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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2021
A spirit is haunting contemporary thought - the spirit of Hegel. All the powers of academia have entered into a holy alliance to exorcize this spirit: Vitalists and Eschatologists, Transcendental Pragmatists and Speculative Realists, Historical Materialists and even 'liberal Hegelians'. Which of these groups has not been denounced as metaphysically Hegelian by its opponents? And which has not hurled back the branding reproach of Hegelian metaphysics in its turn? Progressives, liberals and reactionaries alike receive this condemnation. In light of this situation, it is high time that true Hegelians should openly admit their allegiance and, without obfuscation, express the importance and validity of Hegelianism to the contemporary intellectual scene. To this end, a small group of Hegelians of different nationalities have assembled to sketch the following book - a book which addresses a number of pressing issues that a contemporary reading of Hegel allows a new perspective on: our relation to the future, our relation to nature and our relation to the absolute.
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CONTENTS
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Notes on the text
Introduction
Notes
1 Hegel: The Spirit of Distrust
Hegel in a Topsy-Turvy World
Reconciliation in Hegel
“Forgiving Recollection”: Yes, but …
From Concrete Universality to Subject
How does “Stubborn Immediacy” Arise?
The Alethic versus the Deontic
What is Absolute in Absolute Knowing
“Ungeschehenmachen”
The Parallax of Truth
Method and Content
Notes
2 Hegel on the Rocks: Remarks on the Concept of Nature
New Geriatrics, or: Newly Born Old
Nature’s Compulsion to Return
Philosophy Begins. The (Eight) Dialectics of Nature
Notes
3 The Future of the Absolute
Hegel Today
Marx’s Critique of Religion
Theory of the State
Dialectic and Politics in Hegel
Notes
Index
End User License Agreement
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Notes on the text
Introduction
Begin Reading
Index
End User License Agreement
Pages
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Reading Hegel
Slavoj Žižek, Frank Ruda, and Agon Hamza
polity
Copyright © Slavoj Žižek, Frank Ruda, and Agon Hamza 2022
The right of Slavoj Žižek, Frank Ruda, and Agon Hamza to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2022 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press101 Station LandingSuite 300Medford, MA 02155, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4591-9
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021939021
The publisher has used its best endeavors to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Notes on the text
The first chapter, Hegel: The Spirit of Distrust, was written by Slavoj Žižek; the second chapter, Hegel on the Rocks: Remarks on the Concept of Nature, by Frank Ruda; and the third, The Future of the Absolute, by Agon Hamza. The introduction is coauthored.
Introduction
According to Marx’s famous saying, “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”1 Displacing this well-known quip, if only a bit, we might ask: Does this also hold for world-historic personages and facts in and of philosophy? Could one read Hegel’s philosophy itself as the first, the tragic event? Such a reading would in some respects not be entirely alien to a certain phase in the reception of Hegel’s thought in general. Many of his readers have asserted that he can and must be considered an essentially tragic thinker – one may here just in passing refer to the famous “tragedy in ethical life” which is often taken to provide a paradigmatic articulation not only of the constitution of the Greek, but also of modern political life and ethical communities, despite this view being repeatedly contested. However, if – for the sake of following this hypothesis – Hegel represents the tragic event, not only of ethical life, but also of modern philosophy in general, where and how do we locate its repetition in the form of the farce? Where are we to find Hegel’s inverted twin?
There is certainly a farcical dimension to the immediate aftermath of Hegel’s thought. This is already the case, because (some of) his pupils prepared and published an edition of his works that became highly influential to most of his subsequent readers, and which consequently led, to some degree, to profound confusion about the true kernel and thrust of Hegel’s philosophical system, and – by adding comments and annotations that were taken to be his very own wording – generated a peculiar struggle about Hegel’s ultimate achievements (and failures). Surprisingly material from this edition was nonetheless able to become, for long, the main reference for reading Hegel – a sort of manifestation of the Deckerinnerung, the screen memory that overshadows what one perceives to be Hegel’s ultimate philosophical system.2 However, the immediate Hegelian aftermath also already inaugurated, among other things, the infamous split between the young and the old Hegelians, which seemed to practically and farcically enact Hegel’s own claim that any immediate unity (and thus also that of the Hegelianism and of Hegel himself) will need to undergo processes of alienation and division to, at least possibly, reinstate the original unity in a reflected form. Does Hegel’s ultimate tragedy, in both senses of the term, lie in the fact that immediately after his death his philosophy was not only dissected and rebutted, but there was also a farcical element in the defense of a Hegel that was articulated in words he never wrote against critics who got it all wrong? So, did the farce not simply prove the tragedy to be a real tragedy? One could also, in both enlarging the historical focus and in locating the ultimate embodiment of the repetition of Hegel’s tragedy as farce, identify the tragedy of Hegel’s oeuvre with the fact that the arguably most influential and important pupil of the thinker who was by many perceived to have been a Prussian state philosopher (Hegel), has been one of the most influential and famous contenders of revolution and of overthrowing the state, namely Marx. May then not Marx’s ultimate Hegelian heritage – again confirming the tragedy–farce sequence – be identified in the fact that he himself not only witnessed as many rebuttals as Hegel, but was actually often claimed to have been the one who put (revolutionary) dialectic into practice, and thereby refuted it even more harshly, due to the brutal and bloody outcomes of his thought when concretely realized?
The move from tragedy to farce then happens first as tragedy, then as farce that becomes again, a tragedy of its own, and then repeats as a (bloody) farce … Whatever historical frame one likes to posit, today neither Marx nor Hegel are, and maybe surprisingly, thinkers who are generally and overall considered to be indefensible any more. Both have become widely accepted (rather than merely tolerated) within the universities and even within the wider outskirts of academia. There are journals dedicated to both, conferences held around the world on a regular basis that deepen and perpetuate the already existing immense scholarship. Numerous books are regularly published on their work and editions of their writings that demonstrate high philological quality have been prepared during recent years. They have almost created their own branches of the academic industry and have certainly become proper objects of academic study. At first sight, it might seem surprising that this holds for both Hegel and Marx. It might seem – given the political history linked to their names – especially astounding that this also happened to Marx. And one might be tempted to assume that he was after all too farcical (in all the brutal aspects of the farce) to be integrated into and assimilated within academic discourse, even if simply because it is mainly the discourse of state institutions (one of the reasons why Lacan called it “discourse of the university”). Was Marx not the anti-statist thinker par excellence and Hegel the ultimate thinker of the (Prussian) state?
One ought not to forget and thus must acknowledge that already in the last century there have been more institutions devoted to the study of Marx (and Engels) and of historical and dialectical materialism than there have ever been for (the arch idealist) Hegel. Surprising as it may be, it has proven for very different reasons more difficult to assimilate and integrate Hegel into academia, and this is the case, even though he was deemed to have been a state philosopher in all senses of the term (and Marx did not manage to find a proper job in any institution) and not at all the paradigmatic thinker of revolution. There seemed (and maybe still seems) to be something in Hegel’s thought that was nonetheless a too bitter pill, too hard, too big to swallow, too much to assimilate for, at least, academia. Maybe it is just too difficult to swallow a system that swallows everything – as he was often criticized for having. A symptom of this may be, as everyone knows, that Hegel was for a long time – and especially in the last century – considered to be the incarnation of the worst kind of philosophy possible. This was, at least partially, because he was one of the very few thinkers who one could find within the history of philosophy who did not announce and inaugurate a renewal of philosophical thought. He was radical in claiming that he brought to the end what had begun long before him. Hegel was thus considered the worst, since he was considered a thinker not allowing for, not conceiving of novelty or transformation. This was paradoxically but symptomatically identified to manifest in him declaring the end of philosophy (in his own philosophy); but he also declared the end of art, politics, religion, history, and thus all human practices. All this was read as if the end would not change anything. Hegel was the worst philosophy could get, because he ended (and as he phrased it himself: completed) it. He sublated, however precisely this term is to be understood, everything into a final form of knowledge that – worse comes to worst – he seems to have called Absolute Knowing.
Thereby he was for a long time taken to be the thinker who forestalled any kind of future, in and of philosophy or in and of history, because he systematically suspended historicity proper. This is a criticism that was famously articulated repeatedly by many, mostly by Marxist critics of Hegel. Hegel was considered, after Plato maybe (and a slightly naive Frenchman who inaugurated modern philosophy), philosophy’s ultimate bête noir. He was the one who just seemed to have overdone it: at once the tragedy and the farce of philosophy, one permanently flipping over into the other, like a circle of circles. That Hegel pathologically, and to a certain degree comically, exaggerated the very business of philosophy was already diagnosed by a famous pupil of Sigmund Freud, namely Carl Gustav Jung, who stated that Hegel’s language is so megalomaniac that it is reminiscent of the language of schizophrenics. If one takes Jung’s diagnosis more seriously than one should – since it seems apparent that Jung did not know anything about and of Hegel – this rather uninformed diagnosis might provide a starting point for understanding why today there is a peculiar, maybe even schizophrenic kind of resuscitation of Hegel’s thought. Hegel is today no longer represented as philosophy’s ultimate lowland but as its pragmatist summit, he is no longer taken to be the thinker who pushed rationalism and systematicity so far that it went over its rationalist edge, he is rather taken to be the first to establish a proper and moderate account of the rational components of collective human practice, with all its rational weaknesses and strengths; he is no longer the philosopher of the end of all practices and of ultimate sublation, but rather a philosopher of intersubjectively mediated normativity that as such has – at least for human beings – neither end nor beginning, because it is the ultimate form of human practice. Yet, have these shifts of emphasis just been missed beforehand or do they come at a price? How does one also integrate and not simply discard everything that in Hegel’s oeuvre seems to disturb and spoil this rather peaceful and tamed picture of his philosophy?
Can this become the goal of a contemporary rendering of Hegel? Today, many aspects of his thought, be it surprising passages in the philosophy of right or the theory of madness in his philosophy of subjective spirit, or most directly from his concept of Absolute Knowing that is still often – even though no longer always – identified as the highpoint of his metaphysical regression, are still difficult to tackle for Hegel’s readers. To avoid those difficulties, the name “Hegel” seems to have become precisely the kind of toolbox that, as Michel Foucault once stated, one should take all kinds of theory to be and out of which one takes what one needs and what appears to be useful here and now. Is contemporary Hegelianism methodologically Foucauldian? Might this even be ultimately a good thing, or maybe the best one can do with Hegel today? This raises at least a number of questions: Firstly, what does it mean that one is witnessing today not only a Hegel revival but one that risks getting rid of all the elements that were considered crucial elements of the “substance” of Hegelian thought that made it once appear too dangerous, crazy, or just tragically metaphysical? And what is a Hegel without its “metaphysical,” “megalomaniac” kernel, wherever precisely we may locate it? Is this akin to the infamous beer without alcohol?
But the main question is the following one: what would Hegel – and not the name, “Hegel” – have said vis-à-vis this new wave of reception of his thought? What are we in the eyes of Hegel (and not the other way around)? Hegel always insisted that philosophy only must think what is (and not what should be). But what is, is (what constitutes) one’s “time.” And this is why philosophy has the difficult task of grasping its own time in thought (according to Hegel’s most famous definition of philosophy). But what does one do with a philosophy that asserts that the task of philosophy is to think its own time, after it exhausted and exceeded this very time? How does one think the present time with Hegel (a time after Hegel’s time that has also become the present of new Hegelianism)? Resulting from this, the thrust of the book you’re about to read can be best formulated in the following question: What does it mean to conceive of our time, “the today,” as a Hegelian? In the preface of his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes:
… it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of transition to a new era. Spirit has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation. Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the gradualness of merely quantitative growth – there is a qualitative leap, and the child is born – so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world.3
Hegel’s sunburst was the French Revolution, whose ardent supporter he was. In our predicament, we are still unable to fully grasp and comprehend the world in which we are, because inter alia we still were unable to solve the problems brought about by the French Revolution (how to properly bring together freedom and equality, for instance). We throw catchwords around, veiled as concepts, through which we try to understand the epoch into which we are entering globally. This grandiose rhetoric only comes to hide the lack of conceptual and philosophical (or theoretical) apparatus, capable of truly understanding our own era. Its dawn appears to be, doubtlessly, a violent one, which thereby produces unsettling effects to established theories and destroys the already existing structures. It is our view that the present epoch can be best and fully grasped through the Hegelian system: “the whole mass of ideas and concepts” that are being proposed either as an anti-thesis of Hegel, or as a “subtle” replacement, are collapsing in front of the reality they try to understand and explain. In 1922 Lenin proposed the creation of a Society of the Materialist Friends of Hegelian Dialectics. The present book attempts in a different form to repeat this proposal. It is not only conceived as (yet another) exercise in affirming the unique dimension of Hegel’s philosophical system. We are also trying to emphasize in the following the necessity of drawing lines of demarcation within this very society, creating instructive liaisons and debating (between friends) what paths remain still open to explore and which might be the ones that are leading us astray. Our hope that the practice of such a Hegel-friendly society would not only prove to be farcical or tragic, but may bring to light a properly comic dimension of Hegel – a dimension that has been often neglected or at least downplayed in Hegelian scholarship but has been brought to the fore by some in recent years.4 The present book therefore presents three contributions from imagined members of this still fictitious society, three contributions within which becomes manifest the results of a continuous collective labor and discussions between three friends, who also happen to be friends of Hegelian dialectics.
Reading Hegel has been completed about three years after Reading Marx – the first book on which the three of us worked together. This move (from Marx to Hegel) is not accidental. It is our firm conviction that our contemporary predicament calls for a return from Marx to Hegel (that we also noted in our previous book). This return does not consist only of the “materialist reversal” of Marx (a thesis elaborated and developed in length by Žižek), but its implications and consequences are much deeper (for example the development and affirmation of an idealism of another kind, an idealism without idealism). So, why return (from Marx) to Hegel?
Hegel was born about a quarter of a millennium ago. Then, as the famous Heideggerian adage goes, he thought and then he finally died. One hundred and twenty-five years after his death, Theodor W. Adorno remarked that historical anniversaries of births or deaths create a peculiar temptation for those who had “the dubious good fortune”5 to have been born and thus to live later. It is tempting to believe that they thereby are in the role of the sovereign judges of the past, capable of evaluating everything that and everyone who came before. But standing on a higher pile of dead predecessors and thinkers does not (automatically) generate the capacity to decide the fate of the past and certainly it is an insufficient ground to judge a past thinker. A historical anniversary seduces us into seeing ourselves as subjects supposed to know – what today still has contemporary significance and what does not. They are therefore occasions on which we can learn something about the spontaneous ideology that is inscribed into our immediate relationship to historical time, and especially to the past. Adorno makes a plea for resisting the gesture of arrogantly discriminating between What is Living and What is Dead – for example – of the Philosophy of Hegel.6 Adorno viciously remarked that “the converse question is not even raised,” namely “what the present means in the face of Hegel.”7 The distinction between what is alive and dead, especially in the realm of thinking, should never be blindly trusted to be administered only by those alive right now. Being alive does not make one automatically into a good judge of what is living and not even of what it is to be alive.
The dialectical intricacy to which Adorno is pointing does have a direct relation to a difficulty that Hegel himself pointed out at the beginning of the Phenomenology of Spirit: any “right now” comes with its inner dialectic that one can reformulate like this: as soon as we try to capture what we mean when we say “now,” now is not “now” any more. What seemed so evident and undoubtedly true and certain at first sight – now – proves to be essentially not what we expected it to be. That one therefore must question the assumption of stable distinctions (for example between life and death, as one assumes conceiving of them in natural and biological terms alone, or between the past as what happened before and the present as what is here right now) in general. This is one way of reformulating one fundamental law of the Hegelian dialectic, namely that “one divides into two,” as it was once rendered much later. Such formal(ized) and therefore abstract renderings of what we refer to as Hegel’s or the Hegelian “dialectic” then certainly and immediately also apply to their own product: “one divides into two” applies to each one produced by the first splitting of the one. The two sides that result from the originary division destabilize repeatedly, and everything that appears solid, from this perspective, melts into air. But this also means that things can revert from one to the other: there can be something undying in the thought of the dead – which can, but mustn’t be good – as well as something deadening in what seems most lively (including life itself or vitalism). As Brecht once remarked vis-à-vis Hegel’s dialectic (as presented in his Science of Logic): two concepts – very much as the two sides mentioned above – are separate, yet welded together: “they fight each other … and enter … into pairs, each is married to its opposite … They can live neither with nor without each other.”8 This is the “dialectic which” each side “possesses within itself” – it is what “moves the subject forward” [der Gang der Sache selbst], “the going or passing of the thing itself.”9
If in dialectical spirit, one inverts the spontaneous(ly tempting) perspective on Hegel and starts looking at our present, including at its past (thus even at Hegel) as well as our present’s (conception of the) future with Hegelian eyes – Hegel thereby becoming “die Sache selbst,” – one necessarily transforms one’s gaze. One looks in a circle (of circles) and might potentially end up forming a Borromean knot, or even a Klein bottle,10 both images that Hegel did not know, but could have liked. The latter always argued that philosophy deals not with “what is dead, buried and corrupt,” but with the “living present.”11 To look at Hegel’s thought with eyes trained to see in this way, means to look at what his philosophy allows us to see in today’s world and proves Hegel’s dialectical contemporaneity. Hegel is with us – as the “absolute is with us … all along”12 – in what his thought allows us to see in and of the present. What can it make us see? This is what we seek to find out in the following by reading Hegel. By reading Hegel as a reader of our contemporary situation; by reading Hegel as a reader of the readers of Hegel; and by reading Hegel as a thinker whose thought is equipped to intervene into the most burning questions not only of contemporary philosophy, but of contemporary socio-collective practice. Hegel assigned to art, for example, the capacity to make visible such invisible structures. In 1826 he remarks that the “semblance [Schein] of art is a much higher and truer form of the real than that which we are used to call reality.” This means that art allows us to see what makes reality tick, the dividing dialectical motors that determine it, “the powers at work in it.”13 Philosophy, for Hegel, has the same content as art has, but it presents it in a different form. It is this presentation that we will explore in the following.
This will happen in three instalments: Slavoj Žižek will defend the thesis that Hegel is the philosopher most open to the future precisely because he explicitly prohibits any project of how our future should look. This becomes manifest in the Preface to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, with the Owl of Minerva, which takes off at dusk. Philosophy can only paint “gray on gray,” i.e., it only translates into a “gray” (lifeless) conceptual scheme, a form of life that has already reached its peak and entered its decline (is becoming “gray” itself). From this we can infer that we should reject all those readings of Hegel that see in his thought an implicit model of a future society reconciled with itself, leaving behind the alienations of modernity – Žižek calls them the “not-yet-Hegelians.” In this regard, the first chapter engages systematically with Robert Brandom’s masterpiece The Spirit of Trust, i.e. the position one of the most prominent “not-yet-there Hegelians.” And it demonstrates in what way Hegel has already moved beyond any such form of transcendental pragmatism.
Frank Ruda’s contribution examines the Hegelian concept of nature against the background of two features specific to the present philosophical conjuncture:
The widespread contemporary tendency to present naturalizing readings of Hegel and
The equally widespread return of philosophies of nature to the contemporary philosophical scene. The chapter shows by drawing on a variety of different (anecdotal, systematic, didactical, and biographical) material why it is precisely Hegel’s concept of nature that forces us to avoid all types of naturalization.
Agon Hamza in the third and the final chapter takes up the problem of Hegel’s materialism. It begins with the claim that it is not Hegel who requires a materialist reversal but Marx. It develops a Hegelian critique of Marx. It formulates a discussion of the (ir)religious criticism in Marx and Hegel’s readings of Christianity. The problem of the state remains one of the most important topics in the contemporary debates of the Left. Clearly, Marx and Marxism in general failed to outline a theory of the state different from that of capitalist form. The contemporary Left, predominantly, wants to do away with the state tout court, but without having a general idea of how to organize the society in its basic levels, even when faced with the serious challenges that call for universal cooperation. Therefore, the return to Hegel’s theory of the state offers us the possibility of conceptualizing a vision of a “non-statal state” as a political possibility.
What is a Hegelian account of a present that has ultimately become (somewhat) Hegelian (in philosophy)? We are well aware that this book does not exhaust or fulfill its self-set task, yet we assume that the three chapters can nonetheless stand – in very Hegelian fashion, almost as a concrete universality – to produce an insight into Hegel’s universality and contemporaneity, so that it becomes visible that Hegel has been with us all along. If this attempt generates further critical and harsh discussions among the friends of Hegel, this work will have served this end even more successfully. The aim of the present book is neither simply to assert the relevance of Hegel’s thought, nor only to explore the ways in which one can and maybe should be a Hegelian today, but also to depict why it is precisely Hegel who provides a major point of orientation and conceptual tools for understanding the present world as it is.
You will find in the following three attempts to avoid the arrogant position that we deem Adorno rightly criticized. But what does this mean? For us, it means you will get three attempts to treat Hegel as our contemporary, and with whom we attempt to look at the present, since we believe that his theoretical eyes can help us see what otherwise remains invisible, in the present as well as to the naked eye. Be prepared, you will get three attempts to look with Hegelian eyes through Hegelian glasses.
Berlin/Ljubljana/Prishtina, April 2021
Notes
1.
Karl Marx,
18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
:
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm
.
2.
This is what Žižek has repeatedly argued to be true for the immediate Hegelian aftermath from Kierkegaard through Schopenhauer, Marx, and even Schelling.
3.
G.W.F. Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 6–7.
4.
Cf. Alenka Zupančic,
The Odd One In: On Comedy
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), or Mladen Dolar, “The Comic Mimesis,”
Critical Inquiry
43 (Winter 2017): 570–589.
5.
Theodor W. Adorno,
Hegel: Three Studies
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. xxi.
6.
Benedetto Croce,
What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel?
(London: Kessinger Publishing, 2008).
7.
Theodor W. Adorno,
Hegel: Three Studies
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993) p. xxi.
8.
Cf. Bertolt Brecht, “On Hegelian Dialectic,” Autodidact Project:
http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/hegel-brecht.html
.
9.
G.W.F Hegel,
Science of Logic
(New York: Humanity Books, 1969), p. 54
10.
On this, cf. for example: Slavoj Žižek,
Sex and the Failed
Absolute
(London: Bloomsbury, 2020).
11.
G.W.F. Hegel,
Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Greek
Philosophy to Plato
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska University Press), p. 38.
12.
Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 47.
13.
G.W.F. Hegel,
Philosophie der Kunst. Vorlesung von 1826
(Frankfurt am Main, 2005), p. 64.
