Regulations on the prevention and remediation of environmental damage: a comparison between Directive 2004/35/EC and Legislative Decree 152/2006 E-Book

Antonio Aruta Improta

• Herausgeber: Youcanprint
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2019

Beschreibung

Le lesioni delle componenti ambientali non possono che assumere una rilevanza straordinaria, in quanto determinano uno squilibrio del delicato sistema ecologico, ossia l’interrelazione tra le risorse biotiche e abiotiche ed i servizi di esse, di cui l’essere umano stesso è parte fondamentale. A tale riguardo, appare utile un raffronto tra la normativa europea e italiana in materia di prevenzione e riparazione dei danni all’ambiente. La critica offerta dal presente trattato, in particolare, muove dalla molteplicità di significati che sono attribuiti all’ambiente e dalla particolare definizione di danno ambientale, tenendo conto anche degli effetti riflessi che detto pregiudizio può spiegare nella sfera individuale dei soggetti, persone fisiche o giuridiche. La disamina, poi, si incentra sul regime della responsabilità ambientale e sulle azioni volte a prevenire e riparare i pregiudizi alle risorse naturali, con le relative modalità di attuazione. In conclusione, si affrontano le dibattute ipotesi della molteplicità di responsabili dello stesso danno ambientale e della responsabilità del proprietario o gestore dell’area compromessa.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter II

Chapter III

Conclusions

Bibliography

Note

Antonio Aruta Improta

Regulations on the prevention and remediation of environmental damage: a comparison between Directive 2004/35/EC and Legislative Decree 152/2006

Title |Regulations on the prevention and remediation of environmental damage: a comparison between Directive 2004/35/EC and Legislative Decree 152/2006

Author |Antonio Aruta Improta

ISBN | 9788831629430

© All rights reserved to the author

This work is published directly by the Author through the Youcanprint self-publishing platform and the Author holds every right of the same in an exclusive manner. No part of this book can therefore be reproduced without the prior consent of the author.

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Introduction

Regulations on the prevention and remediation of environmental damage are some of the most sensitive and controversial legal instruments.

In response to the growing problems affecting the global ecosystem, many disputes are raised about the causal contribution of Man in causing these problems and on the efficiency of approved regulations to prevent and remedy the impairment caused to environmental media.

The main impediment of an effective action against environmental problems is in fact specifically determined by the lack of a systematic and precise nature in environmental legislation.

This is especially seen in international law, characterized, on one hand, by the production of legal deeds that contain general rules but no binding efficacy by their nature, i.e. statements of principles; on the other, by the production of various binding regulations such as treaties, albeit only sectorial ones. Examples of this are the “International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships” on hydrocarbons, and the recently approved “Paris Agreement” on Climate.

Moreover, rather than giving a comprehensive legal classification of environmental damage per se, international regulations only establish a general prohibition for cross-border pollution. The supranational system, in fact, allows states to arbitrarily exploit their resources in principle, provided this does not cause damage to the territory of other States, quantifiable in terms of losses suffered by people, damage to property, cleaning costs and other impairments deriving from pollution.

In various instances, the claim of the aforementioned laws has actually been detrimental to the global environment, for both economic and political reasons, without causing any consequences to the liable States.

Evidence of this is the accident of April 26th, 1986 at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. The widespread environmental disaster caused by this catastrophe did not generate repercussions at a judicial level neither for the State of origin of the power plant, Ukraine, then belonging to the hegemonic Soviet Union, nor to the nuclear lobby, very influential in the political and economic life of the country. The accident, therefore, is among the major cases of impunity in history.

This also holds true for the uncontrolled development of some Nations that are currently considered superpowers, so advanced at an industrial and productive level that they have created serious problems of cross-border atmospheric pollution, these problems were not addressed by the judicial authorities.

It is enough to think of China’s exponential growth in the past few years, determined by a total lack, until recently, of environmental and labor legislation, as well as by the indifference of other States to the serious repercussions that such arbitrary development has generated on the global environment.

Based on these considerations, European institutions have rightly endorsed a common legislation for all EU Member States, namely the Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability, with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage.

Unlike international sector agreements, the European Directive legally identifies environmental damage, imposing the implementation of preventative measures in situations where a threat of environmental damage is present. It also imposes to concretely repair the natural resources and/or damaged services.

The burden of undertaking such measures is placed on the operator responsible for the damage or for the threat of such damage, being the only subject to be held liable on the basis of the restrictive interpretation of the “polluter pays” principle, which forms the basis of the environmental liability regulation.

Although the framework directive allows the approval of stricter national laws, as a rule, the aforementioned liability from which prevention and remedy obligations arise is not attributed, even jointly, to the State from whose territory the damage to natural resources was caused.

This circumstance can obviously undermine the remedy of the damaged natural media themselves, since the State or the competent authority not required to undertake preventative and remedial actions in the cases in which the responsible operator cannot be identified, or if he is unable to bear the costs of the aforementioned actions. Moreover, with particular regard to the latter case, the directive suggests -but does not impose- insurance coverage for the environmental damage caused by the operators, even if they carry out professional activities considered by the legislation itself as potentially dangerous to health and the environment.

In Italy’s domestic law, many questionable provisions exist concerning the special regulation on environmental liability as set out in Articles 298 bis-318, Part Six, of Legislative Decree no. 152 of 2006, also known as the Environmental Code or the Consolidated Environmental Law, which implemented Directive 2004/ 35 / EC.

Various provisions appear to be conceptually confusing, not coordinated between each other and non-compliant with the provisions of the European Framework Directive, especially regarding the environmental liability system and the criteria for assessing the damage to natural resources.

Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to reconstruct, in the clearest and most comprehensible way possible, the fragmented scenario of the legislation on compensation for environmental damage, as defined in the twenty articles of the sixth part of the Environmental code, comparing them to the contents of the European Directive and indicating its critical points, offering points for reflection.

The paper, in particular, analyzes the evolution of the concept of “environment” and of the controversial notion of environmental damage as a multi-factor offense. In this regard, the negative repercussions that ecological damage can cause to the individual sphere of the various subjects are pointed out, whether these are physical or juridical persons who, therefore, can act independently in court for the compensation of the damages suffered. Such damages can also have a material nature, impacting the quality of life of the person who suffers the consequences of the environmental media’s contamination.

The analysis of the environmental liability system then follows, as well as the compensation and quantification of damages caused only to natural resources.

Evaluation criteria were used, whose purpose was to allow a real and specific remedy of the environmental media and/or of their compromised services.

Lastly, attention was devoted to some particular cases of environmental liability that have been the subject of debate in case-law and literature: the several liability of polluters and of the owner or manager of the damaged site.

Chapter 1

 

LEGAL NATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

1.1. The environment, a material asset

Within the Italian legal system, the technical-legal problems of the legislation on compensation for environmental damages mentioned in the introduction stem, first of all, from the complex definition of the legal asset protected by the legislation itself, namely the environment.

To date, in fact, there have been heated debates both in case-law and literature on the classification of the aforementioned asset.

As a preliminary point, it can be stated that the etymology of the Italian word “ambiente” (environment), which derives from the Latin word ambiens-entis, expresses the idea of being around, of surrounding. Thus, the meaning of the word “environment” is that of a «set of conditions external to the organism where plant and animal life takes place» or in a figurative sense, a «set of external materials, social and cultural conditions in which a human being develops, lives and works».1 The various theories expressed by philosophers, theologians, scientists and economists have surely significantly influenced the gradual evolution of the legal system regarding the concept of “environment”.

In fact, from the analysis of international and national sector regulations, there is an anthropocentric projection typical of the Greco-Roman period and mistakenly supported deduced from the common Christian vision of the Western world.2 However, to be concise, the confirmation of the theories referred to was omitted, and can be consulted directly for in-depth knowledge.3

At the international level, public interest in the environment was recognized in case-law in 1941, following the outcome of an arbitral dispute between Canada and the US due to air pollution caused by emissions from a Canadian foundry in Trail, located at a short distance from the border with the United States.

On that occasion, one of the fundamental environmental principles was stated, which soon became an international custom, according to which «no State has the right to use or allow its territory to be used in such a way as to cause damage».4

This principle established a ban on cross-border pollution, based on which Canada was ordered to compensate the damage to the US agriculture caused by the harmful emissions of sulfur dioxide from the industrial production processes of the Canadian foundry.

However, the first definition of “environment” was introduced into the international legal system with the subsequent UN Declaration at the Conference on Human Environment:5 «The natural resources of the Earth, including air, water, land, flora and fauna, and particularly representative samples of natural ecosystems must be preserved, in the interest of present and future generations, through an adequate planning and management».6

Subsequently, the International Court of Justice drafted a concept of environment comprising, in addition to the «space where human beings live», also the quality of life and the health of human beings, including future generations.7

The concept of environment was therefore reconstructed in a purely anthropocentric way, its protection mainly stemming from the need to ensure the well-being of present and future human generations.

In this regard, the principle of sustainable development was clearly expressed, defined for the first time by the Bruntdland report, understood as «development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs».8

This was also clearly expressed in the first principle of the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development,9 according to which «human beings are at the center of problems for sustainable development. They have the right to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature».

In the legal documents drafted at the Community level, instead, the supremacy of man over nature tended to weaken.

In 1985, the European Community approved Council Directive no. 337/85 of 27 June 1985, concerning the environmental impact assessment of certain public and private projects, according to which the environment represents the following elements: «1) man, fauna and flora; 2) soil, water, air, climate and landscape; 3) material assets and cultural heritage; 4) the interaction between the elements referred to in the first, second and third point».10

A few years later, in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,11 it was stated that the notion of environment encompassed all the natural resources and the interactions between them, the assets forming part of the cultural heritage and the characteristic aspects of the landscape.12

Therefore, with respect to international regulations, European requirements provided for a fundamental element, represented by the concept of an “interrelation” between man and natural resources. This criterion marked the trend towards the ecological and less anthropic awareness that has been developing to date: being man interdependent with nature, he has the duty to necessarily protect the environment in which he lives.

It should be noted that the concept of ecology must be kept separate from that of environmentalism. “Ecology”, [comp. of eco and logia, a word created (from the German Oekologie) by biologist E. Haeckel (1986)13], indeed, is not an ideal or a movement, but an interdisciplinary field that includes the biology and sciences of the Earth, focusing on the scientific analysis and study of the interactions between the organisms and their environment.

Therefore, the European institutions have devoted to the environment (strictly speaking) the entire Title XX of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),14 namely, Articles. 191, 192 and 193,15 within which the principles, criteria and objectives of the Union’s environmental policy were stated.

Within the Italian legal system, instead, the definition of environment as a legal asset has found some initial complications at the constitutional level.

The notion of “environment” was in fact not explicitly mentioned in the text of the new Constitution of Italy, which became effective on 1 January 1948.16 The founders limited themselves to providing for a generic “protection of the landscape”, without giving further details on the meaning of the word.

Given this legal loophole, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), through an interpretation of the combined provisions of Articles 2, 9 and 32 of the Constitution, which refer respectively to the recognition of the inviolable rights of man and to the protection of the landscape and health, has described the subjective right to a healthy environment.

From an anthropic point of view, constitutional relevance to the environment was indirectly recognized, as it is functional to the protection of certain fundamental interests of an individual.17

Subsequently, the first judgment of the Constitutional Court on environmental matters identified -in the provisions of art. 9, paragraph 2, of the Constitution-, the legislative reference implicit in the naturalistic value of the assets forming the Nation’s landscape as well as its cultural and artistic heritage.

In this regard, the landscape, mentioned as one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution, was defined as «a primary, aesthetic and cultural value».18

Moreover, although Law no. 349 of 8 July 1986 had established the Ministry of the Environment and issued the first provisions regarding an environmental damage, it did not provide an exhaustive definition of the environment, limiting itself to protecting it in its unity.19 The definition is also missing in the Legislative Decree no. 152 dated April 3rd, 2006, known as the Environmental Code.20

Nevertheless, the aforesaid unified vision of the environment as an asset determined the gradual transition from a “set” of elements to a “system”, supporting the interrelations between the various elements that compose it.

A subsequent ruling by the Constitutional Court, in fact, defined the environment as a «fundamental right of the human being and a fundamental interest of the community», affirming a unitary notion of the environment as an asset, that included all natural and cultural resources. In particular, it was clarified that the environment includes

The conservation, rational management and improvement of natural conditions (air, water, soil and territory in all its components), the existence and preservation of the terrestrial and marine genetic heritage of all the animal and plant species that live in it, in a natural state, and ultimately, the human being in all its expressions.21