Battles at Sea in World War I - Jutland E-Book

Jürgen Prommersberger

• Herausgeber: Jürgen Prommersberger
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Beschreibung

The Battle of Jutland was a naval battle fought by the British Royal Navy's Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, against the Imperial German Navy's High Seas Fleet under Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer during the First World War. The battle unfolded from 31 May to 1 June 1916 in the North Sea, near the coast of Denmark's Jutland Peninsula. It was the largest naval battle in that war and the only full-scale clash of battleships. Jutland was the third fleet action between steel battleships, following the smaller but more decisive battles of the Yellow Sea (1904) and Tsushima (1905) during the Russo-Japanese War. Jutland was the last major battle fought primarily by battleships in world history.

Germany's High Seas Fleet intended to lure out, trap, and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the German naval force was insufficient to openly engage the entire British fleet. This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to allow German naval vessels access to the Atlantic. Meanwhile, Great Britain's Royal Navy pursued a strategy of engaging and destroying the High Seas Fleet, thereby keeping German naval forces contained and away from Britain and her shipping lanes.

Leseprobe

Battles at Sea in World War I

The Battle of Jutland

Jürgen Prommersberger: The Battle of Jutland

Regenstauf , January 2017All rights reserved:Jürgen PrommersbergerHändelstr 1793128 Regenstauf

First Edition: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform

CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Background and Planning

Chapter 2 Order of Battle: the Hochseeflotte

Chapter 3 Order of Battle: the Royal Navy

Chapter 4 The Commanders

Chapter 4 Naval Tactics in 1916

Chapter 5 Warship Design

Chapter6 Battlecruiser Contact

Chapter7 The „Run to the South“

Chapter8 The „Run to the North“

Chapter9 Fleet Action

Chapter10 Crossing the T

Chapter 11 Night Action and German Whitdrawal

Chapter 12 Outcome

Chapter13British Self-Critique

Chapter 14 Controversy

Chapter 15List of ships sunk at Jutland

Chapter 16Weapons & Ships - Hochseeflotte

Chapter 17Weapons & Ships – Royal Navy

Introduction

The Battle of Jutland (German: Skagerrakschlacht, the Battle of Skagerrak) was a naval battle fought by the British Royal Navy's Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, against the Imperial German Navy's High Seas Fleet under Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer during the First World War. The battle was fought from 31 May to 1 June 1916 in the North Sea, near the coast of Denmark's Jutland Peninsula. It was the largest naval battle in that war and the only full-scale clash of battleships. Jutland was the third fleet action between steel battleships, following the smaller but more decisive battles of the Yellow Sea (1904) and Tsushima (1905) during the Russo-Japanese War. Jutland was the last major battle fought primarily by battleships in world history.

Germany's High Seas Fleet's intention was to lure out, trap and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the German naval force was insufficient to openly engage the entire British fleet. This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to allow German naval vessels access to the Atlantic. Meanwhile, Great Britain's Royal Navy pursued a strategy to engage and destroy the High Seas Fleet, thereby keeping the German force contained and away from Britain and her shipping lanes.

The German plan was to use Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper's fast scouting group of five modern battlecruisers to lure Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty's battlecruiser squadrons into the path of the main German fleet. Submarines were stationed in advance across the likely routes of the British ships. However, the British learned from signal intercepts that a major fleet operation was likely, so on 30 May Jellicoe sailed with the Grand Fleet to rendezvous with Beatty, passing over the locations of the German submarine picket lines while they were unprepared. The German plan had been delayed, causing further problems for their submarines which had reached the limit of their endurance at sea.

On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty encountered Hipper's battlecruiser force long before the Germans had expected. In a running battle, Hipper successfully drew the British vanguard into the path of the High Seas Fleet. By the time Beatty sighted the larger force and turned back towards the British main fleet, he had lost two battlecruisers from a force of six battlecruisers and four battleships, against the five ships commanded by Hipper. The battleships, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, were the last to turn and formed a rearguard as Beatty withdrew, now drawing the German fleet in pursuit towards the main British positions. Between 18:30, when the sun was lowering on the western horizon, back-lighting the German forces, and nightfall at about 20:30, the two fleets – totalling 250 ships between them – directly engaged twice.

Fourteen British and eleven German ships were sunk, with great loss of life. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manoeuvred to cut the Germans off from their base, hoping to continue the battle the next morning, but under the cover of darkness Scheer broke through the British light forces forming the rearguard of the Grand Fleet and returned to port.

Both sides claimed victory. The British lost more ships and twice as many sailors but succeeded in containing the German fleet. However, the British press criticised the Grand Fleet's failure to force a decisive outcome while Scheer's plan of destroying a substantial portion of the British fleet also failed. Finally, the British strategy to prevent Germany access to both Great Britain and the Atlantic did succeed which was the British long term goal. The Germans' "fleet in being" continued to pose a threat, requiring the British to keep their battleships concentrated in the North Sea, but the battle confirmed the German policy of avoiding all fleet-to-fleet contact. At the end of the year, after further unsuccessful attempts to reduce the Royal Navy's numerical advantage, the German Navy accepted that their surface ships had been successfully contained, subsequently turning its efforts and resources to unrestricted submarine warfare and the destruction of Allied and neutral shipping which by April 1917 triggered the United States of America's declaration of war on Germany.

Subsequent reviews commissioned by the Royal Navy generated strong disagreement between supporters of Jellicoe and Beatty concerning the two admirals' performance in the battle. Debate over their performance and the significance of the battle continues to this day.

Chapter 1: Background and planning

German planning

With 16 dreadnought-type battleships, compared with the Royal Navy's 28, the German High Seas Fleet stood little chance of winning a head-to-head clash. The Germans therefore adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy. They would stage raids into the North Sea and bombard the English coast, with the aim of luring out small British squadrons and pickets, which could then be destroyed by superior forces or submarines.

In January 1916, Admiral von Pohl, commander of the German fleet, fell ill. He was replaced by Scheer, who believed that the fleet had been used too defensively, had better ships and men than the British, and ought to take the war to them. According to Scheer, the German naval strategy should be:

to damage the English fleet by offensive raids against the naval forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight, as well as by mine-laying on the British coast and submarine attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had been realised as a result of these operations, and all our forces had been made ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be made with our fleet to seek battle under circumstances unfavourable to the enemy.

Reinhard Scheer, German fleet commander

On 25 April 1916, a decision was made by the German admiralty to halt indiscriminate attacks by submarine on merchant shipping. This followed protests from neutral countries, notably the United States, that their nationals had been the victims of attacks. Germany agreed that future attacks would only take place in accord with internationally agreed prize rules, which required an attacker to give a warning and allow the crews of vessels time to escape, and not to attack neutral vessels at all. Scheer believed that it would not be possible to continue attacks on these terms, which took away the advantage of secret approach by submarines and left them vulnerable to even relatively small guns on the target ships. Instead, he set about deploying the submarine fleet against military vessels.

It was hoped that, following a successful German submarine attack, fast British escorts, such as destroyers, would be tied down by anti-submarine operations. If the Germans could catch the British in the expected locations, good prospects were thought to exist of at least partially redressing the balance of forces between the fleets. "After the British sortied in response to the raiding attack force", the Royal Navy's centuries-old instincts for aggressive action could be exploited to draw its weakened units towards the main German fleet under Scheer. The hope was that Scheer would thus be able to ambush a section of the British fleet and destroy it.

Submarine deployments

A plan was devised to station submarines offshore from British naval bases, and then stage some action that would draw out the British ships to the waiting submarines. The battlecruiser SMS Seydlitz had been damaged in a previous engagement, but was due to be repaired by mid May, so an operation was scheduled for 17 May 1916. At the start of May, difficulties with condensers were discovered on ships of the third battleship squadron, so the operation was put back to 23 May.

Ten submarines—U-24, U-32, U-43, U-44, UC-47, U-51, U-52, U-63, U-66, and U-70—were given orders first to patrol in the central North Sea between 17 and 22 May, and then to take up waiting positions. U-43 and U-44 were stationed in the Pentland Firth (the very north-east corner of Scotland), which the Grand Fleet was likely to cross leaving Scapa Flow (Orkney Islands), while the remainder proceeded to the Firth of Forth (near Edinburgh, awaiting battlecruisers departing Rosyth. Each boat had an allocated area, within which it could move around as necessary to avoid detection, but was instructed to keep within it. During the initial North Sea patrol the boats were instructed to sail only north–south so that any enemy who chanced to encounter one would believe it was departing or returning from operations on the west coast (which required them to pass around the north of Britain). Once at their final positions, the boats were under strict orders to avoid premature detection that might give away the operation. It was arranged that a coded signal would be transmitted to alert the submarines exactly when the operation commenced: "Take into account the enemy's forces may be putting to sea".

Additionally, UB-27 was sent out on 20 May with instructions to work its way into the Firth of Forth past May Island. U-46 was ordered to patrol the coast of Sunderland, which had been chosen for the diversionary attack, but because of engine problems it was unable to leave port and U-47 was diverted to this task. On 13 May, U-72 was sent to lay mines in the Firth of Forth; on the 23rd, U-74 departed to lay mines in the Moray Firth; and on the 24th, U-75 was dispatched similarly west of the Orkney Islands. UB-21 and UB-22 were sent to patrol the Humber, where (incorrect) reports had suggested the presence of British warships. U-22, U-46 and U-67 were positioned north of Terschelling to protect against intervention by British light forces stationed at Harwich.

On 22 May 1916, it was discovered that Seydlitz was still not watertight after repairs and would not now be ready until the 29th. The ambush submarines were now on station and experiencing difficulties of their own: visibility near the coast was frequently poor due to fog, and sea conditions were either so calm the slightest ripple, as from the periscope, could give away their position, or so rough as to make it very hard to keep the vessel at a steady depth. The British had become aware of unusual submarine activity, and had begun counter patrols that forced the submarines out of position. UB-27 passed Bell Rock on the night of 23 May on its way into the Firth of Forth as planned, but was halted by engine trouble. After repairs it continued to approach, following behind merchant vessels, and reached Largo Bay on 25 May. There the boat became entangled in nets that fouled one of the propellers, forcing it to abandon the operation and return home. U-74 was detected by four armed trawlers on 27 May and sunk 25 mi (22 nmi; 40 km) south-east of Peterhead. U-75 laid its mines off the Orkney Islands, which, although they played no part in the battle, were responsible later for sinking the cruiser Hampshire carrying Lord Kitchener (head of the army) on a mission to Russia on 5 June. U-72 was forced to abandon its mission without laying any mines when an oil leak meant it was leaving a visible surface trail astern.

Zeppelins

The Germans maintained a fleet of Zeppelins that they used for aerial reconnaissance and occasional bombing raids. The planned raid on Sunderland intended to use Zeppelins to watch out for the British fleet approaching from the north, which might otherwise surprise the raiders.

By 28 May, strong north-easterly winds meant that it would not be possible to send out the Zeppelins, so the raid again had to be postponed. The submarines could only stay on station until 1 June before their supplies would be exhausted and they had to return, so a decision had to be made quickly about the raid.

The throat of the Skagerrak, the strategic gateway to the Baltic and North Atlantic, waters off Jutland and Norway

Author Attilios

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It was decided to use an alternative plan, abandoning the attack on Sunderland but instead sending a patrol of battlecruisers to the Skagerrak, where it was likely they would encounter merchant ships carrying British cargo and British cruiser patrols. It was felt this could be done without air support, because the action would now be much closer to Germany, relying instead on cruiser and torpedo boat patrols for reconnaissance. Orders for the alternative plan were issued on 28 May, although it was still hoped that last-minute improvements in the weather would allow the original plan to go ahead. The German fleet assembled in the Jade River and at Wilhelmshaven and was instructed to raise steam and be ready for action from midnight on 28 May.

Franz Hipper, commander of the German battlecruiser squadron (4th from left)

Attribution: Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-R10687 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

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By 14:00 on 30 May, the wind was still too strong and the final decision was made to use the alternative plan. The coded signal "31 May G.G.2490" was transmitted to the ships of the fleet to inform them the Skagerrak attack would start on 31 May. The pre-arranged signal to the waiting submarines was transmitted throughout the day from the E-Dienst radio station at Brugge, and the U-boat tender Arcona anchored at Emden. Only two of the waiting submarines, U-66 and U-32, received the order.

British response

Unfortunately for the German plan, the British had obtained a copy of the main German codebook from the light cruiser SMS Magdeburg, which had been boarded by the Russian Navy after the ship ran aground in Russian territorial waters in 1914. German naval radio communications could therefore often be quickly deciphered, and the British Admiralty usually knew about German activities.

The British Admiralty's Room 40 maintained direction finding and interception of German naval signals. It had intercepted and decrypted a German signal on 28 May that provided "ample evidence that the German fleet was stirring in the North Sea." Further signals were intercepted, and although they were not decrypted it was clear that a major operation was likely. At 11:00 on 30 May, Jellicoe was warned that the German fleet seemed prepared to sail the following morning. By 17:00, the Admiralty had intercepted the signal from Scheer, "31 May G.G.2490", making it clear something significant was imminent.

Not knowing the Germans' objective, Jellicoe and his staff decided to position the fleet to head off any attempt by the Germans to enter the North Atlantic, or the Baltic through the Skagerrak, by taking up a position off Norway where they could possibly cut off any German raid into the shipping lanes of the Atlantic, or prevent the Germans from heading into the Baltic. A position further west was unnecessary, as that area of the North Sea could be patrolled by air using blimps and scouting aircraft.

Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe led the sixteen dreadnought battleships of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons of the Grand Fleet and three battlecruisers of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron eastwards out of Scapa Flow at 22:30 on 30 May. He was to meet the 2nd Battle Squadron of eight dreadnought battleships commanded by Vice-Admiral Martyn Jerram coming from Cromarty. Hipper's raiding force did not leave the Outer Jade Roads until 01:00 on 31 May, heading west of Heligoland Island following a cleared channel through the minefields, heading north at 16 knots (30 km/h; 18 mph). The main German fleet of sixteen dreadnought battleships of 1st and 3rd Battle Squadrons left the Jade at 02:30, being joined off Heligoland at 04:00 by the six pre-dreadnoughts of the 2nd Battle Squadron coming from the Elbe River. Beatty's faster force of six ships of the 1st and 2nd Battlecruiser Squadrons plus the 5th Battle Squadron of four fast battleships left the Firth of Forth on the next day.

Jellicoe's intention was to rendezvous with him 90 mi (78 nmi; 140 km) west of the mouth of the Skagerrak off the coast of Jutland and wait for the Germans to appear or for their intentions to become clear. The planned position would give him the widest range of responses to likely German moves.

Chapter 2 Order of Battle: the Hochseeflotte

The High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) was the battle fleet of the German Imperial Navy and saw action during the First World War. The formation was created in February 1907, when the Home Fleet (Heimatflotte) was renamed as the High Seas Fleet. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was the architect of the fleet; he envisioned a force powerful enough to challenge the Royal Navy's predominance. Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, championed the fleet as the instrument by which he would seize overseas possessions and make Germany a global power. By concentrating a powerful battle fleet in the North Sea while the Royal Navy was required to disperse its forces around the British Empire, Tirpitz believed Germany could achieve a balance of force that could seriously damage British naval hegemony. This was the heart of Tirpitz's "Risk Theory," which held that Britain would not challenge Germany if the latter's fleet posed such a significant threat to its own.

The primary component of the Fleet was its battleships, typically organized in eight-ship squadrons, though it also contained various other formations, including the I Scouting Group. At its creation in 1907, the High Seas Fleet consisted of two squadrons of battleships, and by 1914, a third squadron had been added. The dreadnought revolution in 1906 greatly affected the composition of the fleet; the twenty-four pre-dreadnoughts in the fleet were rendered obsolete and required replacement. Enough dreadnoughts for two full squadrons were completed by the outbreak of war in mid 1914; the eight most modern pre-dreadnoughts were used to constitute a third squadron. Two additional squadrons of older vessels were mobilized at the onset of hostilities, though by the end of the conflict, these formations were disbanded. The fleet conducted a series of sorties into the North Sea during the war designed to lure out an isolated portion of the numerically superior British Grand Fleet. These operations frequently used the fast battlecruisers of the I Scouting Group to raid the British coast as the bait for the Royal Navy. These operations culminated in the Battle of Jutland, on 31 May–1 June 1916, where the High Seas Fleet confronted the whole of the Grand Fleet. The battle was inconclusive, but the British won strategically, as it convinced Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the German fleet commander, that even a highly favorable outcome to a fleet action would not secure German victory in the war. Scheer and other leading admirals therefore advised the Kaiser to order a resumption of the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign. The primary responsibility of the High Seas Fleet in 1917 and 1918 was to secure the German naval bases in the North Sea for U-boat operations. Nevertheless, the fleet continued to conduct sorties into the North Sea and detached units for special operations in the Baltic Sea against the Russian Baltic Fleet. Following the German defeat in November 1918, the Allies interned the bulk of the High Seas Fleet in Scapa Flow, where it was ultimately scuttled by its crew in June 1919, days before the belligerents signed the Treaty of Versailles.

Summary

Royal Navy

German Navy

Dreadnoughts

4 × Queen Elizabethclass

3 × Iron Dukeclass

4 × Orionclass

3 × King George Vclass

3 × Bellerophonclass

2 × Revengeclass

2 × Colossusclass

3 × St. Vincentclass

1 × HMSNeptune

1 × HMSAgincourt

1 × HMSErin

1 × HMSCanada

4 × Kaiserclass

4 × Helgolandclass

4 × Nassauclass

4 × Königclass

Pre-Dreadnought Battleships

5 × Deutschlandclass

1 × Braunschweigclass

Battlecruisers

3 × Invincibleclass

3 × Lionclass

2 × Indefatigableclass

1 × HMSTiger

2 × Derfflingerclass

1 × SMSSeydlitz

1 × SMSMoltke

1 × SMSVon der Tann

Armoured Cruisers

3 × Minotaurclass

2 × Duke of Edinburghclass

2 × Warriorclass

1 × HMSHampshire

Smaller Ships

26 × Light Cruisers

79 × Destroyers (one of them Destroyer-Minelayer)

11 × Light Cruisers

61 × Torpedo Boats [Note 1]

Broadsideweight

332,360 lb (150,760 kg)

134,216 lb (60,879 kg)

THE GERMAN FORCES

Dreadnoughts of the High Seas Fleet steam in a line of battle

The High Seas Fleet was the main body of the German surface navy, principally based at Wilhelmshaven, on the Jade River in North-West Germany.

Commander-in-Chief (Chef der Hochseeflotte): Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer in SMS Friedrich der Grosse

Chief of Staff: Captain Adolf von Trotha; Chief of Operations: Captain Magnus von Levetzow(GE)

The Hochseeflotte: the Battleships

Fleet Flagship (Flaggschiff der Hochseeflotte)

SMS Friedrich der Grosse: Captain Theodor Fuchs

3rd Battle Squadron (III. Geschwader) (Battleships):

Rear Admiral Paul Behncke

5th Division: Rear Admiral Behncke

SMS König (flagship): Captain Friedrich Brüninghaus

SMS Grosser Kurfürst: Captain Ernst Goette

SMS Kronprinz: Captain Constanz Feldt

SMS Markgraf: Captain Karl Seiferling

6th Division: Rear Admiral Hermann Nordmann

SMS Kaiser (flagship): Captain Walter Frhr von Keyserlingk

SMS Prinzregent Luitpold: Captain Karl Heuser

SMS Kaiserin: Captain Karl Sievers

1st Battle Squadron (I. Geschwader) (Battleships):

Vice Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt

1st Division: Vice Admiral Schmidt

SMS Ostfriesland (flagship): Captain Ernst-Oldwig von Natzmer

SMS Thüringen: Captain Hans Küsel

SMS Helgoland: Captain Friedrich von Kameke

SMS Oldenburg: Captain Wilhelm Höpfner

2nd Division: Rear Admiral Walter Engelhardt

SMS Posen (flagship): Captain Richard Lange

SMS Rheinland: Captain Heinrich Rohardt

SMS Nassau: Captain Robert Kühne

SMS Westfalen: Captain Johannes Redlich

2nd Battle Squadron (II. Geschwader) (Battleships):

Rear Admiral Franz Mauve

3rd Division: Rear Admiral Mauve

SMS Deutschland (flagship): Captain Hugo Meurer

SMS Hessen: Captain Rudolf Bartels

SMS Pommern* : Captain Siegfried Bölken†

4th Division: Rear Admiral Frhr Gottfried von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels

SMS Hannover (flagship): Captain Wilhlem Heine

SMS Schlesien: Captain Friedrich Behncke

SMS Schleswig-Holstein: Captain Eduard Varrentrapp

The Light Cruisers

4th Scouting Group (IV. Aufklärungsgruppe) (light cruisers): Commodore Ludwig von Reuter

SMS Stettin (flagship): Commander Friedrich Rebensburg

SMS München: Lieutenant-Commander Oscar Böcker

SMS Frauenlob*: Commander Georg Hoffman†

SMS Stuttgart: Commander Max Hagedorn

SMS Hamburg: Lieutenant-Commander Gerhard von Gaudecker

The Torpedo Boats / Hochseeflotte

German torpedo boats (Große Torpedoboote) were the equivalent of British destroyers

First Leader of Torpedo-Boats: Commander Andreas Michelsen

SMS Rostock* (light cruiser; flagship 1st Leader of Torpedo-Boats): Commander Otto Feldmann

1st Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (I. Torpedoboots-Flottille)

1st Half-Flotilla (1. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Conrad Albrecht

SMS G39 (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Franz-Ferdinand von Loefen

SMS G40: Lieutenant Richard Beitzen

SMS G38: Lieutenant Hermann Metger

SMS S32: Lieutenant Hermann Froelich

3rd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (III. Torpedoboots-Flottille): Lieutenant-Commander Wilhelm Hollmann

SMS S53 (lead boat, flotilla): Lieutenant Friedrich Götting

5th Half-Flotilla (5. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Theophil Gautier

SMS V71 (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Friedrich Ulrich

SMS V73: Lieutenant Martin Delbrück

SMS G88: Lieutenant Hans Scabell

6th Half-Flotilla (6. Halbflottille)[L]: Lieutenant-Commander Theodor Riedel†

SMS V48* (lead-Boat): Lieutenant Friedrich Eckoldt†

SMS S54: Lieutenant Otto Karlowa

SMS G42: Lieutenant Bernd von Arnim

5th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (V. Torpedoboots-Flottille): Lieutenant-Commander Oskar Heinecke

SMS G11 (lead boat, flotilla): Lieutenant Adolf Müller

9th Half-Flotilla (9. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Gerhard Hoefer

SMS V2 (lead boat): Lieutenant Gerhard Hoefer

SMS V4*: Lieutenant Armin Barop

SMS V6: Sub-Lieutenant Hans Behrendt

SMS V1: Sub-Lieutenant Hans Röthig

SMS V3: Lieutenant Manfred von Killinger

10th Half-Flotilla (10. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Friedrich Klein

SMS G8 (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Ernst Rodenberg

SMS V5: Sub-Lieutenant Paul Tils

SMS G7: Lieutenant Johannes Weinecke

SMS G9: Lieutenant Hans Anschütz

SMS G10: Sub-Lieutenant Waldemar Haumann

7th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (VII. Torpedoboots-Flottille): Lieutenant-Commander Gottlieb von Koch

SMS S24 (lead boat, flotilla): Lieutenant Max Fink

13th Half-Flotilla (13. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Georg von Zitzewitz

SMS S15 (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Christian Schmidt

SMS S17: Lieutenant Hans-Joachim von Puttkammer

SMS S20: Lieutenant Albert Benecke

SMS S16: Lieutenant Walter Loeffler

SMS S18: Lieutenant Bruno Haushalter

14th Half-Flotilla (14. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant-Commander Hermann Cordes

SMS S19 (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Georg Reimer

SMS S23: Lieutenant Arthur von Killinger

SMS V189: Sub-Lieutenant Wilhelm Keil

A German Torpedo-Boat (equivalent to a British destroyer)

The Scouting Forces

Commander, Scouting Forces (Befehlshaber die Aufklärungsstreitkräfte): Vice Admiral Franz Hipper; flag lieutenant: Lieutenant-Commander Erich Raeder

The Battle Cruisers

1st Scouting Group (I. Aufklärungsgruppe): Vice Admiral Hipper

SMS Lützow* (flagship): Captain Victor Harder

SMS Derfflinger: Captain Johannes Hartog

SMS Seydlitz: Captain Moritz von Egidy

SMS Moltke: Captain Johannes von Karpf

SMS Von der Tann: Captain Hans Zenker

Scouting Force / Light Cruisers

2nd Scouting Group (II. Aufklärungsgruppe): Rear Admiral Friedrich Boedicker

SMS Frankfurt (flagship): Captain Thilo von Trotha

SMS Elbing* : Commander Rudolf Madlung

SMS Pillau: Commander Konrad Mommsen(GE)

SMS Wiesbaden*: Commander Fritz Rei߆

Scouting Force / Torpedo Boats

Second Leader of Torpedo-Boats: Commander Paul Heinrich

SMS Regensburg (light cruiser; flagship Second Leader of Torpedo-Boats): Commander Bruno Heuberer

2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (II. Torpedoboots-Flottille): Commander Heinrich Schuur

SMS B98 (lead boat, flotilla): Lieutenant Theodor Hengstenberg

3rd Half-Flotilla (3. Halbflottille): Lieutenant-Commander Heinrich Boest

SMS G101 (lead boat): Lieutenant Rudolf Schulte

SMS G102: Lieutenant von Barendorff

SMS B112: Lieutenant Carl August Claussen

SMS B97: Lieutenant Leo Riedel

4th Half-Flotilla (4. Halbflottille): Lieutenant-Commander Adolf Dithmar

SMS B109 (lead boat): Lieutenant Victor Hahndorff

SMS B110: Lieutenant August Vollheim

SMS B111: Lieutenant Heinrich Schickhardt

SMS G103: Lieutenant Fritz Spiess

SMS G104: Georg von Bartenwerffer

6th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (VI. Torpedoboots-Flottille): Lieutenant-Commander Max Schultz

SMS G41 (lead boat): Lieutenant Hermann Boehm

11th Half-Flotilla (11. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Wilhelm Rüman

SMS V44 (lead boat): Lieutenant Karl von Holleuffer

SMS G87: Lieutenant Siegfried Karstens

SMS G86: Lieutenant Kurt Grimm

12th Half-Flotilla (12. Halbflottille): Lieutenant Rudolf Lahs

SMS V69 (lead boat): Lieutenant Robert Stecher

SMS V45: Lieutenant Martin Laßmann

SMS V46: Lieutenant Bruno Krumhaar

SMS S50: Lieutenant Philipp Recke

SMS G37: Lieutenant Wolf von Trotha

9th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (IX. Torpedoboots-Flottille): Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Goehle

SMS V28 (lead boat, flotilla): Lieutenant Otto Lenssen

17th Half-Flotilla (17. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant Hermann Ehrhardt

SMS V27* (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Hartmut Buddecke

SMS V26: Lieutenant Hans Köhler

SMS S36: Lieutenant Franz Fischer

SMS S51: Lieutenant Werner Dette

SMS S52: Lieutenant Wilhelm Ehrentraut

18th Half-Flotilla (17. Halbflottille):

Lieutenant-Commander Werner Tillessen

SMS V30 (lead boat): Sub-Lieutenant Ernst Wolf

SMS S34: Lieutenant Otto Andersen

SMS S33: Lieutenant Waldemar von Münch

SMS V29* : Lieutenant Erich Steinbrinck†

SMS S35* : Lieutenant Friedrich Ihn†

The German Submarines

Leader of Submarines (Führer der Unterseeboote) : Captain Hermann Bauer in SMS Hamburg

The following submarines were deployed to attack the Grand Fleet in the North Sea during the period of the Battle of Jutland:

Off Terschelling:

U-46: Lieutenant Leo Hillebrand

U-67: Lieutenant Hans Nieland

Off the Humber estuary:

UB-21: Lieutenant Ernst Hashagen

Off Flamborough Head, Yorkshire:

UB-22: Sub-Lieutenant Bernhard Putzier

Off the Firth of Forth, Scotland:

U-52: Lieutenant Hans Walter

U-24: Lieutenant Rudolf Schneider

U-70: Lieutenant Otto Wünsche

U-32: Lieutenant Edgar von Spiegel von und zu Peckelsheim

U-51: Lieutenant Walter Rumpfel

U-63: Lieutenant Otto Schultze

U-66: Lieutenant Thorwald von Bothmer

Off Peterhead, Scotland:

U-47: Lieutenant Heinrich Metzger

Off the Pentland Firth (between the Orkneys and the Scottish mainland):

U-44: Lieutenant Paul Wagenführ

U-43: Lieutenant Helmuth Jürst

Airships

During the battle the Germans used the Zeppelin airships of the Naval Airship Section (Marine Luftschiff Abteilung) for scouting, although in the prevailing overcast conditions they were not particularly successful. The commander of the Naval Airship Section was Lieutenant-Commander Peter Strasser, and they flew from bases at Nordholz and Hage in north-west Germany and Tondern (then part of Schleswig; the town became part of Denmark in 1920).

Sortied on 31 May

L.9: Captain August Stelling (Army Officer, on the inactive list)

L.14: Lieutenant Alois Böcker

L.16: Lieutenant Erich Sommerfeldt

L.21: Lieutenant Max Dietrich

L.23: Lieutenant Otto von Schubert

Sortied on 1 June

L.11: Lieutenant Victor Schultze

L.17: Lieutenant Herbert Ehrlich

L.22: Lieutenant Martin Dietrich

L.24: Lieutenant Robert Koch

Did not sortie during the Battle of Jutland

L.13: Lieutenant Eduard Prölß

L.30: Sub-Lieutenant Horst Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels

Chapter 2 Order of Battle: The Royal Navy

The Grand Fleet

The Grand Fleet was the main fleet of the British Royal Navy during the First World War. It was formed in August 1914 from the First Fleet and elements of the Second Fleet of the Home Fleets and it included 35–40 state-of-the-art capital ships. It was initially commanded by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. He was succeeded by Admiral Sir David Beatty in 1916. The Grand Fleet was based first on Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands and later at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth and took part in the biggest fleet action during the war – the Battle of Jutland. In April 1919 the Grand Fleet was disbanded, with much of its strength forming a new Atlantic Fleet.

Commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet: Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O. in HMS Iron Duke

Second in Command, Grand Fleet: Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. in HMS Marlborough.

The Battleships

The Grand Fleet had a total of 32 Dreadnought and Super-Dreadnought battleships available to use by the time of Jutland. Of these, 28 took part, organized into four Battle Squadrons. The 24 vessels of 2nd, 4th and 1st Battle Squadrons formed the main body of Fleet, and are listed below order from van to rear following their deployment to engage the German fleet, 6:30pm 31 May 1916.

Fleet Flagship (at head of 3rd Division but not part of 4th Battle Squadron)

HMS Iron Duke: Captain Frederic Charles Dreyer

2nd Battle Squadron (Battleships):

Vice-Admiral Thomas Henry Martyn Jerram

1st Division: Vice-Admiral Jerram

HMS King George V (Flagship):

Captain Frederick Laurence Field

HMS Ajax: Captain George Henry Baird

HMS Centurion: Captain Michael Culme-Seymour

HMS Erin: Captain the Hon. Victor Albert Stanley

2nd Division: Rear-Admiral Arthur Cavenagh Leveson

HMS Orion (Flagship): Captain Oliver Backhouse

HMS Monarch: Captain George Holmes Borrett

HMS Conqueror: Captain Hugh Henry Darby Tothill

HMS Thunderer: Captain James Andrew Fergusson

The 2nd Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet in 1914. From left to right the ships are: King George V, Thunderer, Monarch and Conqueror.

4th Battle Squadron (Battleships): Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Charles Doveton Sturdee

3rd Division: Rear-Admiral Sir Alexander Ludovic Duff

HMS Royal Oak: Captain Crawford Maclachlan

HMS Superb (Flagship): Captain Edmond Hyde Parker

HMS Canada: Captain William Coldingham

Masters Nicholson

4th Division: Vice-Admiral Sturdee

HMS Benbow (Flagship): Captain Henry Wise Parker

HMS Bellerophon: Captain Edward Francis Bruen

HMS Temeraire: Captain Edwin Veale Underhill

HMS Vanguard: Captain James Douglas Dick

1st Battle Squadron (Battleships): Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G

5th Division: Rear-Admiral Ernest Frederick Gaunt

HMS Colossus (Flagship): Captain Dudley Pound

HMS Collingwood: Captain James Clement Ley

HMS St. Vincent: Captain William Wordsworth Fisher

HMS Neptune Captain Vivian Henry Gerald Bernard

Sixth Division: Vice-Admiral Burney

HMS Marlborough (Flagship): Captain George Ross

HMS Revenge: Captain Edward Buxton Kiddle

HMS Hercules: Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker

HMS Agincourt: Captain Henry Montagu Doughty

The Cruisers

Two squadrons of Armored Cruisers and one squadron of Light Cruisers were attached to the main body of the Grand Fleet to act as a scouting force.

The armored cruiser was a type of warship of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was designed like other types of cruisers to operate as a long-range, independent warship, capable of defeating any ship apart from a battleship and fast enough to outrun any battleship it encountered. Varying in size, it was distinguished from other types of cruiser by its belt armor—thick iron (or later steel) plating on much of the hull to protect the ship from shellfire much like that on battleships. The first armored cruiser, the Imperial Russian Navy's General-Admiral, was launched in 1873 and combined sail and steam propulsion. By the 1890s cruisers had abandoned sail and took on a modern appearance.

Armored Cruiser „General – Admiral“

For many decades naval technology had not advanced far enough for designers to produce a cruiser which combined an armored belt with the long range and high speed required to fulfill its mission; for this reason, many navies preferred to build protected cruisers in the 1880s and early 1890s. It was often possible to build cruisers which were faster and better all-round using this type of ship, which relied on a lighter armored deck to protect the vital parts of the ship; however, by the late 1880s the development of rapid-fire cannon and high-explosive shells made the reintroduction of side armor a necessity. The invention of face-hardened armor in the mid-1890s offered effective protection with less weight than previously.

In 1908 the armored cruiser was supplanted by the battlecruiser which, with armament equivalent to that of a dreadnought battleship and steam turbine engines, was faster and more powerful than armored cruisers. At around the same time, the term "light cruiser" came into use for small cruisers with armored belts. Despite the fact they were now considered second-class ships, armored cruisers were widely used in World War I. Most surviving armored cruisers from this conflict were scrapped under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which imposed limits on warships and defined a cruiser as a ship of 10,000 tons or less carrying guns of 8-inch caliber or less—rather smaller than many of the large armored cruisers. A handful survived in one form or another until World War II.

A light cruiser is a type of small- or medium-sized warship. The term is a shortening of the phrase "light armored cruiser", describing a small ship that carried armor in the same way as an armored cruiser: a protective belt and deck. Prior to this smaller cruisers had been of the protected cruiser model, possessing armored decks only.

1st Cruiser Squadron (Armored Cruisers):

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Keith Arbuthnot

HMS Defence (Flagship): Captain Stanley Venn Ellis†

HMS Warrior: Captain Vincent Barkly Molteno

HMS Duke of Edinburgh: Captain Henry Blackett

HMS Black Prince: Captain Thomas Parry Bonham†

2nd Cruiser Squadron (Armored Cruisers): Rear-Admiral Herbert Leopold Heath

HMS Minotaur (Flagship):

Captain Arthur Cloudesley Shovel Hughes D'Aeth

HMS Hampshire: Captain Herbert John Savill

HMS Shannon: Captain John Saumarez Dumaresq

HMS Cochrane: Captain Eustace La Trobe Leatham

4th Light Cruiser Squadron: Commander Charles Edward Le Mesurier

HMS Calliope: Commander Le Mesurier

HMS Constance: Captain Cyril Samuel Townsend

HMS Comus: Captain Alan Geoffrey Hotham

HMS Caroline: Captain Henry Ralph Crooke

HMS Royalist: Captain the Hon. Herbert Meade

Light cruisers attached for repeating visual signals

HMS Active: Captain Percy Withers

(attached to Fleet Flagship)

HMS Boadicea: Captain Louis Charles Stirling Woollcombe (attached to 2nd Battleship Squadron)

HMS Blanche: Captain John Moore Casement

(attached to 4th Battleship Squadron)

HMS Bellona: Captain Arthur Brandreth Scott Dutton

(attached to 1st Battleship Squadron)

Other ships under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief:

HMS Abdiel: Commander Berwick Curtis

(destroyer-minelayer)

HMS Oak: Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell (destroyer)

The Destroyers

The main body of the Grand Fleet was escorted by 46 destroyers and flotilla leaders organized into three flotillas. The of these three destroyer groups was Commander James Rose Price Hawksley, on HMS Castor (11th Destroyer Flotilla)

4th Destroyer Flotilla:

Captain Charles John Wintour†

HMS Tipperary* (flotilla leader): Captain Wintour†

1st half-flotilla/4th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Spitfire:

Lieutenant-Commander Clarence Trelawney

HMS Sparrowhawk:

Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins

HMS Garland:

Lieutenant-Commander Reginald Stannus Goff

HMS Contest:

Lieutenant-Commander Ernald Gilbert Hoskins Master

Group 8 /4th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Owl: Commander Robert Gerald Hamond

HMS Hardy: Commander Richard Plowden

HMS Mischief:

Lieutenant-Commander the Hon. Cyril Augustus Ward

HMS Midge:

Lieutenant-Commander James Robert Cavendish

2nd half-flotilla/4th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Broke (flotilla leader): Commander Walter Allen

3rd Division/4th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Porpoise: Commander Hugh Davenport Colville

HMS Unity: Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Lecky

4th Division/4th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Achates: Commander Reginald Hutchinson

HMS Ambuscade: Lieutenant-Commander Gordon Coles

HMS Ardent: Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden

HMS Fortune: Lieutenant-Commander Frank Terry†

11th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Castor (Light Cruise ras lead-ship):

Commander Hawksley

1st half-flotilla/11th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Ossory: Commander Harold Victor Dundas

HMS Martial: Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison

HMS Magic: Lieutenant-Commander Gerald Wynter

HMS Minion: Lieutenant-Commander Henry Rawlings

2nd Division/11th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Mystic: Commander Claud Finlinson Allsup

HMS Mons: Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin

HMS Mandate: Lieutenant-Commander

Edward McConnell Wyndham Lawrie

HMS Michael: Lieutenant-Commander Claude Bate

2nd half-flotilla/11th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Kempenfelt (Führer der Flotille):

Commander Harold Ernest Sulivan

3rd Division/11th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Marne: Lieutenant-Commander George Hartford

HMS Milbrook: Lt Charles Granville Naylor

HMS Manners: Lieutenant-Commander Gerald Harrison

4th Division/11th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Moon: Commander (Acting) William Dion Irvin

HMS Mounsey: Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Eyre

HMS Morning Star: Lieutenant-Commander

Hugh Undecimus Fletcher

12th Destroyer Flotilla:

Captain Anselan John Buchanan Stirling

HMS Faulknor (flotilla leader): Captain Stirling

first half-flotilla/12th Destroyer Flotilla

1st Division/12th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Obedient: Commander George William Campbell

HMS Mindful: Lieutenant-Commander John Ridley

HMS Marvel: Lieutenant-Commander Reginald Grubb

HMS Onslaught: Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Onslow

2nd Division/12th Destroyer Flotilla

HMS Maenad: Commander John Pelham Champion

HMS Narwhal: Lieutenant-Commander Henry Hudson

HMS Nessus: Lieutenant-Commander Eric Carter

HMS Noble: Lieutenant-Commander Henry Percy Boxer

second half-flotilla/12th Destroyer Flotilla :

HMS Marksman (lead ship):

Commander Norton Allen Sulivan

HMS Opal: Commander Charles Sumner

HMS Nonsuch: Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Lyon

HMS Menace: Lieutenant-Commander Charles Poignand

HMS Munster: Lieutenant-Commander Spencer Russell

HMS Mary Rose: Lieutenant-Commander Edwin Homan

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron

This squadron, temporarily attached to the Grand Fleet from the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was stationed ahead of the main body, with the intention that it join Beatty when the action began. In their position ahead of the Grand Fleet, they should be able to be a kind of link between the battlecruiser group of Beatty and the battleship group of Jellicoe. The commander of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Lambert Alexander Hood.

HMS Invincible (Flagship): Captain Arthur Cay†

HMS Inflexible: Captain Edward Heaton-Ellis

HMS Indomitable: Captain Francis William Kennedy

Accompanying Cruisers:

HMS Canterbury: Captain Percy Molyneux Rawson Royds

HMS Chester: Captain Robert Neale Lawson

Attached Destroyers:

HMS Shark : Commander Loftus William Jones

HMS Ophelia: Commander Lewis Gonne Eyre Crabbe

HMS Christopher: Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax Kerr

HMS Acasta: Lieutenant-Commander John Barron

The Battle Cruiser Fleet

This force of high-speed ships was subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, but operated independently as an advanced guard, intended to reconnoiter aggressively the enemy fleet and to engage enemy scouting forces. At its core were six battlecruisers, accompanied by 13 light cruisers, and escorted by 18 destroyers and an early aircraft carrier.

The Design of Battlecruisers

The battlecruiser was developed by the Royal Navy in the first years of the 20th century as an evolution of the armored cruiser.

The first armored cruisers had been built in the 1870s, as an attempt to give armour protection to ships fulfilling the typical cruiser roles of patrol, trade protection and power projection. However, the results were rarely satisfactory, as the weight of armour required for any meaningful protection usually meant that the ship became almost as slow as a battleship. As a result, navies preferred to build protected cruisers with an armored deck protecting their engines, or simply no armour at all.

In the 1890s, technology began to change this balance. New Krupp steel armour meant that it was now possible to give a cruiser side armour which would protect it against the quick-firing guns of enemy battleships and cruisers alike. In 1896–97 France and Russia, who were regarded as likely allies in the event of war, started to build large, fast armored cruisers taking advantage of this. In the event of a war between Britain and France or Russia, or both, these cruisers threatened to cause serious difficulties for the British Empire's worldwide trade.

Britain, which had concluded in 1892 that it needed twice as many cruisers as any potential enemy to adequately protect its empire's sea lanes, responded to the perceived threat by laying down its own large armored cruisers. Between 1899 and 1905, it completed or laid down seven classes of this type, a total of 35 ships. This building program, in turn, prompted the French and Russians to increase their own construction. The Imperial German Navy began to build large armored cruisers for use on their overseas stations, laying down eight between 1897 and 1906.

The cost of this cruiser arms race was significant. In the period 1889–96, the Royal Navy spent £7.3 million on new large cruisers. From 1897–1904, it spent £26.9 million. Many armored cruisers of the new kind were just as large and expensive as the equivalent battleship. The increasing size and power of the armored cruiser led to suggestions in British naval circles that cruisers should displace battleships entirely. The battleship's main advantage was its 12-inch heavy guns, and heavier armour designed to protect from shells of similar size. However, for a few years after 1900 it seemed that those advantages were of little practical value. The torpedo now had a range of 2,000 yards, and it seemed unlikely that a battleship would engage within torpedo range. However, at ranges of more than 2,000 yards it became increasingly unlikely that the heavy guns of a battleship would score any hits, as the heavy guns relied on primitive aiming techniques. The secondary batteries of 6-inch quick-firing guns, firing more plentiful shells, were more likely to hit the enemy. As naval expert Fred T. Jane wrote in June 1902:

Is there anything outside of 2,000 yards that the big gun in its hundreds of tons of medieval castle can effect, that its weight in 6-inch guns without the castle could not effect equally well? And inside 2,000, what, in these days of gyros, is there that the torpedo cannot effect with far more certainty?

In 1904, Admiral John "Jacky" Fisher became First Sea Lord, the senior officer of the Royal Navy. He had for some time thought about the development of a new fast armored ship. He was very fond of the "second-class battleship" Renown, a faster, more lightly armored battleship. As early as 1901, there is confusion in Fisher's writing about whether he saw the battleship or the cruiser as the model for future developments. This did not stop him from commissioning designs from naval architect W. H. Gard for an armored cruiser with the heaviest possible armament for use with the fleet. The design Gard submitted was for a ship between 14,000–15,000 long tons (14,000–15,000 t), capable of 25 knots (46 km/h; 29 mph), armed with four 9.2-inch and twelve 7.5-inch (190 mm) guns in twin gun turrets and protected with six inches of armour along her belt and 9.2-inch turrets, 4 inches (102 mm) on her 7.5-inch turrets, 10 inches on her conning tower and up to 2.5 inches (64 mm) on her decks. However, mainstream British naval thinking between 1902 and 1904 was clearly in favour of heavily armored battleships, rather than the fast ships that Fisher favoured.

The Battle of Tsushima proved conclusively the effectiveness of heavy guns over intermediate ones and the need for a uniform main caliber on a ship for fire control. Even before this, the Royal Navy had begun to consider a shift away from the mixed-calibre armament of the 1890s pre-dreadnought to an "all-big-gun" design, and preliminary designs circulated for battleships with all 12-inch or all 10-inch guns and armored cruisers with all 9.2-inch guns. In late 1904, not long after the Royal Navy had decided to use 12-inch guns for its next generation of battleships because of their superior performance at long range, Fisher began to argue that big-gun cruisers could replace battleships altogether. The continuing improvement of the torpedo meant that submarines and destroyers would be able to destroy battleships; this in Fisher's view heralded the end of the battleship or at least compromised the validity of heavy armour protection. Nevertheless, armored cruisers would remain vital for commerce protection.

Of what use is a battle fleet to a country called (A) at war with a country called (B) possessing no battleships, but having fast armored cruisers and clouds of fast torpedo craft? What damage would (A's) battleships do to (B)? Would (B) wish for a few battleships or for more armored cruisers? Would not (A) willingly exchange a few battleships for more fast armored cruisers? In such a case, neither side wanting battleships is presumptive evidence that they are not of much value.

—  Fisher to Lord Selborne (First Lord of the Admiralty),

20 October 1904

Fisher's views were very controversial within the Royal Navy, and even given his position as First Sea Lord, he was not in a position to insist on his own approach. Thus he assembled a "Committee on Designs", consisting of a mixture of civilian and naval experts, to determine the approach to both battleship and armored cruiser construction in the future. While the stated purpose of the Committee was to investigate and report on future requirements of ships, Fisher and his associates had already made key decisions. The terms of reference for the Committee were for a battleship capable of 21 knots with 12-inch guns and no intermediate calibres, capable of docking in existing drydocks; and a cruiser capable of 25.5 knots also with 12-inch guns and no intermediate armament, armored like Minotaur, the most recent armored cruiser, and also capable of using existing docks.

First battlecruisers

Under the Selborne plan of 1902, the Royal Navy intended to start three new battleships and four armored cruisers each year. However, in late 1904 it became clear that the 1905–06 programme would have to be considerably smaller, because of lower than expected tax revenue and the need to buy out two Chilean battleships under construction in British yards, lest they be purchased by the Russians for use against the Japanese, Britain's ally. These economies meant that the 1905–06 programme consisted only of one battleship, but three armored cruisers. The battleship became the revolutionary battleship Dreadnought, and the cruisers became the three ships of the Invincible class. Fisher later claimed, however, that he had argued during the Committee for the cancellation of the remaining battleship.

The construction of the new class were begun in 1906 and completed in 1908, delayed perhaps to allow their designers to learn from any problems with Dreadnought. The ships fulfilled the design requirement quite closely. On a displacement similar to Dreadnought, the Invincibles were 40 feet (12.2 m) longer to accommodate additional boilers and more powerful turbines to propel them at 25 knots. Moreover, the new ships could maintain this speed for days, whereas pre-dreadnought battleships could not generally do so for more than an hour. Armed with eight 12-inch Mk X guns, compared to ten on Dreadnought, they had 6–7 inches (152–178 mm) of armour protecting the hull and the gun turrets. Dreadnought's armour, by comparison, was 11–12 inches (279–305 mm) at its thickest. The class had a very marked increase in speed, displacement and firepower compared to the most recent armored cruisers but no more armour.

While the Invincibles were to fill the same role as the armored cruisers they succeeded, they were expected to do so more effectively. Specifically their roles were:

Heavy reconnaissance. Because of their power, the Invincibles could sweep away the screen of enemy cruisers to close with and observe an enemy battlefleet before using their superior speed to retire.

Close support for the battle fleet. They could be stationed at the ends of the battle line to stop enemy cruisers harassing the battleships, and to harass the enemy's battleships if they were busy fighting battleships. Also, the Invincibles could operate as the fast wing of the battlefleet and try to outmanouevre the enemy.

Pursuit. If an enemy fleet ran, then the Invincibles would use their speed to pursue, and their guns to damage or slow enemy ships.

Commerce protection. The new ships would hunt down enemy cruisers and commerce raiders.

Confusion about how to refer to these new battleship-size armored cruisers set in almost immediately. Even in late 1905, before work was begun on the Invincibles, a Royal Navy memorandum refers to "large armored ships" meaning both battleships and large cruisers. In October 1906, the Admiralty began to classify all post-Dreadnought battleships and armored cruisers as "capital ships", while Fisher used the term "dreadnought" to refer either to his new battleships or the battleships and armored cruisers together. At the same time, the Invincible class themselves were referred to as "cruiser-battleships", "dreadnought cruisers"; the term "battlecruiser" was first used by Fisher in 1908. Finally, on 24 November 1911, Admiralty Weekly Order No. 351 laid down that "All cruisers of the “Invincible” and later types are for the future to be described and classified as “battle cruisers” to distinguish them from the armored cruisers of earlier date."

Invincible, Britain's first battlecruiser

Along with questions over the new ships' nomenclature came uncertainty about their actual role due to their lack of protection. If they were primarily to act as scouts for the battle fleet and hunter-killers of enemy cruisers and commerce raiders, then the seven inches of belt armour with which they had been equipped would be adequate. If, on the other hand, they were expected to reinforce a battle line of dreadnoughts with their own heavy guns, they were too thin-skinned to be safe from an enemy's heavy guns. The Invincibles were essentially extremely large, heavily armed, fast armored cruisers. However, the viability of the armored cruiser was already in doubt. A cruiser that could have worked with the Fleet might have been a more viable option for taking over that role.

Because of the Invincibles' size and armament, naval authorities considered them capital ships almost from their inception—an assumption that might have been inevitable. Complicating matters further was that many naval authorities, including Lord Fisher, had made overoptimistic assessments from the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 about the armored cruiser's ability to survive in a battle line against enemy capital ships due to their superior speed. These assumptions had been made without taking into account the Russian Baltic Fleet's inefficiency and tactical ineptitude. By the time the term "battlecruiser" had been given to the Invincibles, the idea of their parity with battleships had been fixed in many people's minds.

Not everyone was so convinced. Brassey's Naval Annual, for instance, stated that with vessels as large and expensive as the Invincibles, an admiral "will be certain to put them in the line of battle where their comparatively light protection will be a disadvantage and their high speed of no value." Those in favor of the battlecruiser countered with two points—first, since all capital ships were vulnerable to new weapons such as the torpedo, armour had lost some of its validity; and second, because of its greater speed, the battlecruiser could control the range at which it engaged an enemy.

Battlecruisers in the dreadnought arms race

Between the launching of the Invincibles to just after the outbreak of the First World War, the battlecruiser played a junior role in the developing dreadnought arms race, as it was never wholeheartedly adopted as the key weapon in British imperial defence, as Fisher had presumably desired. The biggest factor for this lack of acceptance was the marked change in Britain's strategic circumstances between their conception and the commissioning of the first ships. The prospective enemy for Britain had shifted from a Franco-Russian alliance with many armored cruisers to a resurgent and increasingly belligerent Germany. Diplomatically, Britain had entered the Entente cordiale in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente. Neither France nor Russia posed a particular naval threat; the Russian navy had largely been sunk or captured in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, while the French were in no hurry to adopt the new dreadnought-type design. Britain also boasted very cordial relations with two of the significant new naval powers, Japan (bolstered by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905), and the USA. These changed strategic circumstances, and the great success of the Dreadnought, ensured that she rather than the Invincible became the new model capital ship. Nevertheless, battlecruiser construction played a part in the renewed naval arms-race sparked by the Dreadnought.

HMS Queen Mary, the third Lion-class battlecruiser

For their first few years of service, the Invincibles entirely fulfilled Fisher's vision of being able to sink any ship fast enough to catch them, and run from any ship capable of sinking them. An Invincible would also, in many circumstances, be able to take on an enemy pre-dreadnought battleship. Naval circles concurred that the armored cruiser in its current form had come to the logical end of its development and the Invincibles were so far ahead of any enemy armored cruiser in firepower and speed that it proved difficult to justify building more or bigger cruisers. This lead was extended by the surprise both Dreadnought and Invincible produced by having been built in secret; this prompted most other navies to delay their building programmes and radically revise their designs. This was particularly true for cruisers, because the details of the Invincible class were kept secret for longer; this meant that the last German armored cruiser, Blücher, was armed with only 21-centimetre (8.3 in) guns, and was no match for the new battlecruisers.

The Royal Navy's early superiority in capital ships led to the rejection of a 1905–06 design that would, essentially, have fused the battlecruiser and battleship concepts into what would eventually become the fast battleship. The 'X4' design combined the full armour and armament of Dreadnought with the 25 knot speed of Invincible. The additional cost could not be justified given the existing British lead and the new Liberal government's need for economy; the slower and cheaper Bellerophon, a relatively close copy of Dreadnought, was adopted instead. The X4 concept would eventually be fulfilled in the Queen Elizabeth class and later by other navies.

The next British battlecruisers were the three Indefatigable class, slightly improved Invincibles built to fundamentally the same specification, partly due to political pressure to limit costs and partly due to the secrecy surrounding German battlecruiser construction, particularly about the heavy armour of SMS Von der Tann. This class came to be widely seen as a mistake and the next generation of British battlecruisers were markedly more powerful. By 1909–10 a sense of national crisis about rivalry with Germany outweighed cost-cutting, and a naval panic resulted in the approval of a total of eight capital ships in 1909–10. Fisher pressed for all eight to be battlecruisers, but was unable to have his way; he had to settle for six battleships and two battlecruisers of the Lion class. The Lions carried eight 13.5-inch guns, the now-standard caliber of the British "super-dreadnought" battleships. Speed increased to 27 knots and armour protection, while not as good as in German designs, was better than in previous British battlecruisers, with nine-inch (230 mm) armour belt and barbettes. The two Lions were followed by the very similar Queen Mary.

By 1911 Germany had built battlecruisers of her own, and the superiority of the British ships could no longer be assured. Moreover, the German Navy did not share Fisher's view of the battlecruiser. In contrast to the British focus on increasing speed and firepower, Germany progressively improved the armour and staying power of their ships to better the British battlecruisers. Von der Tann, begun in 1908 and completed in 1910, carried eight 11.1-inch guns, but with 11.1-inch (283 mm) armour she was far better protected than the Invincibles. The two Moltkes were quite similar but carried ten 11.1-inch guns of an improved design. Seydlitz, designed in 1909 and finished in 1913, was a modified Moltke; speed increased by one knot to 26.5 knots, while her armour had a maximum thickness of 12 inches, equivalent to the Helgoland-class battleships of a few years earlier. Seydlitz was Germany's last battlecruiser completed before World War I.

The next step in battlecruiser design came from Japan. The Imperial Japanese Navy had been planning the Kongō-class ships from 1909, and was determined that, since the Japanese economy could support relatively few ships, each would be more powerful than its likely competitors. Initially the class was planned with the Invincibles as the benchmark. On learning of the British plans for Lion, and the likelihood that new U.S. Navy battleships would be armed with 14-inch (360 mm) guns, the Japanese decided to radically revise their plans and go one better. A new plan was dr [...]