Bhagavadgita with the Sanatsugatiya and the Anugita E-Book

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• Herausgeber: Seltzer Books
• Kategorie: Religion und Spiritualität
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018

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Beschreibung

According to Wikipedia: "The Bhagavad Gita ... is a 700-verse Hindu scripture that is part of the ancient Sanskrit epic Mahabharata... The Sānatsujātiya refers to a portion of the Mahābhārata, a Hindu epic. It appears in the Udyoga Parva (book), and is composed of five chapters... The Anugita is part of the Asvamedhikaparva a book of the Sanskrit epic Mahabharata. It contains Krishna's conversation with Arjuna when Krishna decided to return to Dwaraka after restoring to the Pandavas, their kingdom. The main topics discussed are transmigration of souls, means of attaining liberation, description of gunas and ashramas, dharma, and the effects of tapas or austerity."

Leseprobe

THE BHAGAVADGÎTÂ WITH THE SANATSUGÂTÎYA AND THE ANUGÎTÂ, TRANSLATED BY KÂSHINÂTH TRIMBAK TELANG, M. A.

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From The Sacred Books of the East series, first issued by the Oxford University Press between 1879 and 1910. The series was edited by Max Müller.

BHAGAVADGÎTÂ: Introduction1

BHAGAVADGÎTÂ. Translation37

CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SANATSUGÂTÎYA: Introduction135

Translation149

CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER VI.

ANUGÎTÂ: Introduction197

Translation229

CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER V.

CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VII.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHAPTER IX.

CHAPTER X.

CHAPTER XI.

CHAPTER XII.

CHAPTER XIII.

CHAPTER XIV.

CHAPTER XV.

CHAPTER XVI.

CHAPTER XVII.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CHAPTER XIX.

CHAPTER XX.

CHAPTER XXI.

CHAPTER XXII.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CHAPTER XXV.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CHAPTER XXX.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

CHAPTER XXXV.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

INTRODUCTION TO BHAGAVADGÎTÂ.

IT has become quite a literary commonplace, that--to borrow the words of  Professor Max Müller in one of his recent lectures--history, in the ordinary  sense of the word, is almost unknown in Indian literature 1. And it is certainly  a remarkable irony of fate, that we should be obliged to make this remark on the  very threshold of an introduction to the Bhagavadgîtâ; for according to the  eminent French philosopher, Cousin 2, this great deficiency in Sanskrit  literature is due, in no inconsiderable measure, to the doctrines propounded in  the Bhagavadgîtâ itself. But however that may be, this much is certain, that the  student of the Bhagavadgîtâ must, for the present, go without that reliable  historical information touching the author of the work, the time at which it was  composed, and even the place it occupies in literature, which one naturally  desires, when entering upon the study of any work. More especially in an attempt  like the present, intended as it mainly is for students of the history of  religion, I should have been better pleased, if I could, in this Introduction,  have concentrated to a focus, as it were, only those well ascertained historical  results, on which there is something like a consensus of opinion among persons  qualified to judge. But there is no exaggeration in saying, that it is almost  impossible to lay down even a single proposition respecting any important matter  connected with the Bhagavadgîtâ, about which any such consensus can be said to  exist. The conclusions arrived at in this Introduction must, therefore, be  distinctly

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understood to embody individual opinions only, and must be taken accordingly for  what they are worth.

The full name of the work is Bhagavadgîtâ. In common parlance, we often  abbreviate the name into Gîtâ, and in Sanskrit literature the name occurs in  both forms. In the works of Sankarâkârya, quotations from the Gîtâ are  introduced, sometimes with the words 'In the Gîtâ,' or 'In the Bhagavadgîtâ,'  and sometimes with words which may be rendered 'In the Gîtâs,' the plural form  being used 1. In the colophons to the MSS. of the work, the form current,  apparently throughout India, is, 'In the Upanishads sung (Gîtâs) by the Deity.'  Sankarâkârya, indeed, sometimes calls it the Îsvara Gîtâ 2, which, I believe, is  the specific title of a different work altogether. The signification, however,  of the two names is identical, namely, the song sung by the Deity, or, as  Wilkins translates it, the Divine Lay.

This Divine Lay forms part of the Bhîshma Parvan of the Mahâbhârata--one of the  two well-known national epics of India. The Gîtâ gives its name to a subdivision  of the Bhîshma Parvan, which is called the Bhagavadgîtâ Parvan, and which  includes, in addition to the eighteen chapters of which the Gîtâ consists,  twelve other chapters. Upon this the question has naturally arisen, Is the Gîtâ  a genuine portion of the Mahâbhârata, or is it a later addition? The question is  one of considerable difficulty. But I cannot help saying, that the manner in  which it has been generally dealt with is not altogether satisfactory to my  mind. Before going any further into that question, however, it is desirable to  state some of the facts on which the decision must be based. It appears, then,  that the royal family of Hastinâpura was divided into two branches; the one  called the Kauravas, and the other the Pândavas. The former wished to keep the  latter out of the share of the kingdom claimed by them; and so, after many  attempts at

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an amicable arrangement had proved fruitless, it was determined to decide the  differences between the two parties by the arbitrament of arms. Each party  accordingly collected its adherents, and the hostile armies met on the 'holy  field of Kurukshetra,' I mentioned in the opening lines of our poem. At this  juncture, Krishna Dvaipâyana, alias Vyâsa, a relative of both parties and  endowed with more than human powers, presents himself before Dhritarâshtra, the  father of the Kauravas, who is stated to be altogether blind. Vyâsa asks  Dhritarâshtra whether it is his wish to look with his own eyes on the course of  the battle; and on Dhritarâshtra's expressing his reluctance, Vyâsa deputes one  Sañgaya to relate to Dhritarâshtra all the events of the battle, giving to  Sañgaya, by means of his own superhuman powers, all necessary aids for  performing the duty. Then the battle begins, and after a ten days' struggle, the  first great general of the Kauravas, namely Bhîshma, falls 1. At this point  Sañgaya comes up to Dhritarâshtra, and announces to him the sad result, which is  of course a great blow to his party. Dhritarâshtra then makes numerous enquiries  of Sañgaya regarding the course of the conflict, all of which Sañgaya duly  answers. And among his earliest answers is the account of the conversation  between Krishna and Arguna at the commencement of the battle, which constitutes  the Bhagavadgîtâ. After relating to Dhritarâshtra that 'wonderful and holy  dialogue,' and after giving an account of what occurred in the intervals of the  conversation, Sañgaya proceeds to narrate the actual events of the battle. With this rough outline. of the framework of the story before us, we are now in  a, position to consider the opposing arguments on the point above noted. Mr.  Talboys Wheeler writes on that point as follows 2. 'But there remains one other  anomalous characteristic of the history of the great war, as it is recorded in  the Mahâbhârata, which cannot

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be passed over in silence; and that is the extraordinary abruptness and  infelicity with which Brahmanical discourses, such as essays on law, on morals,  sermons on divine things, and even instruction in the so-called sciences are  recklessly grafted upon the main narrative.... Krishna and Arguna on the morning  of the first day of the war, when both armies are drawn out in battle-array, and  hostilities are about to begin, enter into a long and philosophical dialogue  respecting the various forms of devotion which lead to the emancipation of the  soul; and it cannot be denied that, however incongruous and irrelevant such a  dialogue must appear on the eve of battle, the discourse of Krishna, whilst  acting as the charioteer of Arguna, contains the essence of the most spiritual  phases of Brahmanical teaching, and is expressed in language of such depth and  sublimity, that it has become deservedly known as the Bhagavad-gîtâ or Divine  Song. . . . Indeed no effort has been spared by the Brahmanical compilers to  convert the history of the great war into a vehicle for Brahmanical teaching;  and so skilfully are many of these interpolations interwoven with the story,  that it is frequently impossible to narrate the one, without referring to the  other, however irrelevant the matter may be to the main subject in hand.' It  appears to me, I own, very difficult to accept that as a satisfactory argument,  amounting, as it does, to no more than this--that 'interpolations,' which must  needs be referred to in narrating the main story even to make it intelligible,  are nevertheless to be regarded 'as evidently the product of a Brahmanical age  1,' and presumably also a later age, because, forsooth, they are irrelevant and  incongruous according to the 'tastes and ideas 1'--not of the time, be it  remembered, when the 'main story' is supposed to have been written, but--of this  enlightened nineteenth century. The support, too, which may be supposed to be  derived by this argument from the allegation that there has been an attempt to  Brahmanize, so to say, the

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history of the great war, appears to me to be extremely weak, so far as the Gîtâ  is concerned. But that is a point which will have to be considered more at large  in the sequel 1.

While, however, I am not prepared to admit the cogency of Mr. Wheeler's  arguments, I am not, on the other hand, to be understood as holding that the  Gîtâ must be accepted as a genuine part of the original Mahâbhârata. I own that  my feeling on the subject is something akin to that of the great historian of  Greece regarding the Homeric question, a feeling of painful diffidence regarding  the soundness of any conclusion whatever. While it is impossible not to feel  serious doubts about the critical condition of the Mahâbhârata generally; while,  indeed, we may be almost certain that the work has been tampered with from time  to time 2; it is difficult to come to a satisfactory conclusion regarding any  particular given section of it. And it must be remembered, also, that the  alternatives for us to choose from in these cases are not only these two, that  the section in question may be a genuine part of the work, or that it may be a  later interpolation: but also this, as suggested recently, though not for the  first time, by Mr. Freeman 3 with reference to the Homeric question, that the  section may have been in existence at the date of the original epos, and may  have been worked by the author of the epos into his own production. For that  absence of dread, 'either of the law or sentiment of copyright,' which Mr.  Freeman relies upon with regard to a primitive Greek poet, was by no means  confined to the Greek people, but may be traced amongst us also. The commentator  Madhusûdana Sarasvatî likens the Gîtâ to those dialogues which occur in sundry  Vedic works, particularly the Upanishads 4. Possibly--I will not use a stronger  word--possibly the Gîtâ may

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have existed as such a dialogue before the Mahâbhârata, and may have been  appropriated by the author of the Mahâbhârata to his own purposes 1. But yet,  upon the whole, having regard to the fact that those ideas of unity on which Mr.  Wheeler and others set so much store are scarcely appropriate to our old  literature; to the fact that the Gîtâ fits pretty well into the setting given to  it in the Bhîshma Parvan; to the fact that the feeling of Arguna, which gives  occasion to it, is not at all inconsistent, but is most consonant, with poetical  justice; to the fact that there is not in the Gîtâ, in my judgment, any trace of  a sectarian or 'Brahmanizing' spirit 2, such as Mr. Wheeler and also the late  Professor Goldstücker 3 hold to have animated the arrangers of the Mahâbhârata;  having regard, I say, to all these facts, I am prepared to adhere, I will not  say without diffidence, to the theory of the genuineness of the Bhagavadgîtâ as  a portion of the original Mahâbhârata.

The next point to consider is as to the authorship of the Gîtâ. The popular  notion on this subject is pretty well known. The whole of the Mahâbhârata is, by  our traditions, attributed to Vyâsa, whom we have already noticed as a relative  of the Kauravas and Pândavas; and therefore the Bhagavadgîtâ, also, is naturally  affiliated to the same author. The earliest written testimony to this  authorship, that I can trace, is to be found in Sankarâkârya's commentary on the  Gîtâ 4 itself and on the Brihadâranyakopanishad 5. To a certain extent, the  mention of Vyâsa in the body of the Gîtâ would, from a historic standpoint, seem  to militate against this tradition. But I have not seen in any of the  commentaries to which I have had access, any consideration of this point, as  there is of the mention in some

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Smritis and Sûtras of the names of those to whom those Smritis and Sûtras are  respectively ascribed 1.

We must now leave these preliminary questions, unluckily in a state far from  satisfactory, and proceed to that most important topic--the date when the Gîtâ  was composed, and the position it occupies in Sanskrit literature. We have here  to consider the external evidence bearing on these points, which is  tantalizingly meagre; and the internal evidence, which is, perhaps, somewhat  more full. And taking first the internal evidence, the various items falling  under that head may be marshalled into four groups. Firstly, we have to consider  the general character of the Gîtâ with reference to its mode of handling its  subject. Secondly, there is the character of its style and language. Thirdly, we  have to consider the nature of the versification of the Gîtâ. And fourthly and  lastly, we must take note of sundry points of detail, such as the attitude of  the Gîtâ towards the Vedas and towards caste, its allusions to other systems of  speculation, and other matters of the like nature. On each of these groups, in  the order here stated, we now proceed to make a few observations. And first about the manner in which the Gîtâ deals with its subject. It appears  to me, that the work bears on the face of it very plain marks indicating that it  belongs to an age prior to the system-making age of Sanskrit philosophy In 1875,  I wrote as follows upon this point: 'My view is, that in the Gîtâ and the  Upanishads, the philosophical part has not been consistently and fully worked  out. We have there the results of free thought, exercised on different subjects  of great moment, unfettered by the exigencies of any foregone conclusions, or of  any fully developed theory. It is afterwards, it is at a later stage of  philosophical progress, that system-making arises. In that stage some thinkers  interpret whole works by the light of some particular doctrines or expressions.  And the result is the development of a whole multitude of philosophical sects,  following the lead of those thinkers, and all professing to draw their

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doctrine from the Gîtâ or the Upanishads, yet each differing remarkably from the  other 1.' Since this was written, Professor Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures have  been published. And I am happy to find, that as regards the Upanishads, his view  coincides exactly with that which I have expressed in the words now quoted.  Professor Max Müller says: 'There is not what may be called a philosophical  system in these Upanishads. They are in the true sense of the word guesses at  truth, frequently contradicting each other, yet all tending in one direction 2.'  Further corroboration for the same view is also forthcoming. Professor  Fitz-Edward Hall, in a passage which I had not noticed before, says 3: 'In the  Upanishads, the Bhagavadgîtâ, and other ancient Hindu books, we encounter, in  combination, the doctrines which, after having been subjected to modifications  that rendered them as wholes irreconcileable, were distinguished, at an  uncertain period, into what have for many ages been styled the Sânkhya and the  Vedânta.' We have thus very weighty authority for adhering to the view already  expressed on this important topic. But as Professor Weber appears to have  expressed an opinion 4 intended perhaps to throw some doubt on the correctness  of that view, it is desirable to go a little more into detail to fortify it by  actual reference to the contents of the Gîtâ, the more especially as we can thus  elucidate the true character of that work. Before doing so, however, it may be  pointed out, that the proposition we have laid down is one, the test of which  lies more in a comprehensive review of the whole of the Gîtâ, than in the  investigation of small details on which there is necessarily much room for  difference of opinion.

And first, let us compare that indisputably systematized work, the current  Yoga-sûtras 5, with the Bhagavadgîtâ on one

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or two topics, where they both travel over common ground. In the Gîtâ, chapter  VI, stanzas 33, 34 (p. 71), we have Arguna putting what is, in substance, a  question to Krishna, as to how the mind, which is admittedly 'fickle,  boisterous, strong, and obstinate,' is to be brought under control--such control  having been declared by Krishna to be necessary for attaining devotion (yoga)?  Krishna answers by saying that the mind may be restrained by 'practice (abhyâsa)  and indifference to worldly objects (vairâgya).' He then goes on to say, that  devotion cannot be attained without self-restraint, but that one who has  self-restraint, and works to achieve devotion, may succeed in acquiring it. Here  the subject drops. There is no further explanation of 'practice' or  'indifference to worldly objects,' no exposition of the mode in which they work,  and so forth. Contrast now the Yoga-sûtras. The topic is there discussed at the  very outset of the work. As usual the author begins with 'Now therefore the Yoga  is to be taught.' He then explains Yoga by the well-known definition 'Yoga is  the restraint of the movements of the mind.' And then after pointing out what  the movements of the mind are, he proceeds: 'Their restraint is by means of  practice and indifference to worldly objects 1,'--the very terms, be it remarked  in passing, which are used in the Bhagavadgîtâ. But having come thus far, the  author of the Sûtras does not drop the subject as the author of the Gîtâ does.  He goes on in this wise: Practice is the effort for keeping it steady.' 'And  that becomes firmly grounded when resorted to for a long time, without  interruption, and with correct conduct.' So far we have a discussion of the  first requisite specified, namely, practice. Patañgali then goes on to his  second requisite for mental restraint. 'Indifference to worldly objects is the  consciousness of having subdued desires &c. (Vasikâra sañgñâ) which belongs to  one having no longing for objects visible and those which are heard of' (from  Sâstras &c., such as heaven and so forth).

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He next proceeds to distinguish another and higher species of 'indifference,'  and then he goes on to point out the results of that self-restraint which is to  be acquired in the mode he has expounded. That is one instance. Now take  another. In chapter VI, stanza 10 and following stanzas, the Gîtâ sets forth  elaborately the mode of practically achieving. the mental abstraction called  Yoga. It need not be reproduced here. The reader can readily find out how sundry  directions are there given for the purpose specified, but without any attempt at  systematizing. Contrast the Yoga-sûtras. In the Sâdhanapâda, the section  treating of the acquisition of Yoga, Patañgali states in the twenty-ninth  aphorism the well-known eight elements of Yoga. Then he subdivides these  elements, and expatiates on each of them distinctly, defining them, indicating  the mode of acquiring them, and hinting at the results which flow from them.  'That inordinate love of subdivision,' which Dr. F. E. Hall 1 has somewhere  attributed to the Hindus, appears plainly in these aphorisms, while there is not  a trace of it in the corresponding passage in the Bhagavadgîtâ. In my opinion,  therefore, these comparisons strongly corroborate the proposition we have laid  down regarding the unsystematic, or rather non-systematic, character of the  work. In the one we have definition, classification, division, and subdivision.  In the other we have a set of practical directions, without any attempt to  arrange them in any very scientific order. In the one you have a set of  technical terms with specific significations. In the other no such precision is  yet manifest. In one word, you have in the Gîtâ the germs, and noteworthy germs  too, of a system 2, and you have most of the raw material of a system, but you  have no system ready-made.

Let us look at the matter now from a slightly different point of view. There are  sundry words used in the Bhagavadgîtâ, the significations of which are not quite  identical

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throughout the work. Take, for instance, the word 'yoga,' which we have rendered  'devotion.' At Gîtâ, chapter II, stanza 48 (p. 49), a definition is given of  that word. In chapter VI, the signification it bears is entirely different. And  again in chapter IX, stanza 5, there is still another sense in which the word is  used 1. The word 'Brahman' too occurs in widely varying significations. And one  of its meanings, indeed, is quite singular, namely, 'Nature' (see chapter XIV,  stanza 3). Similar observations, to a greater or less extent, apply to the words  Buddhi, Âtman, and Svabhâva 2. Now these are words which stand for ideas not  unimportant in the philosophy of the Bhagavadgîtâ. And the absence of scientific  precision about their use appears to me to be some indication of that  non-systematic character of which we have already spoken.

There is one other line of argument, which leads, I think, to the same  conclusion. There are several passages in the Gîtâ which it is not very easy to  reconcile with one another; and no attempt is made to harmonise them. Thus, for  example, in stanza 16 of chapter VII, Krishna divides his devotees into four  classes, one of which consists of 'men of knowledge,' whom, Krishna says, he  considers 'as his own self.' It would probably be difficult to imagine any  expression which could indicate higher esteem. Yet in stanza 46 of chapter VI,  we have it laid down, that the devotee is superior not only to the mere  performer of penances, but even to the men of knowledge. The commentators betray  their gnostic bias by interpreting 'men of knowledge' in this latter passage to  mean those who have acquired erudition in the Sâstras and their significations.  This is not an interpretation to be necessarily rejected. But there is in it a  certain twisting of words, which, under the circumstances here, I am not  inclined to accept. And on the other hand, it must not be forgotten, that the  implication fairly derivable from chapter IV, stanza 38 (pp. 62, 63), would seem  to

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be rather that knowledge is superior to devotion--is the higher stage to be  reached by means of devotion as the stepping-stone. In another passage again at  Gîtâ, chapter XII, stanza 12, concentration is preferred to knowledge, which  also seems to me to be irreconcileable with chapter VII, stanza 16. Take still  another instance. At Gîtâ, chapter V, stanza 15, it is said, that 'the Lord  receives the sin or merit of none.' Yet at chapter V, stanza 29, and again at  chapter IX, stanza 24, Krishna calls himself 'the Lord and enjoyer' of all  sacrifices and penances. How, it may well be asked, can the Supreme Being  'enjoy' that which he does not even receive?' Once more, at chapter X, stanza  29, Krishna declares that 'none is hateful to me, none dear.' And yet the  remarkable verses at the close of chapter XII seem to stand in point-blank  contradiction to that declaration. There through a most elaborate series of  stanzas, the burden of Krishna's eloquent sermon is 'such a one is dear to me.'  And again in those fine verses, where Krishna winds up his Divine Lay, he  similarly tells Arguna, that he, Arguna, is 'dear' to Krishna. And Krishna also  speaks of that devotee as 'dear' to him, who may publish the Mystery of the Gîtâ  among those who reverence the Supreme Being 1. And yet again, how are we to  reconcile the same passage about none being 'hateful or dear' to Krishna, with  his own words at chapter XVI, stanza 18 and following stanzas? The language used  in describing the 'demoniac' people there mentioned is not remarkable for  sweetness towards them, while Krishna says positively, 'I hurl down such people  into demoniac wombs, whereby they go down into misery and the vilest condition.'  These persons are scarcely characterised with accuracy 'as neither hateful nor  dear' to Krishna. It seems to me, that all these are real inconsistencies in the  Gîtâ, not such, perhaps, as might not be explained away, but such, I think, as  indicate a mind making guesses at truth., as Professor Max Müller puts it,  rather than a mind elaborating a complete

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and organised system of philosophy. There is not even a trace of consciousness  on the part of the author that these inconsistencies exist. And the contexts of  the various passages indicate, in my judgment, that a half-truth is struck out  here, and another half-truth there, with special reference to the special  subject then under discussion; but no attempt is made to organise the various  half-truths, which are apparently incompatible, into a symmetrical whole, where  the apparent inconsistencies might possibly vanish altogether in the higher  synthesis. And having regard to these various points, and to the further point,  that the sequence of ideas throughout the verses of the Gîtâ is not always  easily followed, we are, I think, safe in adhering to the opinion expressed  above, that the Gîtâ is a nonsystematic work, and in that respect belongs to the  same class as the older Upanishads.

We next come to the consideration of the style and language of the Bhagavadgîtâ.  And that, I think, furnishes a strong argument for the proposition, that it  belongs to an age considerably prior to the epoch of the artificial department  of Sanskrit literature--the epoch, namely, of the dramas and poems. In its  general character, the style impresses me as quite archaic in its simplicity.  Compounds, properly so called, are not numerous; such as there are, are not long  ones, and very rarely, if ever, present any puzzle in analysing. The contrast  there presented with what is called the classical literature, as represented by  Bâna or Dandin, or even Kâlidâsa, is not a little striking. In Kâlidâsa,  doubtless, the love for compounds is pretty well subdued, though I think his  works have a perceptibly larger proportion of them than the Gîtâ. But after  Kâlidâsa the love for compounds goes through a remarkable development, till in  later writings it may be said almost to have gone mad. Even in Bâna and Dandin,  Subandhu and Bhavabhûti, the plethora of compounds is often wearisome. And the  same remark applies to many of the copperplate and other inscriptions which have  been recently deciphered, and some of which date from the early centuries

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of the Christian era. Take again the exuberance of figures and tropes which is  so marked in the classical style. There is little or nothing of that in the  Gîtâ, where you have a plain and direct style of natural simplicity, and yet a  style not by any means devoid of æsthetic merit like the style of the Sûtra  literature. There is also an almost complete absence of involved syntactical  constructions; no attempt to secure that jingle of like sounds, which 'seems to  have proved a temptation too strong even for Kâlidâsa's muse entirely to resist.  But on the contrary, we have those repetitions of words and phrases, which are  characteristic, and not only in Sanskrit, of the style of an archaic period 1.  Adverting specially to the language as distinguished from the style of the Gîtâ,  we find such words as Anta, Bhâshâ, Brahman, some of which are collected in the  Sanskrit Index in this volume, which have gone out of use in the classical  literature in the significations they respectively bear in the Gîtâ. The word  'ha,' which occurs once, is worthy of special note. It is the equivalent of  'gha,' which occurs in the Vedic Samhitâs. In the form 'ha' it occurs in the  Brâhmanas. But it never occurs, I think, in what is properly called the  classical literature. It is, indeed, found in the Purânas. But that is a class  of works which occupies a very unique position. There is a good deal in the  Purânas that, I think, must be admitted to be very ancient 2; while undoubtedly  also there is a great deal in them that is very modern. It is, therefore,  impossible to treat the use of 'ha' in that class of works as negativing an  inference of the antiquity of any book where the word occurs; while its use in  Vedic works and its total absence from modern works indicate such antiquity  pretty strongly. We may, therefore, embody the result of this part of the  discussion in the proposition, that

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the Gîtâ is removed by a considerable linguistic and chronological distance from  classical Sanskrit literature. And so far as it goes, this proposition agrees  with the result of our investigation of the first branch of internal evidence. The next branch of that evidence brings us to the character of the versification  of the Gîtâ. Here, again, a survey of Sanskrit verse generally, and the verse of  the Gîtâ in particular, leads us to a conclusion regarding the position of the  Gîtâ in Sanskrit literature, which is in strict accord with the conclusions we  have already drawn. In the verse of the Vedic Samhitâs, there is almost nothing  like a rigidly fixed scheme of versification, no particular collocation of long  and short syllables is absolutely necessary. If we attempt to chant them in the  mode in which classical Sanskrit verse is chanted, we invariably come across  lines where the chanting cannot be smooth. If we come next to the versification  of the Upanishads, we observe some progress made towards such fixity of scheme  as we have alluded to above. Though there are still numerous lines, which cannot  be smoothly chanted, there are, on the other hand, a not altogether  inconsiderable number which can be smoothly chanted. In the Bhagavadgîtâ a still  further advance, though a slight one, may, I think, be marked. A visibly larger  proportion of the stanzas in the Gîtâ conform to the metrical schemes as laid  down by the writers on prosody, though there are still sundry verses which do  not so conform, and cannot, accordingly, be chanted in the regular way. Lastly,  we come to the Kâvyas and Nâtakas--the classical literature. And here in  practice we find everywhere a most inflexible rigidity of scheme, while the  theory is laid down in a rule which says, that 'even mâsha may be changed to  masha, but a break of metre should be avoided.' This survey of Sanskrit verse  may, I think, be fairly treated as showing, that adhesion to the metrical  schemes is one test of the chronological position of a work--the later the work,  the more undeviating is such adhesion. I need not stay here to point out, how  this view receives corroboration from the rules given on this subject in the  standard work

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of Pingala on the Khandas Sâstra. I will only conclude this point by saying,  that the argument from the versification of the Gîtâ, so far as it goes,  indicates its position as being prior to the classical literature, and nearly  contemporaneous with the Upanishad literature.

We now proceed to investigate the last-group of facts falling under the head of  internal evidence, as mentioned above. And first as regards the attitude of the  Gîtâ towards the Vedas. If we examine all the passages in the Gîtâ, in which  reference is made to the Vedas, the aggregate result appears to be, that the  author of the Gîtâ does not throw the Vedas entirely overboard. He feels and  expresses reverence for them, only that reverence is of a somewhat special  character. He says in effect, that the precepts of the Vedas are suitable to a  certain class of people, of a certain intellectual and spiritual status, so to  say. So far their authority is unimpeached. But if the unwise sticklers for the  authority of the Vedas claim anything more for them than this, then the author  of the Gîtâ holds them to be wrong. He contends, on the contrary, that acting  upon the ordinances of the Vedas is an obstacle to the attainment of the summum  bonum 1. Compare this with the doctrine of the Upanishads. The coincidence  appears to me to be most noteworthy. In one of his recent lectures, Professor  Max Müller uses the following eloquent language regarding the Upanishads 2:  'Lastly come the Upanishads; and what is their object? To show the utter  uselessness, nay, the mischievousness of all ritual performances (compare our  Gîtâ, pp. 47, 48, 84 3); to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its  motive a desire or hope of reward (comp. Gîtâ, p. 119 4); to deny, if not the  existence, at least the exceptional and exalted character of the Devas (comp.  Gîtâ, pp. 76-84 5); and to teach that there is no hope of salvation and  deliverance except by the individual self recognising the true and universal  self, and finding rest there, where alone rest can be found 6' (comp. our Gîtâ  Translation, pp. 78-83).

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The passages to which I have given references in brackets will show, that  Professor Max Müller's words might all be used with strict accuracy regarding  the essential teaching of the Bhagavadgîtâ. We have here, therefore, another  strong circumstance in favour of grouping the Gîtâ with the Upanishads. One more  point is worthy of note. Wherever the Gîtâ refers to the Vedas in the somewhat  disparaging manner I have noted, no distinction is taken between the portion  whi.ch relates to the ritual and the portion which relates to that higher  science, viz. the science of the soul, which Sanatkumâri speaks of in his famous  dialogue with Nârada 1. At Gîtâ, chapter II, stanza 45, Arguna is told that the  Vedas relate only to the effects of the three qualities, which effects Arguna is  instructed to overcome. At Gîtâ, chapter VI, stanza 44, Arguna is told that he  who has acquired some little devotion, and then exerts himself for further  progress, rises above the Divine word--the Vedas. And there are also one or two  other passages of the like nature. They all treat the Vedas as concerned with  ritual alone. They make no reference to any portion of the Vedas dealing with  the higher knowledge. If the word Vedânta, at Gîtâ, chapter XV, stanza 15 (p.  113), signifies, as it seems to signify, this latter portion of the Vedas, then  that is the only allusion to it. But, from all the passages in the Gîtâ which  refer to the Vedas, I am inclined to draw the inference, that the Upanishads of  the Vedas, were composed at a time not far removed from the time of the  composition of the Gîtâ, and that at that period the Upanishads had not yet  risen to the position of high importance which they afterwards commanded. In the  passage referred to at chapter XV, the word Vedântas probably signifies the  Âranyakas, which may be regarded as marking the beginning of the epoch, which  the composition of the Upanishads brought to its close. And it is to the close  of this epoch, that I would assign the birth of the Gîtâ, which is

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probably one of the youngest members of the group to which it belongs. It appears to me, that this conclusion is corroborated by the fact that a few  stanzas in the Gîtâ are identical with some stanzas in some of the Upanishads.  With regard to the epic age of Greece, Mr. E. A. Freeman has said that, in  carrying ourselves back to that age, 'we must cast aside all the notions with  which we are familiar in our own age about property legal or moral in literary  compositions. It is plain that there were phrases, epithets, whole lines, which  were the common property of the whole epic school of poetry 1.' It appears to me  that we must accept this proposition as equally applicable to the early days of  Sanskrit literature, having regard to the common passages which we meet with in  sundry of the Vedic works, and also sometimes, I believe, in the different  Purânas. If this view is correct, then the fact that the Gîtâ contains some  stanzas in the very words which we meet with in some of the Upanishads,  indicates, to my mind, that the conclusion already drawn from other data about  the position of the Gîtâ with regard to the Upanishads, is not by any means  unwarranted, but one to which the facts before us rather seem to point. And here we may proceed to draw attention to another fact connected with the  relation of the Gîtâ to the Vedas. In stanza 17 of the ninth chapter of the  Gîtâ, only Rik, Sâman, and Yagus are mentioned. The Atharva-veda is not referred  to at all. This omission does certainly seem a very noteworthy one. For it is in  a passage where the Supreme Being is identifying himself with everything, and  where, therefore, the fourth Veda might fairly be expected to be mentioned. I  may add that in commenting on Sankarâkârya's remarks on this passage, Ânandagiri  (and Madhusûdana Sarasvatî also)seems evidently to have been conscious of the  possible force of this omission of the Atharva-veda. He accordingly says that by  force of the word 'and' in the verse in question, the Atharvângirasas, or  Atharva-veda must

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also be included. Are we at liberty to infer from this, that the Atharva-veda  did not exist in the days when the Gîtâ was composed? The explanation ordinarily  given for the omission of that Veda, where such omission occurs, namely, that it  is not of any use in ordinary sacrificial matters, is one which can scarcely  have any force in the present instance; though it is adequate, perhaps, to  explain the words 'those who know the three branches of knowledge,' which occur  only a few lines after the verse now under consideration. The commentators  render no further help than has been already stated. Upon the whole, however,  while I am not yet quite prepared to say, that the priority of the Gîtâ, even to  the recognition of the Atharva-veda as a real Veda, may be fairly inferred from  the passage in question, I think that the passage is noteworthy as pointing in  that direction. But further data in explanation of the omission referred to must  be awaited.

If the conclusions here indicated about the relative positions of the Gîtâ and  certain Vedic works are correct, we can fairly take the second century B. C. as  a terminus before which the Gîtâ must have been composed. For the Upanishads are  mentioned in the Mahâbhâshya of Patañgali, which we are probably safe in  assigning to the middle of that century. The epoch of the older Upanishads,  therefore, to which reference has been so frequently made here, may well be  placed at some period prior to the beginning of the second century B. C. The  Atharva-veda is likewise mentioned by Patañgali 1, and as 'ninefold,' too, be it  remembered; so that if we are entitled to draw the conclusion which has been  mentioned above from chapter IX, stanza 17, we come to the same period for the  date of the Gîtâ. Another point to note in this connexion is the reference to  the Sâma-veda as the best of the Vedas (see p. 88). That is a fact which seems  to be capable of yielding some chronological information. For the estimation in  which that Veda has been held appears to have varied at different times. Thus,  in the Aitareya-brâhmana 2, the glory

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of the Sâman is declared to be higher than that of the Rik, In the  Khândogya-upanishad 1 the Sâman is said to be the essence of the Rik, which  Sankara interprets by saying that the Sâman is more weighty, In the  Prasna-upanishad 2, too, the implication of the passage V, 5 (in which the Sâman  is stated as the guide to the Brahmaloka, while the Yagus is said to guide to  the lunar world, and the Rik to the, human world) is to the same effect. And we  may also mention as on the same side the Nrisimha Tâpinî-upanishad and the Vedic  passage cited in the commentary of, Sankara on the closing sentence of the first  khanda of that Upanishad 3. On the other side, we have the statement in Manu  that the sound of the Sâma-veda is unholy; and the consequent direction that  where the sound of it is heard, the Rik and Yagus should not be recited 4. We  have also the passages from some of the Purânas noted by Dr. Muir in his  excellent work, Original Sanskrit Texts, which point in the same direction 5.  And we have further the direction in the Âpastamba Dharma-sûtra, that the Sâman  hymns should not be recited where the other Vedas are being recited 6, as well  as the grouping of the sound of the Sâman with various classes of objectionable  and unholy noises, such as those of dogs and asses. It is pretty evident that  the view of Âpastamba is based on the same theory as that of Manu. Now in  looking at the two classes of authorities thus marshalled, it is plain that the  Gîtâ ranges itself with those which are unquestionably the more ancient. And  among the less ancient works, prior to which we may place the Gîtâ on account of  the facts now under consideration, are Manu and Âpastamba. Now Manu's date is  not ascertained, though, I believe, he is now generally considered to belong to  about the second or third century B. C. 7 But . I

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Dr. Bühler, in the Preface to his Âpastamba in the present series, has adduced  good reasons for holding that Âpastamba is prior to the third century B. C. 1,  and we therefore obtain that as a point of time prior to which the Gîtâ must  have been composed.

The next important item of internal evidence which we have to note, is the view  taken of caste in the Bhagavadgîtâ. Here, again, a comparison of the doctrine of  the Gîtâ with the conception of caste in Manu and Âpastamba is interesting and  instructive. The view of Manu has been already contrasted by me with the Gîtâ in  another place 2. I do not propose to dwell on that point here, as the date of  Manu is far from being satisfactorily ascertained. I prefer now to take up  Âpastamba only, whose date, as just now stated, is fairly well fixed by Dr.  Bühler. The division of castes, then, is twice referred to in the Bhagavadgîtâ.  In the first passage (p. 59) it is stated, that the division rests on  differences of qualities and duties; in the second (pp. 126, 127) the various  duties are distinctly stated according to the differences of qualities. Now in  the first place, noting as we pass along, that there is nothing in the Gîtâ to  indicate whether caste was hereditary, according to its view, whereas Âpastamba  distinctly states it to be such, let us compare the second passage of the Gîtâ  with the Sûtras of Âpastamba bearing on the point. The view enunciated in the  Gîtâ appears to me plainly to belong to an earlier age--to an age of  considerably less advancement in social and religious development. In the Gîtâ,  for instance, the duties of a Brâhmana are said to be tranquillity,  self-restraint, and so forth. In Âpastamba, they are the famous six duties,  namely, study, imparting instruction, sacrificing, officiating at others'  sacrifices, making gifts, and receiving gifts; and three others, namely,  inheritance, occupancy, and gleaning ears of corn, which, it may be remarked en  passant, are not stated in Manu. The former seem to my mind to point

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to the age when the qualities which in early times gave the Brâhmanas their  pre-eminence in Hindu society were still a living reality 1. It will be noted,  too, that there is nothing in that list of duties which has any necessary or  natural connexion with any privilege as belonging to the caste. The Law lays  down these duties, in the true sense of the word. In Âpastamba, on the contrary,  we see an advance towards the later view on both points. You have no reference  to moral and religious qualities now. You have to do with ceremonies and acts.  You have under the head 'duties not mere obligations, but rights. For the duty  of receiving gifts is a right, and so is the duty of teaching others and  officiating at others' sacrifices; as we know not merely from the subsequent  course of events, but also from a comparison of the duties of Brâhmanas on the  one hand, and Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sûdras on the other, as laid down by Manu  and Âpastamba themselves. Âpastamba's rules, therefore, appear to belong to the  time when the Brâhmanas had long been an established power, and were assuming to  themselves those valuable privileges which they have always claimed in later  times. The rules of the Gîtâ, on the other hand, point to a time considerably  prior to this--to a time when the Brâhmanas were by their moral and intellectual  qualities laying the foundation of that preeminence in Hindu society which  afterwards enabled them to lord it over all castes. These observations mutatis  mutandis apply to the rules regarding. the other castes also. Here again, while  the Gîtâ still insists on the inner qualities, which properly constitute the  military profession, for instance, the rules of Âpastamba indicate the powerful  influence of the Brâhmanas 2. For, as stated before, officiating at others'  sacrifices, instructing others, and receiving presents, are here expressly  prohibited to Kshatriyas as also to Vaisyas. The result of that is, that the  Brâhmanas become indispensable to the Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, for

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upon both the duty of study, of offering sacrifices, and making gifts and  presents is inculcated. In his outline of the History of Ancient Religions,  Professor Tiele, speaking of the 'increasing influence of the Brâhmans,' writes  as follows: 'Subject at first to the princes and nobles, and dependent on them,  they began by insinuating themselves into their favour, and representing it as a  religious duty to show protection and liberality towards them. Meanwhile they  endeavoured to make themselves indispensable to them, gradually acquired the  sole right to conduct public worship, and made themselves masters of instruction  1'. And after pointing out the high position thus achieved by the Brâhmans, and  the low position of the Kândâlas and others of the inferior castes, he adds:  'Such a position could not long be endured; and this serves to explain not only  the rise of Buddhism, but also its rapid diffusion, and the radical revolution  which it brought about 2.' To proceed, however, with our comparison of the Gîtâ  and Âpastamba. The superiority distinctly claimed by the latter for the Brâhmana  is not quite clearly brought out in the Gîtâ. 'Holy Brâhmanas and devoted royal  saints' are bracketed together at p. 86; while the Kshatriyas are declared to  have been the channel of communication between the Deity and mankind as regards  the great doctrine of devotion propounded by the Bhagavadgîtâ. That indicates a  position for the Kshatriyas much more like what the Upanishads disclose 3, than  even that which Âpastamba assigns to them. The fact is further noteworthy, that  in the Gîtâ each caste has its own entirely distinct set of duties. There is no  overlapping, so to say. And that is a circumstance indicating a very early stage  in the development of the institution 4. Besides, as already indicated,

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the duties laid down by Âpastamba and Manu as common to Kshatriyas and Vaisyas  are the very duties which make those castes dependent to a very great extent on  the Brâhmanas. Lastly, it is not altogether unworthy of note, that in the  elaborate specification of the best of every species which we find in chapter X,  the Brâhmana is not mentioned as the best of the castes, there is nothing to  indicate the notion contained in the well-known later verse, 'The Brâhmana is  the head of the castes.' On the contrary, the ruler of men is specified as the  highest among men 1, indicating, perhaps, a state of society such as that  described at the beginning of the extract from Professor Tiele's work quoted  above.

We come now to another point. What is the position of the Gîtâ in regard to the  great reform of Sâkya Muni, The question is one of much interest, having regard  particularly to the remarkable coincidences between Buddhistic doctrines and the  doctrines of the Gîtâ to which we have drawn attention in the foot-notes to our  translation. But the materials for deciding the question are unhappily not  forthcoming. Professor Wilson, indeed, thought that there was an allusion to  Buddhism in the Gîtâ 2. But his idea was based on a confusion between the  Buddhists and the Kârvâkas or materialists 3. Failing that allusion, we have  nothing very tangible but the unsatisfactory 'negative argument' based on mere  non-mention of Buddhism in the Gîtâ. That argument is not quite satisfactory to  my own mind, although, as I have elsewhere pointed out 4, some of the ground  occupied by the Gîtâ is common to it with Buddhism, and although various  previous thinkers Are alluded to directly or indirectly in the Gîtâ. There is,  however, one view of the facts of this question, which appears to me to  corroborate the conclusion deducible by means of the negative argument here  referred to. The

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main points on which Buddha's protest against Brahmanism rests seem to be the  true authority of the Vedas and the true view of the differences of caste. On  most points of doctrinal speculation, Buddhism is still but one aspect of the  older Brahmanism 1. The various coincidences to which we have drawn attention  show that, if there is need to show it. Well now, on both these points, the  Gîtâ, while it does not go the whole length which Buddha goes, itself embodies a  protest against the views current about the time of its composition. The Gîtâ  does not, like Buddhism, absolutely reject the Vedas, but it shelves them. The  Gîtâ does not totally root out caste. It places caste on a less untenable basis.  One of two hypotheses therefore presents itself as a rational theory of these  facts. Either the Gîtâ and Buddhism were alike the outward manifestation of one  and the same spiritual upheaval which shook to its centre the current religion,  the Gîtâ being the earlier and less thorough-going form of it; or Buddhism  having already begun to tell on Brahmanism, the Gîtâ was an attempt to bolster  it up, so to say, at its least weak points, the weaker ones being altogether  abandoned. I do not accept the latter alternative, because I cannot see any  indication in the Gîtâ of an attempt to compromise with a powerful attack on the  old Hindu system; while the fact that, though strictly orthodox, the author of  the Gîtâ still undermines the authority, as unwisely venerated, of the Vedic  revelation; and the further fact, that in doing this, he is doing what others  also had done before him or about his time; go, in my opinion, a considerable  way towards fortifying the results of the negative argument already set forth.  To me Buddhism is perfectly intelligible as one outcome of that play of thought  on high spiritual topics, which in its other, and as we may say, less  thorough-going manifestations, we see in the Upanishads and the Gîtâ 2. But  assume that Buddhism was

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a protest against Brahmanism prior to its purification and elevation by the  theosophy of the Upanishads, and those remarkable productions of ancient Indian  thought become difficult to account for. Let us compare our small modem events  with those grand old occurrences. Suppose our ancestors to have been attached to  the ceremonial law of the Vedas, as we are now attached to a lifeless ritualism,  the Upanishads and the Gîtâ might be, in a way, comparable to movements like  that of the late Raja Rammohun Roy. Standing, as far as possible, on the antique  ways, they attempt, as Raja Rammohun attempted in these latter days, to bring  into prominence and to elaborate the higher and nobler aspects of the old  beliefs. Buddhism would be comparable to the further departure from old  traditions which was led by Babu Keshub Chander Sen. The points of dissent in  the olden times were pretty nearly the same as the points of dissent now. The  ultimate motive power also was in both cases identical--a sense of  dissatisfaction in its integrity with what had come down from old times  encrusted with the corruptions of years. In this view the old system, the  philosophy of the Upanishads and the Gîtâ, and the philosophy of Buddha,  constitute a regular intelligible progression. But suppose the turn events took  was different, as is supposed by the alternative theory indicated above. Suppose  Babu Keshub's movement was chronologically prior, and had begun to tell on  orthodox, society. Is it likely, that then one of the orthodox party would take  up the position which Rammohun Roy took? Would he still rely on old authorities,  but with sundry qualifications, and yet earnestly assail the current forms of  orthodoxy? I do not think so. I think the true view to be, as already stated,  very different. The Upanishads, with the Gîtâ, and the precepts of Buddha

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appear to me to be the successive 1 embodiments of the spiritual thought of the  age, as it became more and more dissatisfied with the system of mere ceremonial  then dominant.

There are several other points of much interest in the Bhagavadgîtâ, such as the  reference to the Sânkhya, and Yoga; the place assigned to the Mârgasîrsha month;  the allusion to the doctrines of materialism; the nearly entire coincidence  between a stanza of the Gîtâ and one in the Manu Smriti. But in the present  state of our knowledge, I do not. think that we can extract any historical  results from any of them. Without dwelling on them any further 2, therefore, I  will only state it as my opinion that the Sânkhya, and Yoga of the Gîtâ are not  identical with the systems known to us under those names, and that the Manu  Smriti has probably borrowed from the Gîtâ the stanza common to the two works. We now proceed to a discussion of some of the external evidence touching the age  of the Bhagavadgîtâ. It is, of course, unnecessary to consider any evidence of a  date later than the eighth century A. C., that being the date generally  received, though not on very strong grounds, as the date of Sankarâkârya, the  celebrated commentator of the Gîtâ 3 For the period prior to that limit, the  first testimony to consider is that of Bânabhatta, the author of the Kâdambarî.  The date of Bâna is now fairly well settled as the middle of the seventh century  A. C. The doubt which the late Dr. Bhâu Dâjî had cast upon its correctness 4, by  impugning the received date of king Harshavardhana, appears to me to have been  satisfactorily disposed of by the paper of

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my friend Professor R. G. Bhândârkar on the Kâlukya dates 1. In the Kâdambarî,  then, we have testimony to the existence of the Bhagavadgîtâ in the middle of  the seventh century A. C. For in that work, which, as is well known, abounds  with equivoques, we have a passage which compares the royal palace to the  Mahâbhârata, both being 'Anantagitâkarnanânanditanaram 2,' which, as applied to  the royal palace, means 'in which the people were delighted by hearing  innumerable songs;' and as applied to the Mahâbhârata means 'in which Arguna was  delighted at hearing the Anantagîtâ.' Anantagîtâ is evidently only another name  here for Bhagavadgîtâ. The conclusion deducible from this fact is not merely  that the Gîtâ existed, but that it existed as a recognised portion of the  Bhârata, in the seventh century A. C. Now the Kâdambarî shows, in numerous  passages, in what high esteem the Mahâbhârata was held in its days. The queen  Vilâsavatî used to attend at those readings and expositions of the Mahâbhârata,  which have continued down to our own times; and it was even then regarded as a  sacred work of extremely high authority, in the same way as it is now. It  follows., therefore, that the Gîtâ must have been several centuries old ill the  time of Bânabhatta.

Prior in time to Bâna is the Indian Shakespeare, Kâlidâsa, as he is referred to  in Bânabhatta's Harshakarita 3, and also in a copperplate inscription of the  early part of the seventh century, as a poet who had then already acquired a  high reputation 4. Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to fix exactly the date  at which Kâlidâsa flourished. Still, I think, we have pretty satisfactory  evidence to show that the middle of the fifth century A. C. is the very latest  date to which he can be referred. In a small tract (written by me in 1873),  discussing Professor Weber's theory about the Râmâyana, I have pointed out 5  that the Pañkatantra

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