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- Herausgeber: GAEditori
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020
The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, is a book authored by Gustave Le Bon that was first published in 1895.
In the book, Le Bon claims that there are several characteristics of crowd psychology: "impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of sentiments, and others..."
Le Bon claimed that "an individual immersed for some length of time in a crowd soon finds himself – either in consequence of magnetic influence given out by the crowd or from some other cause of which we are ignorant – in a special state, which much resembles the state of fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotizer.
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Gustave Le Bon
Indice dei contenuti
THE CROWD A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND
CONTENTS
BOOK I THE MIND OF CROWDS
CHAPTER II THE SENTIMENTS AND MORALITY OF CROWDS
CHAPTER IV A RELIGIOUS SHAPE ASSUMED BY ALL THE CONVICTIONS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER I REMOTE FACTORS OF THE OPINIONS AND BELIEFS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER III THE LEADERS OF CROWDS AND THEIR MEANS OF PERSUASION
BOOK III THE CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER II CROWDS TERMED CRIMINAL CROWDS
CHAPTER IV ELECTORAL CROWDS
INTRODUCTION. THE ERA OF CROWDS.
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
1. IMPULSIVENESS, MOBILITY, AND IRRITABILITY OF CROWDS.
2. THE SUGGESTIBILITY AND CREDULITY OF CROWDS.
3. THE EXAGGERATION AND INGENUOUSNESS OF THE SENTIMENTS OF CROWDS.
4. THE INTOLERANCE, DICTATORIALNESS AND CONSERVATISM OF CROWDS.
5. THE MORALITY OF CROWDS.
CHAPTER III
1. THE IDEAS OF CROWDS
2. THE REASONING POWER OF CROWDS
3. THE IMAGINATION OF CROWDS
CHAPTER IV
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
1. RACE
2. TRADITIONS
3. TIME
4. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
5. INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION
CHAPTER II
1. IMAGES, WORDS, AND FORMULAS
2. ILLUSIONS
3. EXPERIENCE
4. REASON
CHAPTER III
1. THE LEADERS OF CROWDS.
2. THE MEANS OF ACTION OF THE LEADERS: AFFIRMATION, REPETITION, CONTAGION
3. PRESTIGE
CHAPTER IV
1. FIXED BELIEFS
2. THE CHANGEABLE OPINIONS OF CROWDS
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
1. HETEROGENEOUS CROWDS
2. HOMOGENEOUS CROWDS
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER V
GUSTAVE LE BON
THE CROWD A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND
The following work is devoted to an account of the characteristics of crowds.
The whole of the common characteristics with which heredity endows the individuals of a race constitute the genius of the race. When, however, a certain number of these individuals are gathered together in a crowd for purposes of action, observation proves that, from the mere fact of their being assembled, there result certain new psychological characteristics, which are added to the racial characteristics and differ from them at times to a very considerable degree.
Organised crowds have always played an important part in the life of peoples, but this part has never been of such moment as at present. The substitution of the unconscious action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal characteristics of the present age.
I have endeavoured to examine the difficult problem presented by crowds in a purely scientific manner—that is, by making an effort to proceed with method, and without being influenced by opinions, theories, and doctrines. This, I believe, is the only mode of arriving at the discovery of some few particles of truth, especially when dealing, as is the case here, with a question that is the subject of impassioned controversy. A man of science bent on verifying a phenomenon is not called upon to concern himself with the interests his verifications may hurt. In a recent publication an eminent thinker, M. Goblet d'Alviela, made the remark that, belonging to none of the contemporary schools, I am occasionally found in opposition of sundry of the conclusions of all of them. I hope this new work will merit a similar observation. To belong to a school is necessarily to espouse its prejudices and preconceived opinions.
Still I should explain to the reader why he will find me draw conclusions from my investigations which it might be thought at first sight they do not bear; why, for instance, after noting the extreme mental inferiority of crowds, picked assemblies included, I yet affirm it would be dangerous to meddle with their organisation, notwithstanding this inferiority.
The reason is, that the most attentive observation of the facts of history has invariably demonstrated to me that social organisms being every whit as complicated as those of all beings, it is in no wise in our power to force them to undergo on a sudden far-reaching transformations. Nature has recourse at times to radical measures, but never after our fashion, which explains how it is that nothing is more fatal to a people than the mania for great reforms, however excellent these reforms may appear theoretically. They would only be useful were it possible to change instantaneously the genius of nations. This power, however, is only possessed by time. Men are ruled by ideas, sentiments, and customs—matters which are of the essence of ourselves. Institutions and laws are the outward manifestation of our character, the expression of its needs. Being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change this character.
The study of social phenomena cannot be separated from that of the peoples among whom they have come into existence. From the philosophic point of view these phenomena may have an absolute value; in practice they have only a relative value.
It is necessary, in consequence, when studying a social phenomenon, to consider it successively under two very different aspects. It will then be seen that the teachings of pure reason are very often contrary to those of practical reason. There are scarcely any data, even physical, to which this distinction is not applicable. From the point of view of absolute truth a cube or a circle are invariable geometrical figures, rigorously defined by certain formulas. From the point of view of the impression they make on our eye these geometrical figures may assume very varied shapes. By perspective the cube may be transformed into a pyramid or a square, the circle into an ellipse or a straight line. Moreover, the consideration of these fictitious shapes is far more important than that of the real shapes, for it is they and they alone that we see and that can be reproduced by photography or in pictures. In certain cases there is more truth in the unreal than in the real. To present objects with their exact geometrical forms would be to distort nature and render it unrecognisable. If we imagine a world whose inhabitants could only copy or photograph objects, but were unable to touch them, it would be very difficult for such persons to attain to an exact idea of their form. Moreover, the knowledge of this form, accessible only to a small number of learned men, would present but a very minor interest.
The philosopher who studies social phenomena should bear in mind that side by side with their theoretical value they possess a practical value, and that this latter, so far as the evolution of civilisation is concerned, is alone of importance. The recognition of this fact should render him very circumspect with regard to the conclusions that logic would seem at first to enforce upon him.
There are other motives that dictate to him a like reserve. The complexity of social facts is such, that it is impossible to grasp them as a whole and to foresee the effects of their reciprocal influence. It seems, too, that behind the visible facts are hidden at times thousands of invisible causes. Visible social phenomena appear to be the result of an immense, unconscious working, that as a rule is beyond the reach of our analysis. Perceptible phenomena may be compared to the waves, which are the expression on the surface of the ocean of deep-lying disturbances of which we know nothing. So far as the majority of their acts are considered, crowds display a singularly inferior mentality; yet there are other acts in which they appear to be guided by those mysterious forces which the ancients denominated destiny, nature, or providence, which we call the voices of the dead, and whose power it is impossible to overlook, although we ignore their essence. It would seem, at times, as if there were latent forces in the inner being of nations which serve to guide them. What, for instance, can be more complicated, more logical, more marvellous than a language? Yet whence can this admirably organised production have arisen, except it be the outcome of the unconscious genius of crowds? The most learned academics, the most esteemed grammarians can do no more than note down the laws that govern languages; they would be utterly incapable of creating them. Even with respect to the ideas of great men are we certain that they are exclusively the offspring of their brains? No doubt such ideas are always created by solitary minds, but is it not the genius of crowds that has furnished the thousands of grains of dust forming the soil in which they have sprung up?
Crowds, doubtless, are always unconscious, but this very unconsciousness is perhaps one of the secrets of their strength. In the natural world beings exclusively governed by instinct accomplish acts whose marvellous complexity astounds us. Reason is an attribute of humanity of too recent date and still too imperfect to reveal to us the laws of the unconscious, and still more to take its place. The part played by the unconscious in all our acts is immense, and that played by reason very small. The unconscious acts like a force still unknown.
If we wish, then, to remain within the narrow but safe limits within which science can attain to knowledge, and not to wander in the domain of vague conjecture and vain hypothesis, all we must do is simply to take note of such phenomena as are accessible to us, and confine ourselves to their consideration. Every conclusion drawn from our observation is, as a rule, premature, for behind the phenomena which we see clearly are other phenomena that we see indistinctly, and perhaps behind these latter, yet others which we do not see at all.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION THE ERA OF CROWDS
BOOK I THE MIND OF CROWDS
CHAPTER I GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CROWDS— PSYCHOLOGICAL LAW OF THEIR MENTAL UNITY
CHAPTER II THE SENTIMENTS AND MORALITY OF CROWDS
CHAPTER III THE IDEAS, REASONING POWER, AND IMAGINATION OF CROWDS
CHAPTER IV A RELIGIOUS SHAPE ASSUMED BY ALL THE CONVICTIONS OF CROWDS
BOOK II THE OPINIONS AND BELIEFS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER I REMOTE FACTORS OF THE OPINIONS AND BELIEFS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER II THE IMMEDIATE FACTORS OF THE OPINIONS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER III THE LEADERS OF CROWDS AND THEIR MEANS OF PERSUASION
CHAPTER IV LIMITATIONS OF THE VARIABILITY OF THE BELIEFS AND OPINIONS OF CROWDS
BOOK III THE CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF CROWDS
CHAPTER I THE CLASSIFICATION OF CROWDS
CHAPTER II CROWDS TERMED CRIMINAL CROWDS
CHAPTER III CRIMINAL JURIES
CHAPTER IV ELECTORAL CROWDS
CHAPTER V PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES
INTRODUCTION. THE ERA OF CROWDS.
The evolution of the present age—The great changes in civilisation are the consequence of changes in National thought—Modern belief in the power of crowds—It transforms the traditional policy of the European states—How the rise of the popular classes comes about, and the manner in which they exercise their power—The necessary consequences of the power of the crowd—Crowds unable to play a part other than destructive—The dissolution of worn-out civilisations is the work of the crowd—General ignorance of the psychology of crowds— Importance of the study of crowds for legislators and statesmen.
The great upheavals which precede changes of civilisations such as the fall of the Roman Empire and the foundation of the Arabian Empire, seem at first sight determined more especially by political transformations, foreign invasion, or the overthrow of dynasties. But a more attentive study of these events shows that behind their apparent causes the real cause is generally seen to be a profound modification in the ideas of the peoples. The true historical upheavals are not those which astonish us by their grandeur and violence. The only important changes whence the renewal of civilisations results, affect ideas, conceptions, and beliefs. The memorable events of history are the visible effects of the invisible changes of human thought. The reason these great events are so rare is that there is nothing so stable in a race as the inherited groundwork of its thoughts.
The present epoch is one of these critical moments in which the thought of mankind is undergoing a process of transformation.
Two fundamental factors are at the base of this transformation. The first is the destruction of those religious, political, and social beliefs in which all the elements of our civilisation are rooted. The second is the creation of entirely new conditions of existence and thought as the result of modern scientific and industrial discoveries.
The ideas of the past, although half destroyed, being still very powerful, and the ideas which are to replace them being still in process of formation, the modern age represents a period of transition and anarchy.
