Moltke Meets Confucius E-Book

Dominik Thoma

• Herausgeber: Tectum
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 218

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

The global business environment is becoming more complex and business activities are increasing in speed. In this volatile environment, companies will need to adjust their approach to strategy, their organizational setup and leadership model in order to be sustainably successful. In military history, armies have gone through the same development. Since the 19th century the concept of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik) has been proven to offer superior performance and competitive advantages through systematic empowerment of employees, decentralised decision-making and allowing (calculated) risk-taking under the severest and most demanding situation: war. In the first part of this book, the historical development of Mission Command is reconstructed and key elements derived. Readers will gain a deeper understanding of the concept of Mission Command, in what situations its application is beneficial, and what is needed for its successful implementation. In the second part, the potential as well as the limitations of Mission Command in China are analysed by contrasting the requirements with findings on Chinese national culture and leadership. This is particularly useful for Chinese and Western leaders of Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME) working in cross-cultural environments and will enable them to apply an appropriate leadership style when setting up, expanding, or reorganising their operations in China.

Leseprobe

Dominik Thoma

Moltke Meets Confucius

Dominik Thoma

Moltke Meets Confucius

The Possibility of Mission Command in China

Tectum Verlag

Dominik Thoma

Moltke Meets Confucius. The Possibility of Mission Command in China

© Tectum Verlag Marburg, 2016

ISBN: 978-3-8288-6420-7

(Dieser Titel ist zugleich als gedrucktes Buch unter der ISBN 978-3-8288-3770-6 im Tectum Verlag erschienen.)

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Abstract

The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the concept of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik in German) can work in a Chinese cultural context. The research method is conceptual and based on an analysis of studies in the areas of research.

In the first section, the historical development of Mission Command in the military field is reconstructed and key elements derived. The outcome illustrates that Mission Command offers competitive advantages in complex, adversarial, and dynamic situations especially for those players who suffer from material and numerical inferiority and need to focus on speed and exploitation of opportunities. This is a situation that many small and medium enterprises nowadays face in markets such as China. Thus, Mission Command could serve as a means of being successful in such an environment.

The findings on Mission Command are then compared with the Management by Objectives (MbO) approach, which was originally intended to be the transfer of Mission Command to the civilian sector. The results suggest that (especially the practical) implementation of MbO is not a direct or complete transfer of the Mission Command concept from the military to the business world. Mission Command and MbO are then reflected against motivational theories such as the Goal-Setting theory and the Social Cognitive theory to explain why Mission Command leads to superior performance. Finally, requirements for a successful application of Mission Command in the areas of Leadership and Education and Professional training are examined.

In a next section, on Chinese national culture, Leadership and Education is analysed using the GLOBE research data as the main basis. In the last part of the thesis the preceding findings are contrasted in order to answer the research question. This thesis argues that the full implementation of Mission Command in a Chinese cultural context would to a high likelihood not work because it would meet various impeding obstacles, such as the focus on independent action, the need for transient structures, and the systematic empowerment of employees under Mission Command.

Key words: Cross-cultural differences; China; Leadership theory; Motivation theory; Mission Command; Auftragstaktik; Management by Objectives

摘要

本篇论文的主要目的是确定“任务命令”式管理在中国文化环境中是否可行。研究方法基于理念和对相关领域研究成果的分析。

在第一部分里,任务命令在军事领域的历史发展中进行了重组以及形成了关键要素。结果表明任务命令能够在复杂，对抗以及动态情况下，尤其是对那些遭受物资和人员劣势情况下需要关注速度和开发机遇的玩家们提供极具竞争力的优势，这是当今许多中小型企业家在类似于中国的市场中面临的情况。因此，任务命令可以成为在此环境中获得成功的一个途径。

把任务命令中的发现和目标管理（MbO）途径进行比较，本来的意图是将任务命令由军用转到民用。结果显示（特别是实际中）实施MbO并不是直接或完全地把任务命令中的概念从军用转移到商业用途。任务命令和MbO反映对激励理论，如目标设置理论和社会认知理论来解释为什么任务命令带来更出色的性能。最后，任务命令在领导力和教育专业培训领域的成功应用的要素被提取了出来。

接下来，用GLOBE研究数据为主要依据分析以领导力和教育为重点的中国民族文化。在论文的最后部分对前面的调查发现进行对比以回答所研究的问题。本文认为在中国的文化背景下全面落实任务命令很可能无法发挥其应有的作用，因为它会遭遇各种阻碍，例如专注于独立行动，瞬态结构的需求，以及任务命令下的系统权利问题。

关键词：跨文化差异，中国，领导力理论，激励理论，任务明命令，目标管理

Preface

I still remember my first school lessons in Latin, when our teacher introduced us to Roman mythology. This was the initial spark for my interest in history, which has lasted until today. Throughout my life, I was devouring every book on world history which I could grab hold of, whereas especially the primarily disastrous events of the first half of the 20th century fascinated me.

However, as one of my personal characteristics is the interest in a wide variety of topics, I studied Business Informatics and joined a multinational company, which gave me the chance to assume management positions in different functions as well as various regions. I started in the area of Information Technology, changed to Finance and Controlling, and took over the position of General Manager of a German / Japanese / Chinese Joint Venture company based in Shanghai. All of these positions offered the opportunity to cooperate with different cultures. The most intensive experience in this regard so far has been a five year assignment to China, where I gained fascinating insight into Chinese culture and philosophy and its impact on leadership and the way of working.

In 2013, I started an EMBA program at the universities of Mannheim and Shanghai Tongji. When the date of the master thesis proposal came closer, I wanted to use that opportunity to do something truly meaningful to me. This was the reason why I chose the topic, which represents the essence of my interests (history, culture, management and leadership), my professional experiences (living and working in Europe and China) as well as the problems and open questions, which a lot of us are facing today (how can small and medium sized enterprises maximise performance and gain sustainable competitive advantages in volatile and unpredictable environments?).

There are many people I want to acknowledge for their help and contributions. First, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Thomas Armbrüster for providing focused, professional, and prompt support whenever needed. I am particularly grateful for his guidance and effort to bring me back on track whenever I was tempted to broaden the scope of this work.

From an inspirational side I appreciate the class of Prof. Dr. Andrew Kakabadse, which has provided me with the initial idea and interest in this topic and to Daniel Tilgner, who eventually convinced me to work on it. My special thanks goes to Dr. Bernhard Jenisch and Jochen Strasser for giving me chances to grow as well as to Guo Ximing for exemplifying a perspective on leadership, which I experienced as broad, well balanced, humane and long-term oriented.

There are many others to be mentioned, who supported me by answering questions, discussing and providing material: Dr. Kimberly Boal, Dr. Yi-Feng Chen, Prof. John Child, Dr. Mary Copeland, Prof. Dr. Jeffrey G. Covin, Dr. Henry Fock, Prof. Dr. Xu Huang, Prof. Michael Hui, Prof. Dr. Alfred Jaeger, Prof. Dr. Martin Kornberger, Prof. Donald MacLean, Dr. Herrmann Ndofor, Dr. Rotem Shneor, Dr. Lisa Qixun Siebers, Prof. Dr. Colin Silverthorne, Prof. Dr. Tjosvold, Prof. Dr. Sunil Venaik, Dr. Karl Wennberg, Dr. Chiahuei Wu, Dr. Ivan Yardley, and finally Shelley Shi and Hanson Qu for their support in Chinese language.

Last but not least I would like to thank my family, and especially Stephanie and Julius, for supporting me not only emotionally and mentally but also professionally throughout this journey.

Even if the passionate work on this book cost me years of my life, I enjoyed it very much and hope that every reader can extract something beneficial to him.

Munich, April 2016 Dominik Thoma

Table of Contents

1Introduction

1.1Background and Purpose

1.2Objectives

1.3Approach, Scope and Structure

1.4Limitations

2Historical and Theoretical Background of Mission Command and Management by Objectives

2.1History of Mission Command

2.1.11806–1857: The Prussian Fiasco As The Beginning of a New Era

2.1.21857–1871: Von Moltke and the Incident of Metz

2.1.31871–1906: The Official Breakthrough of Mission Command

2.1.41914–1945: Mission Command Passing the Trial of Fire in Storms of Steel

2.1.51946–2014: Internationalisation of Mission Command and Recent Developments

2.2Mission Command

2.2.1The Core Principles of Mission Command

2.2.1.1Trust

2.2.1.2Independence

2.2.1.3Intent

2.2.2Strategy

2.2.2.1Approach to Strategy under Mission Command

2.2.2.2The Importance of Speed

2.2.3Organisational Culture

2.2.4Organisation and Structure

2.2.5Leadership

2.2.6Education and Professional Training

2.2.6.1Core principles: Trust, Independence, and Intent.

2.2.6.2Strategy

2.2.6.3Organisational Culture

2.2.6.4Structure

2.2.7Environment

2.3Management by Objectives

2.3.1Adaption of the MbO Concept in Practise

2.3.2Current Status of MbO in Practise

2.3.3Comparison of Mission Command and MbO

2.4Goal-Setting Theory

2.4.1Self-Efficacy and Its Effects on Performance and Work Motivation

2.4.1.1The Determinants of Self-Efficacy

2.4.1.2The Three Assessments in the Process of Forming Self-Efficacy

2.4.1.3Measures to Influence Self-Efficacy

2.4.1.4Self-Efficacy and Socialisation Tactics of Organisations

2.4.1.5Reflection on Self-Efficacy and Mission Command

2.4.2Goal-Setting and Goal Characteristics

2.4.2.1Goal Choice: Goal Difficulty vs. Task Difficulty and Specific Goals vs. General Exhortation

2.4.2.2Goal and Efficiency Mechanism

2.4.2.3Goal Moderators

2.4.3Personality Traits and Values

2.5Requirements for Mission Command

2.5.1Leadership Requirements

2.5.2Education and Professional Training Requirements

2.5.3Other Requirements for Mission Command

3National Culture, Leadership and Education in China

3.1National Culture of China Derived from Cultural Research

3.1.1Performance Orientation

3.1.1.1Achievement

3.1.1.2Achievement Versus Ascription

3.1.1.3External Adaption

3.1.1.4Perspective on Time

3.1.1.5Language

3.1.2Future Orientation

3.1.3Gender Egalitarianism

3.1.4Assertiveness

3.1.5Individualism and Collectivism

3.1.6Power Distance

3.1.7Humane Orientation

3.1.8Uncertainty Avoidance

3.2Leadership in China

3.2.1Philosophical Background of Chinese Contemporary Leadership Style

3.2.1.1Confucianism

3.2.1.2Legalism

3.2.1.3The Confucian School of Thought of Xunzi

3.2.1.4Daoism

3.2.1.5Military Arts Philosophy

3.2.2Paternalistic Leadership as Indigenous Leadership Style of China

3.2.3Cultural Research on Leadership in China

3.2.4Summary: Leadership in China

3.3Education in China

3.3.1Confucianism as the Fundament of the Current Chinese Education system

3.3.2Core Values of Chinese Learning

3.3.3The Gaokao

3.3.4Learning Process and Strategies in China

3.3.5Didactics and Behaviour in School

3.3.6Motivational Aspects of Chinese Learning

3.3.7Outcome of the Educational System

4The Possibility of Mission Command in China

4.1Chinese Education System: Fostering Independent Action within the Intent?

4.1.1The Importance of Practise and the Pursuit of Independence

4.1.2The Intent as Borderline of Independent Action

4.1.3Summary

4.2Chinese Culture and the Creation of Trust

4.2.1The Impact of In-Group Collectivism on Internal Organisational Trust

4.2.2The Role of the Leader and the Creation of Trust

4.2.3Summary

4.3Chinese Philosophy and Beliefs: Consequences on Motivation

4.3.1The Level of Self-Efficacy

4.3.2The Positive Effect of Goal-Setting on Performance

4.3.3The Role of Culture-Based Personality Traits and Values

4.3.4Summary

4.4Chinese Leadership and the Possibility of Empowerment

4.4.1The Leadership Concept and Style

4.4.2The Effects of Systematic Empowerment

4.4.3Summary

5Conclusion and Future Research Areas

5.1Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications

5.2Theoretical implications

5.3Future Research

5.4Limitations

5.5Conclusion

Appendix A: Major Differences between German and US Army

Appendix B: CLT Dimension Subscale Scores and Ranks of China

Bibliography

List of Figures

Figure 2.1:Types of command of the 1888 Field Service Regulations including German original expressions

Figure 2.2:Intra- and interstate conflicts of high intensity 1945–2014

Figure 2.3:An integrated model of work motivation

Figure 2.4:Model of Self-Efficacy-performance relationship

Figure 2.5:A classification of socialization tactics

Figure 2.6:Integrated model of individual differences, goal-setting, and self-efficacy theories

Figure 3.1:GLOBE China and global scores of societal practices and values per cultural dimension I

Figure 3.2:GLOBE China and global scores of societal practices and values per cultural dimension III

Figure 3.3:GLOBE Performance Orientation China vs. global mean

Figure 3.4:GLOBE Future Orientation China vs. global mean

Figure 3.5:GLOBE Gender Egalitarianism China vs. global mean

Figure 3.6:GLOBE Assertiveness Orientation China vs. global mean

Figure 3.7:GLOBE Institutional Collectivism China vs. global mean

Figure 3.8:GLOBE In-Group Collectivism China vs. globel mean

Figure 3.9:GLOBE Power Distance China vs. global mean

Figure 3.10:GLOBE Humane Orientation China vs. global mean

Figure 3.11:GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance China vs. global mean

Figure 3.12:China GLOBE CLT dimension score

Figure 3.13:China GLOBE CLT dimension score ranks vs. median rank

Figure 7.1:Leadership CLT dimension ranks incl. subscales

List of Tables

Table 2.1:Mission Command leadership requirements allocated to leadership theories

Table 3.1:GLOBE Cultural dimensions

Table 3.2:GLOBE China and global scores of societal practices and values per cultural dimension II

Table 3.3:GLOBE CLT dimensions

Table 4.1:Reflecting Mission Command leadership requirements with components of contemporary Chinese leadership

Table 6.1:Major differences German vs. US army

Table 6.2:Major differences German vs. US army with focus on officers and non-commissioned officers

Table 7.1:GLOBE results of CLT dimension subscales for China

1Introduction

The Prussian General Staff, under the elder von Moltke (…) did not expect a plan of operations to survive beyond the first contact with the enemy. They set only the broadest of objectives and emphasised seizing unforeseen opportunities as they arose (…). Strategy was not a lengthy action plan. It was the evolution of a central idea through continually changing circumstances. (Jack Welch, 1981, 8th December, New York, Analyst conference)

1.1Background and Purpose

The global business environment is becoming more complex and business activities are increasing in speed. Especially with the emergence of the internet and globalisation, companies are facing more and more situations where traditional models, organisations and ways of thinking and acting are reaching their limits.

In this volatile environment, companies will need to review and most likely adjust their approach to strategy, their organizational setup and leadership model.

In the military history, armies have gone through the same development. Since the 19th century the concept of Mission Command has been proven to offer sustainable success through systematic empowerment of employees, decentralised decision-making and allowing (calculated) risk-taking.

What makes Mission Command interesting is that it is one of the first well documented approaches to creating a scalable system of empowerment and independence granted to the majority of members of a large and complex organisation (Bungay 2010, 78), which has proven its superiority in practise under the severest and most demanding situation: war.

1.2Objectives

Mission Command emerged in Europe, especially in Germany, and some of its elements are diffused within the Western hemisphere to a certain extent through the Management by Objectives (MbO) approach. However, there is no research available about whether it can also work in the different cultural setting of China. Hence this thesis shall ascertain whether the concept and leadership principle of Mission Command can be successful in China. More precisely, the objectives of the thesis are:

—To reconstruct the historical development of Mission Command and derive key elements

—To analyse the foundations of Mission Command and MbO from motivational research

—To identify the requirements for a successful application of Mission Command

—To derive characteristics of Chinese national culture and leadership principles based on its philosophical heritage from cultural research

The last objective is the primary research question:

—Can Mission Command work in a Chinese cultural context?

The practical value of the outcome of this research is to provide a deeper understanding of the concept of Mission Command, in what situations its application is beneficial, and what is needed for its successful implementation. This is useful for Chinese and German leaders working in cross-cultural environments: Chinese managers will be able to understand the principles of Mission Command and the requirements for its introduction. German leaders will recognise the potential and limitations of Mission Command in China. It will enable them to apply an appropriate leadership style, and to prevent them from making leadership mistakes. The outcome is particularly valuable for Chinese and German Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME) setting up or expanding their operations in China.

1.3Approach, Scope and Structure

This master thesis is conceptual and based on an analysis of studies on Mission Command and MbO as well as on a literature-based analysis of Chinese culture.

Chapter starts with a systematic literature review of Mission Command, which comprises and combines both historical sources such as Woide (1895), Solschenizyn (1971), and Clausewitz (2012) as well as contemporary empirical studies from leading experts in this field like Leistenschneider (2002), Oetting (1993), and Creveld (1985, 2005). Management by Objectives is derived from the oeuvre of Peter Drucker (1954) and enriched by present-day studies.

Motivation research as the theoretical basis of Mission Command and MbO is in this thesis primarily represented through the Goal-Setting theory of Locke and Latham (2006, 2007, 2004).

The analysis of Chinese national culture and leadership in chapter 3 rests mainly upon the results of the GLOBE study (House, et al. 2004), combined and supported by various evidence from empirical research on Chinese culture, psychology, philosophy, and the underlying ideals, beliefs and characteristics of the education system.

Finally, the contribution to the field of research through this thesis is summarised and represented in chapter 4, where the preceding findings of the research areas (Mission Command/MbO, motivation theory and Chinese culture) are combined and reflected.

Chapter 1 provides an answer to the research question of the thesis and identifies the theoretical and practical implications of the study. It will furthermore highlight future areas of research.

1.4Limitations

Even if Mission Command is a concept that emerged over two centuries, the thesis partly deals with a delicate topic: the Prussian and German army, especially the Wehrmacht. Elements of the Mission Command concept as well as the organisation and leadership system of the army were the basis for positively-assessed achievements on a military level. However, they might also have passively enabled the crimes conducted under the national socialist regime.

The scope of this scientific study is therefore restricted to the aspect of performance and excludes the analysis and evaluation of political or moral circumstances. This approach is also in line with the view that victory alone is not a reliable indicator for the performance of an army; economic or political disadvantages can outplay qualitative military superiority.

2Historical and Theoretical Background of Mission Command and Management by Objectives

In this chapter the history of Mission Command in the military field will be examined and evaluated. Mission Command is the English term for a construct commonly known as Auftragstaktik in the German military context. Current research offers various explanations for it, from regarding it as a way of issuing orders, to seeing it as a military tactical doctrine or perceiving it as a holistic concept. The latter is the most convincing point of view and will be basis for, as well as outcome of, the literature research section on Mission Command. Treating Mission Command as a comprehensive concept results in the factum that the main contributing researchers have so far avoided clearly defining the whole framework (Oetting 1993, 24). In order to close this gap, a descriptive method will be used by depicting the historical roots and context of the evolution of Mission Command as the basis for the identification of its main elements.

After that, the historical and theoretical background of the Management by Objectives (MbO) concept will be explained. MbO is commonly regarded as the transfer of Mission Command from the military area to the business world. This perception will be reviewed and its validity challenged.

From chapter onwards, the Goal-Setting theory and the Social Cognitive theory will be used to explain the superior performance reached through the application of Mission Command.

Finally the requirements for the implementation of Mission Command in a business context will be extracted and summarised in 2.5.

2.1History of Mission Command

Mission Command has been used throughout history. However, as a documented and integrated approach it started in the second half of the 18th century, when centralistic leadership reached its climax within standing armies across the world. As an example, the American successes in the War of Independence can to a certain extend be explained by a higher degree of decentralization and empowerment (Oetting 1993, 23). However, Mission Command as a concept has its roots in the European wars of the 19th century and is applied – in diverse characteristics - by all major military organisations until today. Despite this success it took more than one century until Leistenschneider (2002) described the circumstances of the genesis of Mission Command for the first time.

2.1.11806–1857: The Prussian Fiasco As The Beginning of a New Era

October 14 1806 was the day in history when the seed for Mission Command was planted (Oetting 1993, 27). In the aftermath of the French victory over two Prussian armies in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt, which finally led to the occupation of Berlin (Pryer 2013, 31), King Friedrich Wilhelm III originated the Military Reorganisation Committee. It was headed by the German military officials Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August Neidhardt von Gneisenau and Carl von Clausewitz (Leistenschneider 2002, 23). They analysed the reasons for the Prussian defeat and concluded:

—The French army was organised in a way that allowed agile action. As a consequence, the French army could adjust better to the individual situation (Yardley, Kakabadse and Neal 2012, 122). Oetting (1993, 40) argues that this was supported by the introduction of divisions, which were composed of different branches of service and could therefore fight in combined arms. Beyond that, the existence of divisions enabled a delegation of authority and responsibility, what eventually resulted in a faster decision-making process. The Prussian military system on the other hand had optimised and over-theorised the line formation over decades but neglected the changing reality of the warfare and was thus unable to adjust to the new context (Oetting 1993, 36, Leistenschneider 2002, 25).

—The higher desertion rate of the Prussians was credited primarily to the higher share of mercenaries and the recruitment practices in general, which led to the situation that the social constitution of the Prussian army did not represent the constitution of the Prussian society (Oetting 1993, 35). The French army on the other side was highly influenced by the social consequences of the French revolution (Knox and Murray 2001, 68), which were on the one hand reflected in the structure of the army (Knox and Murray 2001, 65), which was raised from citizen conscripts (Bungay 2005, 22) and on the other hand influenced by the motivation of the soldiers, who marched into battle highly motivated in the belief to fight for their values compared to the mercenaries of the Prussian armies. Lacking the moral dimension based on intrinsic values (Harrison and Huntington 2000, 77) affected the required leadership style and necessary training: the Prussians needed iron discipline and marching drill to get the army functioned (Bungay 2005, 22).

—The lack of overview of lower ranks of the Prussians was a result of the low education level of the army in general due to the prevailing view that lower ranks should not be educated (Oetting 1993, 35).

—However, the main Prussian problem identified was the systematic dependence of the individual, which culminated in the behaviour of never act without order (Oetting 1993, 44, Bungay 2010, 55). The Prussians did over-rely on detailed planning, which quickly became outdated and irrelevant as soon as the battle had started (Yardley, Kakabadse and Neal 2012, 122). Napoleon on the other hand relied on and gave tactical latitude to his self-picked marshals, which shared the same tactical doctrines as he did (Bungay 2005, 23). This enabled the French to shorten the decision-making cycle, what provided them with a competitive advantage.

The analysis resulted in comprehensive reforms of the Prussian army, such as conscription without a buy-out option independent of social status and rank (Oetting 1993, 51). Through this change in conscription rules in 1808 the army gained access to the full available talent pool (Bungay 2010, 254). Following the example set by Napoleon, the army was subdivided into relatively autonomous divisions (Leistenschneider 2002, 29). One of the major reforms was the introduction of an official officer corps, which was open to all social classes (Oetting 1993, 53). Supported by the atmosphere of the age of Enlightenment, selection and promotion were now based on performance, which in turn stimulated a higher level of education and professional knowledge, which was acquired in a dual system of alternating theoretical education at school (across troops) and practical training within one’s own troop (Oetting 1993, 53). This systematic professional study especially included the cultivation of decision-making skills (Knox and Murray 2001, 70, Bungay 2010, 178).

The official corps had the authority to make decisions on the battlefield based on a shared set of core values (Bungay 2005, 23). It has to be pointed out that acting in alignment with these values overruled disobedience with the order (Bungay 2005, 23). This development was due to the fact that orders could not take the context of the individual situation into consideration, based on Clausewitz’s dictum that “a great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is uncertain” (Creveld, Command in War 1985, 266) and that gaining a time advantage was a crucial success factor (Oetting 1993, 67).

However, until the middle of the 19th century, initiative was encouraged nearly exclusively in the higher ranks. This changed first with the training regulations of 1847 (Leistenschneider 2002, 38) and finally towards the end of the 1850s, when innovations such as the breech-loading weapons strongly influenced and altered the battle characteristics and made the granting of more responsibility to lower ranks inevitable (Bühlmann and Braun 2010, 54).

It should be mentioned that in the period between the European Wars of Liberation (1813/1814) and the First Schleswig War of 1848 the implementation of the reforms started under Scharnhorst stagnated and were even partly revoked (Leistenschneider 2002). The defeat in the First Schleswig War was also attributed to the low initiative level and served therewith as a starting point to return to the path of reform. However, as Leistenschneider (2002, 49) remarks, so far a leadership concept was missing, which could have served as a framework for training during peace time with regards to the limits and rules of independent action in order to consider the big picture, to ensure coherent action and to practise obedience towards the superiors’ intent.

2.1.21857–1871: Von Moltke and the Incident of Metz

In fact, Auftragstaktik was a concept pioneered by Scharnhorst, fostered by his successors, and brought to perfection by Moltke. (Dupuy 1984, 307)

Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke is often regarded as the father of Mission Command as he officially introduced parts of the concept as chief of staff of the Prussian army through the new Field Service Regulations of 1869 and practically during the wars against Denmark, Austria and France (Bungay 2005, 23). He strongly believed in the advantage of decentralised decision-making, high consideration for the situational context and delegation of authority (Oetting 1993, 104, Leistenschneider 2002, 59) but emphasised the importance of understanding the intention behind a command (Bungay 2005, 23). In this thesis the term intent represents this intention (what and why