sign we recognize that the members of this series increase, for example, instead of diminishing: but this always comes back to the inquiry, why an intensity can be assimilated to a magnitude.
Alleged distinction between two kinds of quantity: extensive and intensive magnitude.
It is only to evade the difficulty to distinguish, as is usually done, between two species of quantity, the first extensive and measurable, the second intensive and not admitting of measure, but of which it can nevertheless be said that it is greater or less than another intensity. For it is recognized thereby that there is something common to these two forms of magnitude, since they are both termed magnitudes and declared to be equally capable of increase and diminution. But, from the point of view of magnitude, what can there be in common between the extensive and the intensive, the extended and the unextended? If, in the first case, we call that which contains the other the greater quantity, why go on speaking of quantity and magnitude when there is no longer a container or a contained? If a quantity can increase and diminish, if we perceive in it, so to speak, the less inside the more, is not such a quantity on this very account divisible, and thereby extended? Is it not then a contradiction to speak of an inextensive quantity? But yet common sense agrees with the philosophers in setting up a pure intensity as a magnitude, just as if it were something extended. And not only do we use the same word, but whether we think of a greater intensity or a greater extensity, we experience in both cases an analogous impression; the terms "greater" and "less" call up in both cases the same idea. If we now ask ourselves in what does this idea consist, our consciousness still offers us the image of a container and a contained. We picture to ourselves, for example, a greater intensity of effort as a greater length of thread rolled up, or as a spring which, in unwinding, will occupy a greater space. In the idea of intensity, and even in the word which expresses it, we shall find the image of a present contraction and consequently a future expansion, the image of something virtually extended, and, if we may say so, of a compressed space. We are thus led to believe that we translate the intensive into the extensive, and that we compare two intensities, or at least express the comparison, by the confused intuition of a relation between two extensities. But it is just the nature of this operation which it is difficult to determine.
Attempt to distinguish intensities by objective causes. But we judge of intensity without knowing magnitude or nature of the cause.
The solution which occurs immediately to the mind, once it has entered upon this path, consists in defining the intensity of a sensation, or of any state whatever of the ego, by the number and magnitude of the objective, and therefore measurable, causes which have given rise to it. Doubtless, a more intense sensation of light is the one which has been obtained, or is obtainable, by means of a larger number of luminous sources, provided they be at the same distance and identical with one another. But, in the immense majority of cases, we decide about the intensity of the effect without even knowing the nature of the cause, much less its magnitude: indeed, it is the very intensity of the effect which often leads us to venture an hypothesis as to the number and nature of the causes, and thus to revise the judgment of our senses, which at first represented them as insignificant. And it is no use arguing that we are then comparing the actual state of the ego with some previous state in which the cause was perceived in its entirety at the same time as its effect was experienced. No doubt this is our procedure in a fairly large number of cases; but we cannot then explain the differences of intensity which we recognize between deep-seated psychic phenomena, the cause of which is within us and not outside. On the other hand, we are never so bold in judging the intensity of a psychic state as when the subjective aspect of the phenomenon is the only one to strike us, or when the external cause to which we refer it does not easily admit of measurement. Thus it seems evident that we experience a more intense pain at the pulling out of a tooth than of a hair; the artist knows without the possibility of doubt that the picture of a master affords him more intense pleasure than the signboard of a shop; and there is not the slightest need ever to have heard of forces of cohesion to assert that we expend less effort in bending a steel blade than a bar of iron. Thus the comparison of two intensities is usually made without the least appreciation of the number of causes, their mode of action or their extent.
Attempt to distinguish intensities by atomic movements. But it is the sensation which is given in consciousness, and not the movement.
There is still room, it is true, for an hypothesis of the same nature, but more subtle. We know that mechanical, and especially kinetic, theories aim at explaining the visible and sensible properties of bodies by well defined movements of their ultimate parts, and many of us foresee the time when the intensive differences of qualities, that is to say, of our sensations, will be reduced to extensive differences between the changes taking place behind them. May it not be maintained that, without knowing these theories, we have a vague surmise of them, that behind the more intense sound we guess the presence of ampler vibrations which are propagated in the disturbed medium, and that it is with a reference to this mathematical relation, precise in itself though confusedly perceived, that we assert the higher intensity of a particular sound? Without even going so far, could it not be laid down that every state of consciousness corresponds to a certain disturbance of the molecules and atoms of the cerebral substance, and that the intensity of a sensation measures the amplitude, the complication or the extent of these molecular movements? This last hypothesis is at least as probable as the other, but it no more solves the problem. For, quite possibly, the intensity of a sensation bears witness to a more or less considerable work accomplished in our organism; but it is the sensation which is given to us in consciousness, and not this mechanical work. Indeed, it is by the intensity of the sensation that we judge of the greater or less amount of work accomplished: intensity then remains, at least apparently, a property of sensation. And still the same question recurs: why do we say of a higher intensity that it is greater? Why do we think of a greater quantity or a greater space?
[Sidenote: Different kinds of intensities. (1) deep-seated psychic statese (2)muscular effort. Intensity is more easily definable in the former case.
Perhaps the difficulty of the problem lies chiefly in the fact that we call by the same name, and picture to ourselves in the same way, intensities which are very different in nature, e.g. the intensity of a feeling and that of a sensation or an effort.
The effort is accompanied by a muscular sensation, and the sensations themselves are connected with certain physical conditions which probably count for something in the estimate of their intensity: we have here to do with phenomena which take place on the surface of consciousness, and which are always connected, as we shall see further on, with the perception of a movement or of an external object. But certain states of the soul seem to us, rightly or wrongly, to be self-sufficient, such as deep joy or sorrow, a reflective passion or an aesthetic emotion. Pure intensity ought to be more easily definable in these simple cases, where no extensive element seems to be involved. We shall see, in fact, that it is reducible here to a certain quality or shade which spreads over a more or less considerable mass of psychic states, or, if the expression be preferred, to the larger or smaller number of simple states which make up the fundamental emotion.
Take, for example, the progress of a desire.
For example, an obscure desire gradually becomes a deep passion. Now, you will see that thee feeble intensity of this desire consisted at first in its appearing to be isolated and, as it were, foreign to the remainder of your inner life. But little by little it permeates a larger number of psychic elements, tingeing them, so to speak, with its own colour: and lo! your outlook on the whole of your surroundings seems now to have changed radically. How do you become aware of a deep passion, once it has taken hold of you, if not by perceiving that the same objects no longer impress you in the same manner? All your sensations and all your ideas seem to brighten up: it is like childhood back again. We experience something of the kind in certain dreams, in which we do not imagine anything out of the ordinary, and yet through which there resounds an indescribable note of originality. The fact is that, the further we penetrate into the depths of consciousness, the less right we have to treat psychic phenomena as things which are set side by side. When it is said that an object occupies a large space in the soul or even that it fills it entirely, we ought to understand by this simply that its image has altered the shade of a thousand perceptions or memories, and that in this sense it pervades them, although it does not itself come into view. But this wholly dynamic way of looking at things is repugnant to the reflective consciousness, because the latter delights in clean cut distinctions, which are easily expressed in words, and in things with well-defined outlines, like those which are perceived in space. It will assume then that, everything else remaining identical, such and such a desire has gone up a scale of magnitudes, as though it were permissible still to speak of magnitude where there is neither multiplicity nor space! But just as consciousness (as will be shown later on) concentrates on a given point of the organism the increasing number of muscular contractions which take place on the surface of the body, thus converting them into one single feeling of effort, of growing intensity, so it will hypostatize under the form of a growing desire the gradual alterations which take place in the confused heap of co-existing psychic states. But that is a change of quality rather than of magnitude.
What makes hope such an intense pleasure is the fact that the future, which we dispose of to our liking, appears to us at the same time under a multitude of forms, equally attractive and equally possible. Even if the most coveted of these becomes realized, it will be necessary to give up the others, and we shall have lost a great deal. The idea of the future, pregnant with an infinity of possibilities, is thus more fruitful than the future itself, and this is why we find more charm in hope than in possession, in dreams than in reality.
The emotions of joy and sorrow. Their successive stages correspond to qualitative changes in the whole of our psychic states.
Let us try to discover the nature of an increasing intensity of joy or sorrow in the exceptional cases where no physical symptom intervenes. Neither inner joy nor passion is an isolated inner state which at first occupies a corner of the soul and gradually spreads. At its lowest level it is very like a turning of our states of consciousness towards the future. Then, as if their weight were diminished by this attraction, our ideas and sensations succeed one another with greater rapidity; our movements no longer cost us the same effort. Finally, in cases of extreme joy, our perceptions and memories become tinged with an indefinable quality, as with a kind of heat or light, so novel that now and then, as we stare at our own self, we wonder how it can really exist. Thus there are several characteristic forms of purely inward joy, all of which are successive stages corresponding to qualitative alterations in the whole of our psychic states. But the number of states which are concerned with each of these alterations is more or less considerable, and, without explicitly counting them, we know very well whether, for example, our joy pervades all the impressions which we receive in the course of the day or whether any escape from its influence. We thus set up points of division in the interval which separates two successive forms of joy, and this gradual transition from one to the other makes them appear in their turn as different intensities of one and the same feeling, which is thus supposed to change in magnitude. It could be easily shown that the different degrees of sorrow also correspond to qualitative changes. Sorrow begins by being nothing more than a facing towards the past, an impoverishment of our sensations and ideas, as if each of them were now contained entirely in the little which it gives out, as if the future were in some way stopped up. And it ends with an impression of crushing failure, the effect of which is that we aspire to nothingness, while every new misfortune, by making us understand better the uselessness of the struggle, causes us a bitter pleasure.
The aesthetic feelings. Their increasing intensities are really different feelings.
The aesthetic feelings offer us a still more striking example of this progressive stepping in of new elements, which can be detected in the fundamental emotion and which seem to increase its magnitude, although in reality they do nothing more than alter its nature. Let us consider the simplest of them, the feeling of grace. At first it is only the perception of a certain ease, a certain facility in the outward movements. And as those movements are easy which prepare the way for others, we are led to find a superior ease in the movements which can be foreseen, in the present attitudes in which future attitudes are pointed out and, as it were, prefigured. If jerky movements are wanting in grace, the reason is that each of them is self-sufficient and does not announce those which are to follow. If curves are more graceful than broken lines, the reason is that, while a curved line changes its direction at every moment, every new direction is indicated in the preceding one. Thus the perception of ease in motion passes over into the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding the future in the present. A third element comes in when the graceful movements submit to a rhythm and are accompanied by music. For the rhythm and measure, by allowing us to foresee to a still greater extent the movements of the dancer, make us believe that we now control them. As we guess almost the exact attitude which the dancer is going to take, he seems to obey us when he really takes it: the regularity of the rhythm establishes a kind of communication between him and us, and the periodic returns of the measure are like so many invisible threads by means of which we set in motion this imaginary puppet. Indeed, if it stops for an instant, our hand in its impatience cannot refrain from making a movement, as though to push it, as though to replace it in the midst of this movement, the rhythm of which has taken complete possession of our thought and will. Thus a kind of physical sympathy enters into the feeling of grace. Now, in analysing the charm of this sympathy, you will find that it pleases you through its affinity with moral sympathy, the idea of which it subtly suggests. This last element, in which the others are merged after having in a measure ushered it in, explains the irresistible attractiveness of grace. We could hardly make out why it affords us such pleasure if it were nothing but a saving of effort, as Spencer maintains.[1] But the truth is that in anything which we call very graceful we imagine ourselves able to detect, besides the lightness which is a sign of mobility, some suggestion of a possible movement towards ourselves, of a virtual and even nascent sympathy. It is this mobile sympathy, always ready to offer itself, which is just the essence of higher grace. Thus the increasing intensities of aesthetic feeling are here resolved into as many different feelings, each one of which, already heralded by its predecessor, becomes perceptible in it and then completely eclipses it. It is this qualitative progress which we interpret as a change of magnitude, because we like simple thoughts and because our language is ill-suited to render the subtleties of psychological analysis.
The feeling of beauty: art puts to sleep our active and resistant powers and makes us responsive to suggestion.
To understand how the feeling of the beautiful itself admits of degrees, we should have to submit it to a minute analysis. Perhaps the difficulty which we experience in defining: it is largely owing to the fact that we look upon the beauties of nature as anterior to those of art: the processes of art are thus supposed to be nothing more than means by which the artist expresses the beautiful, and the essence of the beautiful remains unexplained. But we might ask ourselves whether nature is beautiful otherwise than through meeting by chance certain processes of our art, and whether, in a certain sense, art is not prior to nature. Without even going so far, it seems more in conformity with the rules of a sound method to study the beautiful first in the works in which it has been produced by a conscious effort, and then to pass on by imperceptible steps from art to nature, which may be looked upon as an artist in its own way. By placing ourselves at this point of view, we shall perceive that the object of art is to put to sleep the active or rather resistant powers of our personality, and thus to bring us into a state of perfect responsiveness, in which we realize the idea that is suggested to us and sympathize with the feeling that is expressed. In the processes of art we shall find, in a weakened form, a refined and in some measure spiritualized version of the processes commonly used to induce the state of hypnosis. Thus, in music, the rhythm and measure suspend the normal flow of our sensations and ideas by causing our attention to swing to and fro between fixed points, and they take hold of us with such force that even the faintest imitation of a groan will suffice to fill us with the utmost sadness. If musical sounds affect us more powerfully than the sounds of nature, the reason is that nature confines itself to expressing feelings, whereas music suggests them to us. Whence indeed comes the charm of poetry? The poet is he with whom feelings develop into images, and the images themselves into words which translate them while obeying the laws of rhythm. In seeing these images pass before our eyes we in our turn experience the feeling which was, so to speak, their emotional equivalent: but we should never realize these images so strongly without the regular movements of the rhythm by which our soul is lulled into self-forgetfulness, and, as in a dream, thinks and sees with the poet. The plastic arts obtain an effect of the same kind by the fixity which they suddenly impose upon life, and which a physical contagion carries over to the attention of the spectator. While the works of ancient sculpture express faint emotions which play upon them like a passing breath, the pale immobility of the stone causes the feeling expressed or the movement just begun to appear as if they were fixed for ever, absorbing our thought and our will in their own eternity. We find in architecture, in the very midst of this startling immobility, certain effects analogous to those of rhythm. The symmetry of form, the indefinite repetition of the same architectural motive, causes our faculty of perception to oscillate between the same and the same again, and gets rid of those customary incessant changes which in ordinary life bring us back without ceasing to the consciousness of our personality: even the faint suggestion of an idea will then be enough to make the idea fill the whole of our mind. Thus art aims at impressing feelings on us rather than expressing them; it suggests them to us, and willingly dispenses with the imitation of nature when it finds some more efficacious means. Nature, like art, proceeds by suggestion, but does not command the resources of rhythm. It supplies the deficiency by the long comradeship, based on influences received in common by nature and by ourselves, of which the effect is that the slightest indication by nature of a feeling arouses sympathy in our minds, just as a mere gesture on the part of the hypnotist is enough to force the intended suggestion upon a subject accustomed to his control. And this sympathy is shown in particular when nature displays to us beings of normal proportions, so that our attention is distributed equally over all the parts of the figure without being fixed on any one of them: our perceptive faculty then finds itself lulled and soothed by this harmony, and nothing hinders any longer the free play of sympathy, which is ever ready to come forward as soon as the obstacle in its path is removed.
Stages in the aesthetic emotion.
It follows from this analysis that the feeling of the beautiful is no specific feeling, but that every feeling experienced by us will assume an aesthetic character, provided that it has been suggested, and not caused. It will now be understood why the aesthetic emotion seems to us to admit of degrees of intensity, and also of degrees of elevation. Sometimes the feeling which is suggested scarcely makes a break in the compact texture of psychic phenomena of which our history consists; sometimes it draws our attention from them, but not so that they become lost to sight; sometimes, finally, it puts itself in their place, engrosses us and completely monopolizes our soul. There are thus distinct phases in the progress of an aesthetic feeling, as in the state of hypnosis; and these phases correspond less to variations of degree than to differences of state or of nature. But the merit of a work of art is not measured so much by the power with which the suggested feeling takes hold of us as by the richness of this feeling itself: in other words, besides degrees of intensity we instinctively distinguish degrees of depth or elevation. If this last concept be analysed, it will be seen that the feelings and thoughts which the artist suggests to us express and sum up a more or less considerable part of his history. If the art which gives only sensations is an inferior art, the reason is that analysis often fails to discover in a sensation anything beyond the sensation itself. But the greater number of emotions are instinct with a thousand sensations, feelings or ideas which pervade them: each one is then a state unique of its kind and indefinable, and it seems that we should have to re-live the life of the subject who experiences it if we wished to grasp it in its original complexity. Yet the artist aims at giving us a share in this emotion, so rich, so personal, so novel, and at enabling us to experience what he cannot make us understand. This he will bring about by choosing, among the outward signs of his emotions, those which our body is likely to imitate mechanically, though slightly, as soon as it perceives them, so as to transport us all at once into the indefinable psychological state which called them forth. Thus will be broken down the barrier interposed by time and space between his consciousness and ours: and the richer in ideas and the more pregnant with sensations and emotions is the feeling within whose limits the artist has brought us, the deeper and the higher shall we find the beauty thus expressed. The successive intensities of the aesthetic feeling thus correspond to changes of state occurring in us, and the degrees of depth to the larger or smaller number of elementary psychic phenomena which we dimly discern in the fundamental emotion.
The moral feelings. Pity. Its increasing intensity is a qualitative progress.
The moral feelings might be studied in the same way. Let us take pity as an example. It consists in the first place in putting oneself mentally in the place of others, in suffering their pain. But if it were nothing more, as some have maintained, it would inspire us with the idea of avoiding the wretched rather than helping them, for pain is naturally abhorrent to us. This feeling of horror may indeed be at the root of pity; but a new element soon comes in, the need of helping our fellow-men and of alleviating their suffering. Shall we say with La Rochefoucauld that this so-called sympathy is a calculation, "a shrewd insurance against evils to come"? Perhaps a dread of some future evil to ourselves does hold a place in our compassion for other people's evil. These however are but lower forms of pity. True pity consists not so much in fearing suffering as in desiring it. The desire is a faint one and we should hardly wish to see it realized; yet we form it in spite of ourselves, as if Nature were committing some great injustice and it were necessary to get rid of all suspicion of complicity with her. The essence of pity is thus a need for self-abasement, an aspiration downwards. This painful aspiration nevertheless has a charm about it, because it raises us in our own estimation and makes us feel superior to those sensuous goods from which our thought is temporarily detached. The increasing intensity of pity thus consists in a qualitative progress, in a transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility.
Conscious states connected with external causes or involving psychical symptoms.
We do not propose to carry this analysis any further. The psychic states whose intensity we have just defined are deep-seated states which do not seem to have any close relation to their external cause or to involve the perception of muscular contraction. But such states are rare. There is hardly any passion or desire, any joy or sorrow, which is not accompanied by physical symptoms; and, where these symptoms occur, they probably count for something in the estimate of intensities. As for the sensations properly so called, they are manifestly connected with their external cause, and though the intensity of the sensation cannot be defined by the magnitude of its cause, there undoubtedly exists some relation between these two terms. In some of its manifestations consciousness even appears to spread outwards, as if intensity were being developed into extensity, e.g. in the case of muscular effort. Let us face this last phenomenon at once: we shall thus be transported at a bound to the opposite extremity of the series of psychic phenomena.
Muscular effort seems at first sight to be quantitative.
If there is a phenomenon which seems to be presented immediately to consciousness under the form of quantity or at least of magnitude, it is undoubtedly muscular effort. We picture to our minds a psychic force imprisoned in the soul like the winds in the cave of Aeolus, and only waiting for an opportunity to burst forth: our will is supposed to watch over this force and from time to time to open a passage for it, regulating the outflow by the effect which it is desired to produce. If we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that this somewhat crude conception of effort plays a large part in our belief in intensive magnitudes. Muscular force, whose sphere of action is space and which manifests itself in phenomena admitting of measure, seems to us to have existed previous to its manifestations, but in smaller volume, and, so to speak, in a compressed state: hence we do not hesitate to reduce this volume more and more, and finally we believe that we can understand how a purely psychic state, which does not occupy space, can nevertheless possess magnitude. Science, too, tends to strengthen the illusion of common sense with regard to this point. Bain, for example, declares that "the sensibility accompanying muscular movement coincides with the outgoing stream of nervous energy:"[2] it is thus just the emission of nervous force which consciousness perceives. Wundt also speaks of a sensation, central in its origin, accompanying the voluntary innervation of the muscles, and quotes the example of the paralytic "who has a very distinct sensation of the force which he employs in the effort to raise his leg, although it remains motionless."[3] Most of the authorities adhere to this opinion, which would be the unanimous view of positive science were it not that several years ago Professor William James drew the attention of physiologists to certain phenomena which had been but little remarked, although they were very remarkable.
The feeling of effort. We are conscious not of an expenditure of force but of the resulting muscular movement.
When a paralytic strives to raise his useless limb, he certainly does not execute this movement, but, with or without his will, he executes another. Some movement is carried out somewhere: otherwise there is no sensation of effort.[4] Vulpian had already called attention to the fact that if a man affected with hemiplegia is told to clench his paralysed fist, he unconsciously carries out this action with the fist which is not affected. Ferrier described a still more curious phenomenon.[5] Stretch out your arm while slightly bending your forefinger, as if you were going to press the trigger of a pistol; without moving the finger, without contracting any muscle of the hand, without producing any apparent movement, you will yet be able to feel that you are expending energy. On a closer examination, however, you will perceive that this sensation of effort coincides with the fixation of the muscles of your chest, that you keep your glottis closed and actively contract your respiratory muscles. As soon as respiration resumes its normal course the consciousness of effort vanishes, unless you really move your finger. These facts already seemed to show that we are conscious, not of an expenditure of force, but of the movement of the muscles which results from it. The new feature in Professor James's investigation is that he has verified the hypothesis in the case of examples which seemed to contradict it absolutely. Thus when the external rectus muscle of the right eye is paralysed, the patient tries in vain to turn his eye towards the right; yet objects seem to him to recede towards the right, and since the act of volition has produced no effect, it follows, said Helmholtz,[6]
