LEVIATHAN - Hobbes E-Book

Thomas Hobbes

• Herausgeber: Lebooks Editora
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Seitenzahl: 1072

Beschreibung

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English philosopher considered one of the founders of modern political philosophy. His most famous work is Leviathan (1651), where he laid the foundations of contractualist theory, which had a significant influence on the development of Western political philosophy. Leviathan, as it is commonly known, is undoubtedly the most important and groundbreaking work of the 17th-century English philosopher, politician, and thinker Thomas Hobbes. Referencing and writing with splendid mastery, the author invokes the most feared biblical monster to explain and justify the existence of an absolutist State that subjugates its citizens. Written in 1651, his work has been a great inspiration in political sciences and, paradoxically, in the evolution of social law.

Leseprobe

Thomas Hobbes

LEVIATHAN

Original Title:

“Leviathan”

Contents

INTRODUCTION

About the author

LEVIATHAN

Part I - OF MAN

Chapter I - Of Sense

Chapter II - Of Imagination.

Chapter III - Of the Consequence or Trayne of Imaginations.

Chapter IV - Of Speech.

Chapter V - Of Reason, and Science.

Chapter VI - Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the Passions. And the Speeches by which they are expressed.

Chapter VII - Of the Ends, or Resolutions of Discourse.

Chapter VIII - Of the Vertues commonly called Intellectual; and their contrary Defects.

Chapter IX - Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge.

Chapter X - Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honor, and Worthinesse.

Chapter XI - Of the difference of Manners.

Chapter XII - Of Religion.

Chapter XIII - Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery.

Chapter XIV - Of the first and second Natural Lawes, and of Contracts.

Chapter XV - Of other Lawes of Nature.

Chapter XVI - Of Persons, Authors, and things Personated.

Part II - OF COMMON-WEALTH

Chapter XVII - Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Common-Wealth.

Chapter XVIII - Of the Rights of Soveraignes by Institution.

Chapter XIX - Of the several Kinds of Common-wealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Soveraigne Power.

Chapter XX - Of Dominion Paternal, and Despotic.

Chapter XXI - Of the Liberty of Subjects.

Chapter XXII - Of Systems Subject, Political, and Private.

Chapter XXIII - Of the Publique Ministers of Soveraign Power.

Chapter XXIV - Of the Nutrition, and Procreation of a Common-wealth.

Chapter XXV - Of Counsel.

Chapter XXVI - Of Civil Lawes.

Chapter XXVII - Of Crimes, Excuses, and Extenuations.

Chapter XXVIII - Of Punishments, and Rewards.

Chapter XXIX - Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth.

Chapter XXX - Of the Office of the Soveraign Representative.

Chapter XXXI - Of the Kingdome of God by Nature.

Part III - OF ACHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH.

Chapter XXXII - Of the Principles of Christian Politiques.

Chapter XXXIII - Of the Number, Antiquity, Scope, Authority, and Interpreters of the Books of Holy Scripture.

Chapter XXXIV - Of the Signification of Spirit, Angel, and Inspiration in the Books of Holy Scripture.

Chapter XXXV - Of the Signification in Scripture of Kingdome of God, of Holy, SACRED, and Sacrament.

Chapter XXXVI - Of the Word of God, and of Prophets.

Chapter XXXVII - Of Miracles, and their Use.

Chapter XXXVIII - Of the Signification in Scripture of Eternal Life, Hell, Salvation, The World to come, and Redemption.

Chapter XXXIX - Of the signification in Scripture of the word Church.

Chapter XL - Of the Rights of the Kingdome of God, in Abraham, Moses, the High Priests, and the Kings of Judah.

Chapter XLI - Of the Office of our Blessed Saviour.

Chapter XLII - Of Power Ecclesiastical.

Chapter XLIII - Of what is Necessary for a Man’s Reception into the Kingdome of Heaven.

Part IV - OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE.

Chapter XLIV - Of Spiritual Darknesse from Misinterpretation of Scripture.

Chapter XLV - Of DÆmonology, and other Reliques of the Religion of the Gentiles.

Chapter XLVI - Of Darknesse from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous Traditions.

Chapter XLVII - Of the Benefit that proceedeth from such Darknesse, and to whom it accreweth.

A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION.

INTRODUCTION

About the author

Thomas Hobbes was born on April 5, 1588, in Westport, England. Hobbes' uncle took charge of his education. He learned classical languages, physics, logic, and Aristotelian thought at Oxford. In 1608, he completed his studies and began working as a tutor and later as a private secretary for the Cavendish family. This activity led young Hobbes abroad: he accompanied his noble protectors more than once on the typical Grand Tour, a several-year educational journey across the continent. Hobbes began an intense intellectual exchange with philosophers of his time: Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and possibly also with Galileo Galilei.

His main philosophical themes would be the constitution of the State, free will, and the necessary conditions for human society. During the English Civil War, he supported the establishment of an absolutist state. In 1640, he published "Elements of Law," which contained his essay "Human Nature," and distributed it among parliamentarians to influence them regarding the king.

When parliament attempted to denounce the representatives of the king's absolutist policies, Hobbes felt threatened and fled to France. There, he dedicated himself to teaching mathematics to Charles Stuart, the claimant to the throne. In 1646, Hobbes fell seriously ill and as a result became paralyzed, so he was forced to hire a scribe. Hobbes was isolated in the court of the English king's exile in Paris, suspected of treason.

He returned to England and swore allegiance to the republican England, but then fell into a precarious situation again when, in 1660, the monarchy was restored and republicans were persecuted. Hobbes escaped attacks, but spent the rest of his life as a guest of the Earl of Devonshire and in London. He dedicated himself to publishing philosophical texts and advocating for the secularization of universities. Hobbes died in 1679, at the age of 91.

Influences

The German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz considered Hobbes to be the first to apply the correct method of argumentation and demonstration in the philosophy of law and state. Even today, his work impresses with its originality and radicalism. Hobbes was recognized from the beginning as an independent thinker destined to break with the tradition of ideas. Current political theories continue to be compared with his conglomerate of theoretical ideas about the state.

After its publication, Leviathan sparked controversy that lasted for several decades. In England, over 100 pamphlets were published against Hobbes, practically no one defended him. Many mocked the title: why would a fantastic monster from classical antiquity be the image of a state constructed from reason? Hobbes himself was described by many as an atheistic and rebellious monster. He earned enemies and threats: after all, heresy trials still existed at that time. The churches of England accused him of being an atheist, although he was not, because he questioned many basic ecclesiastical foundations and placed Christian faith close to superstition.

The University of Oxford, where he studied, burned his political texts a few years after his death, alleging a harmful effect on the state, government, and church. On the European continent, on the other hand, the effect on social philosophy was enormous from the beginning: not only did young Leibniz define himself as a follower of Hobbes, but also Baruch Spinoza's "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus" (1670) was undoubtedly influenced by him. David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Denis Diderot, Immanuel Kant, and Karl Marx all developed their ideas from his influence. Hobbes first brought to the table the relationship between citizen and state, between power and law, and he did so in a provocative and productive way that invited reflection. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for example, said that the struggle of all against all in bourgeois society was by no means over, but on the contrary, was just beginning.

Historical Context

The fundamental idea of Leviathan - war as the principle of human existence - stems from Hobbes' experience. In the England of 1642, a civil war erupted between the old nobility, with King Charles I and Parliament at the helm. Additionally, the bloody war against Spain overshadowed English politics, and various confessions intervened in the military actions. The war ended with the execution of the king in 1649. For the first time in human history, a king was not executed by an enemy, but as a result of a parliamentary decision. The monarchy was temporarily dissolved, and a republic was established in its place. Hobbes himself spoke of revolution: for him, it was clear that what had been up was now down. For this reason, his quest focused on a reasonable and orderly state, on a strong and centralized power that would control chaos and nonetheless be capable of guaranteeing the happiness and well-being of all. From this also arises his desire for a concentrated, indivisible power, impossible to be limited by the intervention of subjects or ecclesiastical power: any kind of fragmentation, according to his experience, would lead to social disorder and dissatisfaction.

Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, commonly called Leviathan, is the most famous book of the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Published in 1651, its title refers to the biblical monster Leviathan, of immense power ("None is so fierce that dare stir him up... Of his greatnesse there is no end, no, not so much as to be comprehended... He is King over all the children of pride"). Hobbes' work, markedly materialistic, can be understood as a justification of absolute state, as well as the theoretical proposition of the social contract, and establishes a doctrine of modern law as the basis for societies and legitimate governments.

Hobbes wrote Leviathan during his exile in France. He was already over 60 years old and, due to the paralysis that afflicted him, he was forced to hire a scribe. He had already prepared passages on the natural state and the socialization of man in his work De Cive (On the Citizen), which dealt with civil society. In 1650, he completed the first 37 chapters of Leviathan and a year later published the work in England along with De Cive. At the same time, in the Parisian court of the exiles of Charles II, complaints against Hobbes were piling up, accusing him of being an atheist and a traitor. Indeed, he had become more radical.

Unlike his earlier works, Leviathan shows him more determined and no longer takes into account traditions or political ties. His thinking had reached its zenith and he radically completed all the steps he had formulated with caution in his previous writings. This lack of compromise earned him political enemies: his opponents, more interested in the modifications of political power of the time, used it to isolate him from the court. For this reason, in the same year, he fled to England, where his most famous work was published. However, he did not obtain authorization to publish a Latin translation of his book (at that time, Latin was the usual language among academics and scientists). This led to the translation appearing in Amsterdam. Since the first edition in 1651, Leviathan was only reissued in England in 1840.

The State protects man from himself

Security or freedom. Thomas Hobbes resolves this classic question of political theory in a provocative manner in his Leviathan. He supposes that men relinquish their political freedom and voluntarily subordinate themselves to the power of the State. However, this is a high price to pay to guarantee physical and vital security. The possibility of achieving well-being and acquiring property can only be ensured if a sovereign, centralized, strong, and absolute State regulates politics. Hobbes's theory is influenced by the chaos of the English Civil War (1642-1649), which he experienced, but it goes much beyond that. This is the first time that a statesman asserts that men create their own society by signing a social contract. This idea as the basis of human coexistence is modern and liberal. With this, the notion of God as creator and guarantor of the State disappears. Although the State must be in accordance with Christian principles, the Church cannot exert influence on it. The foundation of the State is reason and it is also the basis of Hobbes's philosophy: to think for oneself and not to believe in authorities, this is the idea that runs through his entire work with refreshing clarity.

Key Ideas in Leviathan

• Leviathan is one of the most important works of modern state theory.

• Hobbes starts from homo homini lupus, that man is a wolf to man.

• Since man is not gregarious, moral, or social by nature, a state of war of all against all prevails in the natural state.

• Hobbes's pessimistic view of human nature has a historical basis: he experienced the bloody English Civil War, which weakened the power held by the State.

• To escape their mortal natural state, men agree to a social contract and cede their political power to a sovereign.

• Subjects owe obedience to the sovereign. In exchange, he offers them security, protection, and well-being through economic freedom of action.

• Citizens can rebel in only one case: when the State is unable to protect them.

• The power of the State cannot be divided, so the Church should not have earthly influence.

• Hobbes does not justify his social theory with divine benevolence, but with human reason: a paradigm shift and the beginning of modern political theory.

• Leviathan is originally a fabulous being from classical mythology: a gigantic sea monster, half fish, half whale, that devours men.

• Hobbes chose this name for his model of the state because the monster does not need to respect anyone, but respects those who pay homage to it.

• This vision of the authoritarian State makes the work remain controversial.

LEVIATHAN

TO MY MOST HONOR’D FRIEND Mr FRANCIS GODOLPHIN

of Godolphin.

Honor’d Sir

Your most worthy Brother Mr. Sidney Godolphin, when he lived, was pleas’d to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with real testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any virtue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civil Society, or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature. Therefore, in honor and gratitude to him, and with devotion to yourself, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse of Common-wealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favor it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, ‘tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavor to advance the Civil Power, should not be by the Civil Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and impartial creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noise defended those within it, not because they were they, but there,) offending none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favor them. That which perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alleged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are the Outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugn the Civil Power. If notwithstanding this, you find my labor generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and say I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honored your Brother, and honor you, and have presum’d on that, to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

Sir,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant,

Paris

April 15/25. 1651

Tho. Hobbes.

Part I - OF MAN

Chapter I - Of Sense

Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or dependence upon one another. Singly, they are everyone a Representation or Appearance, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Ears, and other parts of man’s body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Appearances.

The Original of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is no conception in a man’s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that original.

To know the natural cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the External Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediately, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavor of the heart, to deliver itself: which endeavor because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call Sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye, in a Light, or Color figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostril, in an Odor; To the Tongue and Palate, in a Savor; And to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardness, Softness, and such other qualities, as we discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they anything else, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their appearance to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Ears, produceth a dinner; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those Colors, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could not be severed from them, as by glasses, and in Echoes by reflection, we see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the appearance, in another. And though at some certain distance, the real, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our Eyes, Ears, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schools, through all the Universities of Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a visible species (in English) a visible shew, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an Audible species, that is, an Audible aspect, or Audible being seen; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which coming into the Understanding, makes us Understand. I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.

Chapter II - Of Imagination.

That when a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stirre it, it will lye still forever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change itself,) is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think everything else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schools say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite and Knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something else hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internal parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies appearance, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking.

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their virtue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore, the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continual change of man’s body, destroys in time the parts which in sense were moved; So that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which we look at, appears dime, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voices grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and we lose (for example) of Cities we have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself, (I mean fancy itself,) we call Imagination, as I said before: But when we would express the decay, and signifies that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for diver’s considerations hath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of manythings, is called Experience. Again, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of another man; as when a man imagines himself a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind. There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense: As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehemently attent upon Geometrical Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into men’s discourse.

Dreams.

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcels in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of External Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of man’s body; which inward parts, for the connection they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must needs be more clear, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to passe, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly betwen Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreams, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my self-awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Fear, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearful object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocal:) And that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the overheating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner; as natural kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while we sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn. In summer, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.

Apparitions or Visions.

The most difficult discerning of a man’s Dream, from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easy to happen to a man full of fearful thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Julius Cœsar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus Cæsar, he saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which fear, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or anything but a Vision. And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies; and believe they see spirits and dead men’s Ghosts walking in Church-yards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or else the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious fear, to passe disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any real power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false believe they have, that they can do such mischief, joined with their purpose to do it if they can: their trade being nearer to a new Religion, then to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make unnatural Apparitions: But that he does it so often, as men need to fear such things, more than they fear the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evil men under pretext that God can do anything, are so bold as to say anything when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schools: but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and Evil thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powered (infused) into a man, by God, and Evil ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding.

The Imagination that is raised in man (or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signs, is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custom will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other forms of Speech: And of this kind of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

Chapter III - Of the Consequence or Trayne of Imaginations.

By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) Mental Discourse.

When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former coming again to take place, and be prædominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in time, that in the Imagining of anything, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne of Thoughts unguided.

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mental Discourse, is unguided. two sorts. The first is Unguided, without Designe, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of anything; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohærence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the ware, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne of Thoughts regulated.

The second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire, and designed. For the impression made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this precept, which is now worn out, Respice finem; this is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

Remembrance.

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensual, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summer, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designed, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention which the Latines call Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein he misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it, as it were a Re-conning of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewel; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he finds a sent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence.

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdom; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldom fail him. The Present onely has a being in Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signs to guess by.

Signs.

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesses, has most Signs, whereby to guess at the Future time; and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equaled by any advantage of natural and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture of the time past.

As Prudence is a Præsumtion of the Future, contracted from the Experience of time Past: So there is a Præsumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil war, and then to ruine; upon the sight of the ruines of any other State, will guess, the like ware, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience.

There is no other act of man’s mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and increased by study and industry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore, there is no Idea, or conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honor him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing anything, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must conceive it in some place; and indeed with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolmen.

Chapter IV - Of Speech.

Original of Speech.

The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phænicia. A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the diver’s motions of the Tongue, Palate, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of Speech, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connection; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutual utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find anything in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colors, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as General, Special, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are useful; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other insignificant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into several parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.

The use of Speech.

The general use of Speech, is to transferre our Mental Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labor, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifies (by their connection and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this use they are called Signs. Special uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, we find to be the cause of anything, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsel, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses of Speech.

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connection of them.

Names Proper & Common.

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter, John, this man, this Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of diver’s particular things; in respect of all Universal. which together, it is called a Universal; there being nothing in the world Universal but Names; for the things named, are everyone of them Individual and Singular.

One Universal name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universal, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the less large: and some again of equal extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is of larger signification than the word Man, and comprehendeth it; and the names Man and Rational, are of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another But here we must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely Word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, He that in his actions observeth the Lawes of his Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equal to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shown him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labor, whether the three angles of that also be equal to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these general terms, Every triangle hath its three angles equal to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registered and remembered, as a Universal rule; and discharges our mental reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labor of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.

But the use of words in registering our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbring. A natural foole that could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may observe every streak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what hour it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numeral words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to adde, and subtract, and perform all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joined together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, a man is a living creature; or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature, If the later name Living creature, signifies all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is true; otherwise false. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither Truth nor Falsehood. Error there may be, as when we expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

Necessity of Definitions.

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the only Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them himself. For the errors of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little summers were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature itself cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become wiser, or madder than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise men’s counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject to Names.

Subject to Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an account; and be added one to another to make a summer; or subtract ted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word λόγος, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called Syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for diver’s accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversely wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure general heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which names the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, &c.; and then, of the name of the thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a name for that accident, which we consider; and for living put into the account life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like: And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called names Abstract; because severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction: as when anything is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing itself; but the sight, the Color, the Idea of it in the fancy: and when anything is heard, we reckon it not; but the hearing, or sound only, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Use of Names Positive.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, general, universal, special, œquivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandment, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other such, are names of Speeches. And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Negative Names with their Uses.

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifies that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing, no man, infinite, inducible, three want foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of anything; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words insignificant.

All other Names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof there have been abundance coined by School-men, and pusled Philosophers.