Movement Parties Against Austerity E-Book

Donatella della Porta

• Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2017

Seitenzahl: 472

Beschreibung

The ascendance of austerity policies and the protests they have generated have had a deep impact on the shape of contemporary politics. The stunning electoral successes of SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain and the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy, alongside the quest for a more radical left in countries such as the UK and the US, bear witness to a new wave of parties that draws inspiration and strength from social movements. The rise of movement parties challenges simplistic expectations of a growing separation between institutional and contentious politics and the decline of the left. Their return demands attention as a way of understanding both contemporary socio-political dynamics and the fundamentals of political parties and representation. Bridging social movement and party politics studies, within a broad concern with democratic theories, this volume presents new empirical evidence and conceptual insight into these topical socio-political phenomena, within a cross-national comparative perspective.

Leseprobe

Table of Contents

Title page

Copyright page

Acknowledgements

1: Movement Parties in Times of (Anti-)Austerity: An Introduction

1.1.  Parties and movements: An introduction

1.2.  Conceptualizing relations between movements and parties

1.3.  The genesis of movement parties

1.4.  Evolution of dominant party models

1.5.  Evolution of party/movement relations over time

1.6.  The research

1.7.  This volume

Note

2: The Genesis of Movement Parties in the Neoliberal Critical Juncture

2.1.  The crisis of late neoliberalism in Europe

2.2.  On the genesis and evolution of SYRIZA

2.3.  The genesis of Podemos

2.4.  The genesis of the M5S

2.5.  Conclusion

Notes

3: Organizational Repertoires of Movement Parties

3.1.  Introduction: Organizational models between agency and context

3.2.  SYRIZA's organizational repertoire

3.3.  The organizational repertoire of Podemos

3.4.  The M5S' organizational repertoire

3.5.  Conclusions: A comparative assessment of organizational repertoires

Notes

4: Framing Movement Parties

4.1.  Introduction

4.2.  Framing SYRIZA: A ‘unity of the left’ to take power

4.3.  Framing in Podemos: A leftist populism in Spain?

4.4.  The M5S framing: A catch-all party?

4.5.  Conclusion

Notes

5: Comparing Movement Parties' Success and Failures

5.1.  Party strategies and electoral success: Movement parties that failed?

5.2.  Broadening the scope of the analysis: Critical junctures without (yet) new movement parties in the European periphery

5.3.  Broadening the scope of the comparison: The left, movements and parties in Latin America

5.4.  Conclusion

Notes

6: Movement Parties: Some Conclusions

6.1.  The party genesis: A multi-layered, sequential approach

Note

Appendix: List of Interviews

1.  Greece

2.  Spain

3.  Italy

References

Index

End User License Agreement

List of Tables

Table 1.1.    Party/movement relations over time

Table 2.1.    Election results, 2009–2015 (including only PASOK, ND, and SYRIZA)

Table 2.2.    Electoral evolution of SYRIZA (2004–2015)

Table 3.1.    Comparative assessment of the organizational repertoire of the three parties

Table 3.2.    Comparative assessment of leader's features in three parties

Table 5.1.    Left-wing parties in Latin America (adapted from Levitsky and Roberts 2011a)

List of Illustrations

Figure 1.1.     Explaining the genesis of movement parties

Figure 1.2.    Dominant party models in history and their relation with state and society

Figure 1.3.    Explaining movement party organizational choices

Figure 2.1.    Distrust of parliaments

Figure 2.2.    Distrust of governments

Figure 2.3.    Distrust of political parties

Figure 2.4.    Electoral performance of the M5S (2010–2015, percentages)

Source:

  Author's elaboration on data of the interior minister (http://elezioni.interno.it)

Figure 2.5.    Total volatility index (Low Chamber, 1994–2013, proportional values)

Source:

  data from Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2014

Figure 2.6.    M5S voters' distribution by coalitions voted in 2008 general elections

Source:

  data from Pedrazzani and Pinto 2015, 92

Figure 3.1.    SYRIZA's organizational structure based on its Founding Statute

Figure 3.2.    Podemos' organizational structure

Figure 3.3.    Evolution of the participation in Podemos' primaries

Figure 3.4.    Schematization of the three faces of the M5S and their reciprocal relations

Guide

Cover

Table of Contents

Start Reading

CHAPTER 1

Index

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Copyright page

Copyright © Donatella della Porta, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki and Lorenzo Mosca 2017

The right of Donatella della Porta, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki and Lorenzo Mosca to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2017 by Polity Press

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ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-1145-7 (hardback)

ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-1146-4 (paperback)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Della Porta, Donatella, 1956- author. | Fernández, Joseba, author. | Kouki, Hara, author. | Mosca, Lorenzo, author.

Title: Movement parties against austerity / Donatella della Porta, Joseba Fernández, Hara Kouki, Lorenzo Mosca.

Description: Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA : Polity Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016033696 (print) | LCCN 2016052382 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509511457 (hardback) | ISBN 9781509511464 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781509511471 (Epdf) | ISBN 9781509511488 (Mobi) | ISBN 9781509511495 ( Epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Political parties. | Social movements–Political aspects. | Financial crises–Political aspects. | Economic policy.

Classification: LCC JF2051 .D434 2017 (print) | LCC JF2051 (ebook) | DDC 324.2/3—dc23

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Acknowledgements

The idea for this book came to us, at the beginning of 2015, during a casual conversation over a lunch with colleagues in Berlin, in the observation of a relevant but unexpected dynamic of emergence of parties from within a social movement and, at the same time, a strange lack of, first, conceptualization of them and, second, comparative research on them. These gaps suggested not only theoretical thinking but also empirical investigations. In theory, our aim has been to build an ideal-typical definition of movement parties, locating it within social movement studies and party studies. In reality, we have triangulated various sources on party actors, who, while writing this book, became more and more visible and successful, achieving power at local and even national level. While their evolutionary paths are still developing, we thought that the time was certainly right for first analysis.

Ideas mature in context under favourable circumstances. First and foremost, our work was made possible by an Advanced Scholars Research Grant from the European Research Council for Donatella della Porta's project of ‘Mobilizing for Democracy’. Some parts of this volume have been presented at a conference on Movement and Parties at the Centre for Social Movement Studies of the Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence. We are grateful to Daniela Chironi, Jonas Draege, Sven Hutter, Frank O'Connor, Martin Portos, Ken Roberts, Anna Subirats and Sidney Tarrow for their comments. We also wish to thank Sarah Tarrow for her careful editing.

The authors are listed in alphabetical order; they contributed equally to this book.

1Movement Parties in Times of (Anti-)Austerity: An Introduction

1.1.  Parties and movements: An introduction

During austerity policies and the cycle of protest against them, while the downward trend in party-movement relations had pushed towards an expectation of further separation between institutional and contentious actors, a new wave of parties emerged that took inspiration (and strength) from social movements. This first became visible in Latin America in the 1990s, with a parallel move in Europe (particularly in Southern Europe) more than a decade later. The stunning electoral success of movement parties like SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, and the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy challenged expectations of an increasing separation of movement and party politics in social movement studies, as well as anticipation of a decline of the radical left in studies of political parties. This volume presents a social-science analysis of these topical socio-political phenomena, within a cross-national comparative perspective.

A first contribution of our research is in the bridging of concepts and theories developed in two quite successful subfields in the social and political sciences: studies on social movements and on political parties. In particular, focusing on movement parties that have been successful in electoral politics, we will address the relevant issues of social movement effects as well as party system changes. Bridging both traditions of study, we will reflect on the genesis of movement parties within broad transformations in social conflicts induced by the neoliberal critical juncture and contemplate the organizational changes that, from social movements, spilled over into party politics. Rather than searching for structural determinants, however, we will take a processual stance, considering the emergence and success of movement parties within an approach that is relational, as it looks at repeated interactions of various actors; dynamic, as it addresses these interactions through trials and errors; and constructed, as it considers those actors' construction of their social reality (della Porta 2014).

This introduction will review the existing research on relations between parties and social movements, setting the theoretical stage for the empirical analysis that will follow. First, we review existing literature on the relations developed between movements and parties in an attempt to conceptualize movement parties as based upon a specific type of relations with movements. Movements have developed special links with political parties or party families by targeting parties, allying with parties, founding parties. Movement parties are defined with reference to these different types of relations (Kitschelt 1989). Second, we will single out some conditions under which social movements are expected to influence parties, up to the foundation of movement parties (Tarrow 1989; 2015; Goldstone 2003; della Porta and Diani 2006). Following existing literature in social movement studies and party studies, explanations for movement party emergence will be located within the structure of political cleavages, the representative capacity of existing parties, the characteristics of electoral competition and party systems, the degree of electoral volatility and institutional trust as well as electoral laws. Third, we will address the evolution of party models over time – from parties of notables to personal/cartel parties putting particular emphasis on the characteristics of an emerging type of party organization: the neoliberal populist party. Hegemonic party models in specific historical periods play an important role in providing environmental imprints affecting newborn parties – such as movement parties – despite their aim to challenge and change the existing party systems. In particular, neoliberal populist parties tend to be organizationally thin, highly personalized, post-ideological and mediatized – characteristics that to a certain extent can also be found in contemporary movement parties. Fourth, we will focus on the evolution through time of movement party types that emerged from some social movement families (i.e. labour movements, environmental movements) focusing particularly on the Green parties. Our aim is to shed light on the relations developed between parties and movements in history and on the different ways some movements have interacted with the existing party system. We shall add to this analysis the characteristics of social movements that can lead to the foundation of a party. We will also reflect on movement parties' strategies (in frames, organizations, and forms of action) by mapping the trade-offsthat a close relationship between movements and parties creates for both actors. The last part of this introductory chapter presents the research design of the book, including the case selection and the methods for data collection and data analysis. Building on the knowledge of party/movements relations presented above, we have chosen SYRIZA, Podemos and the M5S for in-depth analysis throughout the volume, as these political actors represent cases of movement parties that emerged during the crisis of neoliberalism and which achieved electoral success. We will finally present the structure of the volume.

1.2.  Conceptualizing relations between movements and parties

While it has often been noted that parties are important for movements and vice versa, the literature on relations between the two is at best sparse. Reciprocal indifferences have been further fuelled as research on parties moved away from concerns with the relations between parties and society – focusing on parties within institutions – and social movement studies mainly framed them as a social phenomenon whose political aspects had to be located outside of the political institutions. Research on contentious politics has indeed become too movement-centric, dismissing the existing reciprocal relationship between electoral and protest politics (Hutter 2014). At the same time, literature on political parties grew more and more biased towards institutions, forgetting about the linkages with the society (della Porta 2015a).

Critiques of a vision of movements as outsiders have been voiced, however, within social movement studies. As Jack Goldstone suggested, institutional politics is permeated by social movements considered as ‘an essential element of normal politics in modern societies’, which do not necessarily institutionalize or fade away. Rather, ‘parties and movements have become overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics to the point that long-established political parties welcome social movement support and often rely specifically on their association to win elections’ (2003, 4). Relations between the two are various: ‘Movements compete with parties. Movements infiltrate parties .… Movements become parties’ (Garner and Zald 1985, 137). Social movements have often addressed programmatic challenges to parties, by proposing new issues; organizational challenges, by promoting a participatory model; electoral challenges, by raising support for some emerging topics in public opinion (Rohrschneider 1993), and even succeeded in changing parties' programmes and organization (della Porta 2007). In a recent contribution, McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 533) singled out six types of relations between movements and parties: ‘Movements introduce new forms of collective action that influence election campaigns. Movements join electoral coalitions or, in extreme cases, turn into parties themselves. Movements engage in proactive electoral mobilization. Movements engage in reactive electoral mobilization. Movements polarize political parties internally.’

On the side of party studies, relations between parties and movements have been addressed as relations with interest groups, in particular within reflections on organizational linkages. A linkage has been defined as ‘any means by which political leaders act in accordance with the wants, needs, and demands of the public in making public policy’ (Luttbeg 1981, 3). A link between elite action and citizens' preferences provides a ‘substantive connection between rulers and ruled’ (Lawson 1980, 3). Particularly important have been considered the relations between parties and interest organizations, as linkages through organizations allow for a better selection and aggregation of ‘relevant grievances into reasonably coherent packages of political demands which then become the object of negotiation between organizational and party elites’ (Poguntke 2002a, 45). This could prove very effective for the party, since ‘As long as organizational integration is high, organization members may cast their vote according to their leaders' recommendation even if they disagree with individual elements of the deal, because their prime loyalty is to the organization’ (ibid., 46).

Relations between parties and interest groups are said to co-evolve, adapting to each other, through competition and cooperation as the two actors see each other as means potentially useful for their ends, and thus try to influence each other through overlapping leadership or other forms of pressure – but also provide each other with brokerage for reaching out of one's own networks as well as bridging identities (Heaney 2010). In fact:

political parties strive to craft platforms that will draw the support of majorities of voters, while interest groups pressure the government to enact policies that advance the substantive agendas or ideological perspectives of narrower constituencies…. Groups sometimes prop up parties by supplying them with essential volunteers and financial resources, thus enabling a group to dictate key parts of a party's agenda. At other times, a group may find itself ‘captured’ by a party such that the group must accept a party's weak efforts on its behalf because the other major party refuses (or is unable) to bargain for its loyalty.

(Heaney 2010, 568)

The definition of movement parties refers in fact to political parties that have particularly strong organizational and external links with social movements. In social movement studies, the political opportunities approach has linked parties' evolution to movements. When looking at party systems, a very first observation is that some social movements have produced new parties (and party families): the labour movements arose from, or gave birth to, socialist parties; regionalist parties have been rooted in ethnic movements; confessional parties in religious movements and the Greens in environmental ones. As Tarrow (2015, 95) noted:

Many parties begin life as movements. Think of the labor movement that gave birth to social democratic parties in Western Europe; or the abolitionist movement that was at the core of the Republican party during and after the American Civil War; or the indigenous peoples' movements that produced ethnically supported parties in Bolivia and Ecuador in recent decades. Movements frequently give rise to parties when movement activists transfer their activism to institutional politics.

In parallel, in party studies, influentially Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have located parties within social cleavages, in which they originate and which they contribute to perpetuate.

Movements have moreover developed special links with a political party or party family. Social movements have, more or less harmonically, allied with parties even beyond stable organizational linkages. Considering parties more broadly, external linkages have often been created with various types of interest groups and civil society associations, such as religious ones for confessional parties or ethnic ones for ethno-nationalist parties. Linkages to movements can be stressed in the very name of the party, in the opening of participation to movement members, in support for movement claims, in the shared use of protest. The presence of overlapping membership at grassroots and leadership levels as well as the presence of movement activists in party lists testify for these ties. Party members may ‘engage in social movement activities themselves, thus promoting and leading to attitudinal changes in the party with respect to those themes at the core of the social movements' mobilizations’ (Piccio 2012, 268). Indeed, ‘for a social movement to be more likely to have an impact on a party, a certain degree of overlap must exist between the party and the social movements' identities’ (ibid.).

The traditional allies of the progressive social movements have mainly been the leftist parties (Kriesi 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 1996), and the radical left is considered as by far the most relevant party in protest politics (Hutter 2014; Kriesi 1989, 296). From the Labour Party in Great Britain to the Social Democrats in Germany, from the French socialists to the Italian communists, the programmes and members of the institutional left have changed following interactions with social movements and in response to increasing awareness on themes such as gender discrimination or environmental protection. As mediators between civil society and the state, parties need to mobilize public opinion and voters, so that the programmes and membership of the institutional left have often been altered by interaction with movements (i.e. Koelble 1991; Maguire 1995; Duyvendak 1995; Koopmans 1995; Piccio 2012). Social movements have indeed been extremely sensitive to the characteristics of their allied political parties: they have often privileged action in society, leaving parties the job of bringing their claims into institutions. They have placed themselves on the political left–right axis, and have constructed discourses consistent with the ideologies of their allies.

Movements parties' relations have been addressed with reference to political cleavages. Comparative research has indicated that, in general, the ‘old left’ has been more disposed to support movements where exclusive regimes had for a long time hindered the moderation of conflicts on the left–right axis (della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995, 68; Tarrow 1990).

Party divisions within the traditional left have also been cited as influencing attitudes towards social movements. In particular, divisions on the left between a social-democratic (or socialist) and a communist party are said to increase the relevance of the working-class vote, discouraging left-wing parties from addressing post-material issues (Kriesi 1991, 18). Differently, the global justice movement, stressing the traditional demands of social rights and justice, seems to have been more able to influence the institutional left in countries such as Italy, France, or Spain, where the moderate left feared the competition of more radical Communist or Trotskyist parties (della Porta 2007). More generally, electoral competition is an important variable in explaining the reaction of potential allies towards social movements as the propensity to support protest has been connected with electoral instability, which renders the winning of new votes particularly important. In fact, member-challenger coalitions are most probable in closely divided and competitive political situations (Piven and Cloward 1977, 31–2; Tilly 1978, 213–14). Alliances between parties and social movements can be facilitated when the electoral environment is more unstable (Piccio 2012). Additionally, the position of the left towards social movements is influenced by whether or not they are in government: when in opposition, social democrats take advantage of the push provided by social movements; when in power, on the other hand, they are forced by budgetary constraints or coalition partners to limit their openness to emerging demands (Kriesi 1991, 19; Kriesi 1989, 296–7). Finally, availability towards changes could be different for mainstream versus peripheral parties, the latter being those who have little to no chance of achieving power (Kriesi 2015a).

Whatever the reasons for alliances, we can speak of movement parties when relations with social movements are particularly close. Social movements are usually defined as networks of groups and individuals, endowed with some collective identification, that pursue goals of social transformation mainly through unconventional forms of participation (della Porta and Diani 2006). Political parties are instead, in Max Weber's (1922) influential definition, free associations built with the aim of achieving institutional power. This is mainly done through participation in elections – in democracy, ‘a party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office’ (Sartori 1976, 64).

Movement parties emerge as a sort of hybrid between the two, when organizational and environmental linkages are very close: to different degrees, they have overlapping membership, co-organize various forms of collective action, fund each other, address similar concerns. As organizations, they participate in protest campaigns, but also act in electoral arenas. As social movements are networks of organizations and individuals, movement parties can be considered as part of them, as testified for by overlapping memberships as well as organizational and action links. According to Kitschelt, ‘movement parties are coalitions of political activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the organization and strategic practice of social movements in the arena of party competition’ (2006, 280). Additionally, even if in different formats, movement parties aim at integrating the movement constituencies within their organizations. Movement parties also represent movements' claims, by channelling their concerns in the institutions. As for framing, ‘movement-based parties are more likely to be driven by ideological militancy than by pragmatic political considerations’ (Tarrow 2015, 95). Moreover, even if using (also) an electoral logic, they tend to be supportive of protest, participating in campaigns together with other movement organizations, as ‘in terms of external political practice, movement parties attempt a dual track by combining activities within the arena of formal democratic competition with extra-institutional mobilization’ (Kitschelt 2006, 281).

1.3.  The genesis of movement parties

A main question is, when do movement parties rise? In addressing this question, we can draw inspiration from social science research on both parties and movements, by singling out some sufficient, if not necessary, causes at the level of the cleavage structure, the party system, and social movements. Bridging party and social movement research, we might build a model about the movement parties' genesis (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1.

     Explaining the genesis of movement parties

Some main elements presented in the figure need to be briefly introduced by referring to relevant literature that indeed addresses the emergence of movement parties.

Transformations in the cleavage structures. Research on the rise of new parties has stressed the role of emerging cleavages, as they are likely to develop in response to neglected or new issues (although strength of post-materialism does not explain the appearance of Green parties), especially in times when economic or other problems become more visible and politicized (Kitschelt 1988; Müller-Rommel 1993). As economic competition erodes protected citizenship rights and also increases cultural diversity, globalization as a critical juncture has been related in Europe with the formation of a cleavage between winners and losers. While research in Europe had looked at the populist right-wing parties as mobilizing the losers in the electoral arena (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012), research in Latin America (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Silva 2009; Roberts 2015) has focused instead on the ways in which the neoliberal critical juncture produced counter-movements towards social protection. In Southern Europe, too, neoliberalism and its crisis have transformed the cleavage structure that was at the base of the domestic party systems with the emergence of a precarization of labour as well as a proletarization of the middle classes. Movement parties have emerged where the crisis has been faster and where it more radically challenged everyday life.

Conducive conditions in the electoral field. Research on the political system has singled out the relevance for the rise of new parties of some institutional conditions. So, it has been noted that ‘In some countries (e.g. the United States), ballot access requirements make it difficult for any but the few largest parties to gain the opportunity for electoral success. Plurality or majority electoral systems with single-member districts have sometimes (e.g. in France) been adopted specifically to deny electoral success to extremist parties, and have had the same effect on other small parties’ (Harmel and Robertson 1985, 505). Studies on parties have discussed in particular the effects of the electoral system on the emergence and success of new parties, although with inconclusive results. While some opportunities must be available in terms of formal electoral access – institutional conduciveness having been linked to degree of decentralization, proportionality, reserved seats for minority, low barriers for registering parties, low threshold for earning seats (Van Cott 2005) – even more important is the level of electoral volatility.

Unrepresented claims and the delegitimation of bipolar party systems – especially of centre-left parties and the traditional left. As Kitschelt noted, ‘movement parties are most likely to appear where (1) collective interests are intensely held by a large constituency, willing to articulate their demands through disruptive, extra-institutional activities, (2) established parties make no effort to embrace such interests for fear of dividing their own electoral constituency and (3) the formal and informal thresholds of political representation are low’ (2006, 282). Movement parties emerged in bipolar systems of alternative coalitions or parties (Sartori 1976) where a relevant portion of the electoral perceived new grievances/interests/identities as not represented by the existing blocs. In this sense, the number of existing parties is expected to affect the coverage of demands, as a large number should increase the possibilities that new issues are addressed (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2001). New parties arise in a structured environment in which of highest importance is the behaviour of existing parties that are often unwilling to follow new movements, as they also think they will soon fade (Hug 2001). While the relevance of institutional thresholds is still debated, the emergence of new parties is clearly linked to the reactions by the other parties. The emergence and success of new parties is in fact embedded within relations inside the party system, as ‘mainstream parties can undermine niche party vote with dismissive or accommodative tactics and boost it with adversarial strategies’ (Meguid 2005, 347). This is the case as ‘mainstream parties also manipulate the salience and ownership of the new party's issue. It follows that competition is not restricted to interaction between ideological neighbors, as the standard spatial theory claims; non-proximal parties play a critical role in the success and failure of Western Europe's niche parties’ (ibid., 357).

Relevant characteristics of party systems that favoured the emergence of indigenous-peoples parties in Latin America are de-alignment, fragmentation, and the weakness of the left (initially, the channel of access for indigenous people) – especially the decline of a once strong left (Van Cott 2005).

Mobilization on non-represented issues. If these new parties emerge especially when movement entrepreneurs realize the need for a complex reorganization of the society, when they assume there is a constituency, and when there are low barriers to entry, they are successful ‘only where an intensively felt, salient political interest harbored by a quantitatively significant constituency lacks representation in the existing party system’ (Kitschelt 2006, 282). Looking at the Latin American experience, Kenneth Roberts (2015) noted that new parties emerged on the left in those countries in which centre-left parties had been leading forces in the implementation of neoliberal reforms. In this regard, research has looked at the loss of representative capacity that is linked to increasing exogenous constraints, such as responsibility towards international and market-related conditionalities, which thwarted established parties' capacity of representation, reducing their electoral support (Mair 2009; Streeck 2014). Neoliberal developments have jeopardized parties' ties with potentially disruptive effects as, as Peter Mair noted:

parties should be seen not as being in complete control of the political agenda, but rather as sharing that control with other, non-electoral, organizations.…This sharing of roles presents no problems for the parties as long as these latter organizations are linked to them in some way. A weakening of these links, however, and/or the emergence of new, non-party associated organizations, and/or a weakening of the agenda-setting role of those associated non-electoral organizations that do exist, could imply a challenge to the hold of party systems on the mass public.

(1983, 420)

With the financial crises of the 2000s and 2010s, parties' conception of responsibility is challenged. If in the 1990s the mobilization on the right of the losers of globalization seemed a major phenomenon at the electoral level, in the 2000s the critique of globalization (especially in its neoliberal form) developed on the left as well, in this case more within contentious politics. Movement parties emerged in fact as established parties were most dramatically losing citizens' trust and the relations of cooperation of centre-left parties with social movements have been reduced as left-wing parties moved to the centre, while movements increasingly addressed social issues. Similarly to the Latin American cases, in Europe the movement parties seem therefore to have emerged and succeeded when centre-left parties were perceived as compromising with austerity policies. As we are going to see, during the economic crisis the PASOK in Greece, the Democratic party in Italy, and the PSOE in Spain all turned towards neoliberal policies based on structural reforms and privatization programmes which translated into cutting social spending, increasing the retirement age, reforming the labour market, reducing the public sector, and so on.

Massive movement mobilization with anti-establishment frames. The emergence of movement parties is also related to the characteristics of social movements themselves. In particular, movement parties tend to be successful when social movements mobilize new cleavages on which representation in institutions is perceived as weak. In fact, new parties have been successful when they have appealed to mobilized constituencies during waves of contentious politics, as has been noted in ethno-nationalist parties and new left-wing parties in Latin America (Van Cott 2005; Madrid 2008; Roberts 2015). Strongly rooted and unitary movements, together with the configuration of power within the party system, had an influence on the formation and endurance of ethnic parties, to which organizers from declining left-wing parties brought frames of cultural recognition, autonomy and anti-neoliberalism (Van Cott 2005, 223). The main preconditions for the emergence of an ethnic party have been indeed singled out in the presence of a deep-rooted indigenous social movement, with dense networks of members, party fragmentation and harmony among indigenous groups, as well as the recruitment of former leaders of left-wing parties in decline (ibid., 223). In addition, ethno-populist parties are said to have succeeded, whereas traditional ethnic parties instead have failed, in conditions of low levels of ethnic polarization as well as fluid ethnic identification which allowed the broadening of the electoral appeal beyond specific other ethnic categories. In recent times, the legitimacy crisis of late neoliberalism has fuelled anti-austerity protests that have pointed at the corruption of an entire political class as the mechanism through which the profits of the few prevailed over the needs – the very human rights – of the many. In opposition to the corrupt elites, the protesters defined themselves as part of the large majority of those suffering from social and political inequalities. Social movements became in fact more and more critical of representative democracy. While these attitudes reflected a drop in trust in existing parties that was widespread in the electorate, however, social movement activists remained convinced of the need for political intervention to control the market (della Porta 2015b). Anti-austerity protests in particular have taken different forms – some more traditional, channelled through existing organizations (including unions and parties), some more innovative. In some countries, they brought about the – almost paradoxical, considering huge mistrust in institutional politics – choice to create new movement parties; the widespread mistrust in the existing political parties then favoured the electoral success of the new parties. Much research has indeed indicated the role of massive waves of protest but also of inclusive frames in the emergence of successful movement parties in countries such as Greece, Spain and, to a minor extent, Italy.

1.4.  Evolution of dominant party models

Apart from the genetic approach mentioned above, as far as movement parties' evolution is concerned, literature on political parties has also paid attention to the dominant models of party organizations. Within the context of our research, we shall make reference to the organizational strategies of political parties in an attempt to locate our parties within evolving party systems, keeping, however, into account also the parallel literature on transformations in social movement organizations. In fact, the dominant party organizations as well as the movement parties have changed in various periods adapting to but also promoting transformations in their environment.

Historical evolution of party organizational models. Party literature has devoted much energy to singling out dominant organizational models and their evolution in time. These reflections are also relevant to addressing movement parties in their historical evolution.

Looking at parties' internal characteristics along three dimensions – organization, strategies, and culture – Panebianco's (1988) typological approach pointed at the types of parties that are dominant (even if not exclusive) in specific periods, linking them to contextual characteristics. Summarizing existing literature, Gunther and Diamond suggested a typology based upon three criteria: (1) the nature of the party's formal organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic commitments of the party (ideological/pragmatic, particularistic-clientele-oriented/promiscuously eclectic electoral appeals, etc.); and (3) the strategy and behavioural norms of the party (tolerant, pluralistic and democratic versus proto-hegemonic and anti-system) (2003, 171). Literature on political parties described, in fact, a double trend with initially an opening to civil society, with the development of the ideologic mass party, but then a continuous approaching of the parties to state institutions and distancing from society (see Figure 1.2). It is in this evolving context that movement parties emerge, as innovators but also in part adapting to existing institutional structures.

At the origins of political parties was what Max Weber (1922) called the party of notables, as party candidates were capable of devoting time to politics thanks to their economic conditions, and built upon their personal social reputation. Parties were organized in (informal) committees, made up of members of the social elite (Duverger 1951) and aimed at electing candidates who were supposed to represent the individual interests of those who voted for them (Neumann 1956).

In nineteenth-century Europe, there was indeed a move of party models towards the society as mass parties emerged, endowed with a stable bureaucracy (Weber 1922) in order to represent the collective interests of those who had hitherto been excluded. As these representatives did not possess individual resources that allowed them to devote themselves to politics, the parties (organized in party sections) built complex organizations in which politics became a profession (ibid., also Duverger 1951). Parties then assumed a function of social integration, allowing for the development of collective identification around common values and solidarities, with a growing influence on the everyday life of party activists (Neumann 1968). Ideological incentives became central for the development of party loyalties (Pizzorno 1981; 1997).

After the mass ideological party, defined as an invention from the left, started to decline, various labels were used to point at the autonomization of parties from their linkages with a specific social base (catch-all parties), a prevalent attempt at getting votes (electoral parties), an interpenetration of party and state based on inter-party collusion (cartel party). The catch-all party is defined by the watering down of the ideological appeals and the aim of representing specific classes with, at the same time, growing power of the leaders and declining influence of the rank-and-file (Kirchheimer 1966). The dominant aim for this type of parties is increasing electoral support, rather than socialization of members. In a similar vein, Panebianco (1988) described the professional-electoral party as characterized moreover by the presence of a bureaucracy that specializes in the relations with electors, through marketing and communication experts. Organizationally weak, this type of party focuses on the electoral moment, with a decline of organizational ideologies. The relations with the mass media also bring about a personalization of the leadership (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999), often with personal conflicts as well. The cartel party represents the culmination of this trend, when parties collude with each other in order to get more and more state support, thus losing more and more the relations with their members (Katz and Mair 1995). In cartel parties, parties become mainly partnerships of professionals, not associations of, or for, the citizens.

Figure 1.2.

    Dominant party models in history and their relation with state and society

These tendencies seem to peak in what appears as an emerging party model that we name as ‘neoliberal populist party’; this is organizationally light, heavily personalized, split in non-ideological factions and characterized by heavy manipulative use of mass media but also by a power rooted in the occupation of institutional positions, often used for clientelistic or corrupt exchanges. This new party type has become mainstreamed in contemporary Europe during the last two decades following the evolution and decline of twentieth-century political ideologies. At the organizational level, the emergent party model displays a centralization of decisions in the hands of few visible leaders, which is intertwined with the merely formal involvement of the rank-and-file members (considered mainly as card-payers) and, especially, a reduced influence of activists, normally considered as more intransigent than either the leaders or the rank-and-file, and therefore as obstacles to moderate political choices (Crouch 2010). The centralization of decisions and the personalization of leadership – typical of neoliberal populist parties – have led scholars to speak of an Americanization of European parties, more and more oriented to an individualistic management of gains, and less and less to the creation of collective identities, progressively assimilated into the state (depending on the state for finances and profits) and less and less autonomous from public institutions (Calise 2000).

Crucial for our analysis of this newly emerging type of party, there is also a weakening of relations between parties and civil society organizations (Allern and Bale 2012). Party activists as channels of communication to potential voters tend to be substituted for by the mass media, particularly television, which facilitate direct identification of electors with leaders able to transmit a self-assured, confident and warm image, as well as appropriate some relevant themes (Barisione 2007), thus side-stepping the mediation of the party. At the same time, a decline of party members is seen as a permanent trend (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012) and distinguishing feature of neoliberal populist parties. However, such parties seem to invest, but differentially, in the recruitment of new members (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Blais 2012). ‘Active members’ became less important in terms of party financing as state subsidies substituted for membership fees, and changing lifestyles, post-materialist values and higher educational levels reduced the supply of membership (Scarrow 2009), producing rather calls for more participatory forms of political commitment (Montero and Gunther 2002). If organizational reforms tended to empower ‘ordinary members’ rather than activists (Mair 1994, 15) especially on the selection of candidates and legitimization of party programmes, party elites kept the power of veto (Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2000, 149).

As we shall see in the next chapter, the framing of neoliberal populist parties changed accordingly, becoming less and less ideological. In fact, the use of an ‘anti-political’ language by leaders, in contrast with parties and professional politicians (Campus 2006), also becomes an instrument for reinforcing personalized leadership by politicians that underlines, paradoxically, their estrangement from politics. Similarly, populist appeals (to the people against the elites) by these parties (prevalently, but not only from the centre-right) seek to utilize low party identification and mistrust in institutional politics to create an electoral following. In a vicious circle, the decrease in trust and identification in parties could further push for personalization as a strategy to win back consent (Diamanti 2007), above all (but not only) from the most socially marginalized and least politically interested voters.

In sum, the emerging model of party presents a shallow, weak, and opportunistic organization; ideological appeals are (at best) vague, with an overwhelmingly electoral orientation. Electoralist parties debouch into personalistic parties, whose ‘only rationale is to provide a vehicle for the leader to win an election and exercise power…an organization constructed or converted by an incumbent or aspiring national leader exclusively to advance his or her national political ambitions. Its electoral appeal is not based on any programme or ideology, but rather on the personal charisma of the leader/candidate, who is portrayed as indispensable to the resolution of the country's problems or crisis’ (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 187).

It is within this evolution in dominant party models that we should locate the organizational choices made by movement parties emerged during the economic crisis.

1.5.  Evolution of party/movement relations over time

While party literature has focused almost exclusively on dominant party models, one could examine this process in parallel with the evolution of the movement-sponsored, challenging party models. Some characteristics of movement parties in fact have also changed over time. Looking at the Latin American case, Roberts (2015, 39) has distinguished the following model of party/movement relations:

vanguard model – with party control of social movements;

electoral model – with relations only mobilized at elections;

organic model – with deliberately blurred distinction between party and movement.

Paralleling the evolution in mainstream party types, we could indeed single out specific movement parties that opposed and at the same time adapted to dominant party types (see Table 1.1); in what follows, we will discuss this dynamic process focusing in particular on the relations developed between parties and movements.

Table 1.1.    Party/movement relations over time

Dominant party type

Movement party type

Relation party/movements

Party of notables

Ideological cadres party

Party as vanguard

Interclass mass party

Class-based mass party

Organic relation

Electoral, catch-all, personal, cartel party

Left-libertarian (Green) party

Fragmented (dual) relation

Neoliberal populist party

Movement parties against austerity

Dialectic relation

First of all, the party of the notables was contrasted by parties of (left-wing) cadres that, in conditions of limited representation, tended to defend the interests of the excluded, within a conception of the party as a vanguard of the proletariat. Similar to Duverger's cell-based ‘devotee’ parties (1951) and Neumann's (1956) parties of ‘total integration’ are Gunther's and Diamond's proto-hegemonic mass-based parties, which ‘place greater emphasis on discipline, constant active commitment and loyalty on the part of party members for the conduct of political conflict in both electoral and extraparliamentary arenas. Thus, recruitment of members is highly selective, indoctrination is intensive, and acceptance of the ideology and short-term party line is demanded of all members’ (2003, 178–9). This type of party emerged and survived where institutional opportunities for expression of left-wing positions were more limited. In these parties, there is

…a closed structure based on the semi-secret cell (rather than the open branch, which characterizes pluralist class-mass parties). Membership is highly selective, and the party demands strict loyalty and obedience on the part of members. Ideological indoctrination of party members is intense and uncompromising, and the party penetrates into key sectors of society.…Decision-making within the party is highly centralized and authoritarian, even if ‘democratic centralism’ often allows for open debate prior to the taking of an official stand.

(ibid., 180)

While challenging parties initially had a small organizational core, they often expanded into the class-based, mass, ideological party, characterized by a hierarchical relationship with the labour movement within an integrated interaction. Classic research on parties stressed in particular the strong linkages that since the late nineteenth century had grown between socialist parties and trade unions in Europe; linkages developed via ‘liaison committees, leadership and membership overlap and interchange, and a wide arena of common collective activities’ (Allern 2010, 37).

As mentioned, the ideological mass party was an invention of the working class. With different models in different countries, the left-wing parties developed an organic relation between the electoral (party) and the functional (trade union) representation of the working class. Born in Europe in the nineteenth century from within the labour movement, these parties raised claims for political and social rights, contributing to the development of the very conception of democracy (della Porta 2013, ch. 2). They mainly originated outside of parliament, with the aim of bringing the claims of the workers in institutional politics, working as the transmission belts of the workers' interest within a (dominant) class cleavage.

The developments on the left of the then-movement parties were influenced by the reactions by the elites. As Rokkan (1970) noted, in the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom, open elites refrained from repressing the workers, facilitating the growth of large and moderate labour parties. Deeper cleavages in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Spain, with related repression of the emerging workers' movements, pushed towards soziale Ghettopartei with radical ideology and a consolidated but also isolated membership. In general, the higher the obstacles to enter into representative institutions, the less appealing was a strategy of gradual reform (Bartolini 2000, 565–6) and the more divided the left (Marks 1989).

From the organizational point of view, in what Kirchheimer (1966) called the class-mass party, authority was located in the executive committee, which centralized power, even if the party congress was formally to act as the last legitimate authority and the parliamentary wing sometimes aimed at increasing autonomous power. These parties established

bases within their class constituency through groups organized both geographically (the local ‘branch’) and functionally (trade unions). While they seek to proselytize prospective members or voters, indoctrination and the demand for ideological conformity are minimal. While social integration through the activities of party and trade union allies is a significant objective, the party is primarily concerned with winning elections and taking part in the formation of governments. Recruitment of members is quite open.

(Gunther and Diamond 2003, 179)

Class-mass parties (particularly social democratic ones) have been characterized by collateral, ancillary organizations ‘strongly tied to their party via partially or fully overlapping memberships and mutual co-determination rights’ (Poguntke 2002a, 49) and capable of attracting members who would not be willing to join the party.

Class-mass parties have, however, transformed dramatically since their foundation. A crisis of the political parties of the left has been singled out as related to a decline in party linkages. In particular, relations between socialist parties and trade unions became less strict and collective membership rare. As Kitschelt observed, ‘From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, socialist, social democratic, and labor ideologies underwent more change than in any decade since World War II. Parties everywhere began to withdraw from old programmatic priorities, yet the pace, extent, and direction of that strategic transformation have varied across countries…new priorities have begun to complement, if not eclipse, conventional social democratic concerns with social security and income equality’ (1994, 3).