The Kosovo War E-Book

Heiko Karl Ital

• Herausgeber: tredition
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch
• Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021

Seitenzahl: 466

Beschreibung

Kosovo is a political entity where different interests of key European actors meet. There is not one common interest of the European Union or of NATO, but a multitude of interests of its key member states involved in the process of nation-building and since 2008, to come up with a new expression, nation parenting in Kosovo. Realism is used as an analytical tool to investigate the Europeanization of Kosovo, as well as relevant patterns of power and influence with Germany at the center. Its explanatory power is being compared to contending theories dealing with the European Union's development. Given that realism is a suitable tool for analyzing the Europeanization of Kosovo, the author assumes that EU member states, including Germany, are mainly guided by security and power considerations in their approach regarding Kosovo.

Leseprobe

© 2021 Heiko Karl Ital

Verlag und Druck: tredition GmbH, Halenreie 40-44, 22359 Hamburg

ISBN

Paperback:

978-3-347-31332-3

Hardcover:

978-3-347-31333-0

e-Book:

978-3-347-31334-7

Das Werk, einschließlich seiner Teile, ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages und des Autors unzulässig. Dies gilt insbesondere für die elektronische oder sonstige Vervielfältigung, Übersetzung, Verbreitung und öffentliche Zugänglichmachung.

Heiko Karl Ital

The Kosovo War

A Strategy of Transformative Realism

1. Introduction: United Germany, European Security and the Western Balkans

1.1 Why Investigate the Puzzle of European Security?

1.2 Europeanization or Germanization of the Western Balkans?

1.3 Key Aspects of the Puzzle to Be Solved

1.4 Research Questions and Research Hypotheses

1.5 Methodology, Sources and Theoretical Contribution

2. Realism as Theoretical Background

2.1 Critical Literature Review

2.1.1 Critique of Realism: A Useful Tool for Analyzing European Integration?

2.1.2 The Prospects for Preserving Peace in Europe

2.1.3 Absolute vs. Relative Gains, Unit Level vs. Systems Level Approaches

2.1.4 Germany and the New European Order

2.1.5 Restructuring the Western Balkans and the Role of Germany

2.1.6 Kosovo, Serbia and the Hybrid External-internal Security Environment

2.2 The Puzzle of the Europeanization of Kosovo

2.2.1 The Western Balkans Peace Process from a Theoretical Perspective

2.2.2 Grasping the Western Balkans' Distinctiveness

2.2.3 Whose Concept to be Implemented, which Role for Germany?

2.2.4 Which Explanatory Power Does Realism Possess – and which Realism?

2.3 Realism as Theoretical Foundation

2.4 How to Make Use of Realist Thought: Prediction, Explanation or Prescrip9on?

2.4.1 Realism under Attack: At Odds with European Integration?

2.4.2 Realism’s Reply

2.4.3 International Law above National Interests?

2.4.4 Balancing and Bandwagoning: A Matter of Debate

2.4.5 Balancing and Bandwagoning: Flexibility of Classical Realism

2.4.6 Bandwagon Europe: A Serbian Miracle?

2.5 European Integration and the Security Dilemma

2.5.1 The Security Dilemma and the Absolute vs. Relatve Gains Problem

2.5.2 Refinements: Balances of Threats and Interests

2.5.3 Status Quo vs. Revisionist Powers

2.6 Realism and Understanding European Integration

2.6.1 A Realist Analysis of EU Security Policy – What Is It About?

2.6.2 Excluding Realism from European Integraton

2.6.3 Obstacles to Integraton: No ‘Ever Closer Union’

2.6.4 A Realist View: The Two Layers of Integraton

2.6.5 Temporary Arrangements vs. Irreversibility

2.6.6 Germany’s Interests and Policy Approaches in the Western Balkans

2.6.7 Low Likelihood of Common European Defense

2.6.8 Obstacles to a Common Defense Identty

2.6.9 Illusion of Coherence: European Integraton and the Refugee Crisis

2.7 Does “One” Realism Serve Best?

2.7.1 Structural, Classical and Neoclassical Views

2.7.2 Realist Perspectves on NATO’s and EU’s Transformaton

2.7.3 Realist Perspectves on Germany in Europe’s Power Equaton

2.8 Liberalism and Other Contending Theoretical Approaches to European Integration

2.8.1 Unexpected Support: Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and European Security

2.8.2 Ratonalism vs. Social Constructvism as Explanatory Tools

2.9 Realism and Liberalism: Searching for Common Ground

2.10 Institutions of European Security Policy

2.10.1 Origins of the CFSP: Security Policy in Maastricht’s Second and Third Pillars

2.10.2 Missions as Central Purpose of Security-related EU Insttutons

2.10.3 Enlargement and Transformation

2.11 Basic Foreign Policy Orientations of Relevant Actors

2.11.1 German View

2.11.2 United Germany’s Foreign Policy: Looking forward while Coping with the Past

2.11.3 Europeanists, Euroskeptics and European Security: Germany in Search of a Role

2.11.4 Germany’s Reorientation toward Out-of-area Engagements

2.11.5 French View

2.11.6 American View

2.11.7 Political Concepts for Dealing with Reunified Germany after 1990

2.11.8 Germany, the Awkward Great Power? Suspicions and Incertitudes

2.11.9 View on Germany: The Case for Tacit Containment

2.11.10 Germany as Manager of Transformation and Emerging Security Provider

3. Nation-building in Kosovo by Germany and the EU

3.1 Framework of the Kosovo Conflict

3.1.1 The Outbreak of the Kosovo War

3.1.2 The Geopolitical Background

3.1.3 The Transformation of Kosovo and the Role of Germany

3.1.4 From Peace Enforcement to Nation-building

3.1.5 Post-Kosovo: Germany Aspires to a Leading Role

3.2 Background: The Kosovo Question and its Historical Context

3.3 Developments from 1990-2016: Nation-building in Kosovo before and after Independence

3.3.1 Pacifying and Reorganizing Kosovo

3.3.2 Defusing the Kosovo Crisis: Belated Action

3.4 The Roles of Germany, the EU and NATO in Kosovo

3.4.1 Germany’s National Interests regarding Kosovo and the Western Balkans

3.4.2 Transformation of Kosovo: Germany's distinct Contribution

3.4.3 The Multilateral Approaches to Kosovo: Mixed Results

3.5 Kosovo: Progress in Conflict Resolution

3.5.1 Coping with Serb Obstruction Tactics

3.5.2 At a Snail's Pace: Getting Kosovo on Track toward EU Accession

3.6 Developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina

3.6.1 Current Situation

3.6.2 Persistent Obstacles

3.7 From War to Cooperation: Changing Relations with Serbia

3.7.1 Belated Transformation and the Belgrade's Endgame

3.7.2 The Decade after Milošević: Small Steps, no Return

3.8 Germany’s Strategy and specific Contribution to the Mission

4. Conclusion and Outlook

4.1 Answering the Research Questions

4.2 European and German Security Policy – Results and Assessment

4.3 The EU as a Pacifier and the Role of Germany

4.4 Theoretical Contribution: An Outline of Transformative Realism

4.5 Limitations

References

1. Introduction: United Germany, European Security and the Western Balkans

1.1 Why Investigate the Puzzle of European Security?

Does it make sense to investigate a particular puzzle of European security policy, with Germany at its center, on the base of realism? It does, when expectations of an ever-closer union which harmoniously integrates Europe and is destined for perpetual peace are left aside and diverging national interests are taken as analytical ground to explain outcomes of interference, integration, transformation and imbalances. Security policy, to be seen as the whole range of policies involving internal, crossborder and external security, defense and the questions of war and peace, highlights the EC’s (renamed EU in 1993) character as a compromise in motion. States have deepened integration when a common stance emerged; however, security matters have been very sensitive and far from a comprehensive project – despite becoming a multifaceted project with integrated areas of security scattered on the security landscape as such. Disagreements have amplified with the substantial expansions (1995, 2004, 2007, 2013), adding a further 16 states to the Union in 21 years. A greater rift between them has emerged, creating bigger gaps among those prioritizing European unity, those favoring the transatlantic link, and those moderate states reconciling both orientations. In contrast, the flaws in the Union’s strategic equation have remained the same because no additional great powers have joined. France holds the far greatest military power and prestige of the Europhiles; Britain grants itself numerous exemptions in non-security matters and rejects any replacement of NATO’s collective defense core by the EU. Germany stands in between and possesses more potential power but for the time being is hindered by treaty obligations like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and by what are consequences of Nazi Germany’s occupation and extermination policies. Its security and reputation remain tied to its multilateral integration, as to a kind of dependence that has to be communicated as accepted voluntarily.

Diverging national interests in the European Union have prevailed for the last 10 to 15 years, following a dynamic decade in the 1990s where major steps were taken: closer rule-based intergovernmental cooperation, a great number of new common institutions, and strengthening of the EU’s supranational bodies (EP, COM, ECJ). Despite the intense warfare in former Yugoslavia, leading to some humiliation of the EU as a “paper tiger,” it pursued its own development intensely. The groundwork for this is less an outcome of the transformation wave of 1989/90, but of a concept agreed upon at the Luxemburg Intergovernmental Conference in 1985-86. Maastricht, the more visible “great leap forward,” largely fulfilled the Luxemburg agenda, in time with the Single Market starting in 1993. After Maastricht and during preparation for the Single Currency, the EU was not a collective defense actor but was increasingly capable to pool resources in order to economically stabilize other regions of Europe. It is not predictable if the EU will become an independent security provider in Europe who need not rely on the United States that does the bulk of “dirty work,” but it looks not unlikely that it will use its chance to rebuild and integrate the whole Western Balkans region. Then there will not be wars which require the United States' intervention, at least for the foreseeable future.

This work analyzes the security policy of the European Union, focused on the Western Balkans region. It specifically investigates the European Union’s role in pacifying and transforming this region, particularly with regard to Kosovo. The reason for choosing Kosovo as the pivot of this investigation is its decisive role in transforming the Western Balkans. First, Serbia’s transformation is linked to its relation to Kosovo. Its acceptance of territorial loss and perception of having rightly lost at least in the view of all other nations except perhaps Russia and China are decisive factors causing the Balkans to leave behind nationalism combined with imperialism. In all other regions of Europe, many states had digested loss of empire and territory, like Irish independence at the expense of the UK, Sweden’s consecutive losses of Finland and Norway in 1807 and 1912, respectively, Italy’s loss of the Northern Dalmatian coast, Hungary’s reduction to a third of its former size, and so on. Furthermore, all European states lost their colonial empires, tiny remnants notwithstanding. Serbia is the last state to date that tried to shift its borders by force, but in today’s Europe west of Russia, violent border conflicts in Belarus and Ukraine look remote at present.

Additionally, Kosovo is a political entity where different interests of key participants meet. There is not one common interest of the European Union but a multitude of interests of its key member states involved in the process of nation-building and since 2008, to invent a new expression, nation parenting in Kosovo. The United States has gradually reduced its engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo, remaining in the background as a helper of last resort should tensions and threat of renewed armed conflict arise again, but this prospect looks more and more distant. This work asks if the United States is leaving Kosovo and the other Western Balkans states deliberately for nation parenting under German leadership, to some extent together with Italy as a junior partner and former imperial power on the Adriatic Eastern coast. If Serbia is transformed peacefully and integrated into the EU and perhaps even NATO, then it will cease to be Russia’s asset for creating instability in Europe. Developments in Southeastern Europe such as the refugee crisis and organized crime, with connections to higher echelons of politics, show that a substantial reform agenda has to be fulfilled in this region. However, these are tasks that the European Union is capable of achieving, in contrast to waging war, which went beyond the capacities and resolve of European states during the Kosovo crisis. Realism is used as analytical tool to investigate this process, as well as relevant patterns of power and influence with Germany at the center. Its explanatory power is being compared to contending theories dealing with the European Union’s development.

1.2 Europeanization or Germanization of the Western Balkans?

Adoption of EU standards is Europeanization in its true sense, not a strengthening of the EU in economic or military respects. Europeanization as a steady state means that political entities have an internal order conforming to standards of EU member states, as well in their foreign policy (precisely, as they should be, stipulated by the Treaty). Europeanization is both a process and an end, when a candidate country accedes the Union. Accordingly, the backbone of Europeanization is gradually adopting the EU Acquis, made up by its norms set by the Treaty on European Union, and constantly respecting these norms since accession. Ongoing quarrels between East European member states and the Union's institutions, backed by the EU-15 (states having acceded prior to 2004) have shown that Europeanization is not unidirectional; defective behavior becomes rampant and threatens the Union's cohesion from within, while an exit of those states having acceded since 2004 has become a real possibility. The Union's credibility has already been damaged, and current candidate countries could begin to view Europeanization as a tactical effort to obtain membership and then becoming quarrelsome members, too.

However, the term “Germanization” appears misguided. Germany's influence heavily depends on its EU and NATO partners' support. More to the point is Europeanization with a significant German design. The German governments have drawn lessons from their erratic approach in the early 1990s and are keen not to let their contribution appear as a bid for mastery in this sub-region.

There is a sort of Germanization which could better be labeled “Northernization” as to the economic and fiscal norms dominating the EU. Austerity, competition and welfare on a means-tested benefits base are promoted not only by Germany but by the Netherlands, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Finland (and exiting Britain) as well – and by others to some extent. There is unease about this among France in particular and the EU southern flank. As was mentioned with respect to French economic interests and the relative/absolute gains problem, there is competition between the different types of welfare states inside the Union. This competition extends to membership-hopefuls because the economic order and welfare system they bring into the Union change the respective models' influence. So far, the Northern, Anglo-Saxon or Third Way model, representing all versions of Neo-Liberalism, has carried the day. All new members acceding since 2004 adhere to this model that puts free markets first and welfare second, without discarding the latter altogether. Germany's shift in 2004 from non-means-tested benefits to a workfare model expressively designed to “make it uncomfortable not to seek employment” certainly corroborated the liberalist attitude.

For the time being, the German question covers a far broader range of issues than the task of transforming the last troublesome region of Europe outside Russia's reach, to be added cautiously from a realist viewpoint. This “German question” is rooted in Europe's history as such, with the Western Balkans as only one important aspect. It has been one of the driving forces of European history for centuries – suffice it to mention here The Holy Roman Empire, the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War and Germany's transformation during the era of nationalism in 19th century Europe. Regardless of the fact that the term “German question” has even been severely tarnished and become associated with revisionism, neo-imperialism, or worse, this question exists, alongside a Russian question. A Hungarian question and a Belgian one exists as well, as well as a Serbian and a Croatian question. These national questions always exist when nations do not comprise all the people clinging to it because their territories were stripped of their nation-state by forces outside of the latter's control. Even if Germany is relieved from this problem that plagued it during the short-lived Weimar Republic, its utter denial would be unhistorical, albeit understandable, given that engaging in public discussion of this issue is hazardous. The German question will extend into the future as long as the system of nation-states in Europe prevails and certainly even after a group of European states, including Germany, has set up a federation, super-state and the like.

Thus, ascribing the Western Balkans a capacity for solving the German question is like making a lorry out of a passenger car. Therefore, a more modest approach seems smarter; what is within reach is a Europeanization of the Western Balkans and Kosovo in particular. This could make an important contribution to “pacifying” Germany, a great power that is occupied with tasks yielding both absolute and relative gains. The Europeanization of the Western Balkans provides Germany, alongside with Austria and to a lesser extent Italy, with important incentives to invest more than the other EU-15 states. Germany will gain more influence, but all EU member states gain from slowly pacifying and transforming the Western Balkans states because war will not return to this region for decades to come.

1.3 Key Aspects of the Puzzle to Be Solved

Kosovo is a political entity where different interests of key European actors meet. There is not one common interest of the European Union or of NATO, but a multitude of interests of its key member states involved in the process of nation-building and since 2008, to come up with a new expression, nation parenting in Kosovo. The United States has gradually reduced its engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo, remaining in the background as a helper of last resort should tensions and threat of renewed armed conflict arise again. However, this prospect appears more and more distant. This work asks if the United States is leaving Kosovo and the other Western Balkans states deliberately for nation parenting under German leadership, to some extent together with Italy as a junior partner and former imperial power on the Adriatic Eastern coast. If Serbia is transformed peacefully and integrated into the EU and perhaps even NATO, then it will cease to be Russia’s asset for creating instability in Europe. Developments in Southeastern Europe such as the refugee crisis and organized crime, with connections to higher echelons of politics, show that a substantial reform agenda has yet to be implemented in this region. Are these tasks that the European Union is capable of achieving alone contrary to waging war? It is argued that they exceed the EU’s capacities and demand both steady NATO involvement and a stronger role for principal outside actors in the Western Balkans. Realism is used as an analytical tool to investigate this process, as well as relevant patterns of power and influence with Germany at the center. Its explanatory power is being compared to contending theories dealing with the European Union’s development. Against this background, the problem setting can be delineated by the following six statements:

1) The European Union has taken charge of Kosovo’s stabilization and nation-building since 2005 when American troops pulled out and the EULEX mission began. Therefore, European security policy is a major contribution to nationbuilding and stabilization in Kosovo.

2) The European Union is contributing substantially to transformation in Kosovo and the Western Balkans in general, albeit not without running the risk of backlash.

3) Germany plays an important role in this context. Its specific history in general and toward the Western Balkans region bear upon this role. However, Germany has managed to emerge as a relevant actor who gives in to decisive impulses to Europeanization of the Western Balkans and Kosovo in particular.

4) Germany wishes to play a leading role in stabilizing Kosovo and the surrounding countries. However, it promotes a way of German-style Europeanizing, meaning a German, and to some extent a German-Austrian sphere of influence with nonviolent means.

5) Germany does have a strategic concept with good chances for success, but also with perils involved. This concept is directed at EU enlargement, entailing adoption of the written und – hopefully – unwritten rules of governance by the Western Balkans states. This is what Europeanization is about.

6) Germany is not only a troubleshooter but also a troublemaker. It has shown a penchant for solitary action several times in the last 25 years, the most recent being its unilateralism during the refugee crisis of 2015. Reunited Germany proves to be a mediocre crisis manager when it gets heavily involved in a crisis itself.

European Security Policy, precisely the joint Security Policy of the European Union and a number of partners of different degrees, was chosen because it is an emerging policy area of high relevance from a realist viewpoint that both deepens and widens the Union’s agency – as the Union gains experience and acts in ever-changing environments. European security policy makes analyzing the EU as a whole particularly accessible from a Realist viewpoint. It helps avoid dealing with non-political matters that, however, have become issues of integration (particularly common legislation). Comprehensive transformation is regarded as the European Union’s general strategy in both enlarging and making the continent more secure. It includes pacifying, stabilizing, rebuilding, transforming and integrating.

Given that realism is an appropriate tool for analyzing European security policy, the author assumes that EU member states including Germany are mainly guided by security and power considerations in their approach toward the Western Balkans. Among European key actors, there is competition for influence in this region, with Germany having the edge, especially since the United States has pulled out, while France and Great Britain remain distracted by different issues. Governments of EU member states, Germany in particular (plus Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Greece; outside EU: Turkey) is aware that providing security may increasingly fall on them should the United States shift strategic priorities away from Europe. Other Central and Eastern European states may face an aggressive Russia in a Post-NATO constellation as well, but their preparedness for common defense looks limited. This rationale is behind the comprehensive efforts to ‘Europeanize’ the Western Balkans. This is worth the pain; more precisely, the costs.

It is doubtful that the EU as a whole has a strategy, as different key member states have different interests regarding the Western Balkans’ incorporation. Who is leading this process, what kind of leadership does it have, and how quality is it? Also, is the EU seeking emancipation from the United States and selfreassurance?1 Furthermore, can the European Union act as a comprehensive agent of transformation equaling the United States in Western Europe after the Second World War?2

Regarding these questions, the puzzle to be solved begins with the impressive success achieved so far. The Western Balkans region has been pacified, stabilized, and institutionally transformed (including Serbia’s change of orientation). Integration of the whole region toward the EU is underway and has been spearheaded by Croatia. Is this an achievement of the EU, an outcome of favorable circumstances, a net gain for the EU, NATO, and particular EU and NATO member states? Is it an achievement at all, instead of a Pyrrhic victory contributing to the EU’s demise? The completed puzzle consists of the relevant actors in this particular problem setting. These are nation states; the EU is only with its central institutions acting purposefully, not as a default actor for everything done under the EU’s flag. The completed puzzle shows which changes in the distribution of power and security will probably result from the realignment of the Western Balkans under EU’s and particularly Germany’s leadership. Germany, alongside with Austria, may be laying the foundation for a future hegemony in Southeastern Europe, without being aware of the results of their actions today.

1.4 Research Questions and Research Hypotheses

In order to analyze Germany's role in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans, it is necessary to focus on a specific case. The Kosovo War is such a case that is marked by a policy shift from respecting the sovereignty of a nation state to protecting human rights, precisely to prevent genocide through mass murder, mass expulsion, and comparable crimes against humanity. This was achieved by military intervention and subsequent stabilization in the shape of robust peacekeeping plus the rebuilding of civil-administrative institutions. Therefore, Kosovo is a test case for Germany's ability as well as the EU's as a whole. Kosovo embodies the promise given toward an emergent nation whose protectors sincerely desire its existence and are prepared to support its transformation. Can the EU and Germany establish and maintain a role as meaningful security providers? Can security be provided amidst a plethora of internal differences and several factions competing with each other? To investigate this unique problem setting a case study on Kosovo between 1990 and 2016 seems most suitable.

The Western Balkans region has been pacified, stabilized, and institutionally transformed, including Serbia’s change of orientation. Integration of Western Balkans states is underway. The nation states concerned with this development and exercising influence are the most relevant actors in Europeanizing the Western Balkans. This fact often becomes blurred because the "EU" designation is used in a random fashion for everything done under the EU's flag. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the EU's member states on the one hand and its intergovernmental and supranational institutions on the other.

Realism is an appropriate tool for analyzing Germany’s role in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans because it assumes that Germany and the EU - to be precise, other EU member states - conduct this process as nations with distinct interests. There is neither an automatism of integration and consolidation; nor is there a unitary actor named "The European Union." The European Union does have bodies that are entitled to speak for it, first and foremost the European Council (a semiannual reunion of heads of state and government), the Presidency of the Council and, at least in policy areas fully transferred to the Union level, the European Commission. The European Parliament's role in this respect is contested, as the European Court of Justice exerts great leverage but, like the Parliament, cannot initiate legislation or decisions by itself. In sum, it is obvious that national governments hold sway, particularly in security matters. Against this background, this work sets out to answer the following research questions:

1) Why did Germany acquire a leading role in the Europeanization of the Western Balkans including Kosovo?

- Why did the other EU member states and the United States allow Germany to take a preponderant position given widespread suspicion about Germany's designs for a renewed great power status?

- Why did the other European NATO and EU member states acquiesce in Germany's increasingly preponderant role in guiding Kosovo toward a stable state of independence?

- Why did the Europeanization of the Western Balkans and Kosovo in particular happen?

- Why was it not Americanization, Russianization, or even Germanization?

- How did the Europeanization in Kosovo contribute to the evolvement of a European security policy?

2) How did Germany emerge as a relevant actor accelerating developments toward Europeanization of the Western Balkans and especially Kosovo?

- Why did Germany play a critical role in this context, given its specific history in general and the Western Balkans region in particular?

- Could Germany again play a role in a (yet to come) "concert of powers" in Europe?

- Why has Germany become increasingly capable to assume stewardship of Kosovo's development toward independence and stabilization, given that (united) Germany's foreign policy eschewed the role of pacifier in war-torn areas, particularly regarding areas occupied by German armed forces during World War II?

3) Can the EU, with Germany performing a leading role, meaningfully fill the power gap in the Western Balkans left by the superpowers?

- Why did Russia retreat from the Western Balkans, particularly abandoning Serbia as a tool for hampering European integration? Why did the United States reduce its engagement in the region to observing and fence-sitting? Is there a clear perspective of security provision, or is the EU just capitalizing on the fact that all parties to the conflict are exhausted at the moment (a “moment” seen through a historian’s lens can last for decades)? Would Brussels call for U.S. Intervention forces if warfare were to erupt anew?

- Also, does adding the Western Balkans to the EU not make it even harder to forge a common strategic rationale? Given the current bickering between EU member states over how to manage increased migration pressure, is there not another source of discord in the making with the Western Balkans acceding? Does the EU really have sufficient coherence to absorb a sub region where states are not saturated, and are perhaps revisionist or instable constructions from the outset? (There are a multitude of questions regarding the nations in this region, smaller in size than the German question, but much more explosive in the short and medium term).

Hypotheses

Based on the above research questions are the following hypotheses:

1) A bundle of economic incentives and Russia's eastward reorientation helped considerably to open the whole of the Western Balkans for the EU's influence with Germany acting assertively.

2) Conceding Germany a leading role in integrating and Europeanizing the Western Balkans means keeping Germany busy, useful and calculable. This is a self-interested approach fitting into a broadened realist framework.

3) Money is thicker than blood. In other words, a brighter economic outlook diverts the Serbs from their traditional pro-Russian attitudes and pushes them toward Europeanization and even toward NATO.

1.5 Methodology, Sources and Theoretical Contribution

This work pursues two methods of research. It analyzes documents and relies on secondary literature. “Documents” pertains to statements, speeches, reports and background information provided by official bodies, including both states and multinational organizations. Documents are, as mentioned, often guided by specific interests and thus are not intended to give unbiased information or to criticize the actors issuing these documents. Thus, the challenge is to obtain informative content while at the same time filtering the documents.

Secondary literature concerning the Western Balkans is abundant, but there are large differences in quality and scope. Comprehensive studies are less numerous and focus either on the region as a whole or on one particular country. While the wars of the 1990s and efforts to pacify this region are covered widely by monographs and edited volumes, policies of rebuilding and integrating the Western Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic framework are mainly dealt with in research papers and journal articles. What is missing at present, are analyses focusing on the Western Balkans as an area for outside powers’ involvement and their interests for shaping this region. This applies to Kosovo as a pivotal part of this region as well. So far, the focus has been on the actions of NATO and the EU as collective actors and less on individual states. Thus, there is an incomplete puzzle where some parts are necessarily missing. Germany has been dealt with only superficially, meaning that its specific interests and its distinct situation as foreign policy actor have not been analyzed in detail. In this respect, this work intends to fill a gap in the literature.

The theoretical contribution this work intends to make is a refinement of realism, called transformative realism. It is elaborated in greater detail in section 4.4. “Transformative” means a realist approach that is more capable to elucidate subtle competitions for influence by states assisting the transformation of other states or regions. Realism, despite being concerned with relative gains and balances of power, often overlooks such competition. This is because it is focused on open competition among states where toolboxes of power politics are used, or at least, explicit language between the competitors is used, which disturbs relations among allies. It is important to uncover such competitions because their outcomes have a substantial impact on balances of power and future great power conflicts. While realism correctly assumes that relative gains are decisive in the long run, its predictive power can be increased by the approach developed here.

1 There may be a mutatis-mutandis-reasoning, like: 'We are showing that we can transform the Western Balkans, so we are proving our capability to ourselves, which will strengthen centripetal forces inside ‘our’ European Union.'

2 The U.S. initiated rebuilding of devastated Western Europe and Greece in roughly the five steps mentioned. Not every step applied to every country, but on the whole it led to a community of collective defense and security. The whole range of steps applied mainly to West Germany, as (part of) the former enemy state, while stabilizing, rebuilding and integrating to European continental states becoming NATO members in 1949 and 1952 (Greece), whereas all but the last step was applied to Austria.

2. Realism as Theoretical Background

2.1 Critical Literature Review

2.1.1 Critique of Realism: A Useful Tool for Analyzing European Integration?

Collard-Wexler (2006) rules out neorealism as a tool for analysis of European integration. In his view, neorealism lacks a theory of integration. Neorealism would constantly predict that states wish to avoid multilateral entanglements, yet their behavior on the ground points in the other direction. Collard-Wexler (2006) claims that European Union member states were especially successful in refuting neorealism, or to sum up his claims: The EU's development is the most powerful evidence against neorealism's core positions on gains and integration.

Legro and Moravcsik (1999) and Collard-Wexler (2006) both take issue with neorealism regarding what are dismissed as auxiliary theories; the former see neoclassical realism not as an attempt for refinement but as diluting a grossly imperfect yet established grand theory of international politics. The latter sees Walt's balance-of-threat theory as a failed approach to circumvent the (for neorealists) intractable problem of integration.

Vazquez (1997) makes a frontal attack on neorealism, claiming that it would fail the Lakatosian test, thus being a degenerative and not a progressive theory. Denying that neorealism is falsifiable, Vazquez even denies realism's role as a meaningful theory at all, purporting that a non-falsifiable theory is a tautology.

Walt (1997) rejects this critique and points to the highly contested nature of Lakatos's classification for theories. Furthermore, Vazquez (1997) had singled out only one trait of realism, Kenneth Waltz's (1979) structural theory, in order to make the case for realism's alleged ineptness. This argument could only be mistaken because of realism's variety and its rich tradition, so Vazquez overlooked the biggest part of realists’ writings since antiquity. As to Waltz's structural theory, Walt (1997) concedes that it is not suitable for explaining phenomena taking place at the unit level or for multilateral action not necessarily explainable in terms of structure. Thus, Waltz's structural realism aims at predictions in international politics on a macro scale, i.e. the world political structure as such or regional power constellations.

Collard-Wexler (2006) claims that neorealism is inescapably at odds with regional integration in the EU because the underlying concepts and interests are beyond the scope of its comprehension. Contrary to neorealist assumptions, EU member states broadened and deepened integration (Collard-Wexler, 2006). This is at odds with the neorealist core assumptions of relative gains and selfhelp, as its member states had preferred absolute gains to relative ones for a long time. They had reduced their independence in favor of interdependence. The security dilemma and the related struggle for larger net gains would impede or at least severely limit cooperation between states. This is a standard argument of realist thought (Grieco, 1988). However, realism is wrongly accused of assuming this problem of cooperation for every interstate relationship. It applies primarily to relations between competitors who have antagonistic interests and play zero-sum games that at least cover part of their relations. It is irrelevant for relations where power considerations are largely absent (e.g. the relations between Germany and Bolivia), but competition for net gains cannot be ruled out for the relations between the European Union or its member states and especially Russia. Also, a specific aspect of this competition and of the EU's foreign policy is being illustrated; it grows and gains influence by nonmilitary means but acquires more hard power in this way. In the EU's case, there is an aggressive great power to counterbalance, which is Russia, and there are conflicts to be pacified on the continent, like the ongoing tensions in Kosovo and Bosnia. Additionally, there are pressing problems transcending boundaries between internal and external security like organized crime and illegal migration. To sum up, the member states of the European Union have shared security interests in many respects.

Realist accounts of European integration or other processes of alignment challenging the paradigm of priority for relative gains over absolute ones are scarce. A rare example is Morgenthau's (1991) brief remark that states (at the time of writing) were not fixed entities for the foreseeable future but could merge with other states if they concluded that the power of the nation could be strengthened in this way. Morgenthau (1991) points to numerous examples from the past without discussing them in detail. Furthermore, Morgenthau (1991) claims in his "six principles" that the states as the core element of international politics (IP) may give way to different entities or IP could even be transformed into something quite different, e.g. a world state with a single government. As evidence of this, Morgenthau (1991) points to royal marriages and peaceful creations of empires by consent of the respective rulers.

Morgenthau (1991) argued that predictions of developments in international politics are extremely difficult, even over narrow time spans of just a few years. This argument reappears in realism's replies to its purported failure to account for European integration. Walt (1987) regards European integration as a process mainly driven by security concerns, quite unlike Moravcsik (1993; 1998) who sees economic interests as the main signpost of integration-minded politicians in the early stages of the Cold War. Moravcsik (1998) sees security sufficiently provided by NATO, so there is little need for the EC/EU to fulfill a similar task in his view. Walt (1997) views European integration through the lens of alliance formation, pointing to the visions that dominated at the origin: The West European states, precisely the six founding member states, aimed at a common security to prevent future wars between them. From Walt's viewpoint, this vision has been the backbone of European integration since the 1950's, irrespective of the EC's complex integration in other areas such as defense, which came back in with the Treaty of Maastricht.

Collard-Wexler (2006) attacks the neorealist view of balancing and bandwagoning behavior. Contrary to neorealist assumptions, as he asserts, East and South-East European states behave in the opposite way as expected; instead of seeking alignment with Russia as the (much) weaker of two militarily dominant powers, nearly all of them prioritized aligning with the United States by becoming a member of NATO. Standard neorealist theory, as Collard-Wexler (2006) argues, expects weaker states to balance by joining the weaker of two opposing alliances. In this way, they contribute to the balance of power in their regional constellation. The weaker states, in turn, should expect to increase their security. However, in actuality, all states with socialist singleparty rule up to 1989-91 quickly chose the Western path, except Serbia-Montenegro (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's remainder).

Collard-Wexler (2006) points to an obvious weakness that precisely concerns the structural theory conceptualized by Waltz (1979). Waltz (1979) insisted on disregarding the internal composition of states in order to arrive at meaningful analyses of problems of international politics. This position rests on the realist core assumption that rulers of preponderant states aim at increasing their power – which means the power of their state and thereby also their own personal power – regardless of ideology. Walt (1987) had countered this critique of Waltz (1979) already in the 1980s by developing a theory of the “balance of threat” (BOT). Walt (1987) argues that weaker states do bandwagon with a stronger great power or alliance if the weaker side is threatening them, while there is no need to fear exploitation by the stronger side. This can be seen as a convincing refinement of a theory treating states as black boxes or snooker balls. On the other hand, Collard-Wexler's (2006) argument that it remains inept repair work is not undone because Walt (1987) returns to the unit level in order to correct a weakness of a theory that explicitly demands not to leave the system level. In short, Walt's BOT theory is reductionist, objectively to be regarded as unwanted help by structuralism.

Adherents of structural realism have not responded to the charge of having given the newly-transformed democracies in Europe the wrong advice, which was, implicitly at least, to align (again) with Moscow in order to counter a dominant NATO with the 'surviving' superpower in its ranks. Accordingly, Collard-Wexler (2006), Legro and Moravcsik (1999), and Vazquez (1997) have an easy target on structural realism.

Walt (1985) had answered similar criticism on theoretical grounds when the superpower conflict was not expected to be close to its termination. Walt argued that a lesser power, if given a free choice of an alliance, could opt for balancing and bandwagoning at the same time. He expected that this depended on the immediate environment of this lesser power. According to Walt (1985), the lesser power would refrain from allying with the weaker great power when situated in its environment and when the weaker great power is more likely to be aggressive. Remoteness and absence of imperial designs on the side of the stronger great power would make an alliance with the stronger one more likely.

This qualification remains a weak defense against the critique that structuralism was watered down by returning to the unit level, and therefore would necessitate becoming inconsistent in order to uphold its key assumptions. Classical realism shows more flexibility on the issue of balancing and bandwagoning. As Rynning (2005) points out, the structuralist prediction only constitutes one of the possible outcomes. Weaker powers could favor aligning with the strongest state or alliance for several reasons, mainly appeasement, survival (to escape annexation), jackal behavior (joining the predators), or joining a group of states on the ascendancy. Rynning (2005) assumes that the latter option appears most convincing as to the East European states' motives after the Cold War. They want to ride on a "wave of the future" (Rynning, 2005, p. 22) to achieve an increased security from a NATO membership. In terms of economic progress, the EU would put the new member states into positions of being net receivers of EU funds at least for the foreseeable future.

Waltz (1979; 2000) did not deal with such issues in detail but expected to adjust the structure of international politics to the distribution of power in the medium and long term. Therefore, it made no difference if for limited time spans the disequilibrium of power had manifested itself. Waltz (1993) expected alliances, explicitly NATO, to wither away over time, given that the confrontation that gave rise to them was gone. Changes on the unit level are expected as consequences of changes at the system level.

2.1.2 The Prospects for Preserving Peace in Europe

Mearsheimer (2003; 2014b) distinguishes between offensive and defensive realism and thereby, in the case of the Western Balkans, contributed to critiques of realism as unable to conceive of this unique process of integration, as well as of European integration since the 1950s as a whole. "Offensive" and "defensive" views diverge about what states are aiming at and are forced to achieve in an anarchic environment where the principle of self-help applies (Mearsheimer, 2014b); should states seek expansion and exploit opportunities to increase power, or should they primarily seek security, as by alliances and treaties of nonaggression? Mearsheimer (2014b) argues that states, especially the few predominant ones, do not have much choice but to increase their power. If they do not, they will be at risk because competing states will try to fill the gaps, and the danger of renewed warfare increases.

For the European Union as well as for NATO, Mearsheimer's (2003) advice seems partially useful in the context of the Western Balkans; there is a clear rationale behind expanding into Eastern Europe and shifting the border of influence eastward. However, Russia could have transformed into a democratic state as Poland or Latvia did, just with a much greater size and military strength. For reasons beyond the scope of this analysis, this did not materialize, as Russia transformed into an autocracy with deficient rule of law and elements of a weak electoral democracy as in 19th-century constitutional monarchies. Consequently, there is still a great power conflict in Europe (Mearsheimer, 2001; 2014b).

The logic of offensive realism, however, is far too unspecific and even mistaken to some extent. East European countries do not need to be occupied or drawn into the Western camp by other forms of coercion. On the contrary, they are queuing up for accession. Mearsheimer's offensive realism, highly influential as to interventions of United States forces during the 2000s, does not take peaceful integration into account (Mearsheimer, 2001; 2014b). It is also not sufficiently fine-tuned to account for middle powers such as Germany, which set out to play the role of peacemaker and coordinator in the Western Balkans. Germany is relying on rather than contradicting the United States’ dominant position in European security.

Realism would be ill equipped to explain increased cooperation between countries where antagonism had prevailed before (Grieco, 1988). Given that they are primarily aiming at net gains (Grieco, 1988), they must be aware, first of all, of their opponent's benefits from cooperating, especially through trade of goods, access to raw materials, or communications and traffic. According to Snidal (1991), cooperation is most likely when a group of states is both hierarchically organized and is confronted with an external threat. Glaser (1994) is more optimistic about cooperation under the security dilemma, assuming that opponents can discern numerous areas for cooperation, where none of the two sides would be severely disadvantaged.

2.1.3 Absolute vs. Relative Gains, Unit Level vs. Systems Level Approaches

Structural realism sees the distribution of military capabilities as the decisive force creating a balance of power and a polar structure in international politics (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985). This is more rigid than classical realism's concept of a balance of interests, which is intended not to replace the balance of power but to give it a refined meaning, adapted to circumstances of time, space and power (understood as a multi-dimensional setting). A working balance of interest can be seen in connection with NATO's eastward expansion; Russia and the United States agreed by the mid-1990s that expansion would stop at a line reached in 2004, so Ukraine, Belarus and the Caucasus region (including West-leaning Georgia) would not be considered for accession.

Rynning (2005) rejects that classical realism is far from inept for understanding European integration and the institution building that takes place in this framework. According to Rynning (2005), this charge was provoked by classical realism itself; Morgenthau (1991) had conceived of international politics as a struggle for power. This implied rationality and a clear signpost for the national interest – its concomitant is the claim for universal applicability. However, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had created the impression, as Rynning (2005) points out, of the Soviet Union being driven by ideology toward self-endangering brinkmanship. Therefore, foreign policy studies were demanded, as begun by Allison (1971). Expressed in terms of theory, those transcending the unit level are of little explanatory or predictive value. Liberalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and neoclassical realism follow this argument.

Niebuhr's (1944) systemic definition of international politics (without using "systemic"), as the struggle between morally superior and morally inferior forces, was more closely aligned with foreign policy studies at the heyday of the Cold War. However, it analyzed world politics from a Christian viewpoint and lacks the rigor of foreign policy studies that systematically and increasingly by quantitative methods analyze the behavior of individual states.

Waltz (1979) reacted to realism relegation to the unit level with a rigorous systemic theory that rejected every form of unit level approach, no matter how different states obviously were as to their political systems. Structuralism revived the formerly established assumption (Morgenthau, 1947; 1991; 1963) that the world's powerful states would compete for supremacy irrespective of their internal composition. Statecraft would be directed at maximizing power and influence, regardless of what had been claimed by a state's leader in terms of what was the right ideology to follow. For Morgenthau (1963), Waltz (1979), and the other proponents of systemic approaches, domestic and foreign policies are dichotomous, i.e. do not influence one another. These positions are part of an ongoing disagreement about the appropriate level of analysis.

Rieker (2004) claimed that the EU lacked a credible identity as a foreign policy actor. Seven years later, Rieker (2011) argued that there existed competing views about the EU's actor identity that were hard to reconcile, but both sides of the argument were flawed because they relied on quantitative analyses. Thus, the quality of an actor could not be grasped accurately by this method.

Moravcsik and Legro (1999), who follow a liberal and therefore a unit level-based approach to study foreign policy and European integration, reject approaches undertaken by neoclassical realists since the 1990s to reconcile both levels of analysis. For Moravcsik and Legro (1999), extending realist's analysis back into domestic politics was a futile attempt to reconcile what is fundamentally different. However, Moravcsik (1993; 1998) shares classical realism's skepticism regarding the discretionary power of multilateral institutions and organizations. For Moravcsik, it is still the member states' governments that make the fundamental decisions in the EU. The EU's intergovernmental institutions are, following Moravcsik and Legro (1999), primarily an arena for power struggles, which is overlooked because it was assumed the member states' temporary conformity would last indefinitely. In this respect, the approach of liberal intergovernmentalism unintentionally upholds the classical realist position regarding institutions. Great Britain's determination to leave the EU by 2019 following the referendum held in 2016 can be seen as supporting evidence for this position.

Waltz (1979) defends his rejection of unit level analysis by pointing to the sameness of state behavior or foreign policy action. Buzan (1993) shares this view and argues that states, more specifically their leaders, consultants, and observers, consider the multitude of states under the criterion of successful organizational behavior. They see what leads to gains in a world of competing states and therefore prefer to imitate the strategies visible to decisions primarily rooted in the ideology of their political background.

2.1.4 Germany and the New European Order

With the United States reaching the “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer, 1991, p. 24), inward-looking Germany could have been expected to arouse little interest for some years to come. On the contrary, however, reunited Germany found itself meticulously scrutinized by its European neighbors. Threat perceptions in this respect relied largely on doubts that NATO and the EU as meaningful organizations hedging Germany's presumed expansionist or revisionist designs might disappear. As Grieco and Baldwin (1993) point out, multilateral organizations wither away when key member states do not see the necessity to cooperate anymore, or when they value cooperation less than other interests.

Should the EU develop into a federation, neorealism, according to Collard-Wexler (2006), would be severely refuted. Neorealism, as Collard-Wexler (2006) views it, declares a transformation of states into a new entity impossible. As mentioned, classical realism is more flexible on this point, albeit not in a systemic way.

Developments in the Western Balkans, beginning with the resurgence of nationalism inside the multinational state Yugoslavia, occupied the international stage only when Germany was formally reunited. Germany's brusque step to extend recognition to the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia looked highly suspicious from its neighbors' point of view, but as Friedrich (2000) elaborates, Germany has a long tradition of reorganizing the Balkan region in concert with other European great powers. However, the Germany of 1991, as Friedrich (2000) points out, was far from able to let this diplomatic step follow anything that could be expected of a viable and functioning great power.

As Friedrich (2000) recapitulates, Germany stood largely apart from efforts to pacify the war-torn former Yugoslavia, including the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. When three years later the Kosovo crisis approached its boiling point, Germany was required to reach domestic consensus on the upcoming intervention in the midst of its first complete change of government since 1949.

The question of European (EU) law above (member states') national interests inside the EU framework has its equivalent in humanitarian and security matters, be it Europe (here: The Western Balkans) or another world region. Friedrich (2000, p. 1) describes this nexus by defining the EU as a “juridical region" dominating the continent, while NATO had turned to put the international law before immediate security interests. According to Friedrich (2000), both the EU and NATO had set in motion a different kind of foreign policy that focused international politics on implementing international law.

The liberal-institutionalist position rejects a realist core assumption, precisely that states put their national interest first and use international law and interstate institutions in ways conforming to their national interest. An example was China's abstention from the U.N. Security Council vote on Iraq in early 1991, intensely discussed by Kissinger (2010). This vote authorized the use of military force to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. China, on this issue, did not adhere to its otherwise uncompromising position on national sovereignty, but this did not reflect a thorough change of position (Kissinger, 2010). Beijing was convinced that keeping fruitful relations with the United States was more important than holding up the principle of noninterference even in this case where Iraq was clearly an aggressor. Abstention instead of veto could be traded against re-acceptance into the community of world powers, two years after the massacre of several thousands of protesters had isolated China, and it was grossly at odds with the political sea-changes beginning only a few months later.

Mearsheimer (1990; 2014b) assumes that Europe will, sooner or later, plunge into conflicts between its major powers, with Germany being at the center of these conflicts because it will almost certainly seek to increase its power. Mearsheimer (2014b) is highly skeptical toward Germany in general and expects it to take a revisionist stance. He made his unspecific forecast of 1990 more specific in 2003 (as in Mearsheimer, 2014b, the 2nd edition of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics"), assuming that the United States would disengage from Europe around 2020. Germany, therefore, occupies a role as a kind of warmonger in the making. Mearsheimer's bold assumption is more mildly reflected in writings by other realists (Snidal, 1991; Waltz, 1993; 2000) who expect Europe to return to conflict-prone situations where there will not be a transatlantic superpower to reign in warring European states.

If Hoffmann's (1966, pp. 866-867) metaphor of every state carrying a “national baggage,” voiced 50 years ago, is still true relative to the setting of nation states in Europe, then it can be expected that Germany will be driven to regain its former preponderant position. Hoffmann takes a position that is rooted in classical realism. This position was derived from history, at the time of writing, a century after "Greater Prussia" or Germany established itself as the strongest power on the European continent.

Hoffmann's metaphor can be interpreted in either way from today's viewpoint in that Germany might have changed its "baggage," and may have abandoned any designs to create an empire; or it might still be striving for hegemony. While Mearsheimer (2014b) sees Germany as imperialist whenever circumstances allow for it, Glaser (1994), Pond (2006), and Asmus (2003), to cite just a few, see Germany as thoroughly transformed. They claim that its policy on foreign affairs has completely changed and new generations of leaders have risen up. Consequently, Germany plays a constructive role as a promoter of integration in both NATO and the EU.

While the two groups of realist scholars express divergent views about the nature and the role of contemporary Germany, the structuralist position (Waltz, 2000) asks what will become of Germany. This position appears deterministic in the way that Germany's capacity to take its destiny into its own hands was small or respectively non-existent. If circumstances change for the worse, especially with a Germany that perceives itself threatened by other great powers, then its behavior will change regardless of what the German leadership and the elite were convinced of before the threats emerged. NATO, as Waltz expected (1993), might still exist as an organization, but it is likely to become meaningless at some point in time because it will no longer be backed by strong national interests of its decisive members. Changes in circumstances might also stem from the European Union's defects as well as from unwanted developments. According to Rosato (2011), the Union is stuck and any further deepening in terms of its strengthening or even communitarization is not to be expected.

2.1.5 Restructuring the Western Balkans and the Role of Germany

The democratization of the Western Balkans region and its integration into the European Union is regarded by EU member states as a viable tool for securing peace in this center of interethnic and inter-religious struggles. Securing peace in this region is also seen as key to preserving peace in Europe as a whole. Short of military aggression by a resurgent Russia, it is the Western Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia) where conflicts are likely to arise and challenge the European Union, which has proven unfit so far to conduct peace enforcement operations even on their own continent (Less, 06-06-2016).