LECTURE I
INTRODUCTORYI
was invited to prepare these lectures, on Lord Gifford's
foundation,
as one who has made a special study of the religious ideas and
practice of the Roman people. So far as I know, the subject has not
been touched upon as yet by any Gifford lecturer. We are in these
days interested in every form of religion, from the most
rudimentary
to the most highly developed; from the ideas of the aborigines of
Australia, which have now become the common property of
anthropologists, to the ethical and spiritual religions of
civilised
man. Yet it is remarkable how few students of the history of
religion, apart from one or two specialists, have been able to find
anything instructive in the religion of the Romans—of the Romans, I
mean, as distinguished from that vast collection of races and
nationalities which eventually came to be called by the name of
Rome.
At the Congress for the History of Religions held at Oxford in
1908,
out of scores of papers read and offered, not more than one or two
even touched on the early religious ideas of the most practical and
powerful people that the world has ever known.This
is due, in part at least, to the fact that just when Roman history
begins to be of absorbing interest, and fairly well substantiated
by
evidence, the Roman religion, as religion, has already begun to
lose
its vitality, its purity, its efficacy. It has become overlaid with
foreign rites and ideas, and it has also become a religious
monopoly
of the State; of which the essential characteristic, as Mommsen has
well put it, and as we shall see later on, was "the conscious
retention of the principles of the popular belief, which were
recognised as irrational, for reasons of outward
convenience."1
It was not unlike the religion of the Jews in the period
immediately
before the Captivity, and it was never to profit by the refining
and
chastening influence of such lengthy suffering. In this later
condition it has not been attractive to students of religious
history; and to penetrate farther back into the real religious
ideas
of the genuine Roman people is a task very far from easy, of which
indeed the difficulties only seem to increase as we become more
familiar with it.It
must be remarked, too, that as a consequence of this
unattractiveness, the accounts given in standard works of the
general
features of this religion are rather chilling and repellent. More
than fifty years ago, in the first book of his
Roman History,
Mommsen so treated of it—not indeed without some reservation,—and
in this matter, as in so many others, his view remained for many
years the dominant one. He looked at this religion, as was natural
to
him, from the point of view of law; in religion as such he had no
particular interest. If I am not mistaken, it was for him, except
in
so far as it is connected with Roman law, the least interesting
part
of all his far-reaching Roman studies. More recent writers of
credit
and ability have followed his lead, and stress has been laid on the
legal side of religion at Rome; it has been described over and over
again as merely a system of contracts between gods and worshippers,
secured by hard and literal formalism, and without ethical value or
any native principle of growth. Quite recently, for example, so
great
an authority as Professor Cumont has written of it thus:—"Il
n'a peut être jamais existé aucune religion aussi froide, aussi
prosaïque que celle des Romains. Subordonnée à la politique, elle
cherche avant tout, par la stricte exécution de pratiques
appropriées, à assurer à l'État la protection des dieux ou à
détourner les effets de leur malveillance. Elle a conclu avec les
puissances célestes un contrat synallagmatique d'où découlent des
obligations réciproques: sacrifices d'une part, faveurs de
l'autre.... Sa liturgie rappelle par la minutie de ses
prescriptions
l'ancien droit civil. Cette religion se défie des abandons de l'âme
et des élans de la dévotion." And he finishes his description
by quoting a few words of the late M. Jean Réville: "The
legalism of the Pharisees, in spite of the dryness of their
ritualistic minutiae, could make the heart vibrate more than the
formalism of the Romans."2Now
it is not for me to deny the truth of such statements as this,
though
I might be disposed to say that it is rather approximate than
complete truth as here expressed, does not sum up the whole story,
and only holds good for a single epoch of this religious history.
But
surely, for anyone interested in the history of religion, a
religious
system of such an unusual kind, with characteristics so well
marked,
must, one would suppose, be itself an attractive subject. A
religion
that becomes highly formalised claims attention by this very
characteristic. At one time, however far back, it must have
accurately expressed the needs and the aspirations of the Roman
people in their struggle for existence. It is obviously, as
described
by the writers I have quoted, a very mature growth, a highly
developed system; and the story, if we could recover it, of the way
in which it came to be thus formalised, should be one of the
deepest
interest for students of the history of religion. Another story,
too,
that of the gradual discovery of the
inadequacy of this
system, and of the engrafting upon it, or substitution for it, of
foreign rites and beliefs, is assuredly not less instructive; and
here, fortunately, our records make the task of telling it an
easier
one.Now
these two stories, taken together, sum up what we may call
the
religious experience of the Roman people;
and as it is upon these that I wish to concentrate your attention
during this and the following course, I have called these lectures
by
that name. My plan is not to provide an exhaustive account of the
details of the Roman worship or of the nature of the Roman gods:
that
can be found in the works of carefully trained specialists, of whom
I
shall have something to say presently. More in accordance with the
intentions of the Founder of these lectures, I think, will be an
attempt to follow out, with such detailed comment as may be
necessary, the religious experience of the Romans, as an important
part of their history. And this happens to coincide with my own
inclination and training; for I have been all my academic life
occupied in learning and teaching Roman history, and the
fascination
which the study of the Roman religion has long had for me is simply
due to this fact. Whatever may be the case with other religions, it
is impossible to think of that of the Romans as detached from their
history as a whole; it is an integral part of the life and growth
of
the people. An adequate knowledge of Roman history, with all its
difficulties and doubts, is the only scientific basis for the study
of Roman religion, just as an adequate knowledge of Jewish history
is
the only scientific basis for a study of Jewish religion. The same
rule must hold good in a greater or less degree with all other
forms
of religion of the higher type, and even when we are dealing with
the
religious ideas of savage peoples it is well to bear it steadfastly
in mind. I may be excused for suggesting that in works on
comparative
religion and morals this principle is not always sufficiently
realised, and that the panorama of religious or quasi-religious
practice from all parts of the world, and found among peoples of
very
different stages of development, with which we are now so familiar,
needs constant testing by increased knowledge of those peoples in
all
their relations of life. At any rate, in dealing with Roman
evidence
the investigator of religious history should also be a student of
Roman history generally, for the facts of Roman life, public and
private, are all closely concatenated together, and spring with an
organic growth from the same root. The branches tend to separate,
but
the tree is of regular growth, compact in all its parts, and you
cannot safely concentrate your attention on one of these parts to
the
comparative neglect of the rest. Conversely, too, the great story
of
the rise and decay of the Roman dominion cannot be properly
understood without following out the religious history of this
people—their religious experience, as I prefer to call it. To take
an example of this, let me remind you of two leading facts in Roman
history: first, the strength and tenacity of the family as a group
under the absolute government of the paterfamilias; secondly, the
strength and tenacity of the idea of the State as represented by
the
imperium of its
magistrates. How different in these respects are the Romans from
the
Celts, the Scandinavians, even from the Greeks! But these two facts
are in great measure the result of the religious ideas of the
people,
and, on the other hand, they themselves react with astonishing
force
on the fortunes of that religion.I
do not indeed wish to be understood as maintaining that the
religion
of the Roman was the most important element in his mental or civic
development: far from it. I should be the first to concede that the
religious element in the Roman mind was not that part of it which
has
left the deepest impress on history, or contributed much, except in
externals, to our modern ideas of the Divine and of worship. It is
not, as Roman law was, the one great contribution of the Roman
genius
to the evolution of humanity. But Roman law and Roman religion
sprang
from the same root; they were indeed in origin
one and the same thing.
Religious law was a part of the
ius civile, and
both were originally administered by the same authority, the Rex.
Following the course of the two side by side for a few centuries,
we
come upon an astonishing phenomenon, which I will mention now (it
will meet us again) as showing how far more interest can be aroused
in our subject if we are fully equipped as Roman historians than if
we were to study the religion alone, torn from the living body of
the
State, and placed on the dissecting-board by itself. As the State
grew in population and importance, and came into contact, friendly
or
hostile, with other peoples, both the religion and the law of the
State were called upon to expand, and they did so. But they did so
in
different ways; Roman law expanded
organically and
intensively, absorbing into its own body the experience and
practice
of other peoples, while Roman religion expanded
mechanically and
extensively, by taking on the deities and worship of others
without any organic change of its own being.
Just as the English language has been able to absorb words of Latin
origin, through its early contact with French, into the very tissue
and fibre of its being, while German has for certain reasons never
been able to do this, but has adopted them as strangers only,
without
making them its very own: so Roman law contrived to take into its
own
being the rules and practices of strangers, while Roman religion,
though it eventually admitted the ideas and cults of Greeks and
others, did so without taking them by a digestive process into its
own system. Had the law of Rome remained as inelastic as the
religion, the Roman people would have advanced as little in
civilisation as those races which embraced the faith of Islam, with
its law and religion alike impermeable to any change.3
Here is a phenomenon that at once attracts attention and suggests
questions not easy to answer. Why is it that the Roman religion can
never have the same interest and value for mankind as Roman law? I
hope that we shall find an answer to this question in the course of
our studies: at this moment I only propose it as an example of the
advantage gained for the study of one department of Roman life and
thought by a pretty complete equipment in the knowledge of
others.At
the same time we must remember that the religion of the Romans is a
highly technical subject, like Roman law, the Roman constitution,
and
almost everything else Roman; it calls for special knowledge as
well
as a sufficient training in Roman institutions generally. Each of
these Roman subjects is like a language with a delicate accidence,
which is always presenting the unwary with pitfalls into which they
are sure to blunder unless they have a thorough mastery of it. I
could mention a book full of valuable thoughts about the relation
to
Paganism of the early Christian Church, by a scholar at once
learned
and sympathetic;4
who when he happens to deal for a moment with the old Roman
religion,
is inaccurate and misleading at every point. He knew, for example,
that this religion is built on the foundation of the worship of the
family, but he yielded to the temptation to assume that the family
in
heaven was a counterpart of the family on earth, "as it might be
seen in any palace of the Roman nobility." "Jupiter and
Juno," he says, "were the lord and lady, and beneath them
was an army of officers, attendants, ministers, of every rank and
degree." Such a description of the pantheon of his religion
would have utterly puzzled a Roman, even in the later days of
theological syncretism. Again he says that this religion was
strongly
moral; that "the gods gave every man his duty, and expected him
to perform it." Here again no Roman of historical times, or
indeed of any age, could have allowed this to be his creed. Had it
really been so, not only the history of the Roman religion, but
that
of the Roman state, would have been very different from what it
actually was.The
principles then on which I wish to proceed in these lectures
are—(1)
to keep the subject in continual touch with Roman history and the
development of the Roman state; (2) to exercise all possible care
and
accuracy in dealing with the technical matters of the religion
itself. I may now go on to explain more exactly the plan I propose
to
follow.It
will greatly assist me in this explanation if I begin by making
clear
what I understand, for our present purposes, by the word
religion. There
have been many definitions propounded—more in recent years than
ever before, owing to the recognition of the study of religion as a
department of anthropology. Controversies are going on which call
for
new definitions, and it is only by slow degrees that we are
arriving
at any common understanding as to the real essential thing or fact
for which we should reserve this famous word, and other words
closely
connected with it,
e.g. the
supernatural. We are still disputing, for example, as to the
relation
of religion to magic, and therefore as to the exact meaning to be
attributed to each of these terms.Among
the many definitions of religion which I have met with, there is
one
which seems to me to be particularly helpful for our present
purposes; it is contributed by an American investigator. "Religion
is the effective desire to be in right relation to the Power
manifesting itself in the universe."5
Dr. Frazer's definition is not different in essentials: "By
religion I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers
superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course
of nature and of human life;"6
only that here the word is used of acts of worship rather than of
the
feeling or desire that prompts them. The definition of the late M.
Jean Réville, in a chapter on "Religious Experience,"
written near the end of his valuable life, is in my view nearer the
mark, and more comprehensive. "Religion," he says, "is
essentially a principle of life, the feeling of a living relation
between the human individual and the powers or power of which the
universe is the manifestation. What characterises each religion is
its way of looking upon this relation and its method of applying
it."7
And a little further on he writes: "It is generally admitted
that this feeling of dependence upon the universe is the root of
all
religion." But this is not so succinct as the definition which I
quoted first, and it introduces at least one term,
the individual,
which, for certain good reasons, I think it will be better for us
to
avoid in studying the early Roman religious ideas."Religion
is the effective desire to be in right relations with the Power
manifesting itself in the universe."
This has the advantage of treating religion as primarily and
essentially a
feeling, an
instinctive desire, and the word "effective," skilfully
introduced, suggests that this feeling manifests itself in certain
actions undertaken in order to secure a desired end. Again, the
phrase "right relations" seems to me well chosen, and
better than the "living relation" of M. Réville, which if
applied to the religions of antiquity can only be understood in a
sacramental sense, and is not obviously so intended. "Right
relation" will cover all religious feeling, from the most
material to the most spiritual. Think for a moment of the 119th
Psalm, the high-water mark of the religious feeling of the most
religious people of antiquity; it is a magnificent declaration of
conformity to the will of God,
i.e. of the desire
to be in right relation to Him, to His statutes, judgments, laws,
commands, testimonies, righteousness. This is religion in a high
state of development; but our definition is so skilfully worded as
to
adapt itself readily to much earlier and simpler forms. The "Power
manifesting itself in the universe" may be taken as including
all the workings of nature, which even now we most imperfectly
understand, and which primitive man so little understood that he
misinterpreted them in a hundred different ways. The effective
desire
to be in right relation with these mysterious powers, so that they
might not interfere with his material well-being—with his flocks
and herds, with his crops, too, if he were in the agricultural
stage,
with his dwelling and his land, or with his city if he had got so
far
in social development—this is what we may call the religious
instinct, the origin of what the Romans called
religio.8
The effective desire to have your own will brought into conformity
to
the will of a heavenly Father is a later development of the same
feeling; to this the genuine Roman never attained, and the Greek
very
imperfectly.If
we keep this definition steadily in mind, I think we shall find it
a
valuable guide in following out what I call the religious
experience
of the Roman people; and at the present moment it will help me to
explain my plan in drawing up these lectures. To begin with, in the
prehistoric age of Rome, so far as we can discern from survivals of
a
later age, the feeling or desire must have taken shape,
ineffectively
indeed, in many quaint acts, some of them magical or quasi-magical,
and possibly taken over from an earlier and ruder population among
whom the Latins settled. Many of these continued, doubtless, to
exist
among the common folk, unauthorised by any constituted power, while
some few were absorbed into the religious practice of the State,
probably with the speedy loss of their original significance. Such
survivals of ineffective religion are of course to be found in the
lowest stratum of the religious ideas of every people, ancient and
modern; even among the Israelites,9
and in the rites of Islam or Christianity. They form, as it
were,
a kind of protoplasm of religious vitality,
from which an organic growth was gradually developed. But though
they
are necessarily a matter of investigation as survivals which have a
story to tell, they do not carry us very far when we are tracing
the
religious experience of a people, and in any case the process of
investigating them is one of groping in the dark. I shall deal with
these survivals in my next two lectures, and then leave them for
good.I
am more immediately concerned with the desire expressed in our
definition when it
has become more effective;
and this we find in the Latins when they have attained to a
complete
settlement on the land, and are well on in the agricultural stage
of
social development. This stage we can dimly see reflected in the
life
of the home and farm of later times; we have, I need hardly say, no
contemporary evidence of it, though archaeology may yet yield us
something. But the conservatism of rural life is a familiar fact,
and
comes home to me when I reflect that in my own English village the
main features of work and worship remained the same through many
centuries, until we were revolutionised by the enclosure of the
parish and the coming of the railroad in the middle of the
nineteenth
century. The intense conservatism of rural Italy, up to the present
day, has always been an acknowledged fact, and admits of easy
explanation. We may be sure that the Latin farmer, before the
City-state was developed, was like his descendants of historical
times, the religious head of a family, whose household deities
were
effectively
worshipped by a regular and orderly procedure, whose dead were
cared
for in like manner, and whose land and stock were protected from
malignant spirits by a boundary made sacred by yearly rites of
sacrifice and prayer. Doubtless these wild spirits beyond his
boundaries were a constant source of anxiety to him; doubtless
charms
and spells and other survivals from the earlier stage were in use
to
keep them from mischief; but these tend to become exceptions in an
orderly life of agricultural routine which we may call
religious. Spirits
may accept domicile within the limits of the farm, and tend, as
always in this agricultural stage, to become fixed to the soil and
to
take more definite shape as in some sense deities. This stage—that
of the agricultural family—is the foundation of Roman civilised
life, in religious as in all other aspects, and it will form the
subject of my fourth lecture.The
growing effectiveness of the desire, as seen in the family and in
the
agricultural stage, prepares us for still greater effectiveness in
the higher form of civilisation which we know as that of the
City-state. That desire, let me say once more, is to be in right
relations with the Power manifesting itself in the universe. It is
only in the higher stages of civilisation that this desire can
really
become effective; social organisation, as I shall show, produces an
increased knowledge of the nature of the Power, and with it a
systematisation of the means deemed necessary to secure the right
relations. The City-state, the peculiar form in which Greek and
Italian social and political life eventually blossomed and
fructified, was admirably fitted to secure this effectiveness. It
was, of course, an intensely
local system; and
the result was, first, that the Power is localised in certain spots
and propitiated by certain forms of cult within the city wall, thus
bringing the divine into closest touch with the human population
and
its interests; and secondly, that the concentration of intelligence
and will-power within a small space might, and did at Rome, develop
a
very elaborate system for securing the right relations—in other
words, it produced a religious system as highly ritualistic as that
of the Jews.With
the several aspects of this system my fifth and succeeding lectures
will be occupied. I shall deal first with the religious calendar of
the earliest historical form of the City-state, which most
fortunately has come down to us entire. I shall devote two lectures
to the early Roman ideas of divinity, and the character of their
deities as reflected in the calendar, and as further explained by
Roman and Greek writers of the literary age. Two other lectures
will
discuss the ritual of sacrifice and prayer, with the priests in
charge of these ceremonies, and the ritual of vows and of
"purification." In each of these I shall try to point out
wherein the weakness of this religious system lay—viz. in attempts
at effectiveness so elaborate that they overshot their mark, in a
misconception of the means necessary to secure the right relations,
and in a failure to grow in knowledge of the Power itself.Lastly,
as the City-state advances socially and politically, in trade and
commerce, in alliance and conquest, we shall find that the ideas of
other peoples about the Power, and their methods of propitiation,
begin to be adopted in addition to the native stock. The first
stages
of this revolution will bring us to the conclusion of my present
course; but we shall be then well prepared for what follows. For
later on we shall find the Romans feeling afresh the desire to be
in
right relation with the Power, discovering that their own highly
formalised system is no longer equal to the work demanded of it,
and
pitiably mistaking their true course in seeking a remedy. Their
knowledge of the Divine, always narrow and limited, becomes by
degrees blurred and obscured, and their sight begins to fail them.
I
hope in due course to explain this, and to give you some idea of
the
sadness of their religious experience before the advent of an age
of
philosophy, of theological syncretism, and of the worship of the
rulers of the state.Let
us now turn for a few minutes to the special difficulties of our
subject. These are serious enough; but they have been wonderfully
and
happily reduced since I began to be interested in the Roman
religion
some twenty-five years ago. There were then only two really
valuable
books which dealt with the whole subject. Though I could avail
myself
of many treatises, good and bad, on particular aspects of it, some
few of which still survive, the only two comprehensive and
illuminating books were Preller's
Römische Mythologie,
and Marquardt's volume on the cult in his
Staatsverwaltung.
Both of these were then already many years old, but they had just
been reedited by two eminent scholars thoroughly well equipped for
the task—Preller's work by H. Jordan, and Marquardt's by Georg
Wissowa. They were written from different points of view; Preller
dealt with the deities and the ideas about them rather than with
the
cults and the priests concerned with them; while Marquardt treated
the subject as a part of the administration of government, dealing
with the worship and the
ius divinum, and
claiming that this was the only safe and true way of arriving at
the
ideas underlying that law and worship.10
Both books are still indispensable for the student; but Marquardt's
is the safer guide, as dealing with facts to the exclusion of
fancies. The two taken together had collected and sifted the
evidence
so far as it was then available.The
Corpus Inscriptionum
had not at that time got very far, but its first volume, edited by
Mommsen, contained the ancient Fasti, which supply us with the
religious calendar of early Rome, and with other matter throwing
light upon it. This first volume was an invaluable help, and formed
the basis (in a second edition) of the book I was eventually able
to
write on the Roman
Festivals of the Period of the Republic.
At that time, too, in the 'eighties, Roscher's
Lexicon of Greek and Roman Mythology
began to appear, which aimed at summing up all that was then known
about the deities of both peoples; this is not even yet completed,
and many of the earlier articles seem now almost antiquated, as
propounding theories which have not met with general acceptance.
All
these earlier articles are now being superseded by those in the new
edition of Pauly's
Real-Encyclopädie,
edited by Wissowa. Lastly, Wissowa himself in 1902 published a
large
volume entitled Die
Religion und Kultus der Römer,
which will probably be for many years the best and safest guide for
all students of our subject. Thoroughly trained in the methods of
dealing with evidence both literary and archaeological, Wissowa
produced a work which, though it has certain limitations, has the
great merit of not being likely to lead anyone astray. More
skilfully
and successfully than any of his predecessors, he avoided the chief
danger and difficulty that beset all who meddle with Roman
religious
antiquities, and invariably lead the unwary to their destruction;
he
declined to accept as evidence what in nine cases out of ten is no
true evidence at all—the statements of ancient authors influenced
by Greek ideas and Greek fancy. He holds in the main to the
principle
laid down by Marquardt, that we may use, as evidence for their
religious ideas, what we are told that the Romans
did in practising
their worship, but must regard with suspicion, and subject to
severe
criticism, what either they themselves or the Greeks wrote about
those religious ideas—that is, about divine beings and their
doings.It
is indeed true that the one great difficulty of our subject lies in
the nature of the evidence; and it is one which we can never hope
entirely to overcome. We have always to bear in mind that the
Romans
produced no literature till the third century B.C.; and the
documentary evidence that survives from an earlier age in the form
of
inscriptions, or fragments of hymns or of ancient law (such as the
calendar of which I spoke just now), is of the most meagre
character,
and usually most difficult to interpret. Thus the Roman religion
stands alone among the religions of ancient civilisations in that
we
are almost entirely without surviving texts of its forms of prayer,
of its hymns or its legends;11
even in Greece the Homeric poems, with all the earliest Greek
literature and art, make up to some extent for the want of that
documentary evidence which throws a flood of light on the religions
of Babylon, Egypt, the Hindus, and the Jewish people. We know in
fact
as little about the religion of the old Italian populations as we
do
about that of our own Teutonic ancestors, less perhaps than we do
about that of the Celtic peoples. The Romans were a rude and
warlike
folk, and meddled neither with literature nor philosophy until they
came into immediate contact with the Greeks; thus it was that,
unfortunately for our purposes, the literary spirit, when at last
it
was born in Italy, was rather Greek than Roman. When that birth
took
place Rome had spread her influence over Italy,—perhaps the
greatest work she ever accomplished; and thus the latest historian
of
Latin literature can venture to write that "the greatest time in
Roman history was already past when real historical evidence
becomes
available."12We
have thus to face two formidable facts: (1) that the period covered
by my earlier lectures must in honesty be called prehistoric; and
(2)
that when the Romans themselves began to write about it they did so
under the overwhelming influence of Greek culture. With few
exceptions, all that we can learn of the early Roman religion from
Roman or Greek writers comes to us, not in a pure Roman form,
clearly
conceived as all things truly Roman were, but seen dimly through
the
mist of the Hellenistic age. The Roman gods, for example, are made
the sport of fancy and the subject of Hellenistic love-stories, by
Greek poets and their Roman imitators,13
or are more seriously treated by Graeco-Roman philosophy after a
fashion which would have been absolutely incomprehensible to the
primitive men in whose minds they first had their being. The
process
of disentangling the Roman element from the Greek in the literary
evidence is one which can never be satisfactorily accomplished; and
on the whole it is better, with Wissowa and Marquardt, to hold fast
by the facts of the cult, where the distinction between the two is
usually obvious, than to flounder about in a slough of what I can
only call pseudo-evidence. If all that English people knew about
their Anglo-Saxon forefathers were derived from Norman-French
chroniclers, how much should we really know about government or
religion in the centuries before the Conquest! And yet this
comparison gives but a faint idea of the treacherous nature of the
literary evidence I am speaking of. It is true indeed that in the
last age of the Republic a few Romans began to take something like
a
scientific interest in their own religious antiquities; and to
Varro,
by far the most learned of these, and to Verrius Flaccus, who
succeeded him in the Augustan age, we owe directly or indirectly
almost all the solid facts on which our knowledge of the Roman
worship rests. But their works have come down to us in a most
imperfect and fragmentary state, and what we have of them we owe
mainly to the erudition of later grammarians and commentators, and
the learning of the early Christian fathers, who drew upon them
freely for illustrations of the absurdities of paganism. And it
must
be added that when Varro himself deals with the Roman gods and the
old ideas about them, he is by no means free from the inevitable
influence of Greek thought.Apart
from the literary material and the few surviving fragments of
religious law and ritual, there are two other sources of light of
which we can now avail ourselves, archaeology and anthropology; but
it must be confessed that as yet their illuminating power is
somewhat
uncertain. It reminds the scrupulous investigator of those early
days
of the electric light, when its flickering tremulousness made it
often painful to read by, and when, too, it might suddenly go out
and
leave the reader in darkness. It is well to remember that both
sciences are young, and have much of the self-confidence of youth;
and that Italian archaeology, now fast becoming well organised
within
Italy, has also to be co-ordinated with the archaeology of the
whole
Mediterranean basin, before we can expect from it clear and
unmistakable answers to hard questions about race and religion.
This
work, which cannot possibly be done by an individual without
co-operation—the
secret of sound work which the Germans have long ago discovered—is
in course of being carried out, so far as is at present possible,
by
a syndicate of competent investigators.14In
order to indicate the uncertain nature of the light which for a
long
time to come is all we can expect from Italian archaeology, I have
only to remind you that one of the chief questions we have to ask
of
it is the relation of the mysterious Etruscan people to the other
Italian stocks, in respect of language, religion, and art. Whether
the Etruscans were the same people whom the Greeks called
Pelasgians,
as many investigators now hold: whether the earliest Roman city was
in any true sense an Etruscan one: these are questions on the
answers
to which it is not as yet safe to build further hypotheses. In
regard
to religion, too, we are still very much in the dark. For example,
there are many Etruscan works of art in which Roman deities are
portrayed, as is certain from the fact that their names accompany
the
figures; but it is as yet almost impossible to determine how far we
can use these for the interpretation of Roman religious ideas or
legends. Many years ago a most attractive hypothesis was raised on
the evidence of certain of these works of art, where Hercules and
Juno appear together in a manner which strongly suggests that they
are meant to represent the male and female principles of human
life;
this hypothesis was taken up by early writers in the
Mythological Lexicon,
and relying upon them I adopted it in my
Roman Festivals,15
and further applied it to the interpretation of an unsolved problem
in the fourth
Eclogue of
Virgil.16
But since then doubt has been thrown on it by Wissowa, who had
formerly accepted it. As being of Etruscan origin, and found in
places very distant from each other and from Rome, we have, he
says,
no good right to use these works of art as evidence for the Roman
religion.17
The question remains open as to these and many other works of art,
but the fact that the man of coolest judgment and most absolute
honesty is doubtful, suggests that we had best wait patiently for
more certain light.In
Rome itself, where archaeological study is concentrated and
admirably
staffed, great progress has been made, and much light thrown on the
later periods of religious history. But for the religion of the
ancient Roman state, with which we are at present concerned, it
must
be confessed that very little has been gleaned. The most famous
discovery is that recently made in the Forum of an archaic
inscription which almost certainly relates to some religious act;
but
as yet no scholar has been able to interpret it with anything
approaching to certainty.18
More recently excavations on the further bank of the Tiber threw a
glint of light on the nature of an ancient deity, Furrina, about
whom
till then we practically knew nothing at all; but the evidence thus
obtained was late and in Greek characters. We must in fact
entertain
no great hopes of illumination from excavations, but accept
thankfully what little may be vouchsafed to us. On the other hand,
from the gradual development of Italian archaeology as a whole,
and,
I must here add, from the study of the several old Italian
languages,
much may be expected in the future.The
other chief contributory science is anthropology,
i.e. the study of
the working of the mind of primitive man, as it is seen in the
ideas
and practices of uncivilised peoples at the present day, and also
as
it can be traced in survivals among more civilised races. For the
history of the religion of the Roman City-state its contribution
must
of necessity be a limited one; that is a part of Roman history in
general, and its material is purely Roman, or perhaps I should say,
Graeco-Roman; and Wissowa in all his work has consistently declined
to admit the value of anthropological researches for the
elucidation
of Roman problems. Perhaps it is for this very reason that his book
is the safest guide we possess for the study of what the Romans did
and thought in the matter of religion; but if we wish to try and
get
to the original significance of those acts and thoughts, it is
absolutely impossible in these days to dispense with the works of a
long series of anthropologists, many of them fortunately British,
who
have gradually been collecting and classifying the material which
in
the long run will fructify in definite results. If we consider the
writings of eminent scholars who wrote about Greek and Roman
religion
and mythology before the appearance of Dr. Tylor's
Primitive Culture—Klausen,
Preuner, Preller, Kuhn, and many others, who worked on the
comparative method but with slender material for the use of it—we
see at once what an immense advance has been effected by that
monumental work, and by the stimulus that it gave to others to
follow
the same track. Now we have in this country the works of Lang,
Robertson Smith, Farnell, Frazer, Hartland, Jevons, and others,
while
a host of students on the Continent are writing in all languages on
anthropological subjects. Some of these I shall quote incidentally
in
the course of these lectures; at present I will content myself with
making one or two suggestions as to the care needed in using the
collections and theories of anthropologists, as an aid in Roman
religious studies.First,
let us bear in mind that anthropologists are apt to have their
favourite theories—conclusions, that is, which are the legitimate
result of reasoning inductively on the class of facts which they
have
more particularly studied. Thus Mannhardt had his theory of the
Vegetation-spirit, Robertson Smith that of the sacramental meal,
Usener that of the Sondergötter, Dr. Frazer that of divine
Kingship;
all of which are perfectly sound conclusions based on facts which
no
one disputes. They have been of the greatest value to
anthropological
research; but when they are applied to the explanation of Roman
practices we should be instantly on our guard, ready indeed to
welcome any glint of light that we may get from them, but most
carefully critical and even suspicious of their application to
other
phenomena than those which originally suggested them. It is in the
nature of man as a researcher, when he has found a key, to hasten
to
apply it to all the doors he can find, and sometimes, it must be
said, to use violence in the application; and though the greatest
masters of the science will rarely try to force the lock, they will
use so much gentle persuasion as sometimes to make us fancy that
they
have unfastened it. All such attempts have their value, but it
behoves us to be cautious in accepting them. The application by
Mannhardt of the theory of the Vegetation-spirit to certain Roman
problems, e.g.
to that of the Lupercalia,19
and the October horse,20
must be allowed, fascinating as it was, to have failed in the main.
The application by Dr. Frazer of the theory of divine Kingship to
the
early religious history of Rome, is still
sub judice, and
calls for most careful and discriminating criticism.21Secondly,
as I have already said, Roman evidence is peculiarly difficult to
handle, except in so far as it deals with the simple facts of
worship; when we use it for traditions, myths, ideas about the
nature
of divine beings, we need a training not only in the use of
evidence
in general, but in the use of Roman evidence in particular.
Anthropologists, as a rule, have not been through such a training,
and they are apt to handle the evidence of Roman writers with a
light
heart and rather a rough hand. The result is that bits of evidence
are put together, each needing conscientious criticism, to support
hypotheses often of the flimsiest kind, which again are used to
support further hypotheses, and so on, until the sober inquirer
begins to feel his brain reeling and his footing giving way beneath
him. I shall have occasion to notice one or two examples of this
uncritical use of evidence later on, and will say no more of it
now.
No one can feel more grateful than I do to the many leading
anthropologists who have touched in one way or another on Roman
evidence; but for myself I try never to forget the words of
Columella, with which a great German scholar began one of his most
difficult investigations: "In universa vita pretiosissimum est
intellegere quemque nescire se quod nesciat."22NOTES
TO LECTURE I
1
Mommsen, Hist. of
Rome (E.T.),
vol. ii. p. 433.
2
Cumont, Les
Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain,
p. 36. Cp. Dill,
Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire,
p. 63. Gwatkin, The
Knowledge of God,
vol. ii. p. 133.
3
See some valuable remarks in Lord Cromer's
Modern Egypt, vol.
ii. p. 135.
4
Since this lecture was written this scholar has passed away, to the
great grief of his many friends; and I refrain from mentioning his
name.
5
Ira W. Howerth, in
International Journal of Ethics,
1903, p. 205. I owe the reference to R. Karsten,
The Origin of Worship,
Wasa, 1905, p. 2, note. Cp. E. Caird,
Gifford Lectures
("Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers"), vol.
i. p. 32. "That which underlies all forms of religion, from the
highest to the lowest, is the idea of God as an absolute power or
principle." To this need only be added the desire to be in right
relation to it. Mr. Marett's word "supernaturalism" seems
to mean the same thing; "There arises in the region of human
thought a powerful impulse to objectify, and even to personify, the
mysterious or supernatural something felt; and in the region of
will
a corresponding impulse to render it innocuous, or, better still,
propitious, by force of constraint (i.e.
magic), communion, or conciliation." See his
Threshold of Religion,
p. 11. Prof. Haddon, commenting on this (Magic
and Fetishism, p.
93), adds that "there are thus produced the two fundamental
factors of religion, the belief in some mysterious power, and the
desire to enter into communication with the power by means of
worship." Our succinct definition seems thus to be adequate.
6
The Golden Bough,
ed. 2, vol. i. p. 62.
7
Liberal Protestantism,
p. 64.
8
For religio
as a feeling essentially, see Wissowa,
Religion und Kultus der Römer,
p. 318 (henceforward to be cited as
R.K.. For further
development of the meaning of the word in Latin literature, see the
author's paper in
Proceedings of the Congress for the History of Religions
(Oxford, 1908), vol. ii. p. 169 foll. A different view of the
original meaning of the word is put forward by W. Otto in
Archiv für Religionswissenschaft,
vol. xii., 1909, p. 533 (henceforward to be cited as
Archiv simply). See
also below, p.
459
foll.
9
See, e.g.,
Frazer in
Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor,
p. 101 foll.
10
Staatsverwaltung,
iii. p. 2. This will henceforward be cited as
Marquardt simply.
It forms part of the great
Handbuch der römischen Alterthümer
of Mommsen and Marquardt, and is translated into French, but
unfortunately not into English. I may add here that I have only
recently become acquainted with what was, at the time it was
written,
a remarkably good account of the Roman religion, full of insight as
well as learning, viz. Döllinger's
The Gentile and the Jew,
Book VII. (vol. ii. of the English translation, 1906).
11
Two fragments of ancient carmina,
i.e. formulae which
are partly spells and partly hymns, survive—those of the Fratres
Arvales and the Salii or dancing priests of Mars. For surviving
formulae of prayer see below, p. 185 foll. Our chief authority on
the
ritual of prayer and sacrifice comes from Iguvium in Umbria, and is
in the Umbrian dialect; it will be referred to in Bücheler's
Umbrica (1883),
where a Latin translation will be found. The Umbrian text revised
by
Prof. Conway forms an important part of that eminent scholar's work
on the Italian dialects.
12
F. Leo, in Die
griechische und lateinische Literatur und Sprache,
p. 328. Cp. Schanz,
Geschichte der röm. Literatur,
vol. i. p. 54 foll.
13
Among Roman poets Ovid is the worst offender, Propertius and
Tibullus
mislead in a less degree; but they all make up for it to some
extent
by preserving for us features of the worship as it existed in their
own day. The confusion that has been caused in Roman religious
history by mixing up Greek and Roman evidence is incalculable, and
has recently been increased by Pais (Storia
di Roma, and
Ancient Legends of Roman History),
and by Dr. Frazer in his lectures on the early history of
Kingship—writers to whom in some ways we owe valuable hints for the
elucidation of Roman problems. See also Soltau,
Die Anfänge der römischen Geschichtsschreibung,
1909, p. 3.
14
Most welcome to English readers has been Mr. T. E. Peet's recently
published volume on
The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy,
and still more valuable for our purposes will be its sequel, when
it
appears, on the Iron Age.
15
Roman Festivals, p.
142 foll.; henceforward to be cited as
R.F.
16
See Virgil's
Messianic Eclogue,
by Mayor, Fowler, and Conway, p. 75 foll.
17
Wissowa, R.K.
p. 227.
18
An account of this in English, with photographs, will be found in
Pais's Ancient
Legends of Roman History,
p. 21 foll., and notes.
19
Mannhardt,
Mythologische Forschungen,
p. 72 foll.
20
Ibid., p. 156 foll.
21
Lectures on the Early History of Kingship,
lectures 7-9.
22
Not long after these last sentences were written, a large work
appeared by Dr. Binder, a German professor of law, entitled
Die Plebs, which
deals freely with the oldest Roman religion, and well illustrates
the
difficulties under which we have to work while archaeologists,
ethnologists, and philologists are still constantly in disagreement
as to almost every important question in the history of early
Italian
culture. Dr. Binder's main thesis is that the earliest Rome was
composed of two distinct communities, each with its own
religion,
i.e. deities,
priests, and sacra; the one settled on the Palatine, a pastoral
folk
of primitive culture, and of pure Latin race; the other settled on
the Quirinal, Sabine in origin and language, and of more advanced
development in social and religious matters. So far this sounds
more
or less familiar to us, but when Dr. Binder goes on to identify the
Latin folk with the Plebs and the Sabine settlement with the
Patricians, and calls in religion to help him with the proof of
this,
it is necessary to look very carefully into the religious evidence
he
adduces. So far as I can see, the limitation of the word
patrician to the
Quirinal settlement is very far from being proved by this evidence
(see The Year's Work
in Classical Studies,
1909, p. 69). Yet the hypothesis is an extremely interesting one,
and
were it generally accepted, would compel us to modify in some
important points our ideas of Roman religious history, and also of
Roman legal history, with which Dr. Binder is mainly
concerned.