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Martin Heidegger - philosophy's 'hidden king', or leading exponent of a dangerously misguided secular mysticism. Heidegger has been acclaimed as the most powerfully original philosopher of the twentieth century. Profoundly influential on deconstruction, existentialism and phenomenology, he stands behind all major strands of post-structuralist and postmodern thought. Heidegger announced the end of philosophy and of humanism, and was a committed Nazi and vocal supporter of Hitler's National Socialism. Was Heidegger offering a deeply conservative mythology or a crucial deconstruction of philosophy as we have known it? "Introducing Heidegger" provides an accessible introduction to his notoriously abstruse thinking, mapping out its historical contexts and exploring its resonances in ecology, theology, art, architecture, literature and other fields. The book opens up an encounter with a kind of thinking whose outlines might still not yet be clear, and whose forms might still surprise us.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
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Published by Icon Books Ltd, Omnibus Business Centre, 39–41 North Road, London N7 9DP Email: [email protected]
ISBN: 978-184831-174-9
Text copyright © 2012 Icon Books Ltd
Illustrations copyright © 2012 Icon Books Ltd
The author and illustrator has asserted their moral rights
Originating editor: Richard Appignanesi
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Beginning with a Question ...
What is Being ?
Which Heidegger?
Against Heidegger
For Heidegger
A Social Heidegger
A Future Heidegger
Heidegger and Nazism
Existence in a World of Things
Strange Moments
Natural Attitudes
Beings and Being
Obedient Piety: Beginnings in Theology
Pious Disobedience
Meanings of “Being”
The Rule of Substance
Scholasticism
Modern Philosophy
The Legacy of Descartes
Phenomenology
The First World War
Towards Pure Consciousness
Objects in Consciousness
Solipsism
The Transcendental Ego
Heidegger and Phenomenology
Limits of Phenomenology
The Practical World
Aristotle’s Phronesis
Heidegger’s “Destruction”
Factical Life
The Hermeneutics of Facticity
Dasein
Being and Time
The Analysis of Dasein
1. Being-in-the-World
Presence-at-Hand
Understanding
States of Mind
Descartes’ Amnesia
IN-the-World ...
... and IN-ness
The World’s Places
2. Being-with-Others
Them
The Dictatorship of the Others
Mass Society
Industrial Misery, Commercial Happiness
Pop Culture and They
Averageness
Fallenness
Thrownness and Projective Possibility
Care
Philosophies of Time
Linear Time
Bergson’s Time
Husserl’s Time-Consciousness
Time All At Once
Time and Care
Mortality
Death Within Life
Time and History
Heidegger’s Museum of Household Utensils
Authenticity
Philosophers of Existence
Adventures in Humanism
Critique of Subjectivity
Ethics and Values
Heidegger’s Theology
The Mistress and the Handmaid
Theology Demythologized
Decision and Action
Politics and Philosophy
The Nazi Agenda
The Politics of Renewal
Crisis and Nation
Germanness and Ruralism
Rural Myths
Philosophy in the Inglenook
Primordial Language
Nation, Crisis and Being
Political Controversies
Conservative Revolution
Questioning the Silence
The Truth of Being
Two Roads to Truth
The Truth of Truths
Disclosures: from Husserl to Heidegger
The Clearing
Opening, Lighting and Presencing
Concealment in Unconcealment
Limits of Disclosure
The Hiding Light
The Ruins of Logic
Towards “Thinking”
Heidegger on Art
The Nazi Attack on “Degenerate Art”
Realms of Being
Essential Strife
Pre-Socratic Thinking
Heraclitus
The Work of Art
What Do Shoes Disclose
The Temple
Art at Work
The Names of Poetry
Legacies of Hölderlin
Remembrance of the Poet
The Journey
The Homecoming
The Four-Fold
Attunement and Gathering
Departing From the West ?
The Jewel Net of the God Indra
The Principle of Reason
Reason and Being
The Play of Being
Words and Writing
Technology and Modernity
The Lost Meanings of Techne
Technological Disclosure
The Danger of Technology
Saving Power
Ecology and Essential Thinking
The History of Being
The Essential Question
Heidegger’s Influence
Some Post-Structuralists
Heidegger’s Deconstruction
Demythologizing Heidegger
Heidegger’s Question
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Index
“Is” is one of the most commonplace words in the English language. It slips into sentences almost unnoticed. It is difficult to speak, write or think without it.
But few people ask –
To the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), that neglect was astonishing.
It is not just the neglect of a word, but of every resonance that such a word might have.
“Is” is part of the verb “to be”, the verb of being. To ask “What is ‘is’?” is to ask a question of BEING. That was Heidegger’s central preoccupation.
A strange concern? Heidegger proposed something extraordinary.
Western thought has ‘FORGOTTEN to question being, not just recently, but in a process of neglect spanning 2,500 years.
Heidegger’s task: to return to the question. How could “being” be understood?
Was it possible to forge a new disposition towards “being”, redirecting the trajectories of the last two millennia?
To Heidegger, what was at stake was nothing less than Western thought as it has been known – not only its philosophy, but its natural sciences, its human sciences, its everyday discourses.
To turn towards “being” meant: to turn away from their traditional concerns, to place their methods, their concepts and their underlying assumptions in question.
It means to propose a “thinking” that proceeds otherwise ...
Few philosophers have proposed such a radical disturbance of philosophy.
It took Heidegger into some strange and contentious territories, both conservative and revolutionary, secular and theological, anti-traditional but deeply rooted, backward-looking while proposing a future thinking whose contours are still not settled.
Unsurprisingly, the author “Heidegger” has been read in many different ways. It has often been said, there are many Heideggers.
A Heidegger of German idealist philosophy, preoccupied with abstruse but fundamental questions of time, death, and the underlying anxiety or Angst of human living ...
A scholarly Heidegger, “central to European philosophy”, intersecting major currents of 20th century thought, interrogating philosophy’s “great traditions” ...
A theological Heidegger, taken to have offered a philosophical foundation for modern Christian thought ...
... and some Heideggers who disclaim this: one thoroughly secular, and another of post-theology, responding to the “death of God” while searching out what remains of religious thought in mystic traditions, Eastern religions, etc.
Not far away is a Heidegger of abstruseness, opacity, impenetrability and obscurity: the bête-noir of Anglophone “analytical” philosophy; a Heidegger of “dangerously unaccountable speculations”; of mysticisms and obfuscations; sham tautologies and self-important immersion in self-generated problems ...
The question of being? A senseless querying of what must be an absolute presupposition. If treated as a question there is no way of answering it ... Heidegger has displays of surprising ignorance, unscrupulous distortion and what can fairly be described as charlatanism.
British analytic philosopher A.J. Ayer in 1982
Heidegger’s writings contain the last despairing glimmer of German romantic philosophy. His major work Being and Time is formidably difficult – unless it is utter nonsense, in which case it is laughably easy. I am not sure how to judge it, and have read no commentator who even begins to make sense of it.
British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton in 1992
Heidegger has been interpreted more positively.
... the rescuer of PHENOMENOLOGY (a philosophy of consciousness) from its own self-constructed limits.
... contributor to modern HERMENEUTICS (the philosophical inquiry into how we make interpretations), crucial to the key hermeneutic theorist, Hans-Georg Gadamer.
... the most profound influence on 20th century EXISTENTIALISM and major figures like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre.
... a POST-STRUCTURALIST Heidegger, coming before the name, anticipating the most innovative developments in philosophy and theory in recent decades – and a powerful formative influence even on thinkers who took other paths.
Jürgen Habermas ...
Herbert Marcuse ...
Michel Foucault ...
and many others.
... And a Heidegger of DECONSTRUCTION, providing the most important resource for its leading proponent, Jacques Derrida.
There are Heideggers of social and cultural critique ...
The Heidegger opposed to the conditions of MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, its “mass” culture and technological modes of thought ...
... correspondingly, a Heidegger of conservative RURALISM, rooted in a vision of the “agrarian past”; its traditional modes of life and its assured lore and customs ...
A proto-ECOLOGICAL Heidegger, offering a platform for “deep ecology”: ways of thinking other than those of “exhaustive extraction and relentless appropriation” ...
There are figures of the as-yet-unknown Heidegger ...
A substantial amount of Heidegger’s large output remains unpublished. He lent a hand in setting up a Collected Edition, the Gesamtausgabe, in 1974. But the task of editing and publishing is far from complete. This is a “not-as-yet Heidegger”, still awaited.
Heidegger’s personal papers are held in the German Literary Archive in Marbach, but access has been strictly limited ...
– A private Heidegger, mostly sealed from view.
“Heidegger” is therefore a noun with many possibilities, and its arrival has often sparked controversies. The most fiercely argued issue has been Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism.
Curiously, this has become a powerful reason for reading him. At issue are the politics of philosophy – the political forces at work on it and in it, its attachments and responsibilities.
For many readers, this is not a purely historical concern. It is bound up with our responses to resurgent nazisms now, emerging with new names and without a swastika in sight.
There are many figures of the “political” Heidegger ...
Heidegger was an energetic supporter of German National Socialism in the 1930s and never fully retracted or renounced his publicly-stated views.
Was this a temporary career compromise – a Heidegger pressured by circumstances, perhaps politically misled?
Or was it something deeper and more pervasive, something intimately bound up with his philosophy? That is another Heidegger: a thinker of conservative revolution, forging a discourse of “romanticism and steel”, bound into a vision of regenerated primordial Germanness.
Whether philosophical or theological, socio-economic or political; none of these figures is totally unambiguous. Many are incompatible, and all are contentious.
But the most persistent figure is Heidegger as the “philosopher of being”. What can this mean? Is there any question about being? How could any such question be cast, let alone answered?
“Being” might seem an innocuous site of inquiry, scarcely likely to upset the usual orders of the world. And it seems strictly philosophical, something rarefied and abstract; a soaring generality, perhaps invented uniquely by and for philosophers.
Indeed the word “being” might be so abstract, that meaning drops away from it ...
It’s an empty word, fated to a hollow resonance ... Doesn’t it refer to existence in general, therefore to everything? After all, everything exists ... Nothing in particular has been identified ... That is the wrong kind of approach. My task is to find a way of thinking “being” and a language in which to speak it.
Heidegger’s sources, modes, methods and procedures – and his concepts and his vocabulary – were not going to be commonplace.
But why is “being” so troublesome? We deal every day with things that “exist”; whether mirrors or clouds, CDs or sonatas, or rain and cities.
We grasp their particularities in all our practical dealings with them ... ...And we could go on to think them theoretically – in scientific or philosophical terms. But in amongst all these practical dealings or theorizings, is the. ineluctable fact that something exists ... We usually overlook this.
Heidegger wanted to create a new awareness of that. And the awareness that might arise of this elusive “is-ness” will not be of the ordinary orders.
What could such an awareness be like?
As a first resort, literature might help: for instance, the writings of Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926), German poet and prose writer, and one of Heidegger’s preferred authors.
Rilke tried often to write of the strange moments in which the very fact of existence – that there is something – seemed to make itself felt.
In “Concerning the Poet” (1912), Rilke’s poet-narrator takes a ferry from the Greek island of Philæ towards the open sea. Almost nothing happens. But Rilke is not interested in events of the usual narrative kind. His happenings are of a different order.
I had the rowers facing me, sixteen of them. Mostly their eyes saw nothing, their open gaze going out into the air ... ...But sometimes I could catch one of them deep in thought, meditating on the strange disguised phenomenon facing him and on possible situations which might disclose its nature ...
... when noticed, he immediately lost his strenuously thoughtful expression, for a moment all his feelings were in confusion, then, as quickly as he could, he reverted to the watchful gaze of an animal ... ...until the beautiful serious expression became again the usual silly baksheesh* face, with its foolish readiness to assume any required humiliating distortion of thanks.
*a gratuity, tip or alms
Rilke’s concerns are styled like Heidegger’s.
First, no worthwhile question of being can expect quick answers. The existence of things is “strange” and “disguised” – not simply given to an observer, nor given all at once. What is might be disclosed, but also perhaps not. That there might be some kind of “mystery” of being has alarmed many philosophers.
In Rilke’s words, ...the strange disguised phenomenon ... possible situations which might disclose its nature.
Second, the meditative state with its possible disclosures can be lost, covered over by the call of the “everyday world”; of labouring to deal with the demands or largesses of the tourist-poet and of others.
...the immediate loss of the thoughtful expression, the momentary confusion, the reversion to the ... usual silly baksheesh face ...
Questions of being can be evaded. We can simply accept that things “exist”, and turn away from questioning, towards practical everyday matters...
And thirdly, who is concerned with all this? Certainly the poet.
For Rilke, being is a proper concern of poets. It is poets who should speak it, and speak our awarenesses of it.
A questioning of being might need “poetic” language... That too has alarmed philosophers. Is this the end of all logic, all reason, all truth and all proofs, all systematized argument?
And this again suggests a possible evasion.
We could throw any question of being over to logical reasoning, or to scientific method: e.g. to the accumulation of “facts” about the world; absorbing ourselves in descriptions of what things are like – not that they are ...
So is Rilke, and Heidegger too, pursuing some beguiling question conjured in the artifice of philosophy? Isn’t “being” so dramatically easy to grasp that it needs no lavish care from poets and philosophers ?
For instance: how do we know that things exist? We can see them, or hear them, or feel them, etc. Sensory perception offers the route and the answer. Rilke and his rower are out after some purely phantasmal realm, inherently untestable, unprovable and perhaps nonsensical.
This attitude has its counterpart in philosophy. For instance, in Empiricism.
Empiricists hold that knowledge must be derived from experience of the world and that the “direct” experience of sensory perceptions is vital. Observation and experiment will rule.Positivismpushes the case further. Philosophy should proceed like the sciences ...
From such perspectives, there can scarcely be a question of being. It is a basic pre-supposition, what one assumes before anything else.