The Sea Raiders E-Book

E. Keble Chatterton

• Herausgeber: E. Keble Chatterton
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

“No more risky enterprise day after day, week after week, can be conceived than that of hovering about on the sea-lanes, usually within wireless range of the British cruisers; and the narrow escapes, the coincidences, the exciting moments rival breathless fiction.”In this gripping narrative, Chatterton describes the journey of German-American liners across the world’s marine highways, through rough waters to Pacific islands and tropical climates followed by treacherous winds and snow-capped mountains.He includes rare first-hand accounts and information from the British Admiralty Archives, providing unrivalled descriptions of one of the greatest and most controversial Naval adventures.

Leseprobe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER

TITLE

COPYRIGHT

THE SEA RAIDERS

PREFACE

I - THE ART OF RAIDING

II - THE FIRST RAIDERS

III - MINELAYING RAIDERS

IV - ON THE TRADE ROUTES

V - THE ELUSIVE DRESDEN

VI - THE GREAT GAME OF HIDE-AND-SEEK

VII - THE RAIDERS’ RENDEZVOUS

VIII - THE CAREER OF KARLSRUHE

IX - KRONPRINZ WILHELM’S CRUISE

X - RAIDERS — AND WIRELESS

XI - AN HISTORIC DUEL

XII - PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH’S VOYAGE

XIII - RAMSEY AND METEOR

XIV - MOEWE’S FIRST VOYAGE

XV - LOOKING OUT FOR RAIDERS

XVI - THE RAIDERS RESUME

XVII - SINKING THE RAIDER

XVIII - A MODERN SEA ROVER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTES

E. Keble Chatterton

THE SEA RAIDERS

Arcadia Ebooks 2016

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www.arcadiaebooks.altervista.org

Copyright © 1931 E. Keble Chatterton

The Sea Raiders

(1931)

THE SEA RAIDERS

PREFACE

THIS is the story of Germany’s marvellous raids, the period 1914-18. The exploits of Emden, being so well known, are purposely omitted, but the general public may find more than ordinary interest in the marvellous world-wide organization and the thrilling events which marked the German endeavour to destroy liners, tramp steamers, colliers, food ships, sailing craft, and others. In its vastness, its carefully thought out detail, daring and originality, its bluff and deception, its amazing situations and fierce duels, we have one of the most gripping narratives in the whole story of the sea.

The author has been privileged by the British Admiralty to examine the requisite documents in the Admiralty archives, and to obtain information from participants in the case of certain happenings. This is not the story of how sea-borne trade was carried on during the war, nor is it a record of the work done by the crews of brave merchantmen. My object has been to present a picture of German-American liners and other units being sent out as armed raiders to make the seas dangerous for traffic; and to show to what extent they were assisted by regular, naval, cruisers. The problem of finding food and fuel on voyage, the ramifications of secret agents in North and South America, West Indies, and along the Pacific coast are now capable of being appreciated as a whole.

No more risky enterprise day after day, week after week, can be conceived than that of hovering about on the sea-lanes, usually within wireless range of British cruisers; and the narrow escapes, the coincidences, the exciting moments rival breathless fiction. But it is not merely a campaign of iron men, steel ships, wireless, secret cyphers, strong passions, delicate diplomacy, but a cinematograph-like panorama of wide oceans, tropical seas, romantic islands, snow-capped mountains, lonely hiding-places, and terrible gales of wind. And we can study these adventures with the knowledge that this was honest warfare. For none of the submarine brutalities and the mean tricks, the murdering of women and children comes into these chapters. On the contrary, these raider captains fought with clean hands and had scrupulous regard for civilians. The days of privateering being long since passed, and piracy being now confined to Chinese waters, there is something about this modern steamship raiding which affords in its reading a secret vicarious pleasure. Most of us in the younger days had a sneaking regard for rovers of the sailing ship era who sallied forth to “refresh” themselves from peaceful merchantmen and then go off to find fortune in another locality. We had the feeling that this must be glorious fun to live exciting life at its fullest.

So, in the ensuing pages, we shall cruise as far north as the Arctic, as far south as Cape Horn, eastward across the Pacific, westward across the Atlantic, in and out of secret bays, through mist and fog, sunshine and moonlight. It all reads like a piece of exaggerated fiction — one of those novels that make one forget the monotony of safety — yet every word is historically true and supported by facts. These were living men in real ships, and the crises were more wonderful than any human imagination could invent. For those who take a serious interest with regard to naval problems there emerges from this narrative a valuable set of data touching the necessity of cruisers. We see, as in a concentrated plan, the world’s marine highways spread out before us, and the highwaymen pouncing upon the rich cargoes. The drama which arises is the means of illustrating by actuality all that was mere theory. But, because it is a story so human and filled with the glamour of the unexpected, and the contest of brains is so keen, we find ourselves led on and on without stopping to worry about principles.

I desire to return thanks to the Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Charles Madden, late First Sea Lord, and to Rear-Admiral B. E. Domvile, C.B., C.M.G., late Director of Naval Intelligence, for the facilities so courteously granted in making researches at the Admiralty; to Vice-Admiral J. D. Allen, C.B., and Captain Selwyn M. Day, C.B., D.S.O., R.N.R.; to the Imperial War Museum; to the Cunard Steamship Company, and the Isle of Man Steam Packet Company, for valuable assistance in supplying information and for permission to reproduce illustrations. The photographs of Kent and Dresden, taken on such unique occasions, form an historical record of particular interest.

E. KEBLE CHATTERTON.

CHAPTERITHEARTOFRAIDING

THE story of the German surface sea-raiding campaign is one of extraordinary interest, alike for its meticulous plans as for the determination and daring in its operation. In comparison with the submarine efforts, we shall find in these surface attacks not the same persistent policy: yet there is a series of brilliant achievements and of enterprising successes that composes one of the most thrilling sections of naval warfare. And to-day, now that at last we are able to have the facts before us, we can view the whole fascinating drama in its right perspective.

If, however, this phase of hostilities was more intermittent than that of the U-boat periods, yet the sphere was far wider. It demanded an organization that had to be in perfect working order long before the European War broke out; and there had to be trustworthy, reliable officials overseas who would maintain this secret system throughout the months when communication with Berlin would be difficult and even impossible. The German pre-war plan in regard to merchant ships was twofold: the preservation of her own property and the destruction of her enemies’ vessels.

How was this to be brought about? What were the problems which presented themselves? In actual practice we shall observe that the carrying out of well-considered schemes was adequately rewarded: the vast machinery for assaulting ocean commerce was set going with remarkable celerity, and it worked extraordinarily well. That same enterprise, far-sightedness, and astute cunning which had built up the German Mercantile Marine in seventy years, contrived likewise that its rivals should suffer when peaceful competition ended. Germany in 1914 was second only to the British Empire as owner of steamships, but there was a greater solidarity and cohesion.

For, about 60 per cent of German shipping was in the hands of ten lines which amounted to one powerful union ready for the Government’s instant service. These ten comprised the Hamburg-Amerika, the North German Lloyd, the Hamburg South American, the Hansa, the German-Australian, the Kosmos, the Roland, the German East Africa, the Woermann, and the Hamburg-Bremen-Africa lines. This huge association represented 3,194,000 gross tons, and there was also the German Levant Line of 155,000 tons. Subsidised to the extent of £107,950 annually, the whole of this mercantile navy was in effect a powerful national combine. Down to the early nineteenth century the Honourable East India Company had been the largest shipowners in the world’s history: but in August 1914 the Hamburg-Amerika Line with its fleet of about 500 vessels, its seventy-five distinct services calling at four hundred of the principal ports and carrying over 400,000 passengers yearly, was the biggest shipping corporation that had ever existed. Founded in May 1847 with a capital of 465,000 marks, it began with three sailing ships of 717 tons, and so prospered that on the eve of war it possessed 1,093,000 steam tonnage.

Similarly the North German Lloyd Company rose to rapid affluence. Their first Atlantic steamer was the Bremen, built by Caird of Grennock in 1858, but such was the wealth of their passenger trade that in 1897 they were able to launch the twin-screw Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. It was this vessel which with a speed of 22.81 knots was able to outstrip the Campania and Lucania, and thus for the first time the “blue riband” of the Atlantic passed from Britain to Germany. The historic part which this four-funnelled liner was to play in commerce-raiding will presently emerge. Another of the North German Lloyd modern liners was the Berlin, built in 1908, and she likewise was destined to play an important part in our story. Altogether this company owned 716,000 of all Germany’s tonnage when finally the Great War broke over the sea.

It is, however, to be noted that the policy of the German Mercantile Marine was to rely chiefly on liner trades; and she was able to build her costly mammoth passenger steamers, often capable of breaking Atlantic records, because she had cleverly attracted a considerable amount of emigrant traffic from the continent of Europe. Just as seventeenth-century Holland built up a magnificent commercial navy on the herring fisheries, so two hundred years later Germany created hers largely through poor emigrants from Russia. At one period there was an average annual emigration of 113,000 Germans to the United States, but in the decade ending in 1914 this figure had dropped to only 34,000. On the other hand, the stream of Russians wishing to change their homes for habitation in North America gradually increased from an average of 2000 in the decade ending in 1874 to 199,000 just prior to the Great War. Now in the year 1894 the German Government erected what were known as control stations at various parts of the Russian frontier. The original aim was to prevent the spread of cholera by Russian emigrants passing through Germany. But the erection and management of these controls was placed in the hands of the Hamburg-Amerika and North German Lloyd companies, who continued to use them in such a profitable manner that it was most difficult for any intending emigrant to get through unless he were about to travel by one of these two lines. The Government legislation made it still more awkward and costly for these passengers to reach the United States except in German ships. The facilities of through-rates over the continental railways, and the geographical position of Germany’s ports contrived to guide hordes of travellers into German-American vessels and thus maintain a steady revenue.

The British Isles depended for its supplies and overseas trade largely on what is known as the tramp steamer, a name that scarcely does justice to the many excellently built and well-conditioned steamers of moderate tonnage. It was these vessels which were keeping the country’s factories, institutions, finance, and actual human bodies from perishing. Thus, whilst Germany concentrated rather on ocean-going passenger ships (and especially in the Atlantic), 60 per cent of British tonnage was made up of tramp steamers, and only 40 per cent were liners. All this “loose”, mobile superiority arose because British shipping had become the chief carriers of the world, just as at one period of history the Netherlandish craft were the great “waggoners of the sea”.

Very valuable, as it turned out, was this tramp fleet when the Royal Navy demanded so many auxiliaries after July 1914, and such heavy pressure was put on cargo-carrying steamers for maintaining supplies at home. The fast Atlantic passenger ships could never have had enough space available. But the pre-war cause of all this tramp tonnage is traceable to the seasons of nature. Whilst there was a steady trade to be done outward-bound in taking coal from Cardiff or the north-east coast of England, the homeward-bound voyage was modified by the reason that the earth’s crops become ripe in different countries at different times. In order, therefore, to return with such commodities as corn, wheat, rice, sugar, wool, cotton, jute, the collier must needs wander from one part of the globe to another and not according to strict schedule. She went where she was wanted and when required. In the month of January the Burmah rice crop was waiting to be shipped before the monsoons occurred; the Calcutta jute season opened in August; the Australian wheat trade began in December; the United States grain trade in July; and so on.

On the other hand, there was a steady flow of cargo borne in British steamers which also carried passengers, though these were not the fastest ships. Some liners were confined, however, to the transport not of human beings but of commodities which were needed with regularity and despatch. The collier could amble along at slow speed, but foreign meat and bananas and certain other produce must not be delayed. So it came to this: if war should ever arrive, it would be sound strategy for Germany to hide her own liners in the most convenient harbours, and send out cruisers to harass all vessels bringing cargoes to the British Isles. For reasons which will presently become apparent, it was not the best wisdom to attack purely passenger liners, nor even those which carried half cargo and half people. The finest effect would be when a big steamer was caught fetching meat from South America, or grain from North America; or, in fact, any supplies that were relied upon for the continuance of life and war.

It followed naturally, then, that the raiding cruisers must first reach those trade-routes along which this traffic should pass. For the few sailing ships which still survived there were recognized routes across the world based on the direction of the trade winds. The steamer tracks were as definitely laid down, subject to navigational dangers, as a road stretches across any country. Just as a highwayman used to find the crossways a most excellent locality for ensuring opportunity, so the meeting of two sea routes suggested a lucrative station to any raider. For example, the vicinity of the Canary Islands is the converging area through which passes an enormous amount of shipping. Hither steamed vessels from New Zealand, via the Horn; others from the Pacific, via the Magellan Straits; others from Buenos Aires, Monte Video, Rio Janeiro, Pernambuco; and all to mingle with that other trade coming up from the West Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, and even the East African ports. Thus we shall not be surprised when we see this part of the ocean off Africa’s north-west shoulder much frequented by German raiders.

Another obvious spot was the north-east shoulder of Brazil near Cape San Roque, for here the traffic divides into that which proceeds north-west to the West Indies and the Atlantic seaboard of the United States, and that which flows north-east across the Atlantic to the Canaries. It was thus logical enough that German raiders should be found operating off Cape San Roque and its contiguous Rocas Reef. The North American route from the United States and Canada to Europe was the most valuable of all. Nevertheless, it presented difficulties for a raider. Civilized warfare demands that some respect must be had for non-combatants. However much German submarine commanding officers on certain occasions displayed callousness and brutality, this accusation can never be laid against the captains of their ships which raided on the surface. There is no parallel, among this more strict brotherhood, to the Lusitania episode.

The aim of the surface raider was to destroy but to conceal both his whereabouts and his existence. If he cruised much over the North Atlantic routes, he would sooner or later be seen by some fast passenger steamer who would by superior speed have every chance of escaping, and meanwhile of reporting the raider’s position by wireless to one of the British cruisers. On the other hand, if the raider were fortunate in stopping and capturing this Atlantic flier, what could be done with two or three thousand passengers? Certainly there would be no room aboard the German vessel, and it would be consequently useless to sink the prize. Altogether the latter would be an embarrassment. Unless she were well laden with munitions of war, or carrying an impossible cargo of food supplies, the raider’s efforts would be wasted, and the risks have been enormous. For this reason, then, there was little North Atlantic raiding, except later by submarines, and on those lucky occasions when some surface raider happened to cross the traffic track whilst proceeding to or from her assigned operational area.

During the last four hundred years whatever sea route was used to India became an attractive path for the enemies of merchant vessels. In different ages the rich commerce being carried to European ports from the Orient has been waylaid as close to its source as the Indian Ocean, and as near to its destination as the Bay of Biscay and English Channel. But, seeing that under modern conditions the Eastern route passes through the Suez Canal and Mediterranean, the obvious areas for a raider must be either outside the Gibraltar Straits or east of the Red Sea. The Emden chose the latter, and during a meteoric period of activity caused considerable havoc along the Indian Ocean. Here was an area additionally suitable because there were so many lonely islands where she could arrange to meet her colliers without the likelihood of being disturbed for a while. She found such localities as Minikoi, Felidu Atoll (in the Maldives), and Diego Garcia (in the Chagos Archipelago) invaluable to this end.

Raiding has become more difficult in the age of steam. So long as a sailing ship had fresh water, meat, and biscuits — supplies which were not so difficult to obtain — she could roam the seas for many months till the hull become so foul that the ship must be careened. But the modern raider is limited by the amount of her fuel, which means that at the best she can operate only for a few weeks. Moreover, there comes a time when boilers need to be cleaned and engines to be overhauled. But besides these factors there must be reckoned the element of speed. If the raider is slow, but economical in coal consumption, she is obviously no match for fast modern cargo ships, and she cannot hope to overtake any vessel which has got a fair start before nightfall. Nor must the raider be capable of high speeds, for that would mean extravagant use of fuel and frequent recourse to a collier. Further complications are bound to occur when, through some special emergency, the engines are driven beyond their normal speed and become inevitably ruined.

Our inquiry does not concern Emden more than to remark that her principles of commerce raiding were in accordance with those manifested by German onslaughts in other waters. Her career is too well known, and it was confined to one area. At the same time her compact and picturesque adventures exemplify both the strength and weakness of modern steamship raiding. In greater detail we shall notice from the following chapters the four facts which are basic. Firstly, that when once the raider has reached a regular trade route, nothing but very bad luck can prevent her from doing an immense amount of damage to shipping. Secondly, this series of captures and sinkings can go on for months at a time. Thirdly, the raider must rely either on (a) her own colliers always arriving at the secret rendezvous to time, or (b) the colliers which must first be captured along the traffic tracks. Of these two the first is risky, and advisable only as a temporary makeshift till the enemy’s vessels have begun to be made prizes. Fourthly, with very few exceptions, the raider (however fortunate and destructive) will not be able to evade being herself destroyed eventually, so long as there is an efficient cruiser force hunting her. The chase may be weeks or months, but sooner or later she will become a victim as surely as the average crook finds that crime cannot ultimately succeed.

Let us elaborate this for a moment and consider the problem from the German’s point of view. It is obvious that if she is to do any good she must be on the move most of the time; continuously steaming along or across the steamship lanes, ever keeping a keen look out for the first signs of smoke coming over the horizon, and always nervous lest the upper works of the stranger may turn out to be the bridge of a cruiser. The suspense, the strain on human endurance, the intercepted wireless messages indicating that the net is gradually closing round her have a cumulative effect on the crew. At the end of a year — if not earlier — these men will decline in moral, a disgruntled mutinous spirit will manifest itself and the captain’s hand may be forced to intern his vessel in some neutral port. It is either that or fighting to a finish some rival cruiser or concentrated superior naval strength.

Or, again, picture the successful raider, who has sunk several big cargo ships, now reaching the limit when bunkers must be replenished at all costs, else she must give up the game. She is making for her rendezvous at the back of some island and recognizes the familiar markings on the funnel of her anchored collier. But that collier has already been captured by a British cruiser, there is a prize crew on board, and the raider steams straight into the trap: H.M.S, Nonesuch is watching and waiting round the corner to pounce on the raider and shell her with 4.7-inch salvoes. And even if the Nonesuch be mortally wounded, other cruisers will now be on their way in answer to wireless summons: the result is predestined.

But, supposing the raider has terrorized one or two colliers of slow speed into surrender and sent them in charge of an armed party to wait the other side of a reef till more important and bigger vessels have been sunk; what then? As soon as the holds have been emptied of their coal supply, all the accumulated prisoner crews must be transferred from raider to collier and within a few weeks at the most sent into port. Will those angered crews keep their mouths shut when landed? Will not the indignant master mariners inform the Press reporters, the British consul, their owners, and the available authorities that in a certain latitude and longitude the raider was last seen on a particular date? From that moment cables will be busy, messages will pour into the Admiralty, and from Whitehall will be sent orders immediately across the seas. For a little longer the game of hide-and-seek will be played, but then one day the raider has no more luck: she must be sunk or she must surrender. Her machinery has been too long denied its overhaul, the breakdowns have become more serious and more frequent. Moreover, the old trade routes are no longer crowded but empty: shipping has been warned to keep fifty or a hundred miles away along new lanes. Nor is this all. The raider has noticed that most of the merchant ships now carry a gun aft for defensive armament; and, whilst this is of distinct inferiority to the German’s, yet it is capable of holing the latter on the water-line, of penetrating through into the engine-room, or flooding the stokehold, or turning the bridge into a roaring furnace. In either case the raider is not efficient for many more of these duels. She must either limp home — if near enough, seeing that her colonies no longer exist — or she must steal through the nocturnal darkness into some convenient neutral harbour.

Whether she will be allowed to effect her repairs and hurry forth again will depend on the local authorities and the force at their disposal for imposing obedience. It is one thing to defy international law when using the facilities of an isolated Chilean harbour that cannot even boast of a telegraph cable: it is something quite different if this resting-place is Newport News or New York, with Customs officers, pilots, harbour-masters, and warships at hand.

There remains to be considered the Pacific as a sphere for raiders. In general this was not given the attention which belonged to the Atlantic, and the reason was sound enough. The Panama Canal had not been opened for traffic when war began. Still, there was a certain attraction in the 5000-mile track from the Far East to Vancouver and San Francisco; in the routes between Western America and Australia; in the local shipping between Sydney and New Zealand. After the United States had entered the war, there was an even greater possibility of a raider’s cruise in the Pacific being worth while. In due course we shall note how German cruisers, both regular and improvised, utilised lonely Pacific islands and unfrequented channels with utter disregard for international law but with considerable benefit to themselves. Romantic Crusoe-like bays and adventures, scenes and narrow escapes, introduce additional colour and drama into the story, as if to prove that the drab North Sea with its highly mechanized grey battle-fleets was not the only theatre of war.

In the main, however, it was not the Pacific with all its vastness and limited shipping that formed the most tempting region for commerce attacks, but that part of the South Atlantic where the ocean is at its narrowest and there steamed the greatest concentration of valuable cargo-cruisers. No Navy could hope to dispose her protecting cruisers so as to ensure that merchantmen proceeding on their lawful occasions should escape molestation all the time. The most that could be attempted was to be at hand in selected areas, such as those of the Canaries, the Cape Verdes, with visits to islands and reefs suspected of being rendezvous for coaling; and the patrolling of vicinities where captures had definitely taken place.

All this was far more complicated than may be immediately realized. The commanding officers entrusted with the job of upsetting overseas trade were all handpicked and used every possible circumstance at their disposal. They were able by clever management to create a sense of mysterious uncertainty, simply by ensuring that between their actions and the tidings of their operations a sufficient period should have elapsed which allowed the raider to shift herself north, south, east, or west. For the British cruisers matters were further complicated by the spreading of unsubstantiated and often worthless rumours. And in the meantime an elusive game was being played which, even if confined to that portion of the ocean where the South American coast comes nearest to Africa, was apt to become tantalizing when the hunters never came in sight of the pursued.

Such, then, were the possibilities and particular problems in the campaign for striking violent blows against the most sensitive part of Britain’s national organization. Privateering being no longer permissible, the raiders’ efforts on the part of armed merchant cruisers against defensively lightly-armed non-combatants were the nearest approach to the olden days when letters of marque were granted. Let us now pass on to watch how the Germans devised their plans and how these plans were transformed into action.