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- Herausgeber: Firenze University Press
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Imperial frontiers have been a topic of research and a source of fascination for decades. This volume deals with the Carolingian Empire, particularly Italy, collecting fifteen essays on the military, economic and social function of the frontier; how it was ideologically conceived and physically realized from Saxony to Catalonia across the Alps and the Danube. In a rich diversity of perspectives and themes, the concept of frontier is used in its political, ideological, normative, and cultural meanings. Aim of the volume is to offer a comprehensive picture of Carolingian frontiers against the background of the broad debate on empires and frontiers.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024
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Reti Medievali E-Book 48
Reti Medievali
Editors-in-chief
Maria Elena Cortese, University of Genoa, Italy
Roberto Delle Donne, University of Naples Federico II, Italy
Thomas Frank, University of Pavia, Italy
Paola Guglielmotti, University of Genoa, Italy
Vito Loré, Roma Tre University, Italy
Iñaki Martin Viso, University of Salamanca, Spain
Riccardo Rao, University of Bergamo, Italy
Paolo Rosso, University of Turin, Italy
Gian Maria Varanini, University of Verona, Italy
Andrea Zorzi, University of Florence, Italy
Scientific Board
Enrico Artifoni, University of Turin, Italy
María Asenjo González, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
William J. Connell, Seton Hall University, United States
Pietro Corrao, University of Palermo, Italy
Élisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, Sorbonne Paris IV University, France
Christopher Dartmann, University of Hamburg, Germany
Stefano Gasparri, University of Venice Ca’ Foscari, Italy
Patrick Geary, Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, United States
Jean-Philippe Genet, Panthéon-Sorbonne Paris 1 University, France
Knut Görich, University of Munich Ludwig Maximilian, Germany
Julius Kirshner, University of Chicago, United States
Maria Cristina La Rocca, University of Padua, Italy
Michel Lauwers, Côte d’Azur University, France
Isabella Lazzarini, University of Molise, Italy
Annliese Nef, Panthéon-Sorbonne Paris 1 University, France
Beatrice Pasciuta, University of Palermo, Italy
Annick Peters Custot, University of Nantes, France
Giuseppe Petralia, University of Pisa, Italy
Walter Pohl, Technische Universitaet Wien, Austria
Flocel Sabaté, University of Lleida, Spain
Roser Salicru i Lluch, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Barcelona, Spain
Francesco Vincenzo Stella, University of Siena, Italy
Giuliano Volpe, University of Bari Aldo Moro, Italy
Chris Wickham, All Souls College, Oxford, United Kingdom
Peer-review
All published e-books are double-blind peer reviewed at least by two referees. Their list is regularly updated at URL: http://www.serena.unina.it/index.php/rm/referee. Their reviews are archived. Ruling in hard times
RULING IN HARD TIMES
Patterns of power and practices of government in the making of Carolingian Italy
3
Carolingian Frontiers: Italy and Beyond
edited by Maddalena Betti, Francesco Borri, Stefano Gasparri
Firenze University Press 2024
Carolingian Frontiers: Italy and Beyond / edited by Maddalena Betti, Francesco Borri, Stefano Gasparri. – Firenze : Firenze University Press, 2024. (Reti Medievali E-Book ; 48)
(Reti Medievali E-Book ; 43)
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DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0416-3
The volume has been published thanks to the contributions of the Department of Humanities and Philosophy of the University of Trento and the Ministry of University and Research, Project of Relevant National Interest, call for proposals 2017 - project code 2017ETHP5S, Ruling in hard times. Patterns of power and practices of government in the making of Carolingian Italy. The project leader is Giuseppe Albertoni (University of Trento); the editor of the volume, Fabrizio Oppedisano, is the project leader at the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa.
Front cover: Nicholas and workshop: Theodoric hunts in hell, c. 1100-1150 (Verona, facade of the basilica of San Zeno). Photo credit: Fabio Coden, by permission of the Ufficio per i beni culturali ecclesiastici, Diocese of Verona (17 Jan. 2023).
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Ruling in hard times.Patterns of power and practices of governmentin the making of Carolingian Italy
Project Coordinator Giuseppe Albertoni
1. Networks of bishops, networks of texts. Manuscripts, legal cultures, tools of government in Carolingian Italy at the time of Lothar I, edited by Gianmarco De Angelis, Francesco Veronese, 2022
2. Between Ostrogothic and Carolingian Italy: survivals, revivals, ruptures, edited by Fabrizio Oppedisano, forthcoming
3. Carolingian frontiers. Italy and beyond, edited by Maddalena Betti, Francesco Borri, Stefano Gasparri, forthcoming
4. Aristocratic networks. Elites and social dynamics in the age of Lothar I, edited by Giuseppe Albertoni, Manuel Fauliri, Leonardo Sernagiotto, forthcoming
5. Patterns of power and practices of government in the making of Carolingian Italy, edited by Giuseppe Albertoni, Gianmarco De Angelis, Stefano Gasparri, Fabrizio Oppedisano, forthcoming
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Maddalena Betti, Francesco Borri, Stefano Gasparri (edited by), Carolingian Frontiers: Italy and Beyond, © 2024 Author(s), CC BY 4.0, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0416-3, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0416-3
Carolingian frontiers: Italy and beyond. An introduction by Stefano Gasparri
In this short introduction, I will cover two topics. The first is a presentation of the research project on Lothar’s rule in Italy, which is behind the conference from which this volume originated. The second is a brief discussion of the way in which the problem of the early medieval frontier has been dealt with in Italian historiography, accompanied by an equally brief focus on the concept of frontier, which has been further developed by historians over the last thirty years, starting with the work of Charles Whittaker.
High Middle Ages; regnum Italiae; Italian peripheries; Lothar; Carolingian rule; early medieval frontiers.
Stefano Gasparri, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy, [email protected], 0000-0002-1374-504X
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FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice) Stefano Gasparri, Carolingian frontiers: Italy and beyond. An introduction, © Author(s), CC BY 4.0, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0416-3.02, in Maddalena Betti, Francesco Borri, Stefano Gasparri (edited by), Carolingian Frontiers: Italy and Beyond, pp. 1-8, 2024, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0416-3, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0416-3
The present volume is the fruit of a conference held in Venice in April 2022, sponsored by the PRIN project Ruling in hard times. Patterns of power and practices of government in the making of Carolingian Italy. The focus of the project is most specifically on the long period of Lothar’s rule in Italy, but it is also interested in the whole of Carolingian Italy, a topic that has long been neglected in the historiography until recently. However, between 2016 and 2018 there were three conferences, two in Vienna and one in Trento, the first of a very general nature, while the other two were focused on the important reign of Pippin; all three have finally shifted the focus towards the role that Italy played within the Carolingian world1. As a result, even within German historiography – as in the very recent book by Paul Predatsch – the results of Eduard Hlawitschka’s old book, which had totally devalued the original contribution of Italian society, suggesting the complete replacement (die Entausschung) of the Lombard ruling class and the full “frankisation” of Italy, are now being questioned2.
The Venetian conference focused on the areas which made up the periphery of the kingdom of Italy during the Carolingian period, particularly during the reign of Lothar I and Louis II. Actually, studying Carolingian Italy means dealing with the entire complexity of its territorial framework, which goes far beyond the direct domination of the Carolingian rulers. The latter had inherited the situation of their predecessors, the Lombard kings, who had never succeeded in exercising complete control over Italy, although they had come very close, particularly with Aistulf, after the capture of Ravenna and before Pippin’s wars3. The Frankish intervention then changed everything.
These peripheral zones were centred around two main areas. The first was traditional Byzantine Italy: the duchy of Venice and its Lagoon, Istria, Ravenna and the old Exarchate, Rome and its duchy4; while the second was the Langobardia Minor, with its own Lombard political tradition5. Carolingian political strategies varied with regard to these two areas, which belonged only in part to the Regnum, but were strongly connected to it6.
Of course, the Carolingians had many more means to cope with the situation than the Lombard kings: an undisputed military supremacy, together with a now marginal presence of Byzantine authorities, if we exclude Sicily, and, above all, the support and alliance with the Church of Rome. However, a true unification of Italy under the authority of the Carolingians was never achieved. This means that the different areas which were not fully – or not at all – part of the kingdom continued to develop societies with their own characteristics, partly different from those of the area under direct Carolingian control7. Even within the latter, there was a difference (as a recent book by Igor Santos Salazar has shown) between Carolingian Lombardy, which was the core of the Regnum, and other areas south of the Po8. The impact of Carolingian rule on regions like Tuscia and the duchy of Spoleto was slower to make itself felt, and more difficult to assess. In those areas, also the appearance of migrants from north of the Alps during the ninth century happened later than in Northern Italy.
Moreover, in Central Italy, the longest-lived Byzantine areas, the Roman duchy and the Exarchate of Ravenna, maintained an ambiguous position within the overall framework of the kingdom. In the case of Rome, the relations of Carolingian power with the city were made more complex on account of the role of the papacy. Rome had more points of convergence with Ravenna than with the rest of the kingdom. The urban landscape of the two cities shared a visible Roman past; also common to both cities was the use of late Roman titles as consul or dux, or the vocabulary relating to the leases of land or to the properties. Rome and Ravenna also had much in common (for example the titles of honour or offices) with Venice, which, however, not only had no Roman past, but in the ninth century was not yet a city; its position in respect to the Carolingian government was also quite different from those of Rome and Ravenna9.
Indeed, the duchy of Venice, together with Lombard Southern Italy, the Longobardia minor, was one of the two areas that were most alien to Carolingian power. The small Venetian duchy, which had almost no territory on the mainland, was under the constant control of Byzantium, which was connected to it by sea. This situation created the premises for the only direct confrontation between the Franks and Byzantium following the Carolingian conquest of Italy, because in the Northeast of Italy the Carolingians attempted to govern in a unified way the whole area from the Po plain to the Adriatic coast, a strategy clearly related to the area’s political importance (for its links with Byzantium), commercial role (in terms of maritime and river trade) and military position (on the Slavic frontier). However, Byzantium remained in control of the Adriatic Sea and of Venice, with the exception of the years 806-807, when Charlemagne summoned to Aachen the leaders of the Venetian duchy and those of Dalmatia, with the ambition of subduing them and thus assuming control of the Adriatic, and the years 809-810, when Pippin militarily occupied the duchy, albeit for a very short time. This state of affairs was confirmed by the Peace of Aachen (812). Charles had to be content with the unstable control of Istria10.
The second, much larger, area remaining outside the direct Carolingian domain was the ancient semi-autonomous duchy of Benevento, which resisted the attacks by the Franks by allying itself with its ancient Byzantine enemies, and by creating a new political system, no longer subordinate to the king of Pavia, which was sanctioned by Arichis II’s assumption of the title of prince after 774. During the first years of the ninth century, the principality of Benevento was, however, progressively drawn into the Carolingian orbit, even if its recognition of the authority of the Frankish king or emperor was always very ambiguous and subject to frequent crises, as it was seen blatantly in 871 when prince Adelchis II captured emperor Louis II11.
In such a complex political and territorial framework, the theme of frontiers immediately comes to scholarly attention. Before addressing this topic, it should be however useful to stress some general points. The very concept of frontier, or border, is not a neutral one, from a historical point of view. As Lucien Febvre had shown many decades ago, the idea of a military frontier, of a linear type, does not predate thenineteenth century12. It is the offspring of the national states, then applied by French and British imperialism over a century ago to colonial possessions in Asia and Africa, where linear frontiers, resting or not on natural elements, were drawn. These frontiers, by dividing ancient tribal territories, are at the root of many of the ethnic tragedies of the contemporary world. It was the idea of a defensive line that held back beyond it the indistinct and dangerous tide of barbarism. As lucidly explained by Charles Whittaker about thirty years ago, this concept was applied by historians to the Roman empire: the Romans would have identified the great rivers Rhine and Danube as their limits for the same reasons that guided the European states: because they were natural, linear and military borders, and at the same time were a symbol of conquest, an assertion of dominance over barbarism. Such was the Roman ideology, which fitted well with that of European imperialism13.
On the contrary, we owe the idea of the Roman empire as an open space, potentially in movement, to the United States, which were literally shaped by the frontier: the reference is obviously to the late-nineteenth-century famous frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner, but also (and above all) to Walter Prescott Webb, who wrote in 1931 that a frontier is not «a line to stop at, but an area inviting entrance». According to his view, the border was a place where ethnic and cultural mixing took place, producing new social realities14. This same concept of permeable frontier could be applied to the Roman borders of the very late period, where – despite the existence of the limes – relations between Romans and barbarians were intense and brought together two worlds that were in no way clearly distinct from one another, creating new communities. In this way, the issue about the ethnic identities intertwines with the study of borders; as Florin Curta has written, «one of the most fascinating aspects of the current state of research is the study of political frontiers as key elements in the creation, as opposed to separation, of ethnic groups»15. To quote Walter Pohl: «boundaries do not “naturally” exist between peoples and states, between social groups and religious confessions»; this is «the new paradigm in the study of frontiers»16.
It is therefore necessary to be aware of the ways in which the idea of the linear frontier in its various forms (limit of civilisation, military barrier, natural-geographical element) arose in order to address the problem of frontiers, even on the relatively small scale of Carolingian Italy. In this perspective, how Italian historiography dealt with the problem of early medieval frontiers?
Despite its politically complexity, in the Early Middle Ages the Italian territory was not divided by natural and/or artificial militarily manned barriers. In Italy, there is only one trace of such a border in the Alpine area, where it was based on the remains of the ancient Tractus Italiae circa Alpes of the late Roman period, described in the Notitia Dignitatum17. The first certain mention of the existence of border territories in the Alpine area, identified as such by royal powers, dates back to the Lombard period, in the two famous chapters of the laws of Ratchis and Aistulf, in which the two Lombard kings established, in the wake of the conflict with the Franks, strict rules to control the movement of people entering the kingdom18. The military and perhaps even more psychological importance of the Alpine frontier is also stressed by Notker the Stammerer, who, one hundred years later the breakthrough made by Charlemagne’s army at the clusae of Susa Valley in the autumn of 773, still wrote that «only a wall» (una macheria) divided the Italians from the Franks: it were the remains of the ancient Tractus19.
This statement needs to be downgraded. The clusae represented punctual rather than linear boundaries, they were «Grenzen als Punkte», as defined by Walter Pohl, who pointed out that this was a typical situation in Italy20. The network of castles in Friuli mentioned by Paul the Deacon, on the occasion of the Avar raid in 611, should be interpreted in the same way. Despite the incorrect name of Langobardische Limes sometimesgiven to it by the historiography, it was not a fortified linear defense system, but a system of in depth-defense, aiming to control the passage from the Alps to the Friulan plains, through fortified points (castra) located far inland in the Lombard territory21.
Nevertheless, the Alpine area remains an exception. Within Italy, the frontiers have long been sought in vain by historians and archaeologists. The classic example comes from one of the most famous theories of Lombard historiography, that of the arimanniae. It originated more than a hundred years ago, and later developed in a contradictory way by Gian Piero Bognetti. This theory postulated the existence of particular military settlements, the arimanniae: i.e. colonies of Lombard warriors, called arimanni, placed by the king on fiscal land, on the borders but also within the kingdom, in every area of strategic value, for garrisoning and defence purposes. According to this theory, traces of arimanniae could still be found in the Carolingian and post-Carolingian periods. Today it is well known, from the studies of Giovanni Tabacco, that this theory had no real documentary evidence, based as it was exclusively on misinterpretations of very late sources. Italy was never dotted with military frontiers manned by the Lombard arimanni, opposed to the equally imaginary fortified garrisons of the Byzantines22.
On the basis of this erroneous reading of the sources (and with a superficial use of toponomastic data), Italian historiography has multiplied military frontiers within Italy, wherever Lombard and Byzantine territories bordered each other, towards the Venetian plain, towards Byzantine Liguria, the Exarchate, or in Southern Italy, in search of strategic motivations even where they lacked any plausibility23. Frontiers and borders were identified everywhere24. However, most of these reconstructions did not go beyond the Lombard period. This is due to the fact that Italian historians (and archaeologists) have always thought of the frontier as linear, because it had to separate civilisation and savagery, i.e. the Italo-Byzantines (heirs of the Romans) from the Lombards. According to this reasoning, when the Franks replaced the Lombards, the linear frontier was no longer needed and therefore it essentially disappeared from historical narrative (that also was the only place where it existed).
Today we have overcome these incorrect interpretations. Therefore, we can examine Italy’s internal and external borders, be they political, economic or cultural, without preconceptions, to try to establish whether they have contributed to the creation of real frontier societies. All these problems should, of course, be treated always bearing in mind similarities and differences with what happened outside Italy, in the North, East or West of the Carolingian world. Which is what, albeit in a limited way, we have precisely tried to do in this volume.
Works cited
After Charlemagne: Carolingian Italy and its Rulers, ed. C. Gantner – W. Pohl, Cambridge 2021.
T.S. Brown, A Byzantine Cuckoo in the Frankish Nest? The Exarchate of Ravenna and the Kingdom of Italy in the Long Ninth Century, in After Charlemagne, pp. 185-197.
F. Curta, Introduction, in Borders, Barriers, and Ethnogenesis, ed. F. Curta, Turnhout 2005 (Studies in the Early Middle Ages, 12).
G. Fasoli, Inizio di un’indagine sugli stanziamenti longobardi intorno a Pavia, in «Bollettino della Società Pavese di Storia Patria», 53 (1953), pp. 3-12.
G. Fasoli, Tracce di insediamenti longobardi nella zona pedemontana tra il Piave e l’Astico e nella pianura tra Vicenza, Treviso e Padova, in Atti del I congresso internazionale di studi sull’Alto Medioevo, Pavia 1952, pp. 303-315.
L. Febvre, Il Reno. Storia, miti, realtà, ed. P. Schlotter, Roma 1998 (first ed. 1931).
S. Gasparri, The Dawn of Carolingian Italy. Central Government and Local Powers, in Il regno di Pipino, i Carolingi e l’Italia(781-810), ed. G. Albertoni – F. Borri, Turnhout 2022 (Haut Moyen Âge, 44), pp. 41-50.
S. Gasparri, The First Dukes and the Origins of Venice, in Venice and Its Neighbors from the 8th to 11th Century. Through Renovation and Continuity, ed. S. Gelichi – S. Gasparri, Leiden-Boston 2017, pp. 5-26.
S. Gasparri, La frontiera in Italia (sec. V-VIII). Osservazioni su un tema controverso, in Città, castelli, campagne nei territori di frontiera (secoli VI-VII), ed. G.P. Brogiolo, Mantova 1995 (V Seminario sul Tardoantico e alto Medioevo in Italia centro-settentrionale), pp. 9-19.
S. Gasparri, I Germani immaginari e la realtà del regno. Cinquant’anni di studi sui Longobardi, in I Longobardi dei ducati di Spoleto e Benevento, Spoleto, 20-23 ottobre 2002, Benevento, 24-27 ottobre 2002, 2 vols, Spoleto 2003 (Atti del XVI congresso internazionale di studi sull’alto Medioevo), vol. 1, pp. 3-28.
S. Gasparri, The Government of a Peripheral Area: The Carolingians and North-Eastern Italy, in After Charlemagne, pp. 85-93.
S. Gasparri, Italia longobarda. Il regno, i Franchi, il Papato, Roma-Bari 2012.
S. Gasparri, The Origins of Venice: Between Italy, Byzantium and the Adriatic, in Byzantium, Venice and the Medieval Adriatic: Spheres of Maritime Power and Influence, c.700-1453, ed. M. Skoblar, Cambridge 2021, pp. 98-110.
S. Gasparri, La questione degli arimanni, in «Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio muratoriano», 87 (1978), pp. 121-153.
Grenze und Differenz im frühen Mittelalter, ed. W. Pohl – H. Reimitz, Wien 2000 (Forschungen zur Geschichte des Mittelalters, 1).
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W. Pohl, Frontiers in Lombard Italy: The Laws of Ratchis and Aistulf, in The Transformation of Frontiers: From Late Antiquity to the Carolingians, ed. W. Pohl – I. Wood – H. Reimitz, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2001, pp. 117-141 (Transformation of the Roman World, 10).
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Stefano Gasparri
Università degli Studi Ca’ Foscari Venezia
On empires and frontiers by Francesco Borri
Empires are theoretically limitless, given the difficulty in determining the nature, or even the existence, of their frontiers. This paper discusses some general issues on the perception, role, and function of imperial boundaries, using examples from the Carolingian Empire and from other imperial formations through history.
Middle Ages; 9th century; Italy; Carolingians; empires; comparative studies; frontiers.
Francesco Borri, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy, [email protected], 0000-0003-3385-2288
Referee List (DOI 10.36253/fup_referee_list) FUP Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (DOI 10.36253/fup_best_practice)
Francesco Borri, On empires and frontiers, © Author(s), CC BY 4.0, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0416-3.03, in Maddalena Betti, Francesco Borri, Stefano Gasparri (edited by), Carolingian Frontiers: Italy and Beyond, pp. 9-36, 2024, published by Firenze University Press, ISBN 979-12-215-0416-3, DOI 10.36253/979-12-215-0416-3
An empire is a universally recognized political organization, suggesting rich variety and several associated ideas1.There is disagreement on what an empire is: an extended debate on the role and identity of empires has provoked a vast literature on the topic, cutting across disciplines, characterized by a strongly diachronic approach and by specific terminology, which differs slightly according to context2.
Surveys generally highlight structures common to empires in world history, only subsequently focusing on distinctive case studies: «[o]ne benefit of comparison is that it helps to clarify phenomena and to sharpen the distinctive nature of the objects under scrutiny»3. It is suggestive that, if all surveys on empires cover the Roman and the British, the Carolingian Empire is seldom included, or at least it was not until a few years ago; in a paper in 2006, Susan Reynolds still lamented this omission4. It seems to have reflected the perceived anomaly of the Carolingian Empire (together with its later incarnations), which led scholars to doubt the imperial nature of Charlemagne’s polity. Reasons were found in diverse structural features, ranging from the empire’s Mittellage to therudimentary fiscal system, through to its ephemeral life5. Geoffrey Barraclough notably wrote that «Charles himself became an emperor; but the lands over which he ruled did not became “an empire”»6.
In the past few decades, however, important studies have appreciably altered this picture. Two volumes have been published in Vienna on the role of early Medieval Staatlichkeit, with the Carolingian Empire as part of the debate, especially in its relation to ecclesia as a comprehensive concept denoting a multi-ethnic polity7. The new developments on the empire’s conceptualization were visible in numerous publications, such as the important textbook TheCarolingian World, or edited volumes and monographs where the centrality of empire features already in the title; a recent issue of «Studies in Church History» was dedicated to the topic of Church and Empire; one of «Medieval Worlds» focused on empires in comparison, with the Carolingian formation featuring prominently8. Jinty Nelson’s recent monograph also highlights Charles’ imperial dignity9. In the most recent survey on empires, an important article by Rosamond McKitterick focused on the Carolingian imperium and its high medieval successors10.
In the following discussion, I shall focus on the Carolingian Empire, but I shall also look at its eastern Roman predecessor, together with the Ottonian and Hohenstaufen successors, relying on both the vast literature on empires and the more focused studies of Medieval Europe.
1. Brief anatomy of a concept
Empires stretched back in history for thousands of years, flourishing across the globe, rising, as pointed out by Michael Mann, on account of their superior military power and economy11. Ian Morris wrote that «the history of empire is the history of organized violence»12. They happen by chance; their success being determined by «luck» according to W.G. Runciman13.
Expansion seems semantically bound to the very notion of empire and imperialism14. In fact, empires rule over territories outside their original one, stretching from a dominant core, called in scholarly discourse “metropole”, to the more or the less distant peripheries: «they involve the exercise of domination by the rulers of a central society over the populations of peripheral societies without either absorbing them to the point that they become fellow-members of the central society or disengaging from them to the point that they become confederates rather than subjects»15.
Generally, empires aim to co-opt local elites in order to lead them to recognise the value of imperial ideology for their own advantage; they penetrate the fabric of their society in an uneven manner: some regions are loosely ruled, while others are firmly controlled. Peripheries are governed emphasising difference, rather than assimilation, so that imperial frontiers do not include a culturally and politically homogeneous and coherent space, as ideally modern nation states do; Alexander Motyl compared empires to a wheel with a hub and spokes, but no rim16.
Among empires, military power is fuelled by a strong ideology and superior claims to non-imperial neighbours. This imperial mission is the main element which defines empires. To use a tautology, empires are such because they act in an imperial manner. Political acts seek to achieve prestige, which Max Weber would have called Prestigestreben17. It does not mean that, as political entities, they are not driven by strategic considerations, but ideology is securely embedded in their actions18. Imperial actors see their power legitimized through their mission, so that cosmologies, foundation myths and myths of military glory, together with clearly manifested destinies, are shaped to justify the imperial order. Claims for superior right to rule, a world-encompassing mission such as peace, religion, celestial harmony, civilization or democracy, generally follow the early conquests: they are all ideologies of just or benevolent rule19. These «Visions of Empire», to quote Krishan Kumar, are rooted in an asymmetric relationship between that empire and its surrounding polities. Asymmetry means a hierarchy of authority and legitimacy between empire and states. If relationships between nation-states are ideally based on equal rights and sovereignty, empires claimed higher status toward their neighbouring polities. Herfried Münkler wrote: «Staaten gibt es stets im Plural, Imperien meist im Singular», states are always in the plural, empires mostly in the singular20. Yet, an empire may adopt different strategies in order to relate to another, such as China and Rome, or Iran and the Steppe powers21.
To measure empires, alongside the self-representation of the actors ruling them, scholarly attention generally concentrates on external, measurable, characteristics, which may comprehend lifespan and expanse, both central to the empires. Yet, there are no absolute requisites22. As we shall see, empires are generally seen as ancient institutions; in Japan, empire was said to be as old as history itself23. In fact, there are major exceptions to this rule: Alexander the Great’s conquests disintegrated into battling realms shortly after the king’s death, but very few would contest the imperial nature of his polity24. Similarly, we can agree that empires are large, however vague this may be as an analytical concept25. The multi-ethnic nature, which is sometimes evoked as the clearest separation between modern nations and empires, is an obvious reflection of this vast expanse26. In fact, extent is not a reliable parameter: years ago, Moses Finley complained about the tendency to define as empire every very large territorial state27. A good example is the huge democracy of Canada, the second largest country on the planet, which by no means is an empire28. The Empire of East Rome, progressively losing its borderlands through its history, never saw its imperial status challenged. The Holy Roman Empire furthermore, a pale reflection of the Roman one in size, claimed its status up to the nineteenth century29.
2. Imagining frontiers
Imperial frontiers are an elusive notion. In fact, different kinds of frontiers – military, institutional, religious, or cultural – could coexist, overlap, or vary in their range, character and longevity in the borderlands. Diocesan borders and areas of ecclesiastical jurisdiction may overstep political frontiers, linguistic frontiers could run elsewhere as the political ones. «Military, political, institutional, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, social and economic frontiers move spatially and temporally at their own pace, so that empire cannot be contained within definite parameters»30. As a concept, moreover, “empire” derives from the Latin imperium, which means the authority to command, exercise violence and judge; only in the end did it come to denote the territories militarily conquered by the Romans31. Dick Whittaker, in a book often quoted in this volume, showed how the frontiers of the Roman Empire were no more real than meridians and parallels32. Since Rome was the «parent of empire», the «archetypal one», or «das paradigmatische Imperium», its example was emulated over the following centuries33.
Their dimensions notwithstanding, empires could more properly and ideally be defined by a lack of frontiers, representing an unbounded, universal rule34. Imperial actors generally shared a vocation to world dominion because of their mission and higher stance35. According to the geographical imagination, empires encompass the complexity and diversity of the world, thus representing an ideal balance where the kaleidoscope of creation is made whole. Imagining and managing space become crucial in the making of empires36. Frontiers represent, thereafter, an ostensibly static imagery needing to be constantly adapted to shifting realities; while modern states survive only with firmly demarcated borders, imperial frontiers are volatile37.
Clear lines of demarcation for imperial borders are exceptions; «no matter how physically demarcated, the edges of empire and the edges of the unmeasured “barbarian” realms outside mesh in many ways, and the walls are osmotic membranes establishing a flow of influences and interaction» in the suggestive and rich phrasing of Charles Maier38. Frontiers appear, in fact, as deep regions covering the wide spectrum of direct imperial rule, including both satellite polities and hostile ones. Among the Romans, the conception of limes, referred to as administrative districts, could «co-exist without problem with subject peoples beyond the frontier», to quote Benjamin Isaac39. The imperial-style villa in Oberleiser Berg, a late Roman settlement north of the Danube, illustrates this complexity40. Elva Johnston has discussed Ireland, famously an island beyond the imperial reach, as a frontier society of Rome41. Chinese emperors or Sasanian kings were able to project authority from the Ocean or the Mediterranean onto Inner Asia42.
Carolingian aristocracies shared similar expectations with authors keen to portraying their empire as boundless43. Great interest was shared in the measuring and representation of the world, a subject thoughtfully discussed by Rosamond McKitterick a few years ago44. The Irish scholar Dicul may be the most know case, but Emily Albu notably suggested that also the Tabula Peutingeriana should be considered a creation of Charlemagne’s court, an empire’s depiction modelled on the glorious ages of Augustus and Theodosius45. Einhard recorded the existence of silver tables in the emperor’s treasure: on one was engraved a depiction of the world in three concentric circles: a precious artefact whose imperial symbolism was straightforward46. This was an ideology developing tropes already present during the Merovingian period: in a revealing entry, the Metz Annalist described the nationes once subjected to the Franks: although beyond the frontiers, they owned loyalty to the emperor.47 Tom Noble depicted the Carolingian frontier as «a rich, diverse and dynamic region with complicated relationships both with the heartlands and with the external borders»48. Brittany was a province constantly negotiating its balance of power with the Carolingian heartland49. Recent studies have forcefully framed Dalmatia and Southeastern Europe as a Carolingian frontier50. In a thoughtful discussion of the eastern frontiers of the Franks’ kingdoms, Matthew Innes wrote how their: «rule shaded away at the edges, from aristocratic frontier commanders through clients who were in a sense part of the Frankish Empire to more independent rulers subject to Frankish influence»51. I will return below on this topic.
Beyond the empires’ reach stretched the territory of the barbarians; empires are symbiotic to the concept of barbarian52. Boundaries often became loaded with ethnic and moral significance, as a shift between civilization and savagery, between our world and theirs53. Carolingian intellectuals inherited some of this vision: in the 840-entry of the Annales Fuldenses, we read how Louis the Pious persecuted a contender of his «usque ad terminos barbarorum»54. For the previous year, the Annales Bertiniani narrated the perils beyond the empire reported by the legates from Constantinople: «inter barbaras et nimiae feritatis gentes inmanissimas»55. As a concept, barbarism was adjusted, both spatially and chronologically: the further the empire stretched, the more distant the barbarians were cast. In the Vita Karoli Magni, we find barbarians only at the very fringes of empire, between Rhine and Vistula and north of the Danube56. The inclusion of new subjects into the empire changed their barbarian condition. Yet, in the Carolingian Empire, imperial actors were conscious of their pluralistic origins and even Einhard defined himself as barbarian in one among the most official imperial narratives57. Ian Wood showed how, during the Middle Ages, monstrous creatures inhabiting the borders of civilization became an increasingly central topic as the imperial boundaries advanced58. In Carolingian discourse and imagination, imperial territories could overlap with those of Christianity, barbarism could collide with paganism; the dichotomy between creeds had become stronger than the divide between the civilized and the barbarians.
3. Reaching frontiers
Notwithstanding imperial ideologies and missions, empires were constantly «in a state of tension between imperial pretences and limited means»59. If imperial discourse portrayed an empire without limits, borderlands had always to be established60. These became fundamental to understanding empires, conflating the chronological and geographical dimensions of their existence. Empires adopted different strategies to gain and control borderlands, most recently discussed in a comprehensive comparative analysis by Ronald Findlay and Mats Lundahl61.
As W.G. Runciman wrote, empires «are easier to acquire than to retain»62. In fact, reaching the peak of territorial expansion and establishing frontiers have been seen as among the most fragile phases in the process of empire building. This was the moment when the military drive at the start of great imperial formations began to lose momentum, giving way to radical change, and confirming the transition from a phase of expansion to a stable, long-enduring empire. This moment has been called the «Augustean Threshold» by Michael Doyle63. It is both a spatial and chronological shadow line to be crossed for an empire so that it can survive the end of military expansion. The name clearly echoes the first Roman emperor Octavian, as his reign is taken as a watershed between Republican Rome, characterized by constant conquest, and the imperial stability which followed. The Roman and Chinese Empires are the most emblematic among those able to survive this transition, while the Steppe Empires of Central Asia, although with notable exceptions, are generally given as examples of empires unable to make this transition64.
In the Middle Ages this trajectory could be observed in the Islamic Empire. After the rapid expansion led by Muhammed’s successors and the Umayyad caliphs, the new rulers from Baghdad were able to maintain a shrinking, although prestigious empire, for almost three generations, while the ideological legitimacy shaped during the conquest lasted until 1258, and even beyond65. Yet, notwithstanding Louis the Pious’ succession to his father’s realm and adoption of the essential title «imperator Augustus», it has been questioned if the Carolingian Empire survived the end of conquest. Here, a long shadow has been cast by two highly influential articles of Tim Reuter, published almost fifty years ago, where the «end of Carolingian expansion» was seen as the prelude to the empire’s breaking apart, as in the great survey of Geoffrey Barraclough66. This relations between the closing of a frontier and loss of political power have a venerable tradition in medieval studies: Archibald Lewis, building on Walter Prescott Webb’s studies, saw the year 1250 as a watershed in the history of the Medieval world, as the end of expansion signed the «crisis of a suddenly frontierless society»67.
Yet, the idea has been thoughtfully nuanced in the last years. Tom Noble discussed the continuity of Carolingian frontier politics since Pippin II as a constant effort to integrate the peripheral regna into the Frankish heartland; and showed that Louis the Pious was no exception68. Simon MacLean demonstrated how the paradigm of an empire that was always decaying influenced historiography for decades, bringing to question the very notion of a Carolingian imperial mission; instead, he showed how the imperial title remained central for competing members of the later dynasty69.
4. Ruling frontiers
Once established, frontiers may have been visible in the landscape: many might immediately think of the Great Wall of China or Hadrian’s Wall as barriers separating the empire from the outside; a monument to greatness and majesty. The Carolingian empire and its later incarnations, however, were seldom characterized by the monumentality of the limes. Certainly, fortifications were built on the river Elbe, as elsewhere: Matthias Hardt suggested the limes Saxoniae was a system of hillforts erected thirty or forty kilometres from each other, as «a large region protected by a system of fortresses and sanctuaries on both sides of the boarder», which may have echoed Rome’s masonry – although the reality of this fortified frontier has been debated70. In the North, we learn, there was a «vallum» open by one gate, a fortification built by the Danes71. Castella dotted the border between the Saxon march and the land of the Sorbs, while another «uuallum»signed the entrance in the territory of the Avars72. Often demarcations were far less spectacular; they nevertheless maintained a function in controlling people’s movements73. Bavarian eastern borders were defined in terms of precisely named places, loca; villae may have marked the border between Saxons and Abodrites74.
Authority in the borderlands made them much harder to cross when entering the imperial territory than when leaving it75. Entering the empire required harsher conditions; leaving it was generally much easier, because of the perceived difference between imperial and outside-the-empire life according to the above-mentioned asymmetry. The Carolingian capitulary of Thionville (805) refers to the regions of Saxony and Bavaria, in Lauriacum where strongholds and royal officials to control exchange and the merchants travelling to the territories of the Slavs and Avars, forbidding the commerce of some wares, while permitting the exchange of others. Such an outpost was still the «limes certus» at the eve of the Avar campaigns and further conquests in the East76. The control of merchants and travellers was not peculiar to the West: the Itinerarium of Bernard the Monk suggestively shows the great complexity of entering the Caliphate at the end of the ninth century77.
Subsequently, frontier regions were places of military power and tax extraction, which could have been marked by defensive structures: powerhouses of imperial authority. The Carolingian rulers left a certain autonomy to the various kingdoms of the empire, while trying to enforce direct authority on the borderlands78. Emperors themselves throve on these liminal spaces; fourth century Roman rulers seldom abandoned them, making the strongholds at the empire’s very fringes their abode. In the middle of the seventh century, Constans II remained for years in Syracuse to oppose the Arab conquests in the Central Mediterranean79. Charlemagne, although growing older, nevertheless undertook voyages to the Western and Northern frontiers in 810 and 811: his horse fall, with the consequent loss of sword and brooch, became the omen of imminent end80. Widukind of Corvey narrated how it was on the frontier, in the aftermath of the battle at the Lechfeld, that Otto was proclaimed emperor by his army81. Rulers despised in the metropole could have been acclaimed at the frontiers, such as Phocas or Justinian II82.
Emperors could not simultaneously be on each frontier with authors developing the fantasy of omnipresent rulers. Notker of Saint Gall imagined a window in Charlemagne’s palace in Aachen from which every location around him could have been scrutinized, even inside the buildings; an all-seeing eye to keep the empire firm in grasp at the moment of its break apart83. In Chris Wickham’s words the story reflected «the concrete operation of […] power, that is, knowledge, and, when necessary, coercion based on that knowledge»84. In the Chronicon Salernitanum, we read how once, «olim», the Romans possessed seventy-two bronze statues, held in the Capitol, each representing a people subject to them: if one of these gentes rebelled the statue representing it began to vibrate, «commovebatur», and a little bell, «tintinnabulum», on them rang, so that the Romans could intervene in no time85. Dreams born by the insurmountable difficulties of ruling imperial vastities.
In fact, when the emperors were too far away, frontier control may have been delegated to powerful persons rooting to the territory. Lords in charge of boundaries were traditionally among the wealthiest and militarily powerful, such as the governors of Merv, the strategoi of Anatolikon, the dukes of Friuli and Bavaria. Charlemagne was himself a product of the frontier because of his Austrasian origin. «The existence of great military commanders along the frontiers, with powers far in excess to the ones of the counts» made them the empire’s masters after the Carolingians’ demise86. Imperial frontier regions could, thereafter, become a reason for the instability for the imperial core87. Under given circumstances, frontier officers escaped the metropolitan authority in many ways, as in terms of fiscal indiscipline, secessionist projects, or refusing to obey the ruler’s rally and deserting the battlefield. One example is duke Cadolah of Friuli during Bernhard’s revolt in 817; another is Henry the Lion three hundred years later during Barbarossa’s last descent into Italy in 116688. Often usurpers emerged from the frontiers. The story of Byzantine Italy in the seventh century is dotted with tyranni whose race for the imperial title demonstrates the strong bonds of frontier societies with the centre, as well as the strength of the empire’s lure at the frontiers89. The short duration of each Exarch’s service was a deliberate imperial precaution to enable them controlling the frontier regions. It eventually became among the reasons for local armies’ lack of effectiveness90. This is what has been called the principal/agent problem91. Agents have their own priorities and agendas and were often resistant to do as they were told, so that rulers in the imperial frontier regions developed their own agency92. A suggestive example is that of the incident concerning the exarch Olympius, who was supposed to persuade the Italian army to the eastern emperor’s cause before imprisoning the pope. Loyalty was by no mean to be taken for granted: Olympius ended up proclaiming himself as emperor, with the local forces refusing to obey the ruler of Constantinople93.
It was in the frontiers that the very idea of empire could have been claimed, questioned, or challenged. Borderland areas could put forward a poignant symbolic language. In Italy, we read of rituals and liturgy, and we can still admire the remnants of monuments meant to enforce allegiance, as in Torcello or in Rome; the Liber pontificalis provides examples of the means by which Constantinople displayed authority on the Italian peripheries in an effort to ingratiate itself with the local aristocracies in a richness of imperial imagery94. The Libellus de imperatoria potestate in urbe Roma was probably composed in Spoleto during the second half of ninth century and the middle of the tenth, at the imperial southern frontier aiming to assess Louis II’s lordship in Central Italy95. Frontiers could also host imperial quarrels96. In the famous words of Tacitus, before the battle at the mons Graupius, Calgacus, chieftain of the Caledonian confederacy, questioned the very idea of pax Romana, thus turning upside-down the Roman claim to universal rule97. In a similar though less dramatic fashion, the same critic of the empire came from the Syrian frontiers in the Monty Python film Life of Brian. In the delightful “what have the Romans ever done for us” scene, the zealots meet to discuss the overthrow of the Roman government:
REG: All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?
XERXES: Brought peace.
REG: Oh. Peace? Shut up98!
The borderlands of empire were the first to seek various degrees of autonomy, such as Umayyad Al-Andalus, the first region of the Caliphate to escape Baghdad’s authority99. The second version of Gregory II’s life collected in the Liber pontificalis narrated the riot of the imperial armies spreading across Byzantine Italy in 727100. The idea of promoting a new emperor was mooted, but eventually the project abandoned, and the frontier provinces fragmented into increasingly autonomous polities, the imperial symbols and lexicon of power bent to local realities, as in Rome, Ravenna or Venice101.
After 774 and the conquest of the Lombard kingdom by the Franks, Carolingian authors highlighted the peace following the conquest of Italy, whereas dissonant voices from the frontiers told a different story during the succeeding decades102. In 983 the newly conquered regions beyond the Elbe revolted, and the very idea of empire was dramatically challenged: a new allegiance was formed, relying on non-imperial patterns of power, and pagan in religion103. Agnellus wrote in Ravenna in the ninth century, a town at the crossroad of empires, where privileges and punishments are evoked in a continuum, even as the imperial centre shifted from the Byzantines to the Carolingians; the empire could be a divine source of authority or a poisonous dragon rising from the sea104.
Empires needed loyal peripheries to survive. Payments, dignities, and prestige goods were, together with violence, among the means used by the imperial centre to achieve this aim. Harsh punishments emerge from our evidence. Powerful and rebelling officers were dealt with publicly and mercilessly; reports survive of surrendering barbarians brutally executed in the frontier regions, such as at Cannstatt, Verden or in the aftermath of Stoinef’s defeat105. Steppe powers, notably the Mongols, adopted violence as a strategy of rule, using concentrated military power as leverage to assuage defiance106.
Yet coercion was only one of the tools, though an extreme and unwieldly one, that empires had in their armoury; co-option was the favoured choice. Charlemagne’s Saxon wars reached an end when local aristocracies finally joined the imperial cause. Einhard was bluntly outspoken on this imperial policy of assimilation, recording a «union with the Franks to form one people»107. Saxon aristocracies were eventually won for the empire, crushing the Stellinga revolts of the mid-ninth century108
