Battlefields E-Book

Michael Rayner

• Herausgeber: IMM Lifestyle Books
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Seitenzahl: 359

Beschreibung

This book is a salute to the skill and bravery demonstrated on 22 of the world's most famous battlegrounds, offering exciting accounts of key phases in the battles that focus on the influence and usage of the terrain. It is illustrated with historic photographs and extremely detailed mapping showing the positions and movements of the fighting forces. For six of the most impressive battles, the book features stunning 3-D maps which focus on pivotal moments in the action. These maps combine artwork and advanced software applications, making use of detailed topographical information, light and weather conditions, to create authentic representations of the action on the day. In addition, there will be information on what you can see on a visit to the sites today, and contact details for tour companies and battle parks. The list of battles was compiled by studying a variety of sources on what are regarded as key battles in the period 1805 to 1945, in consultation with Michael Rayner of the Battlefields Trust and specialist military authors. The chosen battlefields are all served by battlefield tour companies, or cater for self-guided tours, and in each case still feature much of interest to see today. The final consideration was whether the sites are safe to visit. These final two considerations have ruled out most post-1945 sites, hence the period covered spans the eventful 150 years from 1805 to 1945.

Leseprobe

BATTLEFIELDS

Battlefields profiles the sites of 22 famous battles. Most have been officially preserved, feature interpretive facilities and evocative memorials to the bravery of the fighters and the fallen, and are served by battlefield tour companies. All these sites are accessible, fascinating and safe to visit today, bringing to life the personalities and tactics that decided the outcomes of these engagements.

The authors provide concise accounts of key phases of the battles, based on extensive research and first-hand experience of the battlefields, and explore the influence of the terrain on the outcome of each battle. Detailed cartography, exacting 3D illustrations and photographs and period artwork help to bring these historic encounters to life.

This tribute to an unidentified American soldier who died in the D-Day assault was placed on the shell-blasted shore of Normandy after the invasion.

Although vulnerable to artillery fire, tanks helped the infantry to cross otherwise impenetrable barbed wire, and provided cover and close supporting fire to an advance on foot. Photograph taken in Flanders.

First published in 2006 by New Holland PublishersLondon • Cape Town • Sydney • Aucklandwww.newhollandpublishers.com

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Copyright © 2006: New Holland Publishers (UK) LtdCopyright © 2006 in text: individual authorsCopyright © 2006 in maps: New Holland Publishers (UK) LtdCopyright © 2006 in illustrations: New Holland Publishers (UK) LtdCopyright © 2006 in photographs: individual photographers and/or their agents as listed on page 160

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publishers and the copyright holders.

eISBN 978 1 60765 354 7

Consultant editor Michael RaynerPublishing managers Claudia dos Santos & SimonPooley Commissioning editor Simon PooleyConcept design Geraldine CupidoDesigner Nathalie ScottProduction editor Anna TannebergerIllustrator Steven FelmoreCartographer John LoubserPicture researcher Karla KikProduction Myrna Collins

Reproduction by Resolution, Cape TownPrinted and bound in Singapore by Tien Wah Press (Pte) Ltd1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Sari Bair by Terence Cuneo. Major Allan-son leads a battalion of the 6th Gurkha Rifles against the Turkish-held Sari Bair ridge in support of ANZAC units.

Contents

INTRODUCTION BY MICHAEL RAYNER

NAPOLEONIC WARS

Austerlitz December 1805

Jena and Auerstädt October 1806

Salamanca July 1812

Waterloo June 1815

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

First Bull Run (Manassas) July 1861

Shiloh April 1862

Antietam September 1862

Gettysburg July 1863

ANGLO-ZULU WAR

Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift January 1879

ANGLO-BOER WAR

Spioenkop January 1900

Paardeberg February 1900

WORLD WAR I

Gallipoli February 1915 – January 1916

Assault on Fort Vaux, Verdun June 1916

The Somme (Day 1) July 1916

Vimy Ridge April 1917

WORLD WAR II

Pearl Harbor December 1941

El Alamein October – November 1942

D-Day June 1944

Arnhem September 1944

Battle of the Bulge December 1944 – January 1945

About the Authors

Index

Acknowledgements & Photographic Credits

Waterloo (oil on canvas) by George Jones, shows a typically over- dramatized version of the landscape, with Wellington in a blue cape on his chestnut, Copenhagen.

Gettysburg National Military Park – view looking west across the northern face of Cemetery Hill, with the equestrian statue of Major General Winfield Scott Hancock, who helped to secure this hill on the evening of Day 1. Cemet ery Hill was a potential hinge in the Union lines, and was grimly clung to by Meade’s army throughout the fighting.

INTRODUCTION

By Michael Rayner

Battlefields have long held a fascination for those who survived the conflicts and for those of later generations. Motives for visiting these sites, rather than merely reading about them, are many and varied, which remains the case for the modern battlefield tourist. For many in the past and present the main reason is for commemoration and remembrance, which helps to account for the large number of memorials and other monuments on battlefields. These can range from ancient trophies dedicated to the gods to a modern plaque put up by a regimental association. For many, the overriding reason to visit is the desire to improve understanding of the events which took place on the ‘haunted acres’ of the battlefield. Generals and military theorists have always understood the importance of the ground upon which a battle is fought, with the Roman writer Vegetius informing his audience that ‘a large part of a victory depends on the actual place in which the battle is fought’. A visit to this ground is therefore essential for the military historian, so much so that many would hesitate if not always refrain from writing about a battle without visiting its site. This is because the battlefield is a historical source demanding attention, interpretation and understanding like any written or other account. To understand a battle, one has to understand the battlefield. To do this, the nature of the historic landscape first needs comprehension, by stripping away the post-battle layers of development and land-use to return to the battlefield as it was at the time of the action. Naturally, much of this work must be carried out through consulting historic maps and other records as well as through landscape archaeology and geology. However, a site visit will help to support or refute ideas from the written and pictorial record.

Misconceptions about a battlefield, and therefore the battle, often occur, with a good example being the nature of ‘Wellington’s’ ridge at Waterloo. This is depicted in numerous paintings of the battle and described in many accounts, but when these are compared with one’s own observations it soon becomes clear whether the writer or artist has actually visited the site. The ridge is often shown as too high or too steep, whereas it is a relatively gentle incline of no great height, which in many ways makes it such an outstanding choice as the main feature of Wellington’s position. A visit will make this clear, but much more must be factored in: understanding how the construction of the Lion Mound has altered the ground; knowing which buildings were there at the time; how the field boundaries have changed; and how the roads and tracks have changed in their course and nature. The visit will also help with improving knowledge of the soil type and conditions, which had such an impact on 18 June 1815, as well as seeing where hedges, trees and woods had stood, which in turn help with understanding lines of sight and dead ground. Such features can influence any visit of any battlefield and, when coupled with other natural factors such as the time of year at which the battle was fought and the weather conditions that prevailed at the time, can add further to one’s appreciation of the battle and the commanders’ and armies’ actions.

This book focuses on a number of battles dating from the last two centuries that are worth a visit today. Although mainly featuring fighting on land, Pearl Harbor is included, while Arnhem also has an airborne dimension. Visits and tours can be of a personal nature, but all the battlefields featured here are also serviced by commercial tour operators. Therefore, all are safe to visit and have some facilities in terms of interpretation, presentation and comfort for the modern visitor. Battlefield tourism is a growth industry, which has encouraged the development of facilities and better on-site interpretation at many of these and other battlefields. Comparative visits to the Somme battlefield in 1980 and in 2005 would have revealed substantial progress in improving the experience for those visiting. At the earlier date even basic visitor facilities were hard to find, while in 2005 sensitively planned, modern facilities and interpretation have been provided at Newfoundland Memorial Park and Thiepval, while others such as at Delville Wood have been upgraded. The increase in visitor numbers has helped lead to these improvements, but there is a cost in terms of pressure on the often narrow roads and the sites themselves. For example, at Newfoundland Memorial Park, visitors may no longer roam across ‘no-man’s-land’ at will, since the resulting erosion would destroy the very site the visitors wish to see. However, it is surely through the increasing popularity of battlefield sites as tourist and school party destinations that will help to ensure their preservation. In an ideal world these sites would be preserved for their historic significance, but sadly economic pressures frequently gain the upper hand, with the result that many battlefields have been lost or damaged. However, by proving the commercial value of battlefields, local and national authorities are more likely to uphold the preservation of the battlefield, instead allowing it to disappear under tarmac or housing. It is to be hoped that governments will acknowledge the historic importance of these sites, and do more to preserve battlefields and their archaeology.

The impressively massive Thiepval Memorial to the missing of the Somme, designed by Lutyens and listing over 73,000 British and South African soldiers who have no known grave. The adjacent cemetery has 300 French and 300 British graves.

The reader will be pleased to know that the authors assembled to write each chapter are experts in and on their fields. All have indepth personal knowledge of the sites, gained through research and personal visits to the sites. Many of the writers have also conducted tours of the battlefields they cover, with the result that the entries contain helpful visitor hints and insights of the terrain. With the good quality and range of mapping and illustrations the volume has much that can be enjoyed at home, with the book being a likely companion through the gloomier winter months, perhaps inspiring the reader to sally forth in the spring or summer to visit at least some of these fascinating and significant sites of what Winston Churchill termed the ‘punctuation marks of history’.

Colour lithograph by Sullivan. The symbolic fall of Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo, as the Eagle of the French 45th Line Infantry is taken by Sergeant Ewart of the Scots Greys.

By Michael Rayner

The Napoleonic Wars is the name given to the period of warfare primarily between France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria from 1804 – when Napoleon Bonaparte became emperor of France – to 1815 when the war finished at the end of the Campaign of the Hundred Days. Some writers would start the period with Napoleon becoming First Consul of France in 1799. In addition, the Napoleonic Wars were an extension of the French Revolutionary Wars, begun in 1792 and continuing throughout the remainder of the 1790s. In many ways this period of virtually unrelenting warfare can be seen as a world war, 100 years before the start of the more widely recognized World War I. Fighting against France and her sister republics, satellite states and allies was widespread, not only across the entire continent of Europe, but into the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. The war of 1812 between Britain and the USA is also directly related to the conflict with Napoleon, while naval warfare took place around the globe.

The wars follow a pattern of rise and fall, with Napoleon scoring a string of brilliant victories against the armies of the opposing coalition powers, before experiencing a general decline and defeats for his armies until his final downfall at Waterloo. Throughout the period Napoleon was unable to make headway against British naval power, especially after the battle of Trafalgar (1805). On land his early successes were due in large part to the superiority of his armies, fighting in a more flexible way to that of his enemies and with greater vigour, thanks to changes in warfare during the 1790s. Napoleon’s generalship also played a part in this success, although writers disagree as to the extent of this as a key factor, some preferring to single out the weaknesses of the allied generals and their armies -- or even Napoleon’s good luck. Whatever the causes, his armies won a series of stunning victories: at Austerlitz against the Austrians and Russians in 1805; at Jena and Auerstädt against Prussia in 1806; versus Russia at Friedland in 1807; against Austria at Wagram in 1809.

The armies of the coalition had started to reorganize their forces and tactics on the French model by 1809, leading to harder won victories for Napoleon. He overreached himself after deciding to invade Portugal in 1807 and then imposing French rule on Spain in 1808, events which led to the Peninsular War. Part of the reason for this was to impose his Continental System of trade embargoes against Britain, which later led to his disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812. In the Peninsular War, Britain was able to gain a foothold for her army in Europe, fighting alongside Portuguese and Spanish forces, leading to a string of victories in the field for General Arthur Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington), including those at Talavera, Salamanca and Vittoria.

Despite these setbacks for his forces, Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, leading to the hard-fought battle of Borodino and the capture of Moscow, before a catastrophic retreat. Following this disaster, the coalition opposing him strengthened, acting in a more coordinated way than before, leading to the Battle of Leipzig, or the Battle of the Nations, in 1813. A defensive campaign in France could not prevent defeat and abdication for Napoleon. Exiled to Elba in the Mediterranean in May 1814, he escaped in February 1815 to become emperor once more. This led to the Campaign of the Hundred Days and his ultimate defeat at Waterloo, bringing to an end not only his rule, but an era.

Mack, the most effective of the Austrian generals, offers his sword to Napoleon in surrender. Returning the sword, Napoleon sought to console him with the words ‘All empires come to an end.’

AUSTERLITZ 1805

By Michael Hannon

The Peace of Amiens was no more than a temporary truce, and resumption of the war was inevitable. Following the coronation of Napoleon as Emperor of the French on 2 December 1804, the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, successfully organized the third allied coalition (see panel opposite for background).

Austria and Russia began another attempt to restore the situation to that of 1789 and Napoleon realized that the invasion plan would have to be shelved for the time being. Striking camp at Boulogne on 23 August, the Grande Armée was on the Rhine a month later. Never before had such a force been assembled and moved with such speed and precision. French organization and staff work was impeccable, and the standard of training of the rank and file was far superior to that of any enemy. It was organized in seven army corps, totalling nearly 220,000 men, including 30,000 cavalry and nearly 400 guns.

As so often among allies, the enemy suffered from confusion, not least because Russia was still using the Julian calendar, so a difference of ten days between dates went unnoticed until vital deadlines were missed. The Russian army of General Kutuzov arrived on the River Inn ten days after it was expected by the Austrians. Furthermore, they were not entirely agreed on priorities; the Austrians wanted the main effort in Northern Italy; the British urged for it to be in central Germany, with a view to involving Prussia; Russia was mistrusted by both for its designs on Poland and preoccupation with the Turks, and was anyway very slow to mobilize.

Austria and Russia were each to provide three armies, none of them in a very high state of training. The nominal Austrian commanders were three of the brothers of the Emperor Francis II, who himself was commander in chief. The Archduke Charles had the army in Italy, John was in the Tyrol and Ferdinand (with General Karl Mack at his elbow) in Bavaria. The Russian commanders were Kutuzov, Buxhöwden and Bennigsen. Kutuzov was advancing slowly through Moravia. Duke Feodor Feodorovich (Friedrich Wilhelm) Buxhöwden and Bennigsen, both waited for permission from Prussia to move across Silesia.

The Grande Armée crossed the Rhine on 25 September, and, by mid-October, most of Archduke Ferdinand’s army was surrounded at Ulm. Ferdinand himself deserted General Mack, who was thus obliged to surrender on 20 October. The French took between 50,000 and 60,000 prisoners, who marched out of the town the following day. As they did so, Lord Nelson was destroying the combined fleets of France and Spain off Cape Trafalgar. The Shark was now supreme on the oceans; the Tiger was about to demonstrate invincibility on land.

THE TIGER AND THE SHARK

During the first few years of the French Revolution, 1789–92, the other four powers were more or less content with events in France. Great Britain foresaw an opportunity to enlarge her empire at the expense of her long-standing enemy, and the others (Austria, Russia and Prussia) were more concerned with acquiring as large a share as possible of Poland. But it soon became apparent that the French were determined to export their revolutionary principles to all of Europe, if not the world; so war was inevitable.

Between 1792 and 1799 France established control of most of the European mainland, but surrendered control of the seas to Britain’s Royal Navy. The destruction of the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile in August 1798 was the thin end of the wedge that would eventually crush Napoleon’s Empire. By the time the Peace of Amiens was signed in March 1802, the situation was that of ’the Tiger and the Shark’: Britain had a navy but no available army due to operations in India; France had a vastly superior army. Neither was capable of inflicting much damage on the other. Britain therefore needed to hire some help to maintain the balance of power and had resorted to subsidizing the armies of Austria and Russia.

Napoleon, established as First Consul of France in February 1800, appreciated that to achieve his objective of European hegemony he must, sooner or later, eliminate England from the equation. He planned an invasion, and the Grande Armée of some 220,000 men was concentrated at Boulogne. Training was rigorous, discipline strict, and morale high. Furthermore, the army was now organized into corps of two or more divisions, each having its own dedicated staff officers, and its own infantry regiments, cavalry, artillery and wagon trains. It was this combination of training, morale, mutually supporting arms and organization which was to win the Battle of Austerlitz.

Learning of the disaster at Ulm, Kutuzov, whose army had at last reached the River Inn, decided to withdraw eastward along the Danube. He was fortunate to cross unopposed to the north bank on 10 November, and then was narrowly denied an opportunity to destroy the French VIII Corps at Dürnstein. The French entered Vienna on 13 November, and successfully bluffed their way across the one remaining bridge to the north bank. A rearguard action by General Bagration ensured the smooth withdrawal of Kutuzov’s force and concentration of the allied armies in the area of Olmutz.

Following his successful counterattack against the Russian Imperial Guard, General Rapp, one of Napoleon’s aides-de-camp, presents his prisoners, among whom is the commander of the Tsar’s personal guard, Prince Repnin.

Napoleon spent a few days at the Palace of Schönbrunn, just outside Vienna, where his quartermasters were helping themselves to the contents of the enormous arsenal, before heading north to join the advance guard on 17 November. Yet another arsenal fell into his hands when Brünn, or Brnõ, was captured on the 18th. The next few days were spent resting and re-organizing. Napoleon certainly realized the risk he was taking with a long line of communication requiring substantial detachments. Away to the northwest, the few of Archduke Ferdinand’s forces to escape from Ulm were being watched by the Corps of Marshal Bernadotte; and the city of Vienna was secured by the III Corps of Marshal Davout.

MAIN CHARACTERS FEATURED

OPPOSING NAPOLEON

Alexander I, Tsar of Russia

Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor and Emperor of Austria

General Mikhail Illarionovitch Kutuzov

General Mack, Baron Karl Mack von Leiberich

General Peter Bagration

Prince Repnin (Tsar’s personal guard)

General Feodor Buxhöwden

General Levin August Bennigsen

GRANDE ARMÉE

Marshal Jean Lannes (V Corps)

Marshal Jean-Baptiste Jules Bernadotte (I Corps)

Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout (III Corps)

General Anne Jean Marie René Savary

Marshal Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soult (IV Corps)

Marshal Joachim Murat (reserve cavalry)

General Dominique Joseph René Vandamme

General Louis Vincent St Hilaire

General Nicolas Charles Oudinot (Grenadiers)

General Legrand

Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières (Imperial Guard)

General Jean Rapp

Tsar Alexander I

Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières

ALLIED MISJUDGEMENT

The allied staff had also noted the risk Napoleon was running, concluding, wrongly, that the French were in an increasingly weak position. In fact, of course, Napoleon was planning the concentration necessary for the coming battle. To help assess the enemy strength he sent General Savary to the allied camp with the offer of negotiations. This reinforced the belief of the younger staff in French weakness, although the experienced Kutuzov advised further withdrawal, suggesting that Napoleon would not dare to extend his line of communication even more.

The weather was foul and, unlike the French, whose men were well fed and enthusiastic, the Allies were suffering from the cold and lack of supplies. Having overruled Kutuzov’s advice, Alexander and Francis had no alternative but to advance, with a view to cutting Napoleon’s communication with Vienna. On 28 November Marshal Soult’s advance guard was attacked just east of the village of Austerlitz and, following Napoleon’s orders, fell back to a position west of the Goldbach (golden brook). This withdrawal finally convinced the inexperienced allied staff that the French were trying to avoid a battle, and the Tsar ordered the occupation of the high ground around the village of Pratzen. In fact, Napoleon’s preparations were going smoothly. The Santon hill was fortified with trenches and a battery of eight guns, and orders had been despatched to Bernadotte and Davout to join the rest of the army by forced marching. Appreciating the allied intention, Napoleon relied on Davout’s III Corps to hold the right at all costs.

Allied staff work was very poor, resulting in a chaotic attempt to deploy during the night of 1 December. It is said that the allied commanders took a very casual attitude to the situation, only a few of them bothering to review the plan on the map. Written orders were despatched very late, some not arriving until after the battle began shortly before dawn on 2 December.

NAPOLEON’S PLAN

Napoleon’s initial appreciation was that the Allies would attack at Kobelnitz, but during the night the sounds of movements convinced him that they would actually go further south towards Telnitz and Sokolnitz. This suited him well for, provided Davout could frustrate their attempt to cut him off from Vienna, they would be encouraged to reinforce their left wing by withdrawing troops from the centre. The allied right, under General Bagration, would be held by the Santon position and the V Corps of Marshal Lannes, supported by Murat’s reserve cavalry and Bernadotte’s corps. Once the enemy centre was weakened, his main counterattack would be made by IV Corps in the centre, under Marshal Soult, with the divisions of St Hilaire and Vandamme. The Imperial Guard and Oudinot’s Grenadiers would form a strong reserve.

Napoleon met Emperor Francis II of Austria on 4 December and agreed an armistice, embodied in the harsh terms of the Treaty of Pressburg, which was signed on 26 December 1805.

At first the allied attacks were successful at both Telnitz and Sokolnitz, but staff and command failures denied them consolidation and General Legrand’s division was able to hold the situation. A thick mist hid Soult’s other two divisions behind the Goldbach from allied observation. It was cold, but there was a slight thaw. Hail and rain had made the night miserable for everyone, further undermining allied morale. Sunrise, at 08:00, revealed large numbers of Russian troops moving southward across the centre of the battlefield. Napoleon asked Soult for his estimate of the time it would take for his men to reach the Pratzen feature. ‘Twenty minutes, Sire’, said the Marshal, ‘for my troops are hidden by the mist and smoke’.

‘Very well’, said the Emperor ‘we shall wait fifteen minutes’. About 09:00, ‘The Sun of Austerlitz’ at last burned through the mist. Half an hour later the French central attack was going well, with St Hilaire’s division on the Pratzen hill and Vandamme’s on the Vinohrady feature. The Russian Imperial Guard made a spirited cavalry counterattack, which might well have resulted in a major crisis for Napoleon – had they not advanced at the trot over much too great a distance, arriving winded when joining the battle. Marshal Bessières restored the position by sending General Rapp with two squadrons of Chasseurs and the Mamelukes of Napoleon’s guard. This famous engagement was later immortalized in the painting by Gerard, depicting Rapp, his sabre broken, reporting to the Emperor with his prisoners, including Prince Repnin, commander of the Tsar’s personal guard, together with its colour.

FINAL STAGES OF THE BATTLE

By 14:00 French army headquarters had moved to the Chapel of St Anthony, where Napoleon issued fresh orders for the final stages of the battle. Bernadotte was ordered to hold the Pratzen feature, and the Guard, Oudinot and Soult were to envelop the enemy left (Buxhöwden’s force), defeat of which was nothing less than a rout. Many eminent historians claim that Napoleon ordered the frozen ‘ponds’ near the village of Satchen to be shelled, thus drowning many of the fleeing Allies. However, when drained on Napoleon’s orders between 8 and 12 December 1805, the bodies of only two Russians were found. Nevertheless the Allies suffered casualties amounting to about 15,000 killed and wounded and 12,000 prisoners, as well as 180 guns and 50 colours. French losses were reported as 1305 killed, 6940 wounded and 573 captured.

TOURING THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

Today, the battlefield of Austerlitz is relatively unspoiled. The recommended map is the 1:30,000 SLAVKOV – Austerlitz, bitva tri cisarú ISBN 80-85302-03-9 published by Geodézie Brnõ, 1991. On the site of Napoleon’s tactical headquarters stands a memorial installed in 1930 and bearing an engraved sketch map of the battle. It is, of course, the ideal viewpoint from which to view the area, and is easy to find, just off the old Olmutz road (Route 403, Olomoucke Strasse) about 9km (6 miles) east of Brnõ (Brünn). One can appreciate how the low mist hid Soult’s troops along the Goldbach in the early hours, while allowing observation of the enemy on the Pratzen plateau beyond. One can walk up the Santon hill and see the remains of the defensive earthworks. On the hill south of the village of Pratzen is the Peace Monument and a small museum.

BATTLE NAME

The battle of Austerlitz took place short of the village of that name. It is said that on the eve of the battle the emperors of Austria and Russia had slept at the chateau of Austerlitz, and when Napoleon drove them from this, he wished to heighten his triumph by giving that name to the battle.

At Sokolnitz, the castle mentioned in many accounts was no more than a large country house, which was destroyed at an early stage of the battle. The present house was built some years afterwards. Nearby, however, is a huge granary similar to the one which formed the defensive bastion at Essling during the battle of 1809.

Near the village of Zatcany (Satchen) the flat fields around the Litava river (now controlled) were once the famous Satchen Ponds.

No tour of the site would be complete without a visit to Schloss Kaunitz, where Napoleon’s headquarters moved after the battle.

AUSTERLITZ TIMELINE

25 September

Grande Armée crosses the Rhine.

Mid-October

Most of Archduke Ferdinand’s army surrounded at Ulm.

20 October

General Mack obliged to surrender.

10 November

Kutuzov’s army crosses the Danube unopposed to the north bank after reaching the River Inn and withdrawing eastward along the Danube.

13 November

The French enter Vienna and bluff their way across the one remaining bridge to the north bank.

17 November

Napoleon heads north to join the advance guard.

18 November

Arsenal at Brünn (Brnõ) captured by Napoleon

28 November

Marshal Soult’s advance guard is attacked just east of the village of Austerlitz and, following Napoleon’s orders, falls back to a position west of the Goldbach

1 December

Chaotic attempt by allied staff to deploy during the night.

2 December

Shortly before dawn, battle begins.

08:00

Sunrise reveals large numbers of Russian troops moving southward across the centre of the battlefield. Soult estimates it would take his men 20 minutes to reach the Pratzen feature.

09:00

‘The Sun of Austerlitz’ burns through the mist.

09:30

The French central attack going well, with St Hilaire’s division on the Pratzen hill and Vandamme’s on the Vinhorady feature.

The Russian Imperial Guard makes a spirited cavalry counterattack, but arrive winded.

General Rapp restores the position, with two squadrons of Chasseurs and the Mamelukes of Napoleon’s guard.

14:00

French army headquarters has moved to the Chapel of St Anthony. Napoleon issues fresh orders for the final stages of the battle.

Bernadotte is ordered to hold the Pratzen feature, and the guard, Oudinot and Soult to envelop the enemy left (Buxhöwden’s force), resulting in a rout.

The Battle of Jena, watercolour on paper by Jean Antoine Simeon Fort, showing the large scale of Napoleonic battles, with massed formations of infantry in the middle distance.

JENA AND AUERSTÄDT 1806

By Michael Hannon

The events of Tuesday 14 October 1806 are among the most memorable and extraordinary in all the annals of military history: ‘Napoleon won a battle he could not lose, while Davout won a battle he could not win,’ to quote military historian Major General J.F.C. Fuller. The story of these battles really begins in 1805, when the French I Corps of Marshal Bernadotte had marched without permission through the Prussian province of Ansbach, on its way to take part in the Battle of Ulm, which resulted in the surrender of most of the Austrian army under General Mack. The Prussian Foreign Minister, Karl von Haugwitz, (who believed Prussia should remain neutral, and was thus not a particularly good choice of messenger with an ultimatum), was dispatched to find Napoleon and threaten retaliation. At Brnõ (Brünn) the Emperor had given him an audience, but declined to negotiate, being too busy with preparations for the crushing French victory at Austerlitz on 2 December. Von Haugwitz was invited to go on to Vienna, where he would meet his French opposite number, Talleyrand. By the time Napoleon returned to Vienna in December, all von Haugwitz could do was to offer congratulations on the victory. However, one of the terms of the Treaty of Schönbrunn, which established peace between Austria and France, was that Prussia would be mollified by the acquisition of the state of Hannover.

The bulk of the French army (except for the Imperial Guard, which had returned to Paris) remained east of the Rhine, acting as an incentive to the German princes to sign up as members of the new Confederation of the Rhine – Napoleon’s enforced replacement for the old Holy Roman Empire. But Saxony vacillated, despite warnings from France, eventually deciding to ally herself with Prussia, where the continued presence in Germany of French troops was seen by the high command as an affront. Furthermore, Napoleon was having second thoughts about the allocation of Hannover to Prussia, offering to return it to England in exchange for lasting peace. The news of this proposition infuriated the war party, led by the beautiful Queen Louise (colonel in chief of the ‘Queen’s Hussars’) and Prince Louis Ferdinand, who persuaded the King, Frederick William III, to attack Napoleon.

On 10 August 1806, Prussia began to mobilize. King Frederick William was the nominal commander in chief, but had no military experience, and thus appointed Field Marshal von Mollendorf (aged 81) as his advisor. His immediate military subordinates, the Duke of Brunswick, Prince von Hohenlohe and General Rüchel, were all sure of their own ability, and each had personal access to the King – the result was that planning for the forthcoming campaign was confused, and there was no clear and firm chain of command. Decisions were, more often than not, taken at ‘councils of war’, where everyone present thought his ideas the best. Furthermore, the Prussian generals were quite convinced of their superiority over the French. Several had served under the ‘Old Fritz’, Frederick the Great. One or two of them had actually been present, as young captains, at the Battle of Rossbach, on 5 November 1757. Only Prince Louis Ferdinand, at 34, was of comparable age to his French counterparts. The Duke of Brunswick was 71, his chief of staff, General von Scharnhorst, was 61, Field Marshal Hohenlohe was 60 and General Blücher 61. On the other hand, Napoleon was 37, and several of his Marshals about the same age.

The Prussians, and their less-than-enthusiastic Saxon allies, were organized in three army groups. The main army, with which both the King and the Queen travelled, was about 50,000 strong, and commanded by the Duke of Brunswick. The second army group was initially of similar strength, with Prince von Hohenlohe at its head, and the third was a reserve force of about 25,000 men under General Rüchel. The latter included the cavalry division of General Blücher. The Prussian plan for the campaign was confused, but eventually the armies moved to the area of Erfurt, Weimar and Jena, with a view to cutting off the French from the Rhine. After one of the many councils of war, Von Scharnhorst, one of the few Prussian officers who properly appreciated the capabilities of the French army, remarked, ‘I know very well what we should do. What we shall do only the gods know.’ What he knew they should do was to remain east of the Elbe, there to await Russian support, for Russia was still technically at war with France.

Napoleon promptly sent orders to Marshal Berthier to prepare a plan for concentration around Bamberg. Hundreds of German-speaking officers were now despatched to reconnoitre the routes to Berlin, the bridges and fortifications, especially those at Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau and Dresden. On 12 September, Napoleon wrote to the Prussian King, ‘If I am forced to take up arms to defend myself it will be with great regret. The interests of our two countries are so close.’ That same day the Prussians marched into Dresden.

On 15 September, the Emperor ordered the Imperial Guard back to Germany. The operation was a complicated one, organized by the Director General of Posts, Lavalette. The postes in France were every two leagues (four leagues in Germany). 13,000 horses and 3259 vehicles were needed; each horse was paid for at the rate of 5 francs per day. In the event, only about 4000 infantry of the Guard, together with 40 guns, arrived in time for the Battle of Jena. The advance to war continued, with the French pushing northeastward towards Leipzig in three columns. The central column was pre ceded by the light cavalry of Marshal Murat’s reserve force, and led by I Corps (Marshal Bernadotte) with III Corps (Marshal Davout) following. On the right were IV Corps (Marshal Soult) and VI Corps (Marshal Ney). On the left were V Corps (Marshal Lannes) and VII Corps (Marshal Augereau). The whole totalled about 170,000 men and over 300 guns. Napoleon’s orders were that the advance should proceed so that the entire army could concentrate on any one of its components within 48 hours. He likened the movement to that of a battalion square – and his nickname for this army formation was his Bataillon Carré.

MAIN CHARACTERS FEATURED

FRANCE

Marshal Berthier

Marshal Bernadotte, I Corps

Lavalette, Director General of Posts,

Marshal Augereau (VII Corps)

Sergeant Major Guindet (French 10th Hussars)

Auerstädt

Marshal Davout (III Corps)

General Gudin

General Friant

General Morand

Jena

Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte

Marshal Ney (VI Corps)

Marshal Lannes (V Corps)

Marshal Soult (IV Corps)

Marshal Murat (cavalry)

General St Hilaire

PRUSSIA/SAXONY

Field Marshal von Mollendorf

General Blücher (cavalry)

Prince Louis Ferdinand

General von Wartensleben

Auerstädt

King Frederick William commander in chief

Duke of Brunswick

General von Schmettau

General von Scharnhorst (Prussian chief of staff)

Jena

Prince von Hohenlohe

General von Tauentzien

General von Holtzendorf

General Grawert

General Rüchel

Marshal Davout

Duke of Brunswick

A skirmish at Schleiz, on 8 October, resulted in the Prussians falling back towards Jena, but the first major engagement came at Saalfeld, on 10 October, where the advance guard of Hohenlohe’s army under Prince Louis Ferdinand was routed by Marshal Lannes’ V Corps, and the prince himself was killed by Sergeant-Major Guindet of the French 10th Hussars. This event had a serious effect on Prussian morale, and also reduced Hohenlohe’s effective strength for the coming battle of Jena to around 40,000 men.

By 12 October, the Prussians were trying to concentrate between Jena and Weimar. From intelligence reports, Napoleon appreciated there was an opportunity to cut them off from Leipzig and ordered Davout to advance to Naumburg, while Bernadotte was to clear the main road to Leipzig. The remainder of the Bataillon Carré would swing westwards to engulf the enemy. Unknown to him, however, the Prussian high command held a council of war that evening, at which it was decided that Brunswick’s main army, reinforced by Blücher’s cavalry, would withdraw northward, covered by Hohenlohe at Jena and by Rüchel (now only 15,000 strong) at Weimar.

Joachim Murat, the Emperor’s flamboyant, brave and foolhardy brother-in-law, and one of the great cavalry officers of history, leads from the front as thousands of Napoleon’s cavalry reserve pursue the Prussians.

THE BATTLE OF JENA

During 13 October, Marshal Lannes’ V Corps entered the town of Jena, and his advance guard clambered up the steep slope of the Landgrafenberg. The countryside north of Jena forms a large rolling plateau of farms and villages, with very steep wooded slopes on the south (the valley of the Muhlbach) and east (the valley of the River Saale). Roads, or rather tracks, to the high ground were few and tortuous; the only one immediately accessible is nowadays called ‘Am Steiger’. French engineers set to work to improve it. Late in the afternoon, Napoleon himself, together with the 4000 infantry of the Guard, arrived on the Landgrafenberg and, as night fell, he could see the campfires of Hohenlohe’s force, and somehow convinced himself that the whole Prussian army of over 100,000 men lay before him.

Although arguably the greatest commander in modern history, Napoleon shared with others, both before and since, a serious shortcoming, namely the temptation to believe that intelligence reports endorsed his own suppositions. As night fell, observation of the relatively few campfires of Hohenlohe’s force firmly convinced him that he now faced the main body of the Prussians. Orders were given for the corps of Augereau, Ney and Soult to close up without delay. Davout, with III Corps, now at Naumburg, was ordered to advance on Apolda to threaten what Napoleon fondly believed would be the Prussian left rear. Berthier’s postscript to Davout’s orders suggested that I Corps should act in support of III Corps, and Davout immediately sent a written copy to Bernadotte.

During the night of 13 October, Napoleon, noting an apparent delay in the arrival of V Corps artillery, went personally to find out where it was. The column had mistaken the route up the hill and the leading gun had somehow become hopelessly stuck in a ravine. The Emperor immediately took charge, as if he were once again the battery commander, and the column soon moved on again.

Concentration of the Bataillon Carré now proceeded apace. Augereau’s VII Corps was ordered to secure the road from Jena to Weimar, along the Muhltal, with one division, while the remainder were to form on the left of V Corps. In view of the steep wooded slope it is not too surprising that the junction was not established until about 09:30. VI Corps (Marshal Ney) was ordered to form on the right of V Corps and Soult’s IV Corps was to form on the extreme right flank. At dawn on the 14th, despite the best efforts of all concerned, the French position was relatively weak, with only V Corps and the Guard properly deployed, perhaps 25,000 men in all. The Prussians thus had a golden opportunity to sweep them off the plateau and into the Saale, but it seems that Hohenlohe had received an order from the King that no serious engagement was to be undertaken. In any case, Napoleon intended to be the first to strike. At 06:30, in a thick fog, Lannes launched two divisions in an attack on the village of Closewitz.

The main body of Hohenlohe’s army, now only about 40,000 strong altogether, had camped for the night along the general line Isserstadt, Lützeroda, Closewitz, with outposts in Cospeda. Commanding this main force was General von Tauentzien. The left flank was guarded by a detachment of about 5000 men under General von Holtzendorf. The reserves, including General Grawert’s division, were posted on the Dornberg, overlooking the villages of Vierzehnheiligen and Krippendorf, where the windmill provided a useful reference point for both sides.

In the fog, Lannes’ leading troops somewhat lost their way, but broke the Prussian line between Closewitz and Lützeroda. However, St Hilaire’s division, part of Soult’s IV Corps, and with the Marshal himself at its head, cleared the enemy from Closewitz, and then advanced to Rodigen. Thus, when Ney arrived with his small advance guard, he found Lannes’ right in touch with St Hilaire’s division, but his left apparently open to counterattack. Meanwhile, Lannes himself had at first taken the village of Vierzehnheiligen, but then been forced to withdraw to the lower slopes of the Dornberg. The fiery Ney, despite having only his small advance guard to hand, immediately attacked to retake the village, but, carried away with his own excitement, quite overlooked the need for support and was soon isolated. Fortunately for him, the Emperor, from his vantage point on the hill overlooking the village, noticed what had happened. Furious with Ney, who received a severe reprimand later in the day, he despatched some cavalry to rescue his impetuous Marshal.