Journalism at risk E-Book

Onur Andreotti

• Herausgeber: Council of Europe
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015

Seitenzahl: 642

Beschreibung

Is journalism under threat? Censorship, political pressure, intimidation, job insecurity and attacks on the protection of journalists’ sources - how can these threats be tackled?Journalism at Risk is a new book from the Council of Europe, in which ten experts from different backgrounds examine the role of journalism in democratic societies. Is journalism under threat? The image of journalists, as helmeted war correspondents protected by bullet-proof vests and armed only with cameras and microphones, springs to mind. Physical threats are only the most visible dangers, however. Journalists and journalism itself are facing other threats such as censorship, political and economic pressure, intimidation, job insecurity and attacks on the protection of journalists’ sources. Social media and digital photography mean that anyone can now publish information, which is also upsetting the ethics of journalism. How can these threats be tackled? What is the role of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights and national governments in protecting journalists and freedom of expression? In this book, 10 experts from different backgrounds analyse the situation from various angles. At a time when high-quality, independent journalism is more necessary than ever – and yet when the profession is facing many different challenges – they explore the issues surrounding the role of journalism in democratic societies.

Leseprobe

Legal notice

Journalism at risk: Threats, challenges and perspectives

The opinions expressed in this work are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Council of Europe.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be translated, reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc.) or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the Directorate of Communication (F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex or [email protected]).

Copyrights

French edition: Le journalisme à l’épreuve – Menaces, enjeux et perspectives

ISBN: 978-92-871-8150-3

Cover design: Documents and Publications Production Department (SPDP), Council of Europe

Digital publishing partner: IS Edition, Marseille

Council of Europe Publishing

F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex

http://book.coe.int

ISBN (Book): 978-92-871-8120-6

ISBN (ePub version): 978-92-871-8171-8

ISBN (Mobi version): 978-92-871-8172-5

© Council of Europe, October 2015

Contents

Click here to see the whole table of contents, or go on the “Table of contents” option of your eReader.

Note from the editor

There are concepts in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights which contain an entire universe; concepts that need to be explored, defined, understood, debated.

These concepts, bearers of universal values, find for many their origins in violations of human rights sometimes stemming from tragic events such as the murder of a journalist.

The authors of this book were invited to reflect on the concept of “favourable environment for the participation of all in public debate”,{1} in particular of journalists, and the “pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law”{2} that the Court acknowledges as belonging to them.

Each author took a closer look at one of the aspects of such an environment and highlighted not only the pressing problems, but also the standards and principles prevailing in the European and even international landscape, as well as the gaps and the potential of the existing protection mechanisms.

They attempted to identify the meaning of “favourable environment” in terms of complex and constantly changing legal, political, economic and socio-cultural realities, especially in the context of technological advances. The diversity of their approaches blends the legal perspective with other approaches around a discussion of journalistic freedom, enriching thereby the exploration of the concept of “favourable environment”.

The said “favourable environment” for public debate is necessary fertile ground for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the three pillars of the Council of Europe. The thread that connects independent journalism to these three pillars is present in all chapters, regardless of the distinctive approach brought to the debate by each author.

At the funeral of the journalist Hrant Dink, Rakel Dink, his wife, turned to thousands of people who were gathered outside the Agos newspaper building and said:

Whoever the assassin is … I know he was once a little child. My brothers, my sisters, nothing will be possible as long as we do not question the darkness that has transformed a small child into a killer.{3}

This book hopes to shed some light, albeit small, on that threatening darkness.

Onur Andreotti

Co-ordinator

Council of Europe Task Force for Freedom of Expression and Media

Foreword

Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights

In recent years I have observed a progressive deterioration of the conditions in which media professionals work, with a clear acceleration in 2014 when hundreds of journalists, photographers and camera operators were killed, injured, arrested, kidnapped, threatened or sued. The conflict in Ukraine stands out in this context, with six journalists killed while covering the events there. A report by the International Federation of Journalists identifies 2014 as the deadliest year for journalists in Europe in decades.

The rising death toll is the most extreme manifestation of an increasingly difficult working environment for journalists, which also features physical attacks, acts of intimidation, judicial harassment, imprisonment, muzzling legislation, smear campaigns and abuse of financial levers.

Investigations into crimes against journalists often drag on for years. At best they bring to justice the actual perpetrators, but rarely the masterminds. Media freedom is also a victim of political tensions and armed conflicts, with media outlets sometimes forced into becoming propaganda tools or simply shut down. New anti-terrorism legislation under discussion in several European countries risks increasing the vulnerability of the media to undue government control and to pressures on journalists over their sources.

One of the most widespread threats to media freedom that I have encountered is police violence against journalists who try to cover demonstrations. However, courtrooms are also all too often used to muzzle journalists. In the majority of European countries, defamation and libel are still part of criminal law and inadequate media legislation is used to stifle dissent. Throughout Europe, many journalists are still imprisoned because of their journalistic activity. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, nine journalists were still behind bars in Azerbaijan, seven in Turkey, one in the Russian Federation and one in the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as at 1 December 2014.

The trouble does not end here. A more subtle threat comes from powerful holdings or oligarchs that deal a great blow to media diversity and pluralism, as well as editorial independence, by concentrating media ownership. Inadequate legal frameworks and unfair taxes on advertising revenues can also harm media pluralism and be used in a selective way to silence dissenting voices.

In addition to these problems, public service media in Europe have suffered from both debilitating budget cuts and undue political pressure. This is particularly worrying because reduced state support and outright manipulation of public information have serious negative consequences in terms of diversity and quality of content provided to the public.

All evidence points to the urgency of taking action. Two fundamental steps that should be taken are the release of all journalists imprisoned because of views they have expressed and the eradication of impunity by effectively investigating all cases of violence against journalists, including those involving state actors such as law-enforcement officials. Such a move should be reinforced by specific instructions and training for the police on the protection of journalists. In addition, legislation must change: defamation and libel must be fully decriminalised and dealt with through proportionate civil sanctions only. Lastly, more efforts have to be made to preserve media diversity and pluralism. This includes providing adequate public resources to support media outlets, without compromising editorial independence, and enforcing laws and transparency regulations on media ownership.

By defending journalists’ safety and preserving a free and diverse press we make democracy stronger.

Chapter 1 – Positive obligations concerning freedom of expression: mere potential or real power?

Tarlach McGonagle{4}

Anything can happen. You know how Jupiter

Will mostly wait for clouds to gather head

Before he hurls the lightning? Well, just now

He galloped his thunder-cart and his horses

Across a clear blue sky. It shook the earth …{5}

(Seamus Heaney)

Introduction

There was no bolt of lightning, no thunder-clap, no King of the Gods present to herald the occasion. Instead, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) announced in a very inauspicious manner its most far-reaching statement to date of the positive obligations of Council of Europe member states to secure the right to freedom of expression. The Court enunciated that member states are essentially under an obligation to facilitate inclusive and pluralistic public debate. The more detailed and nuanced formulation is tucked away in paragraph 137 of the Court’s judgment in Dink v. Turkey:

States are obliged to put in place an effective system of protection for authors and journalists as part of their broader obligation to create a favourable environment for participation in public debate by everyone and to enable the expression of opinions and ideas without fear, even when they are contrary to those held by the authorities or by a significant section of public opinion and even if they are annoying or shocking for the latter.{6}

Yet even if the announcement was without fanfare, there is a growing recognition that this statement has tremendous potential and may yet prove seminal.

This chapter will first briefly examine the theoretical and normative bases for the positive obligations doctrine and then trace its hesitant development in the case law of the Court. Next, it will show how the Court slowly became more comfortable with the doctrine and more confident when applying it to cases involving freedom of expression, culminating in its Dink judgment. The driving argument of the chapter is that the positive obligations doctrine has enormous potential for strengthening the right to freedom of expression and that the Court must now tease out its implications in concrete cases in a very scrupulous way, if the doctrine’s full potential is to be realised.

This argument will be advanced by exploring the various positive obligations that are brought together in para. 137 of the Dink judgment. For organisational clarity and convenience, the chosen headings correspond to para. 137’s main focuses: a favourable environment for participation in public debate by everyone; the expression of opinions and ideas without fear, and opinions and ideas that offend, shock or disturb.

Theoretical and normative bases

All international human rights treaties share the primary objective of ensuring that the rights enshrined therein are rendered effective in practice. There is also a predominant tendency in international treaty law to guarantee effective remedies to individuals when their human rights have been violated. In order to achieve these objectives, separately and dually, it is not always enough for the state to simply refrain from interfering with individuals’ human rights: positive or affirmative action will often be required as well. It is therefore important to acknowledge the concomitance of negative and positive state obligations to safeguard human rights. Although widely accepted nowadays, this viewpoint has encountered considerable resistance in the past. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) is a case in point.

It is clear from the drafting history of the ECHR that the priority or primary concern was to identify a list of rights and freedoms that would be protected by the Council of Europe’s system of collective enforcement. In turn, the system of collective enforcement would “extend solely to rights and freedoms” which, inter alia, “imposed on the States only obligations ‘not to do things,’ which would thus be susceptible to immediate sanction by a court”.{7} Such obligations of abstention are commonly called negative obligations. Nevertheless, in the text of the Convention that was ultimately adopted, various articles expressly provide for positive state obligations. For instance, Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), both clearly presuppose affirmative action on the part of states, if the rights they guarantee are to be realised in practice.

Besides these explicit positive obligations that are enshrined in the text of the ECHR, the Court has, over the years, identified various positive obligations that are implied by the text. Alastair Mowbray has identified a number of phases in the development of the positive obligations doctrine in the Court’s case law.{8} First, there was the Court’s early case law that developed the Convention’s explicit positive obligations, followed by a phase from the late 1970s to the early 1990s in which the Court developed various positive obligations under Article 8(1)’s requirement to “respect” family and private life. The 1990s were then characterised by the development of positive obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 5 (right to liberty and security). Since then, the Court has been expanding these positive obligations and creating new ones.{9} This chapter will ultimately posit that the Dink judgment could potentially mark the beginning of a new phase in the development of the positive obligations doctrine, at least in respect of the right to freedom of expression.

There are slightly divergent views about when and how the Court started to develop its doctrine of positive obligations. For instance, the current President of the Court, Dean Spielmann, points to the Belgian Linguistic case{10} as the judgment in which the Court “inaugurated” the doctrine,{11} whereas others tend to take the Marckx judgment{12} as the relevant starting point.{13} Both views are accurate in their own way and can be reconciled by noting that the reference to positive obligations in Belgian Linguistic is made in a roundabout way, whereas in Marckx, the reference is more direct. In Belgian Linguistic, the Court held that “it cannot be concluded that the State has no positive obligation to ensure respect for such a right as protected by” Article 2, Protocol 1, ECHR (right to education).{14} The judgment otherwise subscribes to the judicial thinking that typified the times, namely that most of the state obligations under the Convention are “essentially” negative in character.

In Marckx, however, referring specifically to the Belgian Linguistic case, the Court affirmed that while the object of Article 8 “is ‘essentially’ that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities”, “[n]evertheless it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life”.{15} The Airey judgment followed swiftly afterwards, providing the Court with the opportunity to further sharpen this formula and to broaden its object by mentioning private life as well as family life.{16}

Whatever the precise historical origins of the doctrine, its normative basis is clear. Article 1 ECHR, obliges States Parties to the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms” set out in the Convention. The obligation to “secure” these rights is unequivocal and necessarily involves ensuring that the rights in question are not “theoretical or illusory”, but “practical and effective”.{17} Against this backdrop and based on an analysis of the Court’s relevant case law, it has been observed that “various forms of positive obligations have been imposed upon different governmental bodies in order to secure a realistic guarantee of Convention rights and freedoms”.{18} What exactly a “realistic guarantee” entails is best determined on a case-by-case basis, although certain trends can tentatively be identified per Convention article.{19} The examples discussed below have been selected on the basis of their relevance for the positive state obligations set out in para. 137 of the Dink judgment.

The Court’s espousal of the doctrine was initially cautious. It has repeatedly declined to “develop a general theory of the positive obligations which may flow from the Convention”,{20} preferring instead to determine the existence and scope of positive obligations on a case-by-case basis.{21} As the Court’s judgments are “essentially declaratory”, the Court “leaves to the State the choice of the means to be utilised in its domestic legal system for performance of its obligation under Article 53”,{22} assuming, of course, that the circumstances allow for such choice.{23} States are in any case obliged to take “reasonable and appropriate measures” to secure the Convention’s rights and freedoms.{24} This often involves “an obligation as to measures to be taken and not as to results to be achieved”.{25} States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. The margin of appreciation can be wide, especially concerning positive obligations, for instance, in the context of Article 8, where “the notion of ‘respect’ [for family life] is not clear-cut” and “having regard to the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the contracting states, the notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case”.{26}

At present, the criteria applied by the Court in determining whether a state has failed to honour specific positive obligations remain somewhat unclear, although some guidance is given by the following passage:

the boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are nonetheless similar. Whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State or in terms of interference by a public authority which needs to be justified, the criteria to be applied do not differ in substance. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance to be struck between the competing interests at stake.{27}

The Court has held that the legitimate aims of restrictions on, for example, the rights to privacy and freedom of expression (as set out in Articles 8(2) and 10(2)) may be relevant for assessing whether or not states have failed to honour relevant positive obligations.{28} The Court has also found that the margin of appreciation is, in principle, the same for Articles 8 and 10, ECHR.{29} In all cases involving competing rights guaranteed by the Convention, a fair balance has to be struck between the rights involved, as relevant for the particular circumstances of the case.{30}

Having set out some general considerations concerning the positive obligations doctrine, it is clear that the development of this doctrine is one of the main reasons why the ECHR can be seen as “part of a building project, not merely a fire-fighting operation”.{31} Its aim is “the construction of a better rights framework, not just the prevention of the destruction of whatever framework already exists”.{32} Attention will now turn from general considerations to a specific aspect of the doctrine that has proved contentious in the past: the extent to which states’ positive obligations govern the private sphere and relations between private individuals.

Positive state obligations and private actors

The ECHR, like the whole international legal system for the protection of human rights, is built on the linear relationship between individuals (rights-holders) and states (duty-bearers). The recognition that different types of non-state/private actors should also be (explicitly) positioned within the system has come about in a gradual and frictional manner. And even that reluctant recognition has only been achieved through the dynamic interpretation of existing legal norms and the interplay between those norms and policy-making documents.

The questions of whether or how international human rights treaties protect individuals against other private persons do not invite straightforward answers. A leading textbook on the ECHR captures the conceptual difficulties involved when it cautions against describing such protection (in the context of the ECHR) as Drittwirkung, a doctrine under which “an individual may rely upon a national bill of rights to bring a claim against a private person who has violated his rights under that instrument”.{33} Such a “horizontal application of law … can have no application under the Convention at the international level, because the Convention is a treaty that imposes obligations only upon states”.{34} It further clarifies that “insofar as the Convention touches the conduct of private persons, it does so only indirectly through such positive obligations as it imposes upon a state”.{35}

The breakthrough for recognising the indirect horizontal applicability of certain provisions of the ECHR came in the Young, James and Webster judgment in 1981. In that case, the Court held that if a violation of one of the rights enshrined in the ECHR “is the result of non-observance of [the State’s] obligation [under Article 1, ECHR] in the enactment of domestic legislation, the responsibility of the State for that violation is engaged”.{36} This remark about the engagement of state responsibility was of general import, but in its subsequent jurisprudence, the Court progressively extended it to other articles of the Convention.

Thus, in its Airey judgment, the Court had stated that “although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the state to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life”.{37} Later, in X. and Y. v. The Netherlands, the Court supplemented that statement by admitting that such “obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves”.{38} This is an important extension of the principle as articulated in anterior case law; it confirms a degree of horizontal applicability of relevant rights. Yet, the Court “does not consider it desirable, let alone necessary, to elaborate a general theory concerning the extent to which the Convention guarantees should be extended to relations between private individuals inter se”.{39}

Following this exposition of some of the more general features of the positive obligations doctrine, the next section will home in on the positive obligations that specifically relate to freedom of expression and are implicated in para. 137 of the Dink judgment.

A favourable environment for participation in public debate by everyone

At the very heart of the positive obligation set out in para. 137 of the Dink judgment is the obligation on states to create a favourable environment for public debate in which everyone can participate. In other words, states are obliged to create an environment that enables inclusive, pluralistic public debate. The concept of an “enabling environment” for freedom of expression and/or the media, developed in different guises in academic literature and policy-making studies,{40} can be very useful for exploring the range of (positive) state obligations envisaged by the Court. An enabling environment for freedom of expression typically involves a favourable legal and policy environment and a political, socio-economic and cultural climate that is also conducive to pluralist democracy and pluralist media. This is because, as Monroe Price and Peter Krug have noted, “there is a close interaction between what might be called the legal-institutional and the socio-cultural, the interaction between law and how it is interpreted and implemented, how it is respected and received”.{41}

A favourable – or enabling – environment for freedom of expression is a prerequisite for a favourable environment for universal participation in public debate. In order to secure the right to freedom of expression, the safety and security of everyone wishing to exercise the right must first be guaranteed. The safety and security of actors in public debate should therefore be seen as prior (but of themselves insufficient) conditions for inclusive and pluralistic public debate. Numerous (positive) state obligations concern the safety and security of those wishing to participate in public debate. They will be considered now, before turning to the (positive) state obligations that concern public debate more specifically.

The outer ramparts of freedom of expression

As already mentioned, Mowbray’s third phase in the Court’s development of its positive obligations doctrine, in/from the 1990s, concerned the identification and elaboration of various positive obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 5 (right to liberty and security).{42} These positive obligations comprise substantive and procedural dimensions, as will be seen below.

Under Article 2, the state must guarantee the safety and physical integrity of everyone within its jurisdiction and this entails not only the negative obligation to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also the positive obligation to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.{43} This necessarily includes safeguarding the lives of those wishing to participate in public debate. Although its titular focus is on torture, Article 3 obliges states to ensure that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Under Article 5, the state has an obligation to guarantee the substantive liberty of everyone within its jurisdiction and to that end must ensure that everyone, including journalists and other participants in public debate, are not subjected to arbitrary arrest, unlawful detention or enforced disappearance. By fulfilling these obligations, the state protects the outer ramparts of freedom of expression and thereby creates and secures the necessary space for public debate.

In its judgment in Gongadze v. Ukraine, the Court essentialises the nature of the (positive) obligation on states as regards the protection of the right to life, insisting that:

This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also extends, in appropriate circumstances, to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual or individuals whose lives are at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.{44}

This, however, is subject to a number of qualifications, which the Court routinely repeats in relevant case law:

Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party, and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.{45}

It is important to recall that states’ positive obligations govern all state authorities and are to be fulfilled by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of governments, as well as all other state authorities, including agencies concerned with maintaining public order and national security, and at all levels – federal, national, regional and local. They can have particular implications for different state bodies and officials when dealing with particular situations. Policing operations, including the policing of public demonstrations, are a useful and interesting example from the perspective of public debate. The Court has found in its Makaratzis v. Greece judgment that:

Unregulated and arbitrary action by State agents is incompatible with effective respect for human rights. This means that, as well as being authorised under national law, policing operations must be sufficiently regulated by it, within the framework of a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force…, and even against avoidable accident.{46}

This implies a need to take into consideration “not only the actions of the agents of the state who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination”.{47} Furthermore, “a legal and administrative framework should define the limited circumstances in which law-enforcement officials may use force and firearms”, in the light of the international standards which have been developed on this topic.{48} In this respect, a clear chain of command, coupled with clear guidelines and criteria are required;{49} specific (human rights) training can help to formulate such guidelines and criteria. In any case, the “undeniable difficulties inherent in the fight against crime cannot justify placing limits on the protection to be afforded in respect of the physical integrity of individuals”{50} and Article 3 ECHR “does not allow for a balancing exercise to be performed between the physical integrity of an individual and the aim of maintaining public order”.{51}

As mentioned above, states’ positive obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 5 also have a procedural dimension. In the first place, the procedural dimension involves a positive obligation on the state to carry out effective, independent and prompt investigations into alleged unlawful killings or ill-treatment, either by state or non-state actors, with a view to prosecuting the perpetrators of such crimes and bringing them to justice. The Court has given detailed guidance on what criteria must be met in order for such an investigation to be considered effective. An investigation must, for instance, be “capable of leading to the establishment of the relevant facts as well as the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible”.{52} In addition, the authorities “must have taken all the reasonable steps available to them to secure all the evidence concerning the incident” and the investigation’s conclusions “must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all the relevant elements”.{53}

States have an obligation to take all necessary steps to bring the perpetrators of these kinds of crimes to justice. Investigations and prosecutions should consider all of the different (potential) roles in such crimes, such as authors, instigators, perpetrators and accomplices, and the criminal liability that arises from each of those roles.{54} In the same vein, states’ authorities are obliged to investigate “the existence of a possible link between racist attitudes and an act of violence”.{55} They should also pay attention to the vulnerable position in which a journalist who covers politically sensitive topics places himself/herself vis-à-vis those in power.{56} Prosecutions, however, do not necessarily have to lead to convictions and to hold otherwise would be to pre-determine the outcome before justice can take its course. On this point, the Court has stated that:

While there is no absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction or in a particular sentence, any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its capability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul of the required measure of effectiveness. The national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared to allow life-threatening offences to go unpunished.{57}

The Court has further clarified that, if an investigation is to be considered effective, “the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation must be independent and impartial, in law and in practice”.{58} This implies “not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection with those implicated in the events”, “but also a practical independence”.{59} The Court has also explained why it attaches so much importance to the effectiveness of investigations, viz. because they must serve “to maintain public confidence in the authorities’ maintenance of the rule of law, to prevent any appearance of collusion in, or tolerance of, unlawful acts and, in those cases involving state agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility”.{60} For these reasons, investigations should be subject to public oversight and “[i]n all cases, the next of kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests”.{61}

Article 13 ECHR also requires states to ensure that an effective remedy is available whenever any of the Convention’s substantive rights are violated.{62} An effective remedy should be “before a national authority” and, importantly concerning the rights to life and liberty, “notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity”.{63} The Court has explained that this requirement means that “where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of one of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress”.{64}

Remedies should be effective and appropriate and they should be available to victims and, as relevant, their families. The absence of such effective measures gives rise to the existence of a culture of impunity, which leads to the toleration of abuses and crimes against journalists and other media actors. When there is little or no prospect of prosecution, perpetrators of such abuses and crimes do not fear punishment. This inflicts additional suffering on victims and can lead to the repetition of abuses and crimes.

As already mentioned, securing the outer ramparts of freedom of expression is the first step towards creating an environment that is favourable to inclusive and pluralistic public debate. This section has shown that the Court has not only identified positive obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 5, but has given detailed guidance for their operationalisation or realisation. The next section deals with the notion of public debate, as understood by the Court. It will reveal that the detailed level of jurisprudential guidance concerning positive obligations and the outer ramparts of freedom of expression has not yet been replicated in respect of positive obligations and public debate.

Public debate

This section first explores the changing nature of public debate and the importance of robust public debate for democratic society. It then examines the various positive state obligations that have been recognised by the Court as being important for protecting and strengthening public debate.

The reconfiguration of public debate{65}

The Court has repeatedly stressed the instrumental importance of journalists and the media for enhancing public debate in democratic society. The media can make important contributions to public debate by (widely) disseminating information and ideas, thereby contributing to opinion-forming processes within society. As the Court has consistently acknowledged, this is particularly true of the audiovisual media because of their wide reach and “immediate and powerful” impact.{66} The Court has traditionally regarded the audiovisual media as more pervasive than the print media and it now considers the Internet to be a medium with “no less powerful and effect than the print media”.{67}

Journalists and the media also contribute to public debate through the role of “public watchdog” that is very often ascribed to them in democratic society.{68} In other words, they should monitor the activities of governmental authorities (and other powerful forces) vigilantly and expose any wrongdoing on their part. In respect of information about governmental activities, but also more broadly in respect of matters of public interest generally, the Court has held time and again that: “[n]ot only do the media have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive them”.{69}

The media can also make important contributions to public debate by serving as forums for discussion and debate.{70} This is especially true of new media technologies which have considerable potential for high levels of individual and group participation in society. In its Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey judgment, the Court recognised in a very forthright way the importance of the Internet in the contemporary communications landscape, because it offers “essential tools for participation in activities and debates relating to questions of politics or public interest”.{71} Thus seen, the increasingly interactive character of online media enables public debate and empowers a wider range of participants in public debate than just journalists and the media. The Court’s appreciation of the importance of individual contributions to public debate is clear from its judgment in Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, when it held that:

In a democratic society even small and informal campaign groups … must be able to carry on their activities effectively and … there exists a strong public interest in enabling such groups and individuals outside the mainstream to contribute to the public debate by disseminating information and ideas on matters of general public interest ….{72}

Figure 1: The reconfiguration of public debate

Figure 1 attempts to visualise the different ways in which public debate has been reconfigured by technology-driven developments. Once the preserve of professional journalists and institutional media, public debate is nowadays more accessible to wider sections of the public.{73} This has led to the participation of a greater diversity of actors in public debate and a greater diversity in the types of contributions to public debate. This growing diversity offers significant alternative sources of information and ideas to the institutionalised journalistic/media structures and processes that have traditionally been so determinative in shaping the contours and content of public debate. Professional journalists and institutional media are still dominant players in public debate, but they are no longer the de facto gatekeepers or moderators of public debate that they were in the past. Their relationship with other, new actors, is becoming more complex and porous.{74} That relationship is alternatively characterised by competition, complementarity and collaboration. This is captured by the broken – as opposed to hermetic – lines that demarcate the relationship between both sets of actors/types of contributions to public debate in Figure 1.

In the context of this reconfiguration of public debate, new types of actors have emerged and continue to grow in influence, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whistle-blowers and bloggers, to give a few topical examples.{75}

The Court has in recent times repeatedly recognised that “when a non-governmental organisation is involved in matters of public interest … it is exercising a role as a public watchdog of similar importance to that of the press”,{76} thereby entitling it to “similar Convention protection to that afforded to the press”.{77} The Court also introduced the term “social watchdog”;{78} it remains to be seen whether this terminological shift will also acquire substantive significance in future case law. The Court’s recognition of the value of NGOs’ contribution to public debate{79} and ability to play the role of public or social watchdog is not surprising. There are numerous similarities between NGOs and journalists or media, after all. NGOs, especially the better-resourced ones, invest in increasingly professional(ised) media and information strategies, often employing (former) journalists for that purpose. Human rights NGOs, in particular, often conduct, and publish the outcomes of, fact-finding missions in ways similar to investigative journalists.{80}

Whistle-blowers – individuals who, acting in good faith and for reasons of principle and/or conscience, (illegally) disclose confidential information because of its overriding public-interest value - are quintessential public watchdogs. The importance of their contributions to public debate has been resoundingly demonstrated by Edward Snowden’s revelations of secret mass surveillance. The so-called “Snowden effect” has forced online privacy onto international and national political agendas and triggered unprecedented levels of public debate on relevant issues. Whistle-blowing websites – most famously WikiLeaks, but including other initiatives, facilitate the practice of secure, anonymous whistle-blowing. The importance of whistle-blowers’ contributions to public debate has already been recognised by the Court{81} and in other standard-setting work by the Council of Europe{82} and that recognition is likely to develop further in the future.{83}

A burgeoning blogosphere is nowadays the source of myriad contributions to public debate. Of course, not all blogs have the ambition to contribute to public debate. Many blogs are personal in character and as such target personal networks and communities of interest. It is important, therefore, not to lump all blogs together without distinguishing between them. Even within the range of blogs that do contribute to public debate more specific typologies can be useful to further specify the nature of their contribution to news-making, for example, the distinction between media blogs, journalist blogs, audience blogs and citizen blogs.{84} The sub-category, “public watchblog”, has even been put forward to denote blogs that take on the public-watchdog role.{85} Although the Court has not yet explicitly recognised the value of bloggers’ contributions to public debate (including those of micro-bloggers such as Twitter users), such a step would be very much in keeping with the Court’s earlier finding in its Steel and Morris judgment (cited above).

The upshot of these developments is, on the one hand, that the notion of public debate has been considerably widened. Moreover, the Court’s case law clearly recognises the crucial importance of inclusive and pluralistic public debate in democratic society. On the other hand, the parameters of public debate are increasingly being shaped by private parties, notably online intermediaries. The descriptor, “new gatekeepers”, which is sometimes used to refer to these actors, does not fully capture the complex range of ways in which they control access to information, data and communications in the contemporary online environment. Their operative control of private forums that serve quasi-public informational and communicative purposes means that their actions and omissions can affect individuals’ right to freedom of expression in different ways. The dominant positions enjoyed by several leading online intermediaries such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, etc., intensify the impact that their activities can have on their users’ freedom of expression – for better or for worse. As this chapter has already shown, relevant state obligations could, in certain circumstances, extend to cover the activities of the aforementioned private actors, notwithstanding their inter-/multinational character. A detailed explanation of such circumstances is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter.

Positive obligations of states and public debate

In its Informationsverein Lentia judgment, the Court affirmed that the state is the ultimate guarantor of pluralism, especially in the audiovisual media sector.{86} The Court re-emphasised its previous jurisprudence on “the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society, in particular where, through the press, it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive”.{87} It then immediately added that:

Such an undertaking cannot be successfully accomplished unless it is grounded in the principle of pluralism, of which the State is the ultimate guarantor. This observation is especially valid in relation to audio-visual media, whose programmes are often broadcast very widely.{88}

It is important to note in this connection the Court’s express linking of freedom of expression, democratic society, pluralism and “especially” the audiovisual media, “whose programmes are often broadcast very widely”. If the reason for singling out the audiovisual media is the wide reach of their programmes, then these arguments clearly apply mutatis mutandis to the Internet. The Court, however, seems somewhat reluctant (for now) to embrace and develop this line of reasoning because:

notwithstanding the significant development of the Internet and social media in recent years, there is no evidence of a sufficiently serious shift in the respective influences of the new and of the broadcast media in the respondent state to undermine the need for special measures for the latter.{89}

The Informationsverein Lentia case involved the threat to pluralism in the audiovisual sector posed by a state monopoly on broadcasting. In Verein gegen Tierfabriken, the Court focused on the dangers for freedom of expression and pluralism when:

powerful financial groups can obtain competitive advantages in the areas of commercial advertising and may thereby exercise pressure on, and eventually curtail the freedom of, the radio and television stations broadcasting the commercials.{90}

In both cases, the position of the Court was clear: the role ascribed to the press in democratic society can only be effectively discharged in a climate of pluralism.

It was several years before the Court felt ready to start teasing out the implications of the positive obligation it had identified in Informationsverein Lentia, but it has by now begun to do so, most notably in Manole and Others v. Moldova{91} and Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy.{92} In Manole, the Court explicated the positive obligation of the state as the ultimate guarantor of pluralism, which requires it to:

ensure, through its law and practice, that the public has access through television and radio to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinion and comment, reflecting inter alia the diversity of political outlook within the country and that journalists and other professionals working in the audio-visual media are not prevented from imparting this information and comment. Where the State decides to create a public broadcasting system, the domestic law and practice must guarantee that the system provides a pluralistic audiovisual service.{93}

In Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, the Court observed that:

in such a sensitive sector as the audio-visual media, in addition to its negative duty of non-interference the state has a positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee effective pluralism.{94}

Furthermore, the Court took the view that in order to ensure “effective” or “true pluralism in the audiovisual sector in a democratic society”:

it is not sufficient to provide for the existence of several channels or the theoretical possibility for potential operators to access the audio-visual market. It is necessary in addition to allow effective access to the market so as to guarantee diversity of overall programme content, reflecting as far as possible the variety of opinions encountered in the society at which the programmes are aimed.{95}

In its other case law that does not deal with audiovisual media, the Court has also shown itself to be very sensitive to the need to be able to access information and very wary of “the censorial power of an information monopoly”.{96} This prompted the Court to find in Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary that the state’s obligations in matters of freedom of the press include “the elimination of barriers to the exercise of press functions where, in issues of public interest, such barriers exist solely because of an information monopoly held by the authorities”.{97}

Notwithstanding the potential of the state’s role as the ultimate guarantor of pluralism in democratic society, the positive obligations engendered by that role do not extend to guaranteeing a “freedom of forum”{98} or access to a particular medium/service.{99} In Appleby and others v. the United Kingdom, the applicants argued that the shopping centre to which they sought to gain access should be regarded as a “quasi-public” space because it was de facto a forum for communication. The Court held that:

[Article 10, ECHR], notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of freedom of expression, does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of that right. While it is true that demographic, social, economic and technological developments are changing the ways in which people move around and come into contact with each other, the Court is not persuaded that this requires the automatic creation of rights of entry to private property, or even, necessarily, to all publicly-owned property (Government offices and ministries, for instance). Where however the bar on access to property has the effect of preventing any effective exercise of freedom of expression or it can be said that the essence of the right has been destroyed, the Court would not exclude that a positive obligation could arise for the State to protect the enjoyment of Convention rights by regulating property rights.{100}

Instead, the Court tends to place store by the existence of viable expressive alternatives to the particular one denied. In determining whether alternative expressive opportunities are actually viable in the circumstances of a given case, it is important to be mindful of the Court’s Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi judgment,{101} in which it correctly rejected the assumption that different media are functionally equivalent. Different media have different purposes and are used differently by different individuals and groups in society: they are not necessarily interchangeable.{102} This explains why different media are subject to different regulatory regimes.{103}

In light of the Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi judgment, the Court tends to consider whether the blocking of access to a particular medium or forum has the effect of depriving someone of a major source of communication and thereby the possibility of participating in public debate.{104} The Court thus found no breach of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression in Akdeniz v. Turkey after access to two music-streaming websites was blocked on the ground that they were in breach of copyright. The reasoning was that the applicant in the case could “without difficulty have had access to a range of musical works by numerous means without this entailing a breach of copyright rules”.{105} Again, the availability of viable expressive alternatives (or, in casu viable alternatives for receiving information) was a central consideration for the Court. The case was distinguished from Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey as it involved copyright and commercial speech, as opposed to political speech (broadly defined) and the ability to participate in public debate. Member states have a wider margin of appreciation for commercial speech than for political speech.

In the previous section of this chapter, it was shown how the Court has developed influential jurisprudence under Article 8 on how positive obligations of states can extend to address violations of human rights by private actors, thereby ensuring a degree of indirect horizontal effect for the ECHR. Building on this jurisprudence, the Court has adopted similar reasoning regarding the right to freedom of assembly; it has held that “genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly” cannot:

be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11. Like Article 8, Article 11 sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need be ….{106}

The pattern of recognising that positive state obligations are sometimes necessary in order to render rights effective can also be detected in respect of the right to freedom of expression. Such positive state obligations apply to substantive and procedural matters alike.

The Court has accepted in principle that positive measures may be required of states in order to give effect to the right to freedom of expression (as with Articles 8 and 11, including the protection of the right in the sphere of relations between individuals{107}), but it has yet to meaningfully explore the practical workings of the principle. For instance, in Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, taking as its starting point, “the key importance of freedom of expression as one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy”, the Court recognised that:

Genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals … In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual, the search for which is inherent throughout the Convention.{108}

This recognition amounts to an important statement of principle, even if the Court does immediately go on to concede:

The scope of this obligation will inevitably vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States, the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Nor must such an obligation be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities …{109}

Owing to the situational diversity across the Council of Europe, States Parties to the ECHR “enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention”, subject to the practical and effective doctrine.{110}

Concerning procedural matters, the Court has found that when negligibly-funded informational campaigns aiming to influence debate on matters of public interest are pitted against the vastly superior financial resources of multinational corporations, fairness requires that some approximate equality of arms be strived for. It reasoned:

If, however, a State decides to provide such a remedy [against defamation] to a corporate body, it is essential, in order to safeguard the countervailing interests in free expression and open debate, that a measure of procedural fairness and equality of arms is provided for.{111}

Although the Court does not spell out the implications of its pronouncement, it seems logical that it would be for the state to guarantee the requisite measure of procedural fairness and equality of arms.

Reviewing the foregoing, it can be observed that the Court’s recognition of positive state obligations in respect of public debate is nascent and piecemeal, but steady. The process of recognition will continue to be guided by the living instrument doctrine and the practical and effective doctrine. It will also be driven by the Court’s gradual but growing appreciation of the specificities of the online communications environment.

Expression of opinions and ideas without fear

Another key feature of a favourable environment for freedom of expression and participation in public debate is the possibility for everyone to express their opinions and ideas without fear. Franklin Delano Roosevelt showed an awareness of the relationship between freedom from fear and freedom of expression in his famous ‘Four Freedoms’ State of the Union address in 1941. In that historic address, he looked forward to “a world founded upon four essential human freedoms”: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear.{112} The Four Freedoms later had a palpable influence on the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in turn influenced the drafting of the ECHR.

It stands to reason that the effective exercise of the right to freedom of expression should imply the absence of fear. Where fear is present, it can have a chilling effect on individual behaviour or expression. The self-restraint or self-censorship it is likely to engender has a negative influence on the effectiveness with which the right to freedom of expression is exercised. In this sense, there is a logical connection between freedom from fear and freedom of expression. The Court has drawn attention to the threat to free expression that is posed by fear, stating that demonstrators fearing physical violence by their opponents “would be liable to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas or interests from openly expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues affecting the community”.{113} Fear, then, can also lead to the impoverishment of public debate.

It should be noted that engrained prejudicial, discriminatory and hateful attitudes towards particular societal groups and the cumulation of institutional and societal practices reflecting those attitudes can lead to the erosion of self-esteem of members of affected groups, thereby ultimately resulting in a foreclosure of their speech.{114} In a social climate where discrimination prevails, viewpoints of members of certain minority groups are regarded as being of inferior value in deliberative processes. The “silencing” argument, as it is known, can affect, amongst others, women, members of (ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic) minority groups, members of the LGBT community or persons with disabilities.

When used by state officials, public figures and members of dominant societal groups, different types of expression have the ability to silence members of minority groups with varying levels of intensity. Stereotypes, for instance, can “serve to maintain existing power relationships” and be used as “control mechanisms”.{115} (Negative) stereotypes can amount to “misrecognition” and lead to “social subordination”,{116} in the sense that their targets are “denied the status of a full partner in social interaction, as a consequence of institutionalised patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect and esteem”.{117} The Court has shown in its Aksu v. Turkey judgment that it shares this perspective.{118} Attention has also been drawn to how (members of) minority or marginalised groups in society are:

subject to the physical dangers that accompany outcast status, including not only police brutality but also the lack of police protection against private attacks; and hand in hand with that they are subject to the ongoing stigmatization as enemies, aliens, or worse.{119}

Hate speech, too, can become a tool of degradation and subordination – not simply resulting from a discriminatory climate, but actually contributing to its creation.

Besides being a subjective emotion, triggered to a greater or lesser extent by objective stimuli, fear can also be cultivated or manufactured, through what is sometimes referred to as the politics of fear. This strain of politics seeks to create and exploit fear in society in order to try to legitimise the pursuit of particular political agendas (e.g., national security), often posing a threat to human rights guarantees in the process. Conor Gearty makes the point both imaginatively and effectively when he describes a “super-virus” that has infected the international human rights movement.{120} The virus works like a standard computer virus – it has entered the system and is wreaking havoc from within. Like many computer viruses, it is known by its acronym: GWOT. This virus “causes the human rights idea to manifest itself in gross human rights violations and egregious human rights abuses which it presents not as incompatible with but as necessitated by human rights”.{121} GWOT stands for Global War on Terror: the emotive reason routinely given by many states’ authorities for their dismantling of much human rights architecture in recent times. Sweeping surveillance powers and practices, powers to detain and interrogate suspects of terrorist activities, etc., are examples of such dismantling.

Opinions and ideas that offend, shock or disturb

The final component of the envisaged favourable environment for freedom to participate in public debate provided for in para. 137 of the Dink judgment concerns protection for opinions and ideas that are contrary to official or mainstream opinion. This component is directly traceable to the Court’s seminal finding in the Handyside case, even though that case is not explicitly referenced in para. 137 of Dink.{122} The case involved restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in order to protect public morals. The Court’s judgment affirmed that freedom of expression “is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there would be no democratic society”.{123}

This far-reaching principle, however, does not mean that the ECHR creates a right to offend as such. In its Otto-Preminger -Institut judgment, the Court held that the duties and responsibilities that govern the exercise of the right to freedom of expression include (“in the context of religious opinions and beliefs”) a duty:

to avoid as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs.{124}

Nor does the Court’s case law support a right not to be offended. The Court also clarified in its Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment that:

Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. …{125}

Rather, the Handyside judgment recognises that in democratic society, space has to be created and sustained for public discussion and debate. Democratic society is not without its rough edges and pluralistic public debate necessarily involves disagreement and confrontation between opposing viewpoints. Such disagreement and confrontation – even when expressed in strong terms – ordinarily come within the scope of the protection offered by Article 10. This is because Article 10 protects not only the substance of information and ideas, but also the form in which they are conveyed. The references to “the State or any sector of the population” in the Handyside judgment also make clear that the measure of legal protection for contentious speech should not therefore “be the dominant orthodoxy that it challenged, for that would trivialize the protection of free speech to whatever massaged the prejudices of dominant majorities”.{126}

The concern here is for the need to safeguard democratic society from what has been termed the “tyranny of the majority”,{127} i.e. unchecked or insufficiently checked majoritarian tendencies and preferences which tend to ride roughshod over minority values and interests. Again, the Court has underscored the importance of such an approach, stressing in its Young, James and Webster judgment that:

Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.{128}

Morally speaking, the legitimacy of majority rule is contingent on the existence of mechanisms allowing for the effective participation of minorities in deliberative political processes. Only such inclusive participatory practices can provide “the moral basis for binding everyone to the rule ultimately adopted”.{129} This point can easily be extended beyond decision-making and also applied to the legitimation of ideas generally through effective participation in public debate. The key consideration is that ideas be given the opportunity “to spread and become the possession of the multitude”.{130} This is of clear relevance for information about minority groups as well as their views and interests.

Conclusions

The development by the Court of the positive obligations doctrine in its case law has already gone through a number of phases. What the Court has achieved so far has aptly been described as “estimable”,{131} but if the post-Dink phase lives up to its potential, the best may be still to come.{132}