The Embodiment of Philosophy E-Book

Adrian W. Froehlich

• Herausgeber: BoD - Books on Demand
• Kategorie: Fachliteratur
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Seitenzahl: 1818

Beschreibung

Thoughts from four decades on the subject of artificial beings with consciousness and thus on the question of what humans can find out about themselves beyond metaphysics. It turns out in this matter that the solution to the problem is to implement the problem. The book contains the core theory from 1991 on the construction principles of a "Mr. Data" (the android from the sci-fi series Star Trek: The Next Generation). The theory was the subject of a discussion with Valentin Braitenberg at the Max-Planck-Institute in Tübingen, Germany.

Leseprobe

In a cup: the sea

Incomprehensible, yet contained.

The cup cannot hold it

The sea is held by me.

Some of the graphics, panels and pictures contained in this book are originals from the publication Plastware - Spiel der Spiegel from 1991/1995 and from works by the author from the seventies and eighties. They have been left as they were, which is why their print quality may be poor. The text may also contain grammatical errors and some unevenness.

On behalf of the English (US) version the book was supplemented with additional material and translated by a program using AI. However, some of the technical terms could only be translated provisionally and there may be errors in the translation of proprietary terms and abbreviations.

The main theoretical work was done between 1984 and 1991, starting early in the seventies. The seminal Ergon theory was first published in 1995 by Edition Diolkos, under the title ‘Plastware – Das Spiel der Spiegel’.

The book as what it represents today was compiled between 2010 and 2017 and published in German 2018 and 2021, titled “Mr. Data und das Braitenberg-Universum”.

This book is the result of a lifelong expedition in a spaceship of pure thought to the point where everything is either mirrored or erased.

It was and is the loneliest of all expeditions. It is the journey of an indivisible consciousness. Unlike in physics, it cannot be undertaken together. There is no math and no reality.

The result may contain countless errors and inaccuracies, but they have no influence on the course. It ends at the point, regardless of the state in which the spaceship arrives.

It may be ruined, but when it arrives, it is either mirrored or disappears. It undertakes the journey to nothingness at the edge of consciousness.

If you want to make this journey yourself, here you have the spaceship, ruined but successful. By the time you can understand its construction, I will be long dead.

Alone and lonely, even amid intelligent people, I could learn nothing useful from them. Almost every one of their certainties turned out to be a mirage.

I had to rethink everything, from alpha to omega, using a new language.

Mottos

They should get used to a way of thinking in which the material realization of an idea means much less than the idea itself.

Valentin Braitenberg

(...) we need a naturalism that does not straitjacket our understanding of complex systems such as the human brain to failed metaphors coming from early twentieth-century formulation of what is to make a computation.

Why can't the brain be a physical system that does not happen to be a programmable digital computer? Are we sure there are not still new principles to be discovered in complex systems, biology, and neuroscience?

The root of the crisis in naturalism is its being wedded to the picture that the universe is a machine.

Lee Smolin

.

(...) that we do not need an external reality independent of the reality of experience in order to explain all experiences, and thus knowledge, the observer and observation, but that the assumption of an external reality independent of experience is either treated as superfluous or interferes with the understanding of the phenomena mentioned as biological phenomena.

Humberto Maturana

In the organization of living systems, the role of effector surfaces is only to keep the set states of the receptor surfaces constant, and not to act on an environment, however adequate such a description may seem for the analysis of adaptation processes or other processes.

Humberto Maturana

He said that going from the blue sky to the utter blackness of space was a moving experience: "In an instant you go, `Whoa, that's death. That's what I saw."

William Shatner, TV's Capt. Kirk, blasts into space, www-phys.org, Oct 13, 2021

Foreword to the English edition

What an imposition for a reader! Can this book be read at all? As the author, I can hardly say no, but I have to. Reading is the wrong term. The book is a meal at a table as vast as your own mind.

I am perfectly aware that it is impossible to interfere in the academic business with outsider ideas and works. Due to various decisions and constraints in my life, I did not study the subject I was already passionate about as a teenager, philosophy, but medicine, and later, when I finally did study philosophy, I did so in a way that is unusual. During a gap year in 1984, I had written down my thoughts on ontology in an extensive text, which one of the professors of philosophy at the University of Berne, to whom I had sent it on the advice of a friend, thought was so extraordinary, given that I had not studied philosophy for an hour up to that point, that he would have accepted the text as both a licentiate thesis and a dissertation if I had completed an abbreviated curriculum with him for formal reasons. I didn't do that because I was at this time already thinking in terms of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. I then was accepted into the circle of senior assistants and doctoral students of another professor and attended their advanced seminars on analytical philosophy and cognitive theory. However, I had to drop out after three years because in the meantime I had been appointed head of the systems engineering and development methodology division of a high-tech ICT company, a job that was incompatible with a parallel course of study.

In the end, I had to take a six-week sabbatical in 1991 to put down on paper my ideas on the question of whether it would be theoretically possible to develop an artificial being that would have the same problems with the world as humans. The “core theory” printed in this book was written during these six weeks. I sent it 1992 to Valentin Braitenberg at the MPI in Tübingen, who, contrary to expectations, replied, gave the text a very flattering assessment and offered to rewrite it together with experts from the MPI, as he had noticed that my language was outside academic convention. I tried to make friends with the idea, but financial reasons made it impossible for me to spend one to two years on this rewrite at my own expense, which would have required me to be present in Tübingen. That was not an option at the time.

I put the manuscript aside and devoted myself to my professional work and to some literary and video productions. It wasn't until after 2010 that I began to look at the theory again and finally compiled my thoughts, as far as they were relevant, in this book, which I subsequently published myself, as it would not have been accepted by any publisher.

Some time ago I attended a scientific event that was about embodiment. I realized that something has gone since then, in the right direction, but still not enough in principle. I looked at publications about embodiment and found my impression confirmed. In my opinion, we are on the right path, but "blindly", lacking the basic insight into the depth of the problem.

Although I had the experience with Valentin Braitenberg in 1992, which really touched me, that I could be taken seriously, the most I expected from him was mockery, but not the recognition that he then spontaneously gave me. I had less luck with other luminaries to whom I sent a printed version of my theory in 1996; most of them remained silent.

Compared to everything I have read about AI and neuroscience research based on the embodiment idea, my theory is still far more fundamental because it is a meta-model, something that is still completely lacking in both AI and neuroscience.1 My 1991 model is the result of a twenty-year philosophical quest that brought me to the brink of despair before I started all over again by approaching the problem anew as a game of building blocks, inspired by Braitenberg's little marvel "Künstliche Wesen". One thing led to another in 1991 and the core theory of this book was put down on paper within a few weeks.

I could not publish my book in any scientific publishing house, as I am not a member of the community and therefore not legitimized to have thought and written what I thought, wrote, and continue to think and write. So, I published it myself.

Whoever discovers this book, understands it at least in outline and reads longer passages from it, will recognize that it is one of those books that present the fundamentals in a completely new way. It is a true original. But it takes a certain amount of mental effort to discover the book. I apologize for these words, which are arrogant and unqualified.

I hated self-marketing from an early age. I didn't want to be known, I wanted to find the solution to the puzzle I had been given by a fate incomprehensible to me at the time. That was and is still only possible far away from the collective world. For this reason, I have always supported myself with a bread-and-butter job, as a software engineer, as a doctor and now for twenty years as a psychiatrist. Nobody around me knows about my thoughts and the books, except for a handful of people I am close to. Since my youth, I have led two lives at the same time, one for society and one on an inner mission, which I found tyrannical even as a young man. I lead this second life inwardly, in secret. None of the things I have thought and written since my adolescence would have been even remotely debatable with the people who surrounded and surround me.

I am now seventy years old, still working full-time as a psychiatrist and running a group practice. Perhaps after another five years I will retire and finally move to Denmark, my soul home for over forty years. I doubt whether my thoughts will really be able to influence cognitive science and philosophy. They would certainly be extremely useful, but they cannot be communicated to the academic community.

I can see that very clearly, but I can no longer change it. However, if my thoughts were to find their way into good hands somewhere, I would have achieved far more than I can expect and would be indebted to this open mind. I regret that I did not have the courage at the time to accept Braitenberg's invitation, which I should have done. Perhaps someone else will be found today, now that ideas such as those discussed in this book have already become anchored in the discourse, who will take up my theory.

What is this book about, in a nutshell? We essentially have two theories in this book. A theory of the object and a theory of the subject. In terms of terminology and language, neither bears much resemblance to what we know from philosophy, but the latter can be applied quite well to both.

The core theory of the book is the object theory. In complete contrast to philosophy, however, it is not about the "thing", or more generally about what exists, but about an android or, as I occasionally call it, the sarcomaton. However, such a thing cannot be thought or constructed without constantly referring to the subject. The core theory is thus embedded in the subject theory or, to be more precise, in a theory of the monad. Only the two together make up the overall theory, in perfect complementarity, which I call a theory of the "cosmic Ergon". Although, as mentioned, I am talking about androids or sarcomata, it is fundamentally about a metatheory for the human being that I am in my physicality. What is now called "embodiment" in cognitive science and in parts of psychology is a version, albeit a weak one, of what I am concerned with in this book.

In relation to the subject, for a certain better understanding of what I am undertaking in this book, we can include philosophies such as those developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Jaspers, but also Kant, Hegel or Leibniz and Whitehead, and ultimately also psychology. In relation to the object, we place physics, chemistry, biology, and medicine on the other side, essentially the natural sciences. However, my approach is not dualistic in the Cartesian sense; I do not, as in the idea of "embodiment" for example, assume body and mind, nor do I naively assume realism, but rather think of both as inseparably interwoven from the very beginning, holistically, as it were from the perspective of transcendental reason.

My theory, the one for the sake of which this thick book is needed (which is actually still far too narrow to meet this requirement) “embodies” the problem posed to us in philosophy and its spin-offs, the sciences, at a much more fundamental level than anything that AI, robotics and neuro-epistemology can do in this respect. In the basic construct of the Ergon, embodiment is dialectically anticipated, in the concept of the Ergont - an artificial being consisting of Ergons - it is symmetrized in a way that is invariant to size and complexity, and finally, in that of the cosmic Ergon, becoming holistic, transcendentalized, long before the being conceived in this way (in the broadest sense, the “system”) can even “have” a body in the sense of metaphysical realism, or rather “possess” a body which can then be viewed and examined anatomically, biochemically, neuro-epistemologically and finally psychologically as source material.

Newer approaches to somehow get at the fundamental problem we are faced with, such as the theory of free energy as developed and advocated by Friston2, among others, are highly interesting, but ultimately still remain theories of the “double object” because they do not dialectically break the metaphysical realism that must be inherent in every scientific approach before they engage with it. A corresponding necessity is not even recognized in the first place, and what should be done first and foremost is then done afterwards, which leads to the definitive insolubility of the task.

In order to suppress this fact, all such theories eventually slide into infinitesimalism, which leads to the solution being shifted behind a quasi-cosmic asymptote. This gives the impression that the “subject” has finally been understood, since all such solutions are internalist, monadist. Unfortunately, however, this is another deception that corresponds to that which today's cosmology advances and at the same time negates.

You can only solve the problem posed to us humans at the very beginning or not at all. To understand this, you have to be a born philosopher. Having studied philosophy is not enough, it takes the most fundamental of all intuitions to grasp the abyss, the chasm, over which we stand, it takes the primal grasp of what is, or, as I tell him, the experience that “x is empty”. What this means is monstrous in principle and the consequences are infinitely varied. On the contrary, “in experience” nothing is empty, as anyone who does not have this basic intuition will object. And it is no coincidence that the new embodiment approaches adopt Buddhist techniques of experience in order to counteract the basic lack of intuition that one feels within oneself. However, all such borrowings are always only a-posteriori insights, they do not replace the “point” that is at stake in the depths (i.e. in the early stages of all cognition), and corresponding theories always unintentionally demonstrate that this is and remains the case.

The core theory developed in this book and enriched by all kinds of additional material (which sensu strictu is not always needed, but is helpful for the initiated) consists of three pillars:

The Ergon: It is the basic unit of embodiment before all physicality, before any sensorimotor nexus, before any theory formation at all. The Ergon anticipates the unity of physis and noesis. It is what is contained in the black box, which always remains as the last thing when (hypothetically) “everything else” has become discursive. It realizes the dialectical claim that our problem is and remains totalitarian, that an insurmountable paradox is inherent in it, that the symmetry is broken, as I tell it. Only when this is acknowledged do we have any chance of getting to the true location of what is happening, and this is not the body that we are investigating, nor is it the mind that we are speculating about. It is the empty place from which everything comes.

The Ergont: It is a being consisting of Ergons, with which we as humans who have created it can communicate, as with ourselves, because it mirrors us on every conceivable level and at the same time is something metaphysically real developed as a thing of the metaphysically real niche in which it experiences itself, which in turn is ultimately ourselves, as things for it. It is what I call the Android.

The cosmic Ergon: It is the totality of the Android and myself, the only consciousness that is given. The Android needs me as the subject that is and remains mine. Conversely, due to its construction and function, it experiences itself as the subject that was always already mine and is now always already its own, while it experiences me as the Android. This fundamental symmetry is broken because it always has a direction, even though this is not possible. The cosmic Ergon is thus in a certain sense the entire cosmos, for the things themselves, including even the firmament in the sky, are merely signals for the Android as the metaphysically real thing that it is for me, but the fullness of the world is for me. The same applies vice versa. This means that there is nothing that is not contained in this setting; in particular, it contains what I call x, and it is empty.

My theory now develops this trinity consistently from within itself and proves that it is possible to create the artificial human being and thus explain ourselves definitively at the same time. I don't just philosophize about these things; I demonstrate how to build such a being. It is not only something completely new for any philosophy, but also the most groundbreaking thing of all. After a long period of separation, philosophy and natural science are once again congruent, they “cancel each other out”, overlaying each other, as Hegel would say. This is what gives rise to the true unity of knowledge and provides us with the basic technology for the next eon of mankind.

Against this background, the AI and embodiment theories discussed today are tool developments. They are useful, but they do not solve any of the problems for the sake of which we set out to find an answer to Parmenides. For it was there, in Elea, that the catastrophe was put into words some 2500 years ago. We are still trying to answer it.

During my private investigations, which I have undertaken from a wide variety of perspectives, it now seems to me, in view of the results, that Plato's original achievement is less important than it is usually seen in philosophy. Above all, Plato brought the existing, pre-Socratic, sophistic thinking and knowledge to a certain point by tracing it dialogically using the artificial figure of Socrates. In the absence of a formal logic, he used the instrumental approach attributed to Socrates of merely knowing that one knows nothing.

The truly new, ground-breaking achievement at the time was made by the now largely lost atomists, Democritus, and Leucippus, and of course Aristotle, who "invented" formal logic, "correct reasoning". As a result, their didactic embodiment in the artificial figure of Socrates and thus the need for dialog in the development of a thought has since been eliminated. Aristotle was the first to develop a “calculus” that could be used to show what can be held and what is wrong, and for a formal reason alone. In doing so, he raised thinking to the level of geometry and algebra, as represented or further developed by mathematicians such as Pythagoras, Thales, Archimedes, Eratosthenes, Euclid, and many others of whom we have little knowledge.

The picture that emerged in antiquity was therefore like that of modern European culture some two thousand years later. Even then, there was a primary period in which most of what was later elaborated into elaborate teachings had already been discovered. This was the time of the pre-Socratics. This was followed by the High Classical period, which from today's perspective is represented by Plato and his artistic figure of Socrates. At the transition to the post-classical period with the exceptional figure of Aristotle, the various "toolmakers", the mathematicians, the logicians, and the physicists appeared. This after-period, whose most essential and at the time probably most important holdings were lost, the teachings of the atomists, was followed by a period of philosophy of life based on early humanism, which must have been agnostic in the final analysis, the period of Epicurus and the so-called Stoa with its representatives up to the late Roman period. This last period of actual philosophy was then followed by thinking under the spell of the "circle of God", thinking using a totalitarian, personalized concept, which caused the intellectual house of cards of an entire millennium to collapse. It could no longer be kept out of the maelstrom of a powerful circular reasoning and finally replaced itself with the total concept of God, which subsumed object, subject and human being into one and eternally separated them from itself, only to gather them back into itself completely. Only Bruno, Copernicus, Galileo and the thinkers of the Renaissance, rediscovering antiquity, broke out of this circle, whose power only began to show itself when it was exposed to fundamental criticism, which rose to the level of universal dogmatism and brought the free spirit to the stake.

Let’s finally come to what’s called “embodiment” in current research. Pfeifer and Bongard's 2006 book How the body shapes the way we think essentially brings what we have been reading all along: a toolmaker's view of the thing.3 For me, there are three eras of this view: the first was the era of Turing and von Neumann, the ingenious phase of programmable machines based on math. The early thinkers basically continued Leibniz's work, but without elaborating on it, because Leibniz had thought more deeply. Then came phase two, that of AI based on all kinds of representationalism and symbolism, a phase of reconstructing intelligence beyond its human embodiment. Here, in addition to logical and mathematical concepts, analogical concepts were and are also used, which, it is claimed, are somehow inherent to intelligent thinking. These included frame concepts and thinking in microworld solutions, from so-called expert systems to software agents. The so-called GPS, on the other hand, had already failed back then. In the second era, non-philosophers used psychological and psychologist models to develop strategies on how human intelligence solves, decides, or assesses something. These were half creative, half trial-and-error approaches. The emerging biology of cognition was ultimately also part of this. Then came the third phase, which abandoned the previously asserted independence of intelligence in relation to hardware and since then has spoken of embodied intelligence, a school of thought that Rolf Pfeifer had joined in the meantime. Plastware – Das Spiel der Spiegel, the core theory in this book, had been sent to his AI laboratory in Zurich 1996, without response.

In the third era, the sensorimotor circuit approach - and thus implicitly metaphysical realism again as the basis for all further investigations - was basically accepted as indispensable for research into intelligent behavior, thus buying something for free that had previously been unaffordable. Whereas previously the Turing test was obligatory as the truth criterion in the entire calculation at the end, human intelligence was to be completely simulated if this test was passed, it was now assumed that the object areas under investigation, which are usually also referred to as agents (in reference to the software agents from the second era), are not human anyway, but are pure tools. Their criterion of truth is therefore the determination from the experiment as to whether they produce something that can be used, i.e. something that endures in the universe of humanly perceived meaningfulness. Now it is thought that if this is the case, the apparatus behind it must be part of relevant intelligence and therefore suitable for concretizing intelligence. These apparatuses are part of a (developing) theory of intelligence.

This approach is therefore also a realist, an instrumental and a psychological approach. It is characterized by the fact that the principle of reality is assumed (as Einstein, by the way, also wanted to have stated to Bohr and Heisenberg in relation to the final questions of physics at the time), that the externalist reality is the niche in relation to which a tool should be intelligent. There should therefore be a loop between the tool and the niche, as we usually claim for everyday life.

However, this meant that Maturana's, Varela's and Uribe's critique of the foundations was lost, who, like Braitenberg in particular, had recognized in the 1980s that the real problem in all our attempts to understand self-developing and controlling automata, be it in biology or in the world of cognitive systems, lies somewhere else entirely, namely in the fatal, unfortunately habitual imprecision with which we have so far distinguished between the "inside" and the "outside" outside the sphere of purely philosophical investigations. When examined correctly, the "inside" is not an apparatus, not a second "outside", but fundamentally a subject. And this is always connected with an intentio obliqua, in other words, with consciousness, or to put it another way, with the immediacy of given insight into the "essence". Because this has not yet been more precisely specified - except in theories such as those of Kant, Hegel, Husserl or in the modern theory of truth, meaning and reference - science, which deals with artificial intelligence in all its sub-forms, deletes this unclear area and wants to open it up "from the outside" through observations and analyses, this time "correctly", as it believes. In doing so, science overlooks the fact that this is impossible. It is completely impossible to either eliminate the subject from a successful theory of automata or to grasp it as a "second outside", i.e. objectively. This is of course embarrassing and should not be the case. But unfortunately, it is. Braitenberg has put his finger on the sore spot with his artificial beings and Maturana has uncovered where the problem lies in the area of autopoietic systems and epistemology.

The embodiment approach as it is pursued today, in AI and in psychology, overlooks this whole problem without really noticing it, yet the approach requisitions the idea of embodiment, but in a non-philosophical way. This is the reason why the embodiment approach as it presents itself today remains Cartesian-dualistic and fails in the face of the corresponding criticism. The question of dualism and monism was already addressed at the time of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz and ultimately led to Kant's critique, from which, among other things, Hegel's dialectic emerged and later Husserl's phenomenology and existentialism, all profound philosophical clarifications that cannot be ignored if we want to deal responsibly with something like artificial intelligence at all. All these approaches are ultimately based on the insurmountable subject, which is not an object and can never be thought of as such, even though the everyday mind constantly attempts to do so because it is looking for something other than total insight. It only ever needs a tool. This is where the circle closes. The question is whether we recognize that the problem of artificial beings is something that cannot be solved with a tool approach. Tools are needed, but not to solve the problem, but conversely to implement it. This is something fundamentally different from what all AI has done, is doing and will continue to do. The abysmal philosophical problem must be implemented, not an essentially infinite series of shallow solutions around this problem until scientists can no longer find it. The philosopher always finds it again, abandoned and misunderstood, indeed all too often raped. Braitenberg saw that. Maturana saw it. But neither of them could do anything decisive with it, they were able to point it out, as I like to say, with the long index finger on the Isenheim altarpiece.

Braitenberg, fascinated, didn't understand my theory in detail, as he admitted, but wanted it reformulated in a language that meets the standards so that he could understand it. I’m still sorry about that. Unfortunately, it’s not my fault. The matter itself requires a new language.

Easter 2024

Iceland, 2023

Correspondence address:

[email protected]

1 I.e.: Engel, A., Friston, K., Kragic, D., The Pragmatic Turn, The MIT Press, 2015, and: Varela, J., Thompson, E., Rosch, E., The Embodied Mind, The MIT Press, 191, 2016

2 See under Friston in the source chapter of this book.

3 Pfeifer, R., Bongard, J., How the body shapes the way we think, MIT, 2006

Table of Contents

TO THE LAUNCH PAD

1 WHAT IS A BRAITENBERG UNIVERSE?

2 PRELIMINARY REMARK

3 SUMMARY

GETTING STARTED

4 LET'S EAT THE UNIVERSE!

5 TWO CLEVER MONKEYS

6 THE KALEIDON PROBLEM

7 ARISTOTLE'S ERGON IN THE TURING TEST

8 TO BE OR TO BECOME?

9 THE HOLY GRAIL OF THE REST

10 LI AND THE SITUATION

11 THE INFINITESIMAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD

12 THE COSMIC MIRROR

13 TALKS IN SEVILLE

14 EL BANQUETE DE TAPAS

15 THE DESIGN FLAW

16 ANALYTICAL APPROACH

17 THE RADIO OPERATOR PARADOX

18 AN ARRANGEMENT

19 SETTING OFF FOR THE ARCHIMEDEAN POINT

WHAT’S BEHIND US

20 AN ENCOUNTER

21 ABOUT TRUTH AND EXISTENCE

22 ABOUT TRUTH

23 ABOUT LOGICAL TRUTH

24 ABOUT INDUCTION

25 ABOUT KANT

26 ABOUT HILARY PUTNAM

27 ABOUT REASON

28 ABOUT REFERENCE

29 THE SITUATIONAL TURN

30 UNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

THE VESSEL – THE CORE THEORY OF 1991

31 A VEHICLE THAT BRAITENBERG FORGOT

32 THE ACTORS ARE ERGONTS

33 BUILDING BLOCKS: ERGONS, NOT CELLS

34 SEMANTICS IN THE BIOLEGO

35 THE FUNCTIONAL METAMODEL OF THE ERGON

36 SUBTYPES AND CLUSTERS

37 LEARNING ERGONTS

38 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ERGONETICS

39 ERGONOGENESIS

40 OPEN AND CLOSED CIRCUITS

41 SPECIAL PROBLEMS

42 THE LABYRINTH OF SHUNTS

43 CAT AND MOUSE

44 FIRST GAME ROUND

45 SECOND GAME ROUND

46 THIRD GAME ROUND

47 FOURTH GAME ROUND

48 MIRROR AND LIVELINESS

THE PILOT – CONSCIOUSNESS, 2010-2018

49 COPENHAGEN’S LONG LINE

50 A FUNDAMENTAL SYMBIOSIS

51 THE BASIC FUNCTION OR THE LOGOS

52 STRANGE LOOPS AND THE COLLAPSE

53 THE DUAL SOURCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

54 SYMMETRY IS MIRROR SYMMETRY

55 INFINITESIMALITY AND AUTILITY

56 THE MONAD, AND WHAT BECOMES OF IT

57 LEIBNIZ, GOD, PHYSICS AND ASIA

58 REALITY, CONSCIOUSNESS, SITUATION

59 REALITY AND REPRESENTATION

60 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

61 WHAT THIS BOOK SAYS

62 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE

AS

-RELATION

EPIPHENOMENA

63 MENTALIZATIONS

64 THE ILLUSION OF THE SEMANTIC BRIDGE

65 THE "RING OF POWER"

66 A FINAL CLARIFICATION

CLUES OF OTHER DISCOVERERS

67 LEIBNIZ AND THE CONSEQUENCES

68 MATURANA AND WHITEHEAD

RE-ENTRY

69 THE DREAM OF THE LITTLE PRINCE

70 THE MUSEUM OF TRUTH

71 ON THE SHIP

72 A PARABLE

SOURCES

73 A REMARK

74 LITERATURE AND ARTICLES

75 MANUSCRIPTS

LUGGAGE CLAIM

76 HOLOPRAGMA AND REALITY AS COMPLEMENTA

77 CREATION RELOADED

78 ULTRA – BEYOND X

Foreword to the 2021 German edition

The text contains the essentials of my own independent investigations into the question of a conclusive explanation of my - all our - existence. The investigation, which began in the early seventies and came to a temporary end in 1991 with the development of the Ergon theory contained in this book, was resumed after 2010 for the purpose of this synopsis. After its publication in 2018 under the title Mr. Data und das Braitenberg-Universum, further essayistic additions followed in Creation reloaded, Attack on Syracuse and Lumsk, especially on the question of the Holopragma4, but also on fundamental questions of reality. I have included two of these expanding and clarifying texts in the current republication of this book (see at the end of this edition).

To be able to build the android, there is a thing I have not yet done: the examination of the brain, the spinal cord and the autonomic nervous system with regard to the “lost closure points of the transducer continuum” and thus the identification of the main Ergons of the human being. However, this can also be done by someone else, provided they have fully understood the theory of the Ergon systems capable of consciousness contained in these and the supplementary texts.

Nothing in my theory can be found in current university teaching. The theory is completely original, as Valentin Braitenberg had already stated. Moreover, it is linked to (fundamental) ontology, to the deep problems of the theory of meaning. My theory cannot be meaningfully categorized and assessed without taking its philosophical grounding into account.

After 1984, I became convinced that we could only complete ontology if we built an artificial being that had the same problems with it as we did. That philosophy could only be ended if its problems, which make it impossible for us to conclude it satisfactorily, were explained to us in discourse by an android built by us. Only when we both conclude that we are mirror beings in the temporally unlimited, mutual Turing test do we grasp what the human being is, what reality means, what consciousness is. The construction of such an android is crucial for the perfection of the human being. The android does not compete with us, it and we merge into a totality and will prove to be complementary. Only when this has been achieved will we have a future as a species. Otherwise, we will fall prey to religious delusions again and again.

October 2021

4 A crucial term introduced in the theory.

To the launch pad

1 What is a Braitenberg universe?

This book is unfinished in many respects. It represents a necessary, probably worse than right compromise in a matter that can hardly be presented in a comprehensive - and sufficiently formalized - way today. This book is imperfect. It tells of the unexpected journey of thought that my ego sent me on fifty years ago. I was fifteen, maybe seventeen, and encountered Plato in his dialog Parmenides. I heard a distant voice calling out to me: Go out and finish what we start! You may be a mere dripper, but you are shrewd and incorruptible enough to be entrusted with the task. But you are not the only one.

This inner mission kept me very busy until the mid-nineties, so that I only did the bare minimum, studying, military service and work, as if they were casual leisure pursuits. After that, other things came to the fore for over twenty years.

I only returned to my task after a long time, and what was to become pure and hard as diamond now remains imperfect. I have become too weak, too old, to achieve such clarity. But what has been thought will remain so for all time. May this book inspire another to an equally unexpected journey! Whoever undertakes it will not have it easy. Whether my book is read is basically irrelevant. The thoughts it bears witness to, however, seem to me to be everlasting - because they were thought.

I have tried to tell something like the story of my approach to the material I am dealing with here. But only a joint shaping process will shed light on the matter. So, I am not so much addressing the pure layman, but am happy to assume that you are at home in one of the sciences affected by the material. I also hope that in dealing with it you will not just pick it apart, but rather think about it. Thank you for your willingness to engage with the subject matter. I know that it takes courage and remains a risk. Unfortunately, I haven't been able to share the material with anyone for a quarter of a century because there simply wasn't anyone capable of doing so.

It is a feature of my thinking that the disparity of the various scientific model worlds and their assumed general objects has always seemed artificial to me. It is only understandable to me because of a preconscious leap that forms the precondition and prevents a successful return to the overarching. This leap is unavoidable if we want to know what we are talking about. However, although it cannot be reversed, it can at least be neutralized. The neutralization is achieved by the universal transformation proposed in this book, the scheme of which is the so-called cosmic Ergon, or the transformation of all sciences into a self-referential, relativistic Braitenberg cosmos - into a monadic universe - as the new home of all our thoughts and research.

Valentin Braitenberg (Valentin von Braitenberg, 1926-2011), the director of the Max Planck Institute for Biocybernetics in Tübingen between 1968-1994, wrote in his booklet Künstliche Wesen: "There is no doubt that the essence of human beings looks very different from the inside than from the outside."5 With this succinct sentence, he opens the introduction to a brilliant work. In it, a powerful truth is stated in an extremely relaxed manner, so relaxed that the reader must miss it. Braitenberg's insight is the door through which one must pass if one wants to do more than repeat the same thing over and over again, as has been the way of scholastic science at all times.

A Braitenberg universe is first and foremost a universe that is built on the dialectical pair of opposites of inside and outside, a universe in which inside and outside are complementary worlds. In his booklet, Braitenberg shows what this means in concrete terms. He defines a space and a time in which vehicles move. He presents us with fourteen different constructions and interprets their behavior in the same way as the behavior of biological beings. Braitenberg takes an external view of his vehicles. He thus includes them in his universe without, of course, noticing or even problematizing this.

A Braitenberg universe is thus, roughly speaking, a space-time in which any number of vehicles (reference systems) move in the way that is made possible by their construction, as well as a subject that interprets what it observes on the basis of its own experience when it starts from the premise that the vehicles are beings.

Braitenberg's vehicle world is a classical universe with absolute time and absolute space. It can also be called a Newtonian universe. My book now attempts to describe an expanded Braitenberg cosmos based on closedness and constructivism, an Einstein-Bohr-Braitenberg world, so to speak. Realized, it becomes a world that is both relativistic and quantum mechanical.

My experiment is designed as a comprehensive thought experiment. It is not physical, because physics cannot provide all the elements of such a Braitenberg universe. And it is not mathematical, because ultimately it is not a matter of numbers. Only the biological-philosophical-constructivist approach, which does not yet exist, can be rich enough to describe such a cosmos. Biology includes physics and chemistry; philosophy includes logic and metaphysics. This cosmos is constructivist because it encompasses both Braitenberg's inside and its outside. As there is still no adequately prepared science for this, my attempt inevitably remains a thought experiment. As such, it is in the best of company, if one thinks of the thought experiments of the "golden age of quantum physics".

Although it may come as a surprise, my attempt is not in artificial intelligence or artificial life. Artificial intelligence (currently mainly associated with the concept of deep learning and thus with neural networks), artificial life research and robotics are disciplines of current scholasticism. Although they can lead us into a rudimentary Newton-Braitenberg universe, it is not recognizable as such. Braitenberg is still ahead of such attempts today with his 14-vehicle cosmos.

Hofstadter's unique work Gödel, Escher, Bach6 deals with the fact that consciousness emerges from socalled strange loops, which are ultimately an expression of self-referentiality. The whole work revolves fundamentally around Gödel's theorem, as Hofstadter emphasizes in the preface to a later edition of his work. Gödel basically formulated mathematically that there can be no closed world without contingency. A completely closed world would be empty if there were not one break. However, it cannot be built into this world without presupposing it, and so, like Russian dolls, myriads of self-referential worlds emerge, a process against which Russell's typology is powerless and unfruitful. Hofstadter also logically believes that consciousness has and needs no biological basis or even brain-biological basis as such but must be defined metaphysically from the outset as the result of strange loops of self-reference, primarily loops that connect different levels with one another. As the reader of my book will realize, I also hold this view. However, I go beyond this by providing a meta-model of how such strange loops can develop. Although I stipulate quantum physical phenomena as being involved in the process of consciousness, Hofstadter's metaphysical basis of consciousness ultimately also applies to me unreservedly. This apparent contradiction stems from the fact that I consciously incorporate it into my setting in order to first locate consciousness where it takes place, within itself, and to assign it the place within a setting that it alone is capable of occupying. What is new about my theory is the continuous, ultimately instrumental entanglement of the subjective with the objective, the metaphysical with the physical, which requires a special arrangement. Whitehead's process philosophy does not provide it, nor does Leibniz's theory of monads. The only thinkers who attempted something similar were Braitenberg in his work on artificial beings and Maturana. But they did not go as far as I did. Braitenberg in particular did not define the universe as closed, autopoietic and constructivist. Although he also stipulated the entanglement of the subjective with the objective in his experimental design, he did not carry it through to its conclusion. My contribution is to bring this entanglement to a conclusion, which presupposes that I move away from Braitenberg's (semantic) vehicles in favor of a mirror vehicle. In this I also went beyond Maturana. I think you can only understand my theory if you follow it constructively. It overtakes Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant without refuting them, and defines that universe in which the dualism between mind and matter is transformed into a dialectical setting between subject and object, whereby the object is replaced by the mirror being (the Ergon circuit system ES, as I call it in the core theory, similar to a “complete agent”). Only in such a universe, which I call the Cosmic Ergon (CoE), can the boundaries of philosophy and physics be transcended in terms of convergence. My theory establishes a science that is not part of philosophy, not part of physics, not part of biology and not part of psychology. It fills the gap between these sciences, a gap that is still barely recognized and whose filling is like inserting the keystone into the vault.

However, I proceeded differently in my development. For many years, I relied exclusively on classical idealism and its outgrowth in Husserl's phenomenology and its ramifications up to Heidegger and Sartre. After I had failed in my opinion, I realized that it was not possible to find the keystone in this way. I turned to the analytical philosophers of our time, to cognitive science and artificial intelligence. This is how I came across Braitenberg, among others. I realized that analytic philosophy struggled with the same problems as idealism, and that it had the same structural asymptote. Now I felt compelled to venture into the void and invent the world of Ergon systems. This enabled me to integrate thoughts such as those presented by Hofstadter and thus also - for example - to really understand Russell's theory of types. At this point, I also realized that quantum theory was coming up against similar limits, which I reached by thinking about how to interpret the subject inclusion I had created in the cosmic Ergon. I only succeeded in taking this step a few years ago, whereas the core theory had already emerged in 1991.

In this book, the term Braitenberg Universe is not used very often. Instead, there is more talk of the Cosmic Ergon as the basic construct of the vehicle world that I am concerned with. This is where I clearly differ from Braitenberg. Braitenberg develops semantically rich vehicles, vehicles with a non-tautological functionality. I had to eliminate this flaw because otherwise a closed, self-referential and constructivist version of the world is impossible. In it there is only one vehicle whose semantics consists of mirroring. It is a tautological vehicle that becomes the basic building block for vehicle organisms that are symmetrical "in a complex way" in relation to the basic vehicle. We will return to this in detail.

To understand the resulting cosmos, however, you must go a long way. The book cannot be mastered by reading alone. You must think, perhaps even construct. If I were to try to make the thought experiment palatable and readable, my book would probably have to run to ten thousand pages. The current layout is a summary that can still be described as reasonable once you have understood the theory. Valentin Braitenberg himself had roughly understood my core theory from 1991, which forms the center of the book. He found it so original that he recommended its unaltered publication at the time.

The dilemma of my work is to convey an urgently needed theory for whose publication there can be no organ, no publisher. I therefore chose to publish my text on demand, which is the option available today.

When you open this book and read it, you will soon realize that its contents are initially hermetic, that an understanding can only develop if you have in your mind - in addition to perseverance in thinking and imagining - something that could be called creative shamelessness, namely the ability to develop things in green meadows. If you think you can, then let's get started!

But first, a brief assessment of your current situation, which you can refer to later:

The Braitenberg universe occurs as a monadic universe in three variants:

A psychological-interpretative one: semantic and classical-realistic (Braitenberg's world of artificial beings)

An ontologically imagined one: tautological, closed-relativistic (my universe of Ergon systems)

A physical-real: (bio)constructivist-quantum-physical (the future realization in an android)

Various models build on each other in this book. The stratification, which is adhered to in the book, looks like this:

Braitenberg universe→ the situation/transformation→ the structure "Li"→ the Cosmic Ergon→ the M-Loop-Termination 7→ the monad/polyad→ the mentalization→ the models of the Scholium8 of biocybernetics, neurobiology, philosophy, and psychology.

I hope that my theory will be understood by some. I hope that these researchers will have the stature and the ability to help humanity achieve this new science that is being created here, and that they will thus implement the first truly new step since the ancient Greeks.

The first cover design of 2017 with the message:

Who opens the black box will find the mirror.

5 Braitenberg, V., Künstliche Wesen, Vieweg, 1986, p.1.

6 Hofstadter, D.R., Gödel, Escher, Bach, Cotta, 1985

7 Hofstadter's strange loops but implemented.

8 In this book, I use the term scholium to refer to what is thought and taught at colleges and universities, in the broadest sense any kind of doctrine.

2 Preliminary remark

Nature knows nothing and does nothing.

Terje Rian, ranger on Dovre Fjell, Norway

First, the following applies to all our views: "[...] they grasp existence [das Sein] as something that stands opposite me as an object, towards which I am directed as an object standing opposite me, meaning it. This primal phenomenon of our conscious existence is so self-evident to us that we hardly sense its mystery because we do not even question it. What we think, what we speak of, is always something other than us, is what we, the subjects, are directed towards as an opposite, the objects. When we make ourselves the object of our thinking, we ourselves become the other, as it were, and are always simultaneously there again as a thinking ego, which carries out this thinking of itself, but cannot itself be adequately thought of as an object, because it is always the precondition of every objectification [Objektge-wordenseins]. We call this basic finding of our thinking existence the subject-object split. We are constantly in it when we are awake and conscious." 9

That brings us to the scene of the crime. But before we start the investigation, it would be fair for me to introduce myself to the reader. But this is difficult in an age that cultivates a seemingly medieval addiction to titles - and, it must be said, has once again fallen prey to naïve academicism, which our culture had already overcome by producing genuine intellectuals and intellectuals who were convincing through their thoughts and not through their academic CV alone, and where, from today's perspective, there was still a highly educated and numerically large readership that appreciated this. Jean Ziegler's ceterum, that there were no intellectuals in Switzerland, was not true at the time, but is certainly true today, and not just in Switzerland, but in the German-speaking world, if not the whole of Western Europe. Of course, there are always exceptions, but they are exceptions.

The first truly intelligent person I met in my life was my father, a man who possessed what I call a fantasy of reality, the ability not only to see pasts and futures as realities, but to allow the specifics of reality to play out in them, which requires a radical knowledge of the human being that has become rare in our world. In Henri Lauener, I met a philosopher who could not have been drier or more precise, but who loved life to the full and possessed a sparkling spirit that allowed him to accept even contrary opinions without accepting them. The third such spirit I had the pleasure of meeting was Valentin Braitenberg. He read and understood the formalized part of my theory without further explanation and considered it so significant that he congratulated me on it without further questions. I would never have thought that anyone could understand this theory without it being explained to them point by point. Braitenberg was one of the thinkers of biocybernetics, as well as a gifted storyteller and essayist whose challenge was the clever, the hallmark of the intellectual.

I remember that a friend of my father's, Walter Robert Corti, philosopher and founder of the children's village in Trogen, wanted his unsuccessful large-scale academy project to be what is now known as monnaie courante. He wanted to place ethics above ontology and thought that only what satisfies the basic principles of ethics should be thought. His idea has largely prevailed, not because of his work, but because of the culture of remembrance of the Shoah. In the eighties and nineties, decisive things happened here. In Western Europe and the USA, the Shoah has now assumed the position in the debate that was accorded to the reality of evil in the pre-Enlightenment world. Under this chew, it seals the universe of the spirit in the same way that Catholic dogma did before the Enlightenment. Ethically, there is nothing wrong with this - given the millennia of Nazi crimes. But philosophically, it has consequences. It did not promote the Enlightenment, but paradoxically the Counter-Enlightenment. Today, the publicist is once again a Fréron and no longer a Voltaire, but he calls himself Voltaire. The dogma, not a Catholic one this time, but a Human Rights one, is back. Normally, no one is bothered by this. But anyone who ventures into areas of thought such as those explored in this book is in danger of heresy.

In view of this, there is no satisfactory answer to the question of who I am. It is most honest if we agree that this question will be clarified when the book unfolds its eventual effect. Anyone who understands what this book delivers will realize that it could only have been written by a spirit that is sovereign and transcends all visible and invisible boundaries, not to violate them, but to find out whether they rightly exist, or what rightly exists and what does not.

The book is, it must be admitted, an extremely tough read if someone wants to understand it in every detail. And it would be even if I had taken the trouble to spread it out over ten thousand pages and thus perhaps make it a little easier to understand. It is an almost incomprehensible text for the one reason that its subject matter is difficult to grasp. However, much of this book is also easy to understand. But that belies the essence.

This book is a narrated cosmos. Narrative plays a central role in it. Perhaps the most important role of all. In this book, I am not only a thinker, but also a narrator who has lived and is living a full life. Like every intellectual, I am also a romantic, an erotic, an activist, a sinner, and a man of honor. No mind is any good without the man or woman behind it. We live, love, and die.

But let's get started!

9 Jaspers, K., Einführung in die Philosophie, Piper, 1953/1996