Trouble with Strangers E-Book

Terry Eagleton

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Seitenzahl: 755

Beschreibung

TROUBLE WITH STRANGERS 'Written in Eagleton's very readable, clear and witty style, this book may achieve the unthinkable: bridging the gap between academic High Thought and popular philosophy manuals.' Slavoj Zizek 'This is a fine book. It is hugely ambitious in its scope, develops an original thesis to illuminating effect and is written with a compelling passion and commitment.' Peter R. Sedgwick, Cardiff University 'Written with Eagleton's usual wit, panache and uncanny ability to summarise and criticize otherwise complex philosophical positions ... this is an important book by a hugely important voice.' Simon Critchley, The New School for Social Research In this ambitious new book, Terry Eagleton, one of the world's greatest cultural theorists, turns his attention to the now much-discussed question of ethics. In a work full of rare insights into tragedy, politics, literature, morality and religion, Eagleton investigates ethical theories from Aristotle to Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek, weighing the merits and deficiencies of each theory, and measuring them all against the 'richer' ethical resources of socialism and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In a remarkably original move, he assigns each of the theories he examines to one or other of Jacques Lacan's three psychoanalytical categories of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, and shows how this can illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of an ethics of personal sympathy, an impersonal morality of obligation, and a morality based on death and transformation.

Leseprobe

Contents

Preface

PART I THE INSISTENCE OF THE IMAGINARYIntroduction: The Mirror Stage

1 Sentiment and Sensibility

2 Francis Hutcheson and David Hume

3 Edmund Burke and Adam Smith

PART II THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SYMBOLICIntroduction: The Symbolic Order

4 Spinoza and the Death of Desire

5 Kant and the Moral Law

6 Law and Desire in Measure for Measure

PART III THE REIGN OF THE REALIntroduction: Pure Desire

7 Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche

8 Fictions of the Real

9 Levinas, Derrida and Badiou

10 The Banality of Goodness

Conclusion

Index

In memory of Charles SwannEndless kindness, endless courage

This edition first published 2009

© 2009 Terry Eagleton

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Eagleton, Terry, 1943–Trouble with strangers : a study of ethics / Terry Eagleton.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-1-4051-8572-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-1-4051-8573-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Ethics. I. Title.BJ1012.E23 2008170—dc222008011376

Preface

The argument of this book is fairly straightforward. It consists in the claim that most ethical theories can be assigned to one of Jacques Lacan’s three psychoanalytical categories of the imaginary, the symbolic and the Real, or to some combination of the three. Using these registers rather broadly, I try to weight the strengths of each of these types of ethical thought alongside their defects, and to contrast them with what seems to me the richer ethics of socialism and the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Some of my friends and readers will be dismayed to see me wasting my time yet again on theology. It is true that religion has proved one of the most noxious institutions of human history; but that squalid tale of oppression and superstition stands under the judgement of the version of Christianity advanced in this book. It is a paradox of our times that while it has bred various lethal brands of religious fundamentalism, it has also given birth to a current of radical theology – one which, ironically, represents one of the few surviving enclaves of materialist thought in these politically patchy times, and which is often more revolutionary in its political implications than much secular leftist thought. It may well be a dismal sign of the times that it is to the science of God, of all things, that we must look for such subversive insights. But there is no reason to look a gift horse in the mouth.

‘If a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics,’ comments Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world.’1 I am pained to report that when I glanced up from the last sentence of my text, the volumes on my bookshelves were still intact. I trust, even so, that this work makes an original contribution to ethical theory, if only because few such studies investigate both Hume and Levinas, Burke and Badiou. My hope is that the book will be disliked by Anglo-Saxon philosophers for taking Parisians seriously, and scorned by Parisians for finding something of value in English thought. As ever, my philosophical minders, Peter Dews, Simon Critchley, Peter Sedgwick and Slavoj Ziz?ek, have rescued a rank amateur from some of his customary errors and howlers, and I appreciate their kindness in taking the trouble to do so.

In case anyone assumes that only those of impeachable moral stature have the authority to write on ethics, I can only recall, mutatis mutandis, Marx’s comments on his own labours, when he remarked that nobody had written so much on money and had so little.

TE Dublin, 2007

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Lecture on Ethics’, Philosophical Review, 74 (January 1965), p. 7.

PART I

THE INSISTENCE OF THE IMAGINARY

Introduction: The Mirror Stage

No piece of leftist cultural criticism of the 1970s and 1980s seemed complete without an account of Jacques Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage – that moment in the development of a small child when, contemplating its own reflection in a mirror, it delights in the magical correspondence between its own movements and those of the image before its eyes.1 Magical correspondences and miraculous affinities are the stuff of myth; and if Lacan’s essay ‘The Mirror Stage’ investigated such a myth, it rapidly became one in its own right. The boundaries between reality and make-believe, so Lacan argues, are blurred in this early phase: the ego, our window on the so-called real world, is really a kind of fiction, while the child before the mirror is said to treat its image as real even though it knows it to be illusory. A similar ambiguity applies to the word ‘imaginary’, which for Lacan means ‘pertaining to an image’ rather than fantastic or unreal, yet which (like the theory of ideology which Louis Althusser was famously to derive from it) involves delusion and deception even so.

In a mirroring kind of way, the fictional or real-life status of Lacan’s argument itself came into question. Was the mirror stage meant to be literal or metaphorical? Was this most mandarin of French intellectuals really talking about something as embarrassingly empirical as toddlers? How on earth could one actually know what a child might experience in this situation? What – to raise the kind of commonsensical objection of which only the English are capable – about societies which did not enjoy the privilege of possessing mirrors? Would ponds or rivers do just as well? Or is the true mirror of the child its parent or carer, who by investing different parts of its body (face, orifices, etc.) with variable degrees of intensity, builds up for the infant a somatic self-portrait? Are our bodies, like our desire, constituted by the Other? How odd, in any case, that such a momentous piece of theorising should be based on that most fictive and primitive of all human activities, play and play-acting! Playacting, to be sure, as well as play – for the child jubilantly imitating its own motions in the mirror is a mimic, a miniscule magician who can alter reality simply by raising his hand, an actor performing before an appreciative audience of one, a pocket-sized artist who revels in his ability to shape and transform his product at the flick of a finger or the turn of a head. To perform in front of a mirror involves a kind of infinite regress or mise en abyme, as the Gestalt in the glass beams approvingly at the child’s endeavours, thus provoking his smile, which in turn cues another supportive sign of delight from the reflection, and so on. We shall see something of the same dialectic later, in – of all things – eighteenth-century moral philosophy.

It was not, to be sure, as though the cultural theorists of the time were particularly enthralled by the topic of child development. The importance of Lacan’s lecture lay in its illustration of the imaginary – that strange realm of the human psyche in which subjects and objects (if we can even speak of such a division at this early point) appear constantly to exchange places and live each other’s lives. In this play of projecting and reflecting, things seem to pass in and out of each other without mediation, feel one another from the inside with all the sensuous immediacy with which they experience their own interiors. It is as though you can put yourself in the very place from which you are being observed, or see yourself at the same time from the inside and outside. Psychology is only just beginning to understand the neural mechanisms by which a very small infant can playfully imitate an adult’s facial expression, in a complex set of reflections from outside to inside to outside again.2 As Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes:

A baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my teeth and pretend to bite it. And yet it has scarcely looked at its face in a glass, and its teeth are not in any case like mine. The fact is that its own mouth and teeth, as it feels them from the inside, are immediately, for it, an apparatus to bite with, and my jaw, as the baby sees it from the outside, is immediately, for it, capable of the same intentions.3

The imaginary is a realm in which things give us back ourselves, if only we had a determinate enough self to appreciate it. It is a prelapsarian domain, in which knowledge is as swift and sure as a sensation.

In this peculiar configuration of psychic space, where there is as yet no clearly organised ego or centre of consciousness, there can be no genuine otherness. My interiority is somehow ‘out there’, as one phenomenon among others, while whatever is out there is on intimate terms with me, part of my inner stuff. Yet I also feel my inner life as alien and estranged, as though a piece of my selfhood has been captivated by an image and reified by it. This image seems able to exert a power over me which both does and does not spring from myself. In the domain of the imaginary, then, it is not apparent whether I am myself or another, inside or outside myself, behind or before the mirror. One can imagine this as capturing something of the experience of the small infant nursed by its mother, who uses her breast as though it were its own organ; but it is also, as far as objects which are ambiguously inside and outside us goes, a matter of those ‘part-objects’, bits of the body extruded into the external world (faeces, breast milk and the like), which Melanie Klein portrays as transitional between self and other, subject and object, and which Lacan himself describes as the very stuff, lining or imaginary filling of the human subject.

This is why the imaginary involves what is technically known as transi-tivism, in which, as in some primitive bond of sympathy, a small child may cry when another child takes a tumble, or claim to have been struck himself when he strikes a companion. The eighteenth-century philosopher Adam Smith is much taken with this phenomenon, writing as he does in his Theory of Moral Sentiments of how, ‘when we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm’. Transitivism is just a peculiarly graphic instance of sympathetic mimicry as such, which remains to some extent a bodily affair even for those who have managed to travel beyond the seductions of the mirror stage. This is why smiling is contagious, or why, as Smith observes, ‘the mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on a slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do in his situation’.4 Smith seems to suppose that this spontaneous mimicry is a result of what Lacan calls imaginary transposition, as we project ourselves imaginatively into the body of the dancer. But these spectators are also would-be magicians, involuntarily seeking to control the dancer’s movements by their own sympathetic swaying, as the toddler in the mirror stage exuberantly masters his own reflection at the very moment he is in thrall to it. Smith’s spectators remain themselves at the very moment they assume the identity of another; and this conflation is typical of the imaginary register.

Transitivism, then, is a kind of chiming or resonating of bodies. Those with delicate fibres, Smith observes, feel itchy or uneasy sensations when they gaze on the ulcers of a beggar, while looking at the sore eyes of someone else is likely to make your own eyes feel tender. In the end, the only satisfactory image of this condition would be that of two bodies folded into one, as Clym Yeobright and his mother in Thomas Hardy’s The Return of the Native speak to one another as though ‘their discourses were . . . carried on between the right and the left hands of the same body’. Jude Fawley and Sue Bridehead in Hardy’s Jude the Obscure achieve ‘that complete mutual understanding in which every glance and movement was as effectual as speech for conveying intelligence between them, (and) made them almost the two parts of a single whole’. The affection between Laurence Sterne’s Walter Shandy and Uncle Toby, a matter of gesture, intuition and wordless communion, is another case in point. We shall have occasion to return to this idea of the body as language later in the book.

There is a sense in which the adult version of the imaginary is friendship. In friendship, as Aristotle notes in the Ethics, the other is both you and not you – so that this merging and mingling of identities re-creates the mirror phase on a higher level. ‘The only joy I have in his being mine’, writes Montaigne in his great essay on friendship, ‘is that the not mine is mine.’5 His relationship with his dearest friend, he adds, left him nothing that was their own, nothing that was either his friend’s or his own. ‘If I were pressed to say why I love him’, he comments, ‘I feel that my only reply could be: “Because it was he, because it was I” . . . Such a friendship has no model but itself, and can only be compared to itself.’6 The imaginary resists being translated into rational or comparative terms. Unlike the symbolic, in which, as we shall see, exchange and commensurability are of the essence, all its elements are irreducibly specific.

On the whole, the cultural left of the 1970s evoked the imaginary only to demonise it. For one thing, for theorists for whom discourse had become a veritable obsession, pre-linguistic states were scarcely more popular than babies. For another thing, the imaginary was a matter of unity, stasis, resemblance, correspondence, autonomy, mimesis, representation, harmony, plenitude and totality; and no terms could have been less à la mode for an avant-garde whose buzz words were lack, absence, difference, conflict, fissure, dispersal, fragmentation and heterogeneity. The left of the day would tolerate the idea of representation only if the means and conditions of representation were given along with it; and all this, in the mirror stage, is ominously suppressed.7 Even worse, the representation in question is a false one. The image in the mirror is a deceptively unified version of the child’s actual, uncoordinated body, and his delight in it springs from contrasting this idealised whole with his dysfunctional state. The mirror allows him an autonomy which he lacks in real life. One might speculate, too, that he contrasts this agreeably coherent appearance with certain Kleinian fantasises of his own body as torn, mutilated, pounded to pieces.

The pre-egoic innocence of the mirror stage, then, seemed ripe for deconstruction, turning as it did on what was really an iconic notion of identity. This mirror is a glass in which, in St Paul’s phrase, we see only darkly. The dysfunctional toddler enraptured by his own image was as much a case of false identification as the idea that every signifier, as with an icon, is leashed by an internal bond to a single signified, which can be said to represent its meaning. In the mirror, remark Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, ‘there is a sort of coalescence of the signifier with the signified’.8 The other place where this is supposed to happen is known as poetry, in which, by a kind of verbal trompe l’oeil, these two aspects of the sign appear indissociable.9 But it will not do either to think of words and meanings as separate, as long as one still imagines that they are roughly the same kind of entity. ‘Here the word, there the meaning’, remarks Ludwig Wittgenstein sardonically. ‘The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. But contrast: money and its use.’10 A word for Wittgenstein acquires meaning through its use; and this involves it entering into rule-governed relations with other signs in a specific form of life. This, one might suggest, is his version of what Jacques Lacan will term the symbolic order. It is just that Lacan shows that what goes for signs goes for human subjects too. The toddler who imagines that his mirror image is the tangible incarnation of his selfhood is an old-style prestructuralist who has not yet grasped that human identity, like signs, is a differential affair – that it is a question of assuming a place in a symbolic order, a system of roles and relations in which you are an exchangeable function rather than a unique, irreplaceable, living and breathing animal. Elated by the fantasy of being wholly at one with himself, the infant has yet to recognise that, as Wittgenstein comments in his Philosophical Investigations, there is no more useless proposition than that of the identity of a thing with itself. The small child has fallen prey, so to speak, to the philosophical error that there is a special kind of certainty and accessibility about human selfhood.

So it is that the child’s self-recognition in the imaginary sphere is in fact a misrecognition – one which acts as a prelude to the rather more momentous form of misrecognition which it shall encounter in the symbolic order. Its identity is also an alienation, as the je, or subject, mistakes its elusive being for that of a mere moi, a determinate thing in the glass of its self-reflection. The truth of the subject accordingly eludes it – the fact that, in Lacan’s flamboyant rewriting of Descartes, ‘I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think.’ The infant has yet to learn that a subject which coincides with itself is no sort of subject at all. The selfhood which (so one assumes) the young Narcissus of the mirror stage regards as fixed and determinate is in fact fissured and imperfect. Like the process of signification itself, it is driven on by its own incompleteness.

The opposition of the imaginary, in which each term (infant and image) depends symbiotically on the other, must eventually be prised apart or triangulated. And this, for Lacan, is the Oedipal moment. The imaginary enclosure must be thrown open to the play of difference and otherness. The small child must break through the mirror of its own misrecognition to emerge on the terrain of the intersubjective, where it may alone negotiate some poor scraps of truth. For Hegel, from whom much of Lacan’s thought derives, the transition from the one state to another has an ethical dimension. The subject must be weaned from mistaking itself for an autonomous entity and come instead to confess its dependence upon others in the domain of the intersubjective – a domain which Hegel names Geist and Lacan calls the Other or the symbolic order. In Lacan’s words, this involves at its most complete the ‘total acceptance of the subject by the other subject’.11 It was not an ideal of human reciprocity he was to maintain for very long. We must cease to derive our self-image from the other, as we do in the imaginary, and come instead to take it from the Other (the realm of sociality as a whole), as we do in the symbolic. For Hegel, the most elementary forms of human life involve a non-reflective absorption in a closed social order, one which is not far removed from Lacan’s imaginary. Only when one ventures upon the intersubjective exchanges of the symbolic can one become conscious of oneself as an individual. We shall see later, however, that this achievement is, in Lacan’s eyes, never far from catastrophe.

For the cultural avant-garde of the 1970s, this shift of ontological registers was more political than ethical. The point was not to bolster the bourgeois subject by holding a looking-glass to its self-satisfied gaze, but to pitch it into permanent crisis. The former was a matter of ideology, while the latter was a question of revolutionary cultural practice. What made us what we were – lack, the Real, repression, castration, the Law of the Father, the invisible laws of the social formation – lay quite beyond representation. They were the fractures and blind spots in the mirror of consciousness – a phenomenon which itself was traditionally conceived of in specular terms (‘reflection’, ‘speculation’, ‘contemplation’). As the Earl of Shaftesbury puts it: ‘Every reasoning or reflecting creature is, by his Nature, forc’d to endure the review of his own mind, and actions; and to have representations of himself, and his inward affairs, constantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his mind.’12 Self-reflection is in this sense a kind of inward imaginary – a matter of contemplating ourselves in the mirror of our own minds, a mental theatre in which we pass like actors before our own spectatorial gaze as though we were someone else. It was this rather smug self-enclosure which in the left’s view needed to be shattered, and the imaginary subject decentred, if something of the real determinants of our existence was to be exposed.

‘A picture held us captive’, Wittgenstein writes in the Philosophical Investigations. ‘And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.’13 If Lacan’s toddler is captivated by an image or ideal ego, beguiled like Marx’s alienated labourer by a power he fails to recognise as his own, Wittgenstein’s verbally bewitched adult has fallen victim to the inherently reifying structures of our grammar, which forge spurious identities out of what is really no more than a tissue of differences. Friedrich Nietzsche was of much the same opinion, writing of thought as being caught up in ‘the spell of certain grammatical func-tions’.14 For Wittgenstein, this is a chronic form of false consciousness, language being the homogenising way it is – rather as the imaginary for Lacan is not simply a phase we can outgrow, like thumb-sucking, but the very inner structure of the ego, and thus an ineradicable dimension of all human experience. This infantile crowing and cavorting before the looking-glass lives on in all of our later libidinal investments, as we identify with the sort of objects which bear some reassuring resemblance to ourselves. ‘It is around the wandering shadow of his own ego’, Lacan suggests, ‘that will be structured all the objects of (the human) world.’15 What the child of the mirror stage needs to become a person is what we linguistically bamboozled adults require as well – a requirement summarised in the quotation from King Lear which Wittgenstein thought of using as an epigraph to his Investigations: ‘I’ll teach you differences.’

The interminable talking cure which Wittgenstein knew as philosophy is what enables us to de-fetishise our meanings. Philosophy for him is a kind of therapy, which allows us to free up those rigid, isolated, portentous signifiers on which we have become stuck like so many neurotic symptoms, returning them to the play of differences which constitutes a form of life. Or, as Wittgenstein puts it elsewhere, returning us from the pure ice to the rough ground. ‘When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” ’, he admonishes, ‘and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.’16

There is, to be sure, a world of difference between the homespun musings of a Wittgenstein, which at their least impressive merely consecrate the commonplace, and the baroque lucubrations of a Lacan. Yet the aim of the psychoanalyst, too, is to restore the lost signifieds to those who have become stuck in a hard place, and whose discourse has consequently grown rigid and repetitive. To unpick the knot of a neurosis, and to unravel a reified piece of signification, are not dissimilar activities. In the scene of analysis, they may form aspects of a single practice. One of the roles of psychoanalysis is to free us from a fantasy or compulsive repetition on which we have become impaled, converting this stuckness or stumbling-block at the core of one’s being into the cornerstone of a new form of life.17

The mirror stage, then, was never exactly a state of Edenic innocence. On the contrary, there is a sense in which it is a snapshot of the Fall in the act of taking place. For one thing, narcissism itself involves a certain self-loathing and self-aggression. For another thing, the blurring of boundaries between subjects makes for rivalry as much as for harmony. It is the kind of identity-cum-antagonism we can observe in the paranoid state, in which the persecutory figure is both oneself and some shadowy alter ego. It is what Kierkegaard refers to as ‘antipathetic sympathy’ in The Concept of Dread. One’s neighbour, Freud remarks in his Project for a Scientific Psychology, thinking chiefly perhaps of one’s sibling, is both our first gratifying object and our first hostile one. Some of her features (her face, for example), Freud argues, will be strange and threatening, but others – such as the motion of her hands – will evoke similarity. It is interesting in this respect that the word ‘emulate’ means both to rival and to mimic, to equal and to excel. ‘The one you fight is the one you admire the most’, remarks Lacan, unconsciously quoting Oscar Wilde.18 The ideal ego, which is how the infant’s reflection looms up for it, is what you have to kill.

Sunk in mindless collusion with its own image and the objects surrounding it, the small child seeks to dissolve this state of inertia through aggression. One can imagine the infant under the sway of transitivism shifting ceaselessly from the role of hunter to that of hunted, or assuming both positions simultaneously.19 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno speak in Dialectic of Enlightenment of the mimetic desire to merge with the world, but also of the fear of being possessed by alien forces which this desire can engender. In a curious, rather sinister passage, Martin Heidegger writes of how, in the First World War, troops on both sides of the conflict were able to encounter each other face to face on the front, and came thereby to identify with each other, ‘melding into a single body’ (the words are Ernst Jünger’s).20 No such imaginary encounter, Heidegger laments, was possible in the mechanised context of the Second World War. A spot of hand-to-hand fighting is more satisfyingly symbiotic than the ignobly impersonal business of slaughtering each other at long range.

In Lacan’s view, the mirror stage marks the first emergence of the ego, a function which is no more than a form of self-estrangement. Consciousness itself is a structure of misrecognition. The child’s reified reflection in the mirror becomes the prototype of all the later narcissistic identifications which go to make up the ego. ‘The ego of which we speak’, Lacan remarks, ‘is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the imaginary captivations which constitute it from head to toe.’21 This ‘rigid structure’, as intimate yet external to us as a suit of chain mail, is a mirage of unity and solidity, and as such serves to mask the truth that the subject is more non-being than being. The imaginary, in short, is a kind of ideology.

It is in just this way that Lacan’s most spectacular failure of a patient, the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, interprets the imaginary realm, using the term in the broad sense we shall be adopting in this study.22 Ideology for Althusser is a form of imaginary misrecognition, in which subject and object, or self and world, seem tailor-made for one another. Rather than being stonily indifferent to our ends, the world appears to be on familiar terms with us, conforming obediently to our desires and bending to our motions as obsequiously as one’s reflection in the glass. Yet since this image is a consolingly coherent one, as in the case of the Lacanian infant, both self and social reality are misperceived at a stroke. Viewed theoretically, the human subject is as much a decentred entity as the shambolic toddler before the mirror, the mere function of this or that social structure. But since such dishevelled creatures would be incapable of purposive action, the imaginary realm of ideology intervenes to endow them with a sense of unity and autonomy. Only thus do they become historical agents, of whatever political stripe. From this viewpoint, the Bolshevik revolution involves the sphere of ideology quite as much as a St Patrick’s Day parade.

To call the subject of ideology ‘imaginary’ is to claim that, like the child before the Lacanian looking-glass, it feels the world to be part of its own inner substance, centred upon it, spontaneously given to it, leashed to it by an internal bond. Ideology in this view is a rather bovine kind of anthro-pocentrism. ‘We are all born in moral stupidity,’ writes George Eliot in Middlemarch, ‘taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves.’ Ideology reinvents the imaginary at the level of society as a whole, for those fully evolved human subjects who might otherwise realise with a frisson of alarm that the world does not owe them a living and is as indifferent to them as the weather. Caught in this comfortable delusion, the subject can rest assured that society lays special claim to it, singles it out as uniquely precious and addresses it, so to speak, by its name. In beckoning us from the ruck of faceless citizens around us and turning its visage benignly towards us, the super-subject of ideology fosters in us the flattering faith that reality could not get along without us and would be inconsolably distressed to see us lapse from existence, rather as we can imagine the infant at the breast believing in some Berkeleyan fantasy that if it disappeared, then everything else would vanish in a thunderclap along with it.

There are some thorny problems with Althusser’s theory. But I do not intend to pursue them here.23 I want instead to explore the parallels between these modern psychoanalytical ideas and what one might call the imaginary ethics of some eighteenth-century English moralists. Before we come to that, however, we must take a detour through the topic of eighteenth-century sentimentalism.

1 See ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’, in Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection (London, 1977).

2 See Sandra Blakeslee, ‘Cells That Read Minds’, New York Times, 10 January 2006.

3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London, 1966), p. 352.

4 Adam Smith, ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’, in L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), British Moralists, vol. 1 (New York, 1965), p. 258.

5 Montaigne, Essays (Harmondsworth, 1979), p. 98.

6 Ibid., p. 97.

7 The British film journal Screen, which published some remarkably pioneering work, is characteristic of the cultural avant-gardism of the time.

8 J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis (London, 1980), p. 210.

9 See Terry Eagleton, How To Read A Poem (Oxford, 2006), Ch. 2.

10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1963), p. 49.

11 Jacques Lacan, Le SÉminaire Livre 1: Les Écrits Techniques de Freud (Paris, 1975), p. 242.

12 Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, in L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), British Moralists (New York, 1965), vol. 1, p. 45.

13 Ibid., p. 48.

14 Quoted in Manfred Frank, What is NeoStructuralism? (Minneapolis, 1989), p. 208.

15 Quoted in Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration (London, 1987), p. 59.

16 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 48e.

17 See Eric Santner, The Psychotheology of Everyday Life (Chicago, 2001), for an illuminating discussion of this point.

18 Jacques Lacan, ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, Yale French Studies, 55/56 (New Haven, CT, 1997), p. 31.

19 See Frederic Jameson, ‘Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan’, Yale French Studies, 55/56 (New Haven, CT, 1997), p. 356.

20 See Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago and London, 1996), p. 16.

21 Quoted in Dews, Logics of Disintegration, p. 57.

22 See Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in Lenin and Philosophy (London, 1971).

23 For a critical discussion, see my Ideology: An Introduction (London, 1991), Ch. 5.

1

Sentiment and Sensibility

It is commonplace nowadays to acknowledge that the eighteenth century was as much an age of sentiment as of reason. Certainly there was a good deal of fashionable snivelling, swooning, twitching, tingling, snuffling, gushing, glowing and melting.1 Sensibility, that key term of the age, represents a kind of rhetoric of the body, a social semiotics of blushing, palpitating, weeping, fainting and the like. It is also the age’s riposte to philosophical dualism, since for the ideology of sentiment body and soul are on as cosy terms with each other as a jerkin and its lining. As a kind of primitive materialism, eighteenth-century sensibility is a discourse of fibres and nerve endings, vapours and fluids, pulses and vibrations, excitations and irritations. ‘Feelings’, remarks Vicesimus Knox, ‘is a fashionable word substituted for mental processes, and savourying (sic) much of materialism.’2Indeed, the very word ‘feeling’, which can mean both physical sensation and emotional impulse, the act of touching and the event of experiencing, provides the age with a link between the excitation of the nervous fibres and the subtle motions of the spirit.

The Irish novelist Sydney Owenson (Lady Morgan) bemoans in her memoirs her ‘unhappy physical organisation, this nervous susceptibility to every impression which circulated through my frame and rendered the whole system acute’,3 but she is really just boasting of how compassionate she is. Her husband Sir Charles Morgan wrote a treatise on physiology, perhaps influenced by observing his exquisitely impressionable wife. Isaac Newton’s Principia, not unlike Bishop Berkeley’s eccentric work Siris, regards the whole of creation as permeated by the subtle spirit of ether, which creates sensations by vibrating the nerves. Sensibility is the spot where body and mind mingle. It is now the nervous system rather than the soul which mediates between material and immaterial realms. Morality is in danger of being superseded by neurology. Laurence Sterne sends up sensibility as a kind of social pathology in A Sentimental Journey, despite purveying the stuff himself in plenty. For its abundant critics, the cult of sentiment is a mark of the neurasthenically overcivilised.4 The Man of Feeling is a moral pelican who feeds off his own fine emotions.

In contrast to the frigid hauteur of the patrician, a middle-class cult of pity, benevolence and fellow-feeling was sedulously fostered. Richard Steele writes:

By a secret charm we lament with the unfortunate, and rejoice with the glad; for it is not possible for a human heart to be averse to any thing that is human: but by the very mien and gesture of the joyful and distress’d we rise and fall into their condition; and since joy is communicative, ’tis reasonable that grief should be contagious, both of which are seen and felt at a look, for one man’s eyes are spectacles to another to read his heart.5

We have here some of the primary elements of the imaginary: a projection or imaginative transposition into the interior of another’s body; the physical mimesis of ‘by the very mien and gesture (of the other) we rise and fall into their condition’; the ‘contagiousness’ by which two human subjects share the same inner condition; the visual immediacy with which the other’s inner state is communicated, so that the inside seems inscribed on the outside; and the exchange of positions or identities (‘one man’s eyes are spectacles to another’).

Or consider this statement from Joseph Butler’s Sermons:

Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods . . . There is such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and familiarities many years after . . . Men are so much one body, that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other, shame, sudden danger, resentment, honour, prosperity, distress . . .6

Once more, we are offered some of the chief components of the imaginary: correspondence, the exchange of inward sensations, the merging of two bodies and a quasi-magical principle of magnetism, along with a rather clubbish disregard for difference which assumes that others are of much the same inner stuff as oneself. Indeed, for Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, such affectionate sentiments are due as much to oneself as to others. Only those who are amicably disposed towards themselves, Aristotle argues, are truly capable of love for others, while those who feel no affection for themselves ‘have no sympathetic consciousness of their own joys and sorrows’.7 The necessary corollary of treating others as oneself is to treat oneself as another. For Aristotle, the condition in which each takes place in terms of the other is known as friendship.

Before we delve more deeply into Butler’s idea of inward correspondences, however, we need to investigate its social context a little further. In the culture of sentiment, the virtues of civility, uxoriousness and blithe-ness of spirit seek to oust the more barbarous upper-class values of militarism and male arrogance.8 They are aimed equally at the unpolished earnestness of the petty-bourgeois puritan. ‘The amiable virtue of humanity’, Adam Smith observes, ‘requires a sensibility much beyond what is possessed by the rude vulgar of mankind.’9 The delicacy of your nervous system is now a reasonably reliable index of social class. A new kind of anti-aristocratic heroism, one centred on the man of meekness, the chaste husband and the civilised entrepreneur, becomes the order of the day, to reach its consummation in that ineffably tedious prig Sir Charles Grandi-son, last and least of Samuel Richardson’s protagonists and a kind of Jesus Christ in knee-breeches. There is a general embourgeoisement of virtue: Francis Hutcheson offers as types to be commended not only the prince, statesman and general but ‘an honest trader, the kind friend, the faithful prudent adviser, the charitable and hospitable neighbour, the tender husband and affectionate parent, the sedate yet cheerful companion’.10 It is, in Raymond Williams’s phrase, ‘the contrast of pity with pomp’.11 Mildness, gallantry and joviality are weapons to wield against both the hatchet-faced Dissenters and the bellicose ruffians of the old-style squirearchy. Adam Smith sees economic self-interest as a kind of displacement or sublimation of the lust, power-hunger and military ambition of the ancien rÉgime, while Francis Hutcheson distinguishes a ‘calm’ desire for wealth from the more turbulent passions. The Earl of Shaftesbury speaks with remarkable blandness of the possession of wealth as ‘that passion which is esteemed particularly interesting’;12 while Montesquieu, whose Esprit des Lois is the source of much of this philosophy of le doux commerce, has a touching faith in the civilising power of bills of exchange.

One thinks, too, of Samuel Johnson’s celebrated remark that a man is never as harmlessly employed as when he is making money – a comment which goes to show that a falsehood authoritatively enough proclaimed ceases instantly to sound like one. As far as economic life goes, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher John Millar even ropes the proletariat into the sentimentalist project, incorporating them into a single social sensorium or community of sentiment. When labourers are massed together by the same employment and the ‘same intercourse’, he asserts, they ‘are enabled, with great rapidity, to communicate all their senses and passions’, and the basis for plebeian solidarity is accordingly laid.13 For the English middle classes of a later historical era, such solidarity would prove more a source of anxiety than edification.

In this pervasive feminisation of English culture, pathos and the pacific were now the badges of a bourgeoisie whose commercial ends seemed best guaranteed by social decorum and political tranquillity. Sensibility was among other things a response to the bloody sectarianism of the previous century, which had helped to fashion the political status quo but which now, having accomplished its subversive work, was like many a revolutionary heritage to be erased from memory and thrust into the political unconscious. Within a still despotic patriarchy, there were calls for a deepening of emotional bonds between men and women, along with the emergence of ‘childhood’ and the celebration of spiritual companionship within mar-riage.14 A cheerful trust in Christian providence was to oust an old-style pagan fatalism. A style of mannered moderation was fashioned by social commentators such as Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, one which would seem to succeeding generations the very essence of Englishness. Properly indulged in, sentimentalism allowed you to be ardent or enraptured, lively or lachrymose, without for a moment violating decorum. It is this which Jane Austen’s emotionally unkempt Marianne Dashwood of Sense and Sensibility has yet to learn.

In the domain of ideas, a militant empiricism sought to discredit rationalist systems with too little blood in their veins, embracing instead the raw stuff of subjective sensation. Concepts were to be rooted in the rough ground of lived experience, where the honest burgher felt rather more at home than on the pure ice of metaphysical speculation. It was a style of philosophising appropriate to an age which witnessed the rise of the novel. Perception and sensation – the human body itself – lay at the source of all our more elaborate speculations. Meanwhile, buoyed by the nation’s economic prosperity and political triumphs, many of the intelligentsia felt free to cultivate a sanguine trust in the beneficence of human nature. An oozy, self-satisfied air of benevolence and humanitarianism suffused the clubs, journals and coffee houses. Despite the prevalence of malice, envy and competition in society, the Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson was still able to believe that ‘love and compassion [were] the most powerful principles in the human breast’.15

Sensibility and sentimentalism were, so to speak, the eighteenth century’s phenomenological turn – the equivalent in the realm of the emotions of that turn to the subject which was Protestant inwardness and possessive individualism. In such extraordinarily influential journals as the Tatler and Spectator, sensibility took on programmatic form, as the uncouth reader submitted himself to a crash course in civility. This brand of journalism, with its adroit blending of grace and gravitas, represented a new form of cultural politics, consciously educating the reading public in the virtues of meekness, simplicity, decency, non-violence, chivalry and connubial affection. ‘I have long entertained an ambition to make the word Wife the most agreeable and delightful name in nature’, Steele writes in the fortieth number of the Spectator. He was hardly a cynosure of virtue himself: he drank too much, killed a man in a duel, was familiar with the inside of a debtor’s prison, married a widow for her money and was arraigned for sedition before the House of Commons. Yet the writ of his and Addison’s cultural authority ran all the way from the reform of dress to homilies against duelling, from modes of polite address to eulogies of commerce.16 Among their journalism’s gallery of exemplary social figures were Cits, Snuff-Takers, Rakes, Freethinkers, Pretty Fellows and Very Pretty Fellows.

Moral codes were to be aestheticised, lived out as style, grace, wit, lightness, polish, frankness, discretion, geniality, good humour, a love of company, freedom and ease of manner, and courteous self-effacement. Francis Hutcheson recommends as quasi-moral virtues in his An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil ‘a neat dress, a humane deportment, a delight in raising mirth in others’, along with sweetness, mildness, vivacity, tenderness, certain airs, proportions and ‘je ne sais quoys [sic]’.17 It is a far cry from the moral philosophy of Plato or Kant. As in the fiction of Richardson or Austen, stray empirical details can prove morally momentous: it is in the crook of a finger or the cut of a waistcoat that virtuous or vicious dispositions may be disclosed, a notion which would have seemed absurd to Leibniz. Bodies, and countenances in particular, are for Hutcheson directly expressive of the moral condition of their possessors, so that in the manner of the imaginary, interiors and exteriors are easily reversible and seamlessly continuous. In this unity of manners and morals, states of consciousness are well-nigh material affairs, visibly inscribed on the surfaces of human conduct, incarnate in too servile a gait or too haughty a tilt of the head. Dickens will inherit this brand of anti-dualism. The most admirable of Jane Austen’s characters reveal an inward sense of outward propriety, dismantling the opposition between love and law, spontaneity and social convention.18Politesse goes all the way down: civility means not just not spitting in the sherry decanter, but not being boorish, conceited or emotionally tactless as well.

The cult of sentiment was the feel-good factor of a successful mercantile nation, but it was a social force as well as a state of mind. Feeling could oil the wheels of commerce, allowing the Irish-born poet and novelist Henry Brooke to write rhapsodically of how the merchant ‘brings the remotest regions to converse . . . and thus knits into one family, and weaves into one web, the affinity and brotherhood of all mankind’.19 (As a rapaciously mercenary character who wrote pro-Catholic pamphlets for profit despite his robustly anti-Catholic views, Brooke knew a thing or two about the market.) Here, in a nutshell, is the ideology of so-called commercial humanism, for which the proliferation of trade and the spawning of human sympathies are mutually enriching.20 Laurence Sterne uses the phrase ‘sentimental commerce’ with the economic meaning well in mind. Economic relations between men deepen their mutual sympathies, polish their parochial edges, and render the conduits of commerce more frictionless and efficient. Trade, as a kind of material version of civilised conversation, renders you more docile and gregarious, a doctrine that the associates of Defoe’s Moll Flanders or Dickens’s Mr Bounderby might have had trouble in believing. Commercial wealth, being diffusive and mercurial, has an affinity with the ebb and recoil of human sympathies; and the same quicksilver quality provides a mighty counterweight to the insolence of autocratic power.

Yet these rituals of the heart had their utopian aspect as well as their ideological one. Sensibility, of all things, was perhaps the most resourceful critique of Enlightenment rationality which pre-Romantic British culture was able to muster. Feeling may have oiled the wheels of commerce, but it also threatened to derail the whole project in the name of some less crassly egocentric vision of human society. The man of sentiment, Janet Todd comments, ‘does not enter the economic order he condemns; he refuses to work to better himself or society’.21 There is a smack of the Benjaminian flâneur about the Man of Feeling, whose lavishness of sensibility, and smug or generous-hearted refusal to calculate, cut against the grain of a crassly utilitarian order. His cavalier carelessness of proportion, as well as his habit of giving for the sheer sake of it, represent an implicit assault on the doctrine of exchange value, rather like the later extravagances of an Oscar Wilde. At the same time, carelessness of proportion was just what the critics of sentimentalism find hard to stomach: an excess of sensibility means a failure to sort the central from the marginal, since ‘feeling’ itself will yield you no clue to such vital distinctions. Sentimentalism, and the literature produced by it, tends to be whimsical, digressive and idiosyncratic, preferring the pale sheen of a snowdrop to prison reform. It is in every sense a luxurious ethics.

There is, however, a need for such affective rapport in a social order no longer held together by an absolutist state. An individualist society requires a framework of solidarity to contain its anarchic appetites. Otherwise, those appetites are in danger of subverting the very institutions which permit them to flourish. It is, however, a concord increasingly hard to come by, given that social relations are in danger of being reduced to the purely contractual, political power to the instrumental, and individuals themselves to isolated monads. Adam Ferguson, in his Essay on the History of Civil Society, gloomily contrasts the solidarity of a tribal culture with the ‘detached and solitary’ individuals of modern life, for whom ‘the bands of affection are broken’. In these conditions, it is not surprising that men and women should fall back on the natural affections to secure themselves a degree of fellowship, given its shrinking availability in the social world. What cannot be found in human culture must now be located in human nature.

In a self-interested social order, the springs of public virtue are likely to appear obscure. As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, it is no longer possible in such conditions to provide an account of social roles and relations in ways which make implicit reference to moral obligations and responsibili-ties.22 Such obligations are accordingly left hanging in the air – rather as, for the more immoderate of the sentimentalists, feelings have come loose from the objects with which they are supposed to be bound up, to become strange, quasi-objective entities in their own right. Since there seems nothing in the constitution of society which might prompt its members to mutual aid and affection, the sympathetic faculty must be relocated instead in the interior of each man and woman, naturalised as an instinct akin to hunger or self-preservation. We are as much delighted by benevolence as we are gratified by the scent of perfume or nauseated by a foul stench. It is in this sense that an age of reason, for which utility, technology and rational calculation are increasingly paramount, is also a culture of the heart, of tearfulness and tendresse. In the kingdom of possessive individualism, love and benevolence are forced to migrate from the private sphere of the domestic hearth to become metaphors of broader public significance. On the most dismal of estimates, sentiment – the quick, whimsical, wordless exchange of gestures or intuitions – is now perhaps the sole form of sociality left in a world of bleakly isolated individuals. Sterne’s Tristram Shandy might be taken to intimate as much.

The turn to the subject is a canny move, but also a perilous one. For to anchor political community in the natural affections is in one sense to furnish it with the strongest foundation imaginable, and in another sense to leave it alarmingly vulnerable. For David Hume, human society is held together in the end by habits of feeling; and if nothing could be more spiritually coercive, nothing could be less rationally demonstrable. Feelings matter because they provide motives for behaviour in a way that mere rational precepts may not. The same is true for modern-day rationalism: as J. M. Bernstein points out, Jürgen Habermas’s communicative ethics are strongly decontextualising; but if their universal norms are to be fleshed out as persuasive motives, they must be re-anchored in everyday practice.23The drawback is that there can now be no rational justification for compassion or generosity, as there could be for Spinoza. There is no pragmatic rationale for it either: as the fiction of Henry Fielding suggests, such soft-heartedness is more likely to land you up at the end of a rope than to secure you a country estate or a government ministry. This is why Fielding commends his heroes’ virtue while at the same time satirically sending it up, since in such a predatory society it can only appear naïve.

Yet there is no rational justification for tasting a peach or smelling a rose either, experiences which (like a sudden upsurge of pity or moral revulsion) seem to carry their justifications on their faces, writ large in their very immediacy and incontrovertibility. If we cannot furnish the virtues with a rational foundation, as eighteenth-century moralists like Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston still sought to do, perhaps this is because they are themselves foundational, as built into the body as the liver or pancreas. Maybe in this sense they resemble aesthetic taste, a je ne sais quoi which – who knows? – we may need to know no more of after all, since there may be nothing more to know. Perhaps taste and moral judgement, like God and the work of art, provide their own raison d’être. Francis Hutcheson certainly seems to have believed so: if he is asked, he writes, why we approve of public good, ‘I fancy we can find (no reasons) in these cases, more than we could give for our liking any pleasant fruit’.24 Explanations, as Wittgenstein comments, have to come to an end somewhere; and Hutcheson’s spade hits rock bottom, in a Wittgensteinian phrase, when it arrives at the idea of a moral sense which is as much part of our material nature as sneezing or smiling.

In any case, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ seem to be terms which go all the way down, in the sense that even if we could back such judgements up with non-moral reasons, as the rationalists claim we ought, it might always be possible to push the question back a stage and ask why these reasons should in turn be regarded as good ones, or why it should be thought good to be guided by them. The question is partly one of motivation, as the etymology of the term ‘benevolence’ would suggest. Hutcheson, Hume and their colleagues are addressing a civilisation in which what is thought to be real is by and large what is felt on the pulses or the eyeballs, and which thus feels a natural scepticism of acting on abstract principle. ‘Virtue placed at such a distance’, Hume remarks of images of ancient virtue, ‘is like a fixed star, which, though to the eye of reason it may appear luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed, as to affect the senses, neither with light or heat.’25 Such bloodlessly admirable ideals lack psychological force. As far as a concern with motive goes, the philosophy of Hutcheson and the fiction of Defoe belong to the same cultural milieu. If one wished to pursue an inquiry into human motivations in all their pragmatic intricacy, one which delves into the most elusive recesses of the psyche, one would probably end up writing a novel.

Besides, in a society where virtue appears in scant supply, and where what little of it exists is scarcely beguiling (thrift, prudence, chastity, self-discipline, obedience, abstinence, punctuality, industriousness and so on), men and women are likely to demand some rather more robust motivation for acting well than a rational appreciation of cosmic harmony. Once morality grows drearily bourgeois, in short, one needs extra incentives for adhering to it. In any case, what would it mean to claim that the reasons for virtue advanced by the rationalists have a specifically moral force? What is so splendid, for example, about conforming to the nature of the cosmos? Plenty of moralists have imagined that the good life consists precisely in not doing so.

Hutcheson himself deploys just this line of reasoning in his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, arguing that rationalism presupposes the very moral sense it seeks to explain. It is a dilemma familiar enough to modern ethical theory: either we hold, like Hutcheson and G. E. Moore, to an intuitive or non-naturalistic notion of the good, in which case we buy a foundation of sorts at the cost of its utter mysteriousness; or we translate the idea of the good into some set of natural properties, which demystifies the notion only at the expense of laying the explanation itself open to further explanation, thus depriving it of the very foundational function it was required to fulfil.

The so-called moral sense of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, which as we shall see a little later is a kind of spontaneous divination of good and evil, is in one sense a confession of philosophical defeat. This spectral moral sense, which Hutcheson himself calls ‘an occult quality’, and which Immanuel Kant bluntly deemed ‘unphilosophical’, is simply a kind of locum tenens for some more solid kind of ethical grounding, a mysterious X marking an empty place in the argument. To posit this sense, a kind of spectral shadowing of our grosser organs of perception, as the source of moral judgement is in one sense tantamount to claiming that such judgements cannot be justified at all. It is as question-begging as Molière’s ‘dormitive power’. It seems that we can deny the reality of this sense no more than we can deny the taste of potatoes; but it is just as perplexing to say what the former consists in as it is to analyse the latter. Moral sense is a kind of je ne sais quoi, akin to the aesthetic faculty, as irrefutable as it is undemonstrable. Reason for Hume and Hutcheson must inform our moral sense, but it cannot found it. And this is scarcely surprising, given that reason loses much of its credence when it is defined by an Age of Reason in instrumental terms. If the moral sense is prior to reason, it is partly because reason is now largely in the hands of those for whom it can have no truck with moral ends. All this, then, amounts to admitting that though love, generosity and mutual cooperation are indeed the most resplendent of human virtues, it is impossible any longer to say why.26 Yet why should we need to do so in the first place? Is this not simply a sign that our spade has hit rock bottom and need sink no further?